Timing-Based Attacks for HATS
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2026-01-30
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Corporate Contributors:Center for Automated Vehicles Research with Multimodal Assured Navigation (CARMEN+) Tier-1 University Transportation Center (UTC) ; United States. Department of Transportation. University Transportation Centers (UTC) Program ; United States. Department of Transportation. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology
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Edition:Final Report: (Aug ‘24 to Dec ‘25)
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Abstract:We have addressed attacks on information freshness using a model with application to cooperative autonomous routing networks. In this model, each user monitors the status of each other user in the network, where the statuses are communicated using beacon transmissions over a shared channel. We consider an adversarial attack where a portion of the beacon transmissions are delayed, causing each user to act on outdated information. As a method of mitigation of the adversarial delays, we allow the users to reset beacon transmissions. The users select the rate at which beacon transmissions are started from when the channel becomes idle and how long the users wait before resetting a transmission with the objective of having the most up to date information at the monitors. The adversary selects the average increase by which transmission durations are extended with the objective of having the status information at the users be as outdated as possible.
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Main Document Checksum:urn:sha-512:c69dbb22447cbaf6ee1b0c8c823ef13bb6f185db847249181d2eca692afdcf7309b47552a10df7e39c5bc147700cb05c7b2af99900680b403342ce4870ce3593
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