Dynamic Incentive Design for Transportation Systems with Unknown Value of Time
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2024-05-02
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By Savla, Ketan
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Edition:Final report (08/16/2022-12/31/2023)
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Abstract:Congestion pricing is a common technique to steer the user choices towards a socially optimal profile. Determination of pricing requires knowledge of travelers' values of time (VOT). Currently, most methods for estimating VOT analyze certain groups of people, using data collected from surveys. We consider the problem of adaptive congestion pricing to learn unknown value of time and unknown coefficients of link latency functions, which are collectively referred to as the parameters of routing game. The input for each trial is pricing for each link and the output is the corresponding Nash flow. The input for a trial is allowed to depend on input-output from all previous trials. For polynomial link latency functions, we provide a necessary condition for unique identification of the parameters and provide an adaptive pricing policy which uniquely identifies the parameters in finite trials. This naturally translates into finite trial guarantee for adaptive pricing to minimize social cost. We implemented our adaptive pricing policy in traffic assignment human subject experiments and find that the estimated value of time is lower than the one estimated by a known adaptive stated preference method, but the corresponding marginal pricing is quite effective in inducing social equilibrium link flows.
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Main Document Checksum:urn:sha-512:f3661b71cce4dab3977be1054650a3df9b8bed5715add7f337b1873425c97aa63df70eaf104d6773d159ccd25e30a74fbe7ca56c72534a44866618a7f6c3ab31
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