United States Department of Transportation
i
Asymmetric Information Sharing in Dialysis Paratransit using an Agency Approach
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2018-12-01
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Edition:Final Report: Jan 2018 – Dec 2018
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Abstract:Dialysis patient transit services presents an agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989) where the county paratransit operator is the agent that provides the principal, the dialysis center, transport of dialysis patients to their centers under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information. The agent (paratransit) collects riders in need of paratransit services for doctor appointments (Social Service and Elder Services), dialysis appointments (principal), and other transit needs under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information where the pickups are scheduled with a limited number of vehicles. Asymmetric scheduling information between the dialysis centers (principal) in a county, the para-transit authority (agent), and the patient’s knowledge of his/her schedule was the focus of this research where it was discovered that Social Service is another principal in this agency problem. The communication flows between the agencies and the principals was examined in 13 rural North Carolina counties with high demand for paratransit services. Service quality factors that impact the information asymmetry were analyzed with Bayesian analysis. Results of this research showed the impact service factors on information asymmetry and suggests the need for call center technologies and improved paratransit scheduling. A unique contribution to transportation research was the use of probabilistic Bayesian factors in the principal/ agency model that will provide the basis for paratransit route scheduling in the next phase of this research.
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