Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dynamic Traffic Equilibria

Details

• Creators:
  Boyles, Stephen D. ; Melson, Christopher ; Rambha, Tarun ; Duthie, Jennifer C.
• Corporate Creators:
  University of Texas at Austin. Center for Transportation Research
• Corporate Contributors:
  Southwest Region University Transportation Center (U.S.) ; United States. Department of Transportation. Research and Innovative Technology Administration
• Subject/TRT Terms:
  • Traffic equilibrium
  • Dynamic traffic assignment
  • Simulation
  • Traffic flow
  • Game theory Research Hub
  • Highways
  • Operations and Traffic Management
  • I72: Traffic and Transport Planning
• Publication/ Report Number:
  SWUTC/14/600451-00079-1;600451-00079
• Resource Type:
  Tech Report
• Geographical Coverage:
  Texas;United States
• Edition:
  Final Report
• Corporate Publisher:
  Texas A&M Transportation Institute
• Abstract:
  Dynamic traffic assignment has grown steadily in popularity and use since its inception. It has become an important and permanent tool in transportation agencies across the country. However, the exact nature of dynamic traffic equilibrium, including existence and uniqueness results, is not fully known in simulation-based models. Specifically, we discuss the possibilities of unrealistic multiple equilibria that arise out of simplified flow models. We demonstrate this with a simple diverge-merge network and discuss piecewise-linear fundamental diagrams as one possible resolution.
• Format:
  PDF
• Funding:
  DTRT12-G-UTC06
• Download URL:
  https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/28222/dot_28222_DS1.pdf
• File Type:
  [PDF - 739.05 KB]
• Collection(s):
  University Transportation Centers ; US Transportation Collection
• Main Document Checksum:
  urn:sha-512:ca769785dd79bfdd54be1831f1b9f8bcc285063b1a4d5e57a3d337cabc29991c9f2230f4fc07ee8422853bf03a3afaad9cf4754de308882d490c283c8a49d507