Aviation security : vulnerabilities in, and alternatives for, preboard screening security operations
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Aviation security : vulnerabilities in, and alternatives for, preboard screening security operations

Filetype[PDF-106.62 KB]


English

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  • TRIS Online Accession Number:
    818207
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  • NTL Classification:
    NTL-AVIATION-Aviation Safety/Airworthiness
  • Abstract:
    This is the statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Oversight of Governmental Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate regarding aviation security. The testimony discusses safeguards to protect passengers and prevent unauthorized access to or attacks on aircraft. The testimony includes assessments of security concerns with (1) airport access controls, (2) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and (3) alternatives to current screening practices, including practices in selected other countries. Briefly, controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. General Accounting Office (GAO) special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. These agents could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. Testing of screeners shows that significant, long-standing weaknesses (measured by screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage) continue to exist. A principal cause of screener performance problems is the rapid turnover among screeners, due to low wages, limited benefits, and the monotonous nature of their work. Weaknesses in the current system in which airlines are responsible for screening passengers and controlling access to secure areas have raised questions about whether alternative approaches should be considered. Four alternative approaches include 1) continue with air carriers but with new requirements, 2) assign responsibility to airports, 3) shift responsibility to the federal government through creation of a new federal agency, or 4) shift responsibility to the federal government through creation of a federal corporation.
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