fan WORLD

February 1980



They Had Another Dream

FAA WORLD

FEBRUARY 1980
Volume 10 Number 2

They Had Another Dream

Blacks Took to the Air Early

By Marjorie Kriz

Aviation, like many another field, has buffeted the ambitions of blacks and women (see FAA WORLD, January 1980). Though progress has been slow, it hasn't been for want of the pioneering

In 1933, John C. Robinson was operating Robbin's Airport south of Chicago, which was an all-black facility and headquarters of the Challenger Aero Club. Two years later he did the first of two stints in Ethiopia's air force and was shot down twice in combat with the Italians.

spirit that has led all kinds of Americans to dare the air with sticks and baling wire.

The beginnings of aviation in general are shrouded in poor documentation—more so, blacks' involvement, for in the early days, there were many fliers who built their own planes and were taught to fly by themselves or others. There was no certification and no licenses. There may have been any number of blacks among them. And discrimination against blacks was rife.

We don't know when Eugene Jacque Bullard of Columbus, Ga., learned to fly. We do know he flew in combat with the Lafayette Escadrille in World War I, earning numerous medals and the nickname, "The Black Swallow of Death."

Typical of the confusion was a Department of Commerce Air Service News Letter in 1921 that stated that Bessie Coleman of Chicago had returned from France where she learned to fly and was "said to be the first of her race" to fly. This was amended in 1923 when the publication said she was "probably the only colored *woman* in the world who can pilot an airplane."

"Brave Bessie," as she was known to audiences at her barnstorming thrill shows, was the first black to be licensed by the Federation Aeronautique Internationale, which still is the world's record-keeper for aviation prowess and aircraft performances.

In 1932, U.S. Representative Oscar DePriest of Chicago, the first black to serve in Congress since Reconstruction days, assembled a list of blacks who held aviation licenses. C. Alfred Anderson, known to black aviators everywhere today as "Chief," was the only one listed as holding a transport license. John W. Greene was the sole holder of a limited commercial license, again according to DePriest.

Greene and Cornelius Coffey, of Chicago, then were the only black licensed mechanics, while the private-license list named Hubert F. Julian, who called himself the "Black Eagle," John C. Robinson of Chicago, dubbed the "Brown Condor," and Dr. Albert E. Forsythe. Also holding private licenses at the time were James Herman Banning of Los Angeles, the first black to obtain a license from the Department of Commerce, while Janet Waterford of Chicago had an industrial license, again according to DePriest.

Robinson and Julian both served in Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie's air force, with Robinson replacing Julian as the emperor's number one pilot during World War II. Robinson later became an aviation instructor at Curtiss Aeronautical University. Earlier in his career, in the late 1920s, he teamed up with Coffey as a barnstormer and operated the "Col. Johnny Robinson Airlines."

By the late 1930s, a group of blacks in aviation, under the sponsorship of Robert S. Abbott, publisher of the *Chicago Defender* newspaper, toured black colleges and universities to encourage interest in aviation and to urge Congress to include blacks in federally sponsored aviation-training programs. At the suggestion of Enoch P. Waters, Jr., editor of the *Defender*, two pilots, Dale L. White and Chauncey E.

Generally conceded to be the first black woman pilot, Bessie Coleman barnstormed around the country in a pseudo-military uniform until she died in a crash in Florida in 1926.

After serving in the French Foreign Legion in World War I, American Eugene Bullard became a fighter pilot in the Lafayette Escadrille.

Willa Brown was the first black officer in the Civil Air Patrol, before which she was co-operator of the Coffey School of Aeronautics in Chicago and after which she became a member of FAA's Women's Advisory Board.

John C. Robinson, a 1924 graduate of Tuskegee Institute, flew to his tenth reunion in a Buehl Bull Pup, where he was greeted by Capt. A. J. Neeley, dean of men. Robinson operated Robbin's Airport, Chicago, and an airline, was an air force instructor and later became chief pilot for Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selasie's air force toward the end of World War II.

Preceding Robinson as chief pilot in the Ethiopian air force was another Chicagoan, Hubert Fauntleroy Julian (right). Julian was natty in his uniform, but his troops were barefoot.

Cornelius Coffey (right), one of the first blacks to hold both pilot and mechanic licenses from the Department of Commerce, receives his designated mechanic examiner's certificate from CAA/FAA inspector William T. Goulding (left). Others (from left) are aviation teacher John Dorgan, Chicago Vocational High School; and Arthur LaPointe, Chicago superintendent of vocational education.

Among prominent black pilots in the Chicago area were (left to right) William Paris, Cornelius Coffey and Earl Franklin, all of whom flew out of Harlem Airport in the 1930s. Coffey operated an aviation school at the airport and later was an instructor in the Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP).

Spencer, flew to Washington to meet with members of Congress who would be instrumental in including blacks in the Civilian Pilot Training Program. On May 9, 1939, Spencer and White took off from Harlem Airport in a rented Lincoln-Page biplane.

While their flight was not without difficulties en route, including a broken crankshaft which grounded them for two days, an accidental meeting with Sen. Harry S. Truman in Washington led to success. At a later meeting, Truman, apparently unaware that blacks were not included in the proposed training program or in the military air services, reportedly said, " . . . if you had guts enough to fly this thing to Washington . . . I've got guts enough to see that you get what you are asking for."

Once the Civilian Pilot Training Program became a reality, there were schools such as Tuskegee Institute, with "Chief" Anderson as head instructor, Hampton Institute and Howard University where blacks could learn to fly. The Coffey school, though not offering degree college programs, was part of the Civilian Pilot Training Program with a full range of courses. It also was the hub of black Civil Air Patrol activity when this program was organized in 1941. Willa Brown was the first black officer in the CAP.

The fact that so few blacks were licensed as pilots and mechanics in the early 1930s does not mean that these were the only ones flying. While the Department of Commerce required licensing, and only for interstate commerce, comparatively small staffs kept the department from reaching everyone. Even the great Emil M. "Matty" Laird, famed pilot and aircraft design/builder who learned to fly at Chicago's Cicero Field in 1913, did not obtain a pilot's license until after 1930, and then only because he was so well known that Commerce put its foot down and made him take the test.

Two transcontinental flights in the early 1930s showed that black pilots could accomplish as much as their white brethren. In 1932, James Banning and his passenger, Thomas Allen, who called themselves the "Flying Hoboes," spanned the country in 41 hours flying time. In 1933, "Chief" Anderson and Dr. Forsythe flew from Atlantic City to Los Angeles and back in Dr. Forsythe's Fairchild 24, "The Pride of Atlantic City."

By 1941, license records showed 102 blacks with private licenses, compared with only 11 in 1932. "Chief" Anderson by then had a commercial license, along with Coffey and Greene, and Earl Renfro, Willa Brown and Grover Nash, all of Chicago, Charles Ashe of Philadelphia

This group photo of Chicago black pilots was taken in 1935 prior to a memorial flight over the grave of Bessie Coleman, who had crashed nine years earlier. Among them are Willa Brown and Janet Waterford (second and third from left, second row), Cornelius Coffey (left, third row) and lobbyist-flier Dale White (right, third row), who helped include blacks in the Civilian Pilot Training Program.

and Robert Terry of Basking Ridge, N.J. Coffey and Renfro also had qualified as flight instructors, giving lessons at Harlem Airport, Chicago, where Coffey and Brown operated the Coffey School of Aeronautics. The school graduated a number of white students as well as numerous blacks.

Black pilots who saw action excelled during World War II combat, though they were assigned to segregated units. It was Truman, as President, who ordered integration of the armed forces in 1948 and ended segregation.

After the war, black pilots continued to fly and black instructors taught more. By the second half of the century, they were in every form of aviation: civilian, military, the government, the airlines. Willa Brown became a member of FAA's Women's Advisory Board. The Air Force had a number of high-ranking black officers.

Because of the prominence of so many Chicago blacks in early aviation, the Great Lakes Region's public affairs office became interested in their successes and developed a photo display of black pilots, their aircraft and the airports where they operated most frequently. The display was exhibited in the fall of 1979 at the National Air and Space Museum as part of the Negro Airmen International ceremony honoring pioneer black aviators.

The exhibit has been duplicated and currently is on tour. This month, Black History Month, it is to be displayed at the Chicago Public Library's Woodson Regional Library, repository for black history material, and at one of the city's largest black banks, as it was found that Chicago blacks also were mostly unaware of their pioneer aviation heritage and were interested in learning about it.

Many of the photographs and much of the biographical material was obtained through Rufus Hunt, general maintenance mechanic at the Chicago Center, who has had a long-time interest in black aviation history.

It's been a long road, and there's still a way to go, but the doors have been opening throughout the aviation industry.

Representative of the inroads being made in the higher echelons of aviation today are these United Airlines pilots and executives.

WORD SEARCH

By Barbara Hinton
EEO Specialist, Washington, D.C.

This month's puzzle is in commemoration of Black History Month, during which we remember the role of Black Americans in American history and the development of the nation.

The last names and organization abreviations read forward, backward, up, down and diagonally, are always in a straight line and never skip letters. The words may overlap, and letters may be used more than once.

Use the word list if you must, but try covering it first. All 62 can be found. Circle those you do find and cross them off the list. The name Jill "Brown" has been circled to get you started. When you give up, the answers may be found on page 17.

C J S E K C U T R E H C T A H F D P Q N R M N
Z H M R N O D S E N O L A M B I A S P O W A A
Q O I J E U E B V R S C L C G K V K C T D R D
S Z T S B Y H K A E H S A G I H I O A G E S R
R L H O H A N B E R G D S R B G S O A N Z H O
E C I X L O N O L G A A P E S A E R N I B A J
V S M E P U L N C N L K P G O R M B D H E L X
E L Y G D C O M E I S Z A O N P A U E S T L O
S E K O T S A D J K E C I R P E J F R A H P S
K H A L E B C A O B E R R Y K B T O S W U Q M
O T E B M A W O N U B R O W N O Y R O B N R A
O U O G S L H J T A G T I F H R U D N O E E I
Y R A H Y D I X S T Y L S G P T B F S U J K L
P T B O O W T I Y R K K A D Y N L K Z L M R L
E D U L C I E S R I R P N S E U C E J W N U I
A N N Z C N O A N A W O R Q S A O X M A P B W
G S C F M N B S P Z B N M J J E L H A R R I S
E U H E P U S H Q Y S S E L P R E D L E O J Z
M L E I N A D C M Y E L D A R B S M U L L E D

MUHAMMAD ALI
MARIAN ANDERSON
ARTHUR ASHE
JAMES BALDWIN
BENJAMIN BANNEKER
AMIRI BARAKA
MARION BARRY
COUNT BASIE
MARY McLEOD BETHUNE
JULIAN BOND
DOUGLAS BOULWARE
THOMAS BRADLEY
EDWARD BROOKS
JILL BROWN
GUION BUFORD
RALPH BUNCHE
YVONNE BURKE
SHIRLEY CHISHOLM
ELDRIDGE CLEAVER
NAT KING COLE
JOHN CONYERS
GEORGIA DAVIS
RONALD DELLUMS
CHARLES DIGGS
FREDERICK DOUGLASS
W.E.B. DUBOIS
PAUL L. DUNBAR
LEE ELDER
MEDGAR EVERS
ALTHEA GIBSON
DICK GREGORY
ALEX HALEY
PATRICIA HARRIS
RICHARD HATCHER
BENJAMIN HOOKS
MAYNARD JACKSON
DANIEL (CHAPPIE) JAMES
BARBARA JORDAN
MARTIN L. KING
VIVIAN MALONE
THURGOOD MARSHALL
ELIJAH McCOY
HATTIE McDANIEL
N.A.A.C.P.
LAWANDA PAGE
ROSA PARKS
HOMER PLESSY
RICHARD PRYOR
P.U.S.H.
PAUL ROBESON
CARL ROWAN
S.C.L.C.
DRED SCOTT
BESSIE SMITH
LEWIS STOKES
SOJOURNER TRUTH
CICELY TYSON
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON
BARRY WHITE
RALPH WILKINS
MARY LOU WILLIAMS
ANDREW YOUNG

SMALL WORLD

FULL MOON OVER MIAMI . . . We're not even going to mention the title of the book. I mean the book sounds that bad. Nor are we going to identify the author except to say that his last book was about a drunken airline pilot. But just in case the subject should come up at a cocktail party, you ought to know that there's a new book out this month about an air traffic controller who flips his wig in the Miami tower and . . . well, here's how *Publisher's Weekly* summarizes the plot:

"As a Concorde jet nears Miami International, all is in turmoil on the ground, the chief problem being an air controller run amok. A veteran of 20 years, Harry Boyle has just been fired. He retaliates by attacking the tower and holding his ex-boss Jeff Sutton and the Secretary of Transportation hostage. (Sutton also has a beef against the system, CORAD, which the FAA sees as a computerized miracle.) The next crisis occurs when a small plane impales itself on the nose of the SST. Thus the captives must neutralize Boyle before Sutton, now very much in command, relies on instinctual, seat-of-the-pants methods to save the day."

Anyone out there still believe that truth is stranger than fiction?

GOING IN STYLE . . . *U.S. News & World Report* recently listed the latest status symbols in key cities around the country—telling what's "in" and what's "out"—and we thought we'd repeat a few as a service to FAA employees. After all, this kind of information could play a critical role in deciding whether one should or shouldn't bid on a job in these locations. Here goes: rebuilt pickup trucks are in and big luxury cars are out in Atlanta; snow blowers are in and suntans are out in Chicago; hot tubs are in and motor-home vacations are out in Detroit; California wines are in and imported fizz water is out in Houston; roller skating is in and promiscuity is out in Los Angeles; divorce is in and marriage is out in San Francisco; and chewing tobacco is in and cigars are out in Washington, D.C. The editors of "Small World" assume that their counterparts at *U.S. News* had their tongues in their cheeks when they put this list together. I mean, promiscuity out in Los Angeles!

NO PARKING AT ANY TIME . . . Think you got problems? Well, there's an FAA employee in New York who has been accused of owing the city $102,000 in unpaid parking tickets dating back to 1975. The accused FAAer contends it's all a horrible computer error, and we certainly hope he's right. If not, the city says it will garnishee 10 percent of his wages. Someone has computed that it would take the FAAer 65 years to pay off his debt at that rate.

'The Best Way To Promote Aviation Is To Promote Safety'

By Nick Komons

"Isn't FAA's mission to foster civil aeronautics incompatible with its responsibility to ensure aviation safety?" a young man asked Najeeb E. Halaby at a recent aviation symposium.

The former FAA Administrator replied that the agency may have been wrong to promote the development of a supersonic transport—but he left the larger implications of the question unanswered.

Najeeb E. Halaby

Others are less reluctant.

Many critics of the FAA are quick to contend that the dual responsibility of ensuring safety and fostering aviation has bred an all-too-cozy relationship between the regulator and the regulated. One such critic, Ralph Nader, charges that FAA weighs "human safety against corporate profits" and too often comes down in favor of profits.

Over the years, similar charges have often surfaced in the wake of major air disasters. The present controversy over FAA's dual mandate stems directly from the Chicago crash last May of an American Airlines DC-10 and the subsequent grounding of all DC-10s by FAA.

If an air transport had crashed under similar circumstances 50 years ago, it is doubtful that anyone would have thought to question the efficacy of the agency's mission. Indeed, the framers of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the first Federal statute regulating civil aviation, saw nothing incompatible in a single agency both regulating and fostering the same industry.

"The purpose of this bill is not so much to regulate as to promote [aviation]," declared Hiram Bingham, the Senate sponsor of the Air Commerce Act. The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, a strong supporter of Federal legislation regulating air commerce, agreed with Bingham and went a step further, suggesting that the encouragement of civil aviation *should be* the primary purpose of the act; providing reasonable and needful regulation was only "an incident to that encouragement."

The idea, then, was to foster aviation. This is why the responsibilities under the Air Commerce Act were given to the Secretary of Commerce; he would promote air commerce just as he promoted other economic activities.

In those days, the U.S. Air Mail Service carried out almost all organized civil flying. The major reason commercial aviation had failed to take root was its atrocious safety record, which was due almost entirely to the absence of a central authority regulating its activities.

"Uniform regulation of aeronautics . . . is not only desirable but absolutely indispensable to the effective development of aerial transportation as an instrumentality of interstate commerce," declared William P. MacCracken, Jr., a principal draftsman of the Air Commerce Act.

Hence, though it was the manifest intent of the Air Commerce Act to foster civil aeronautics, the act's framers realized that aviation would never prosper if the Federal Government did not ensure its safety.

With the passage of time, the aviation mandate of the Secretary of Commerce underwent subtle changes. It was all well and good to keep the industry's economic health uppermost in one's mind when aviation was young and struggling and a heavy-handed regulator could deal the industry a fatal blow; it was something else again, after the industry was on a firm economic footing and was transporting hundreds of thousands of paying customers, to talk of providing "a maximum of encouragement with a minimum of regulation." For one thing, the public and the Congress would not have stood for it; for another, it was recognized by all—the air transport industry included—that maintaining a high standard of safety was itself the surest means of promoting the industry's interests.

> "The purpose of [the Air Commerce Act] is not so much to regulate as to promote [aviation]."

Thus, by the time the Air Commerce Act had run its course, in 1938, the Secretary of Commerce was primarily a regulator, not a promoter, of civil aviation. It is testimony to this changing emphasis that a concern for safety was partly responsible for the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and wholly responsible for the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. At the same time,

Alexander P. Butterfield

recognizing the economic benefits of a healthy civil aviation industry, Congress kept the responsibility to foster civil aeronautics in both laws.

Has the responsibility to foster aviation, as critics charge, worked at cross-purposes with the responsibility to ensure air safety?

There is no easy, clear-cut, or definitive answer. Certainly the FAA and its predecessor agencies have been solicitous of the industry's economic welfare; this was their responsibility under the law. And certainly this dual responsibility has made FAA's task more delicate and more difficult.

"This does, in fact, cause dilemmas when a regulatory body such as the FAA has another almost equal responsibility to keep the industry active and alive and well," explained former FAA Administrator Alexander P. Butterfield in

In 1926 when the Air Commerce Act was passed, almost all civil aviation was the province of the Post Office Department.

1974. But government administration is full of dilemmas. The important thing is which choices are made to resolve these dilemmas.

Critics charge that FAA has indeed been making the wrong choices. According to a former Federal aviation-safety expert, the responsibility to foster aviation causes FAA officials to pull in "their fangs a bit. . . ." John J. O'Donnell, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, is more critical. "The FAA . . . conducts its business with manufacturers behind closed doors," he charged in June 1979, "[and] attempts to balance safety against short-term economic factors."

Nor has Congress been silent. "I wonder if the FAA is not exercising more concern . . . for manufacturers than they are for safety," Congressman J. J. Pickle has speculated. Another Congressman, Toby Moffett, has charged FAA with placing "too great an emphasis on the economic health of the airline industry to the detriment of passenger safety." The "real trouble" with FAA, according to Congressman John L. Burton, is the Federal Aviation Act, "which [tells the FAA Administrator] to do two contradictory things: to protect the public safety and promote commerce in aviation." Burton was echoing a 1974 House report, which detected "a tendency within the agency to view [its fostering and safety] responsibilities as if they were competing interests to be balanced off against each other."

For its part, FAA admits to no inherent conflict in its dual mission. "We view the two functions as complementary," declared former FAA Deputy Administrator James E. Dow. "You can't foster or promote, which is to say sell, a product, unless you've got a safe product." The current FAA Administrator, Langhorne Bond, put the matter more succinctly: "The best way to promote aviation is to promote safety."

James E. Dow

Airline operators and aircraft manufacturers would be the first to agree. They promote safety because it is good for business. They may resist a new procedure or a new device until its utility and performance has been demonstrated, but they would be foolish to urge safety compromises on FAA for mere short-term gain. "No matter what people might imagine about an FAA-industry relationship," one airline official said in 1974, "they must realize that we would be insane to compromise safety to save money."

So much for the pros and cons. Now let's take a look at how Federal aviation officials have met their dual responsibilities.

The first Federal aviation official charged with putting the interests of the industry before those of the public was Clarence M. Young, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics from 1929 to 1933. Among Young's responsibilities was "to investigate, record and make public the causes of accidents in civil air navigation . . ." Because the Air Commerce Act didn't bar the use of accident reports in legal proceedings, Young believed that it would hurt the industry if the Department of Commerce reported details of major air-carrier accidents. Instead, he issued periodic accident statistics.

Photo courtesy of Eastern Airlines

An operational limitation rather than grounding was all that was needed to make the Lockheed Electra safe to fly in the 1950s.

This practice went unquestioned until a U.S. Senator became interested in an air-transport accident that had occurred in his home state and asked Young for a full accounting of its causes. Young refused. It took a Senate resolution to pry the report loose from him. This scenario was repeated a few months later following another air crash, leaving the prospect of a tug of war erupting between the Senate and the Department of Commerce every time an air transport met with disaster.

To the charge that he was disregarding the public's right of access to Federal accident reports, Young answered that the "purpose of the Air Commerce Act was to foster aviation, and the sole purpose in investigating accidents is to determine the causes and promote aviation by what we learn." The public release of accident reports, he feared, could lead to suits so damaging that airlines might be put out of business.

Was Young overly solicitous for the welfare of the air carriers? Perhaps. On the other hand, he did have a point. And he did express a willingness to release accident reports as a matter of course once the Congress barred their use in court. Moreover, Young's position in this matter was no fair measure of his firmness in safety matters. For Young was also the first Federal official to ground a fleet of aircraft: The Fokker F-10s.

The grounding destroyed airline confidence in the Fokker aircraft and finally drove it from the skies; it also led to the demise of the Fokker Aircraft Company, then a division of General Motors. Young could be protective of the industry; but when safety was an overriding issue, he could act with firmness, the economic consequences to the industry notwithstanding.

No FAA Administrator had a greater reputation for toughness than Elwood R.



William P. MacCracken, Jr. (left), first Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics, and his deputy, Clarence M. Young, later to hold MacCracken's position.

Quesada. The reputation was well deserved. Taking command of a Federal civil-aviation establishment that many believed was soft and lax, he transformed it into a stern, uncompromising enforcer. No segment of aviation was spared. Quesada cracked his whip so often that FAA was nearly overwhelmed processing disciplinary actions.

Yet even he was not immune from the charge of playing fast and loose with safety in order to further the industry's financial interests. That charge was made in the aftermath of a series of accidents involving the Lockheed Electra, which, it was determined, suffered from serious structural defects. Despite calls to ground the aircraft, Quesada stubbornly maintained that the Electra could be flown safely at reduced speeds until the defect was corrected. Time proved Quesada right.

Quesada was also a vigorous promoter of civil aviation. He was the first Federal official to suggest that the Federal Government launch a civil supersonic transport development program so that the United States could maintain its "supremacy as a producer of . . . civil transport aircraft. . . ." He predicted "hysteria" and other dire consequences if the Soviet Union beat the United States into the air with an SST. And he insisted that FAA, because of its mandate to foster civil aeronautics, run the program. Quesada demonstrated, then, that an FAA Administrator can be both a tough regulator and an aggressive promoter of aviation.

Elwood R. Quesada (right)

America's entry in the supersonic transport race was to have been a Boeing design, here shown in mockup, but escalating costs and growing inflation killed the project.

This is not to suggest that an FAA Administrator can always demand, in the words of the Federal Aviation Act, "the highest possible degree of safety." Of course, he must deal with an overriding safety issue, even if it means grounding the entire U.S. air carrier fleet; but he nevertheless cannot interpret these words literally in every instance. It simply isn't feasible.

"We can't afford to take any action that would cut the pins out from under any segment of aviation," Alexander Butterfield said in 1974. "If we shoot from the hip, if we go out with a rule, precipitously, . . . without looking very closely at the implications, the ramifications from every angle, then we're remiss," he said on another occasion. "I think we have an obligation to [weigh the implications of a rule], because once that rule is imposed, it's going to affect an awful lot of people."

John L. McLucas

Eugene L. Vidal

"You've got to reach some kind of balance between perfect safety and economic viability."

What Butterfield was driving at was that the aviation industry, like other industries, is and should be self-supporting. It would be self-defeating if FAA drove the industry out of business or greatly compromised its ability to make money. "You've got to reach some kind of balance between perfect safety and economic viability," former FAA Administrator John L. McLucas said. "People that I've talked to about this don't like to hear me say it. It's much easier to say to consumer groups that perfect safety is the objective. Well, I don't think it is. It has to be economically viable, too."

Economic considerations, then, as well as differences in aircraft performance, size and operational use, play a part in determining standards. In consequence, one standard of safety cannot be set for all flying activities. "Well, the standard of safety . . . applied in air-carrier [operations] is very, very high," Langhorne Bond said in a recent interview. "The standard of safety that we apply for general aviation is less high. . . ."

FAA prescribes the highest standards for certificated route air carriers, not only because the vast majority of revenue passengers are carried in scheduled domestic and foreign air service but also because these lines can afford the highest standards and still maintain a profitable operation.

This was not always the case. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Ford Trimotors and the Fokker F-10s were the workhorses on scheduled routes, it was simply not realistic to prescribe the highest attainable operating standards. The Department of Commerce had determined that these trimotors required two transport-rated pilots for optimum safety. The trouble was that these transports, which could accommodate no more than 10 to 12 passengers, had a ridiculously high ratio of crewmembers to passengers.

"Now then," pointed out an airline

Promotional Programs a Mixed Bag

As promoters of civil aeronautics, FAA and its predecessor agencies have run many successful small or low-budget programs. Such undertakings as civilian pilot training (a New Deal program), technical assistance, accident prevention and securing worldwide acceptance of U.S. aeronautical products and standards have, almost without exception, borne fruit.

Except for Federal aid to airports, though, larger and more ambitious programs have failed, particularly when they tampered with the marketplace.

In the middle of the Great Depression, Eugene L. Vidal, the Director of Air Commerce, anxious to pull the sagging U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry out of its economic doldrums, got the idea of promoting the development of an inexpensive general-aviation airplane. The Department of Commerce would subsidize the manufacturers' tooling-up costs, so that the plane could be sold for $700. Aircraft manufacturers, caught with a large inventory of higher-priced aircraft, were not exactly enamored of the idea. Potential aircraft buyers, they protested, would put off purchases in anticipation of Vidal's flying flivver. After months of debate, Vidal gave up the project, earning in the process the enmity of the very people he had wanted to help.

The development of a civil supersonic transport easily qualifies as the most ambitious promotional program ever undertaken by FAA or any of its predecessors. It also qualifies as the most costly financial disaster in FAA's history. The program, begun with much fanfare in 1963, was killed by Congress eight years later after a Federal investment of $860 million. Subsequent termination costs pushed up the taxpayers' losses to over a billion dollars.

FAA—and, indeed, the Federal establishment—found compelling reasons for undertaking the development of an SST. In an age that had a near-absolute faith in the efficacy of technology, traveling at supersonic speeds was seen as the wave of the future in air-passenger transportation. Hence, if the United States hoped to remain the leader in the manufacture of commercial aircraft, developing an SST appeared to be a necessity. But because the venture entailed a lengthy development phase, an enormous outlay of risk capital and an extraordinarily long period between initial investment and initial return on equity, the program was beyond the means of the industry to undertake without Federal assistance.

The program's rationale was valid enough in 1963. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, with inflation on a rampage, with race riots manifesting long-neglected social and economic ills, and with the nation mired in a costly, unpopular war, financing the development of a gold-plated airliner appeared to many people as a clear case of misplaced priorities. When, on top of this, serious environmental questions were raised about the aircraft, the program's political base collapsed, just as the airframe manufacturer was preparing to cut metal for a prototype.

Meanwhile, the U.S. aircraft industry is managing quite nicely without an SST, taking orders for new, more-efficient subsonic jet transports at a record pace, while its British and French counterparts, who went ahead with the production of a supersonic transport, are counting their losses.

"It's much easier to say to consumer groups that perfect safety is the objective. Well, I don't think it is."

operator, "with a pilot, co-pilot, courier (or steward) and, lastly, a radio operator, the result is an economic absurdity." And, indeed, it was. Even with a full passenger load and a reduced crew complement, the trimotors could not make money without carrying mail. To burden the lines with a crew large enough to ensure optimum safety would have forced many an operator to abandon passenger service. Clarence Young bowed to the economic realities of the situation by requiring the copilot to hold only a limited commercial license. Moreover, any crewmember could serve as radio operator, and the copilot could double as steward.

A couple of years later, however, when instrument flying became widespread on air-passenger routes and the first of the modern airliners were introduced, Young stiffened crewmember requirements. Higher operating standards were more necessary now because of the greater complexity of instrument flying; they were also economically more feasible because the new Boeing 247s and Douglas DC-2s were more efficient passenger carriers than the trimotors. The new rules, moreover, applied to the new airliners and the old trimotors alike, helping speed up the transition to the more reliable 247s and DC-2s.

FAA recently faced a somewhat similar situation with the commuter airline industry. Commuter airlines have grown spectacularly in recent years, and their services will be in even greater demand as they move into low-density routes abandoned by certificated carriers because of economic deregulation.

FAA made a key decision in the course of updating the rules governing the commuter industry. It decided that requiring the commuters to operate under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, which covers the operations of trunk and regional air carriers, did not make sense. If, as a commuter industry spokesman pointed out, commuters have to bear the cost for "training, the management structure and personnel" required under Part 121, they, like the certificated carriers, would abandon low-density routes, leaving a host of communities to make do without scheduled air transportation.

Hence, under a new rule, commuters operating aircraft with 30-or-fewer passenger seats would be governed by a revised Part 135. To be sure, it is a strengthened Part 135, which, considering the size and complexity of commuter operations, offers a level of safety "substantially similar" to that enjoyed by air carriers; but, nevertheless, it is less demanding and less costly in its requirements than Part 121.

A case can be made that this sort of thing should not go on. Some people have trouble coming to terms with a practice or policy that subjects safety to an economic test and, by implication, places a dollar value on human life. They want to be guaranteed precisely the same high level of safety, whether they climb aboard a trunk line, a supplemental or a commuter. It's a legitimate-enough demand, and yet it should be recognized that it carries with it unpleasant social and economic ramifications.

The Fokker F-10 had the dubious distinction of being the first aircraft whose entire U.S. fleet was grounded, as a result of the crash that killed football coach Knute Rockne in 1930.

Would these same people apply the same yardstick of safety to all of transportation? They get into boats, buses, trains and automobiles daily and don't demand the same level of safety as they enjoy when flying in scheduled air-carrier service. It would be absurd to demand it.

It's probably within the state of the art to manufacture a taxicab that could sustain a head-on collision at 60 mph with no serious injury to its occupants. But who would pay the fare for the privilege of riding in such a costly vehicle? It would make as much economic sense to equip a taxicab company exclusively with Rolls Royces.

By the same token, who would pay the fare on a 20-seat commuter airliner that possessed the same capability and the same redundancy and was operated under the same rules as a 300-seat Boeing 747? The market simply won't allow a uniform standard of safety for all types of air travel.

But the basic question—whether you apply the highest attainable safety standards across the board or allow economic forces to determine those standards in part—is still not answered. And it's likely that it won't ever be answered in any definitive way. Rather, it will be debated in the political arena by the public, consumer groups, government officials and legislators, for it is ultimately a national policy question whose answer depends not only on an evolving technology and changing economic conditions but also on changing public attitudes, perceptions and aspirations.

Langhorne M. Bond

This much can be said for the present: It was the clear intent of the framers of the Federal Aviation Act that safety standards be tempered by economic realities. The Administrative Procedure Act and Executive Order 11821 carry the same intent. As FAA Administrator Bond pointed out recently, "The Congress has been clear in recent years . . . that all of the regulatory agencies should say, 'What good does it do?' when you make a regulation and 'What does it cost?' "

Meanwhile, if a critic needs comfort, he can take a hard look at the U.S. safety record. In the 10-year period of 1968-77, air transports operated by certificated air carriers were airborne 61 million hours and experienced 70 fatal accidents. Hence, if the law of averages is with you, you can expect to log 863,280 hours—or 99 years—on a certificated carrier before meeting with tragedy. And while these figures don't prove by any stretch of the imagination that FAA is perfect, they do tend to weaken the argument that the agency cannot carry out its dual mission and still deliver safety.

Nevertheless, Congress might still decide one of these days to give FAA's promotional mission to another agency. Indeed, some feel that the aviation industry is strong enough and prosperous enough to do without the fostering hand of the Federal Government. "We do not think the government should be promoting aviation anymore," one Congressman said recently.

Even if this view prevails, however, the problem still will not go away.

Air-transport manufacturers, general-

aviation-aircraft manufacturers, certificated air carriers, commuter airlines, air taxis, business and industrial aircraft operators, airline pilots, flight attendants and pleasure fliers are all well organized and well financed. As a result, an FAA Administrator will always be subject to severe pressures, whether or not he has a mandate to foster civil aeronautics. He will be caught between those who stress the need for additional safety devices and those who say that aviation is already overburdened with such devices.

Many of these critics will have an ax to grind. "Let's not kid ourselves . .," said Alexander Butterfield. "The manufacturer [of safety devices] wants to sell the product, and the airlines are going to be loath to spend the money unless it is absolutely needed." Pete Quesada related how he sometimes found it difficult to remember that he was a "public servant and not an industry servant"—not because of his responsibility to foster aviation, but because of the intense pressures exerted on him by well-organized aviation interest groups.

And any FAA Administrator will find, as Quesada did, that no course will please all users. He will find, moreover, no infallible yardstick to help him decide which black box ought to be installed on all aircraft and which is too expensive, unnecessary or disadvantageous. "The only way to decide is to insure that all points of view have been heard and then apply the best tests of reasonableness which we can devise for each case," John McLucas said.

Even then, the Administrator will still be charged with favoring one segment of the industry over another, with saddling the industry with unreasonable rules or unnecessary safety devices or with compromising safety out of a solicitousness for the industry's economic welfare.

No change in the laws can prevent this—unless it is a change in the laws of human nature.

Correction

In "A Heroic Quartet" (FAA WORLD, December 1979) about the presentation of Department of Transportation Awards for Valor, regional identifications of the award recipients were transposed. Ronald I. Fedchenko and Dale R. Colt are electronics technicians from the New England Region and Paul A. Palmer is a data systems specialist from the Eastern Region. Controller Donald R. Gottman was correctly identified as from the Great Lakes Region.

Ronald I. Fedchenko

Donald R. Gottman

Paul A. Palmer

History for Sale

The third volume of the four-part history of FAA and its predecessor agencies, "Turbulence Aloft: The Civil Aeronautics Administration Amid Wars and Rumors of Wars, 1938-1953" by John R. M. Wilson, is now available in a hard cover edition. Originally published in 1979 in a soft cover (Stock No. 050-007-00486-9) at $6.00 a copy, "Turbulence Aloft" can be ordered in a hard cover (Stock No. 050-007-00496-6) for $8.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

More Power to People-Power

It's certainly not everybody's shtick, but an FAA family near Fresno, Calif., has found one way to beat the gasoline shortage and have fun and exercise at the same time.

Gerald Beardsley, an air traffic controller at the Fresno Air Terminal, and his wife, Toni, drive a yellow and white, fiberglass three-wheeler they have affectionately dubbed their "People-Powered Vehicle."

They have pedaled their PPV around town for two years, frequently using it to transport their two boys, Gerry and Tony, to activities and visit near-by shopping centers and relatives.

Their only required stop enroute is an occasional visit to a gas station—for air for their tires. In addition to an energy saver, the vehicle is a frustration reliever, as they pedal unconcernedly past closed gas stations with smiles on their faces.

The PPV has adjustable plastic seats for two people, both of whom propel the vehicle with pedals up to 38-40 mph. The Beardsleys find a comfortable 15-18 mph more to their liking. Obviously—and fortunately for them—the Beardsleys do not live in hilly country, but in Clovis, a small flatland community outside Fresno.

Demonstrating that the PPV is here to stay in the Beardsley family, Gerry has spruced it up further by adding a speedometer and a motorcycle battery that powers a radio and head- and taillights.

"Most motorists slow and stare or yell 'all right!' as they pass," notes Beardsley, but the only challenge to the idea, he adds, comes from the canine population. Large dogs, particularly, pose a hazard when they threaten at eye level.

The Beardsleys find their PPV fun, convenient, a good source of exercise and a fuel-saver. But aviation has nothing to look forward to in people-power. Save for the solo Gossamer Albatross, a PPV won't get off the ground.

By Barbara Abels

Word Search Answer

puzzle on page 7

C	J	S	E	K	C	U	T	R	E	H	C	T	A	H	F	D	P	Q	N	R	M	N
Z	H	M	R	N	O	D	S	E	N	O	L	A	M	B	I	A	S	P	O	W	A	A
Q	O	I	J	E	U	E	B	V	R	S	C	L	C	G	K	V	K	C	T	D	R	D
S	Z	T	S	B	Y	H	K	A	E	H	S	A	G	I	H	I	O	A	G	E	S	R
R	L	H	O	H	A	N	B	E	R	G	D	S	R	B	G	S	O	A	N	Z	H	O
E	C	I	X	L	O	N	O	L	G	A	A	P	E	S	A	E	R	N	I	B	A	J
V	S	M	E	P	U	L	N	C	N	L	K	P	G	O	R	M	B	D	H	E	L	X
E	L	Y	G	D	C	O	M	E	I	S	Z	A	O	N	P	A	U	E	S	T	L	O
S	E	K	O	T	S	A	D	J	K	E	C	I	R	P	E	J	F	R	A	H	P	S
K	H	A	L	E	B	C	A	O	B	E	R	R	Y	K	B	T	O	S	W	U	Q	M
O	T	E	B	M	A	W	O	N	U	B	R	O	W	N	O	Y	R	O	B	N	R	A
O	U	O	G	S	L	H	J	T	A	G	T	I	F	H	R	U	D	N	O	E	E	I
Y	R	A	H	Y	D	I	X	S	T	Y	L	S	G	P	T	B	F	S	U	J	K	L
P	T	B	O	O	W	T	I	Y	R	K	K	A	D	Y	N	L	K	Z	L	M	R	L
E	D	U	L	C	I	E	S	R	I	R	P	N	S	E	U	C	E	J	W	N	U	I
A	N	N	Z	C	N	O	A	N	A	W	O	R	Q	S	A	O	X	M	A	P	B	W
G	S	C	F	M	N	B	S	P	Z	B	N	M	J	J	E	L	H	A	R	R	I	S
E	U	H	E	P	U	S	H	Q	Y	S	S	E	L	P	R	E	D	L	E	O	J	Z
M	L	E	I	N	A	D	C	M	Y	E	L	D	A	R	B	S	M	U	L	L	E	D

DIRECT LINE

Q No one here seems to know the answer to this question even though it comes up in conversation frequently. Is there a foreign affairs regulation or any regulation that states that FAA personnel in an overseas post (in this case, Frankfurt, Germany) must spend a minimum of 20 working days in the United States while on home leave? If so, isn't this a violation of freedom of choice in the use of their annual leave, because they don't accrue enough home leave to cover this period? Home leave is accrued at the rate of five days a year, so at the end of a tour when home leave must be taken, only 10 days have accrued, and 10 days of annual leave have to be added.

A Home leave is additional leave earned under the Leave Act by employees serving abroad and must be used in the United States, its possessions or in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Its purpose is to provide employees with an opportunity to return to the United States after a tour of duty abroad to become reacquainted with day-to-day life in this country and to reinforce American ideals and customs. Order 3600.4, Change 7, dated May 15, 1972, Para. 23, provides guidelines for the use of home leave. When home-leave travel expenses are paid by the government, a minimum of 20 workdays, including, if necessary, annual leave, shall be taken. This is supported by the Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 3, Para. 454,1-2: Personnel in a foreign area must spend a minimum of 20 working days on home leave in the locations cited. The rate of accrual of home leave varies, however, according to the nature of the duty post. In Southeast Asia, for example, 15 days a year are accrued. The FAA Act of 1958, Section 303, gives FAA the authority for payment of allowances and other benefits to employees stationed in foreign countries to the same extent as authorized for members of the foreign service of comparable grade. Since home leave is one of these benefits, we comply with the Department of State regulations, which allow the employer to order to the United States, etc., on statutory leave of absence any employee, upon completion of 18 months continuous service abroad and as soon as possible after completion of three years of such service.

Q What is the regulation that permits Airway Facilities sector managers and Air Traffic facility chiefs to take their non-government-employee spouses on GSA travel in government vehicles? What is the government's liability to the passenger in case of an accident?

A The regulation permitting the taking of non-government-employee spouses on travel in government vehicles is covered in FAA Motor Vehicle Management Handbook, Chapter 3, paragraph 11, Note. It provides for the transport of dependents of employees in a travel status when properly authorized in writing. When non-government persons are passengers, the government may be liable in certain instances. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides a remedy for injury or loss of property or death that results from the operation of a vehicle by any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his employment. Liability under the Act is determined according to the law of the state in which the accident occurred. For this reason, no fixed general rule of law can be prescribed. In the event of an accident, an injured passenger could sue the government. The individual employee driver could not be sued himself. Under the FTCA, as long as a vehicle is used for official government business, it is only the government that may be sued. Only if an employee uses a government vehicle for personal use or for non-official business could he or she be held liable in the event of an accident.

Q My question concerns a possible discrepancy between verbal instructions and Handbook 7110.65A, Section 5, "Altitude Verification and Position"—Para. 250A, "Altitude Verification Non-automatic Altitude Reporting." This states, "Request a pilot to verify altitude on initial contact and when position reports are received, unless . . . Terminal: the aircraft was intra-facility transferred to your control." On a recent annual inspection by the region, we were told that the approach controller shall verify assigned altitudes of all departures from our airport. The local controller issues the clearances with altitudes and transfers the departure to the approach controller. At that time, even though the two positions are only three feet apart, the approach controller must verify the departure's altitude. This appears to be in direct conflict with the procedure in the handbook.

A As originally used, the phrase "intra-facility" was intended to apply between control positions in a common instrument flight rules (IFR) area of operation (e.g.: sector-to-sector, departure-arrival). It was not intended to apply between tower cab and approach-departure positions, even where those functions are administratively/operationally combined under a "one facility" configuration, such as a TRACON or TRACAB. We agree that the literal interpretation of "intrafacility" does not coincide with the verbal interpretation correctly given by your region. A handbook change to the subject paragraph is being formulated to correctly specify verification requirements.

Q Recently, a pilot filed a VFR flight plan with this facility and upon completion of the flight he failed to close the flight plan. This is a common occurrence, as any flight service specialist will attest. The specialist involved covered the procedures prescribed in such a case. After much time and effort in INREQ, ALNOT and search-and-rescue efforts, which included getting people out of bed to check airports, the aircraft was located at its home base, and the pilot was home in bed. The specialist asked if something could be done to discipline the pilot because of the unnecessary work he had created and his being in violation of FAR 91.83 (D). He was told that the pilot's failure to close his flight plan was irrelevant and nothing could be done about it. In other words, pilots who fail to close VFR flight plans can thumb their noses at the FAA.

A Pilots who fail to close a VFR flight plan are in violation of the FAR, and the facility chief has the responsibility to notify Flight Standards of such incidents on FAA Form 8020-11, Incident Report. If the incident is inadvertent or a first offense, administrative action in the form of a Warning Notice or Letter of Correction is usually warranted. Handbook 8030.7A, Para. 111, Sept. 16, 1975, states that a Warning Notice will be issued when all of the following elements are present: (1) No significant unsafe condition existed. (2) Lack of competency or qualification was not involved. (3) The violation was not deliberate. (4) The alleged violator has a constructive attitude toward complying with the regulations. Legal action will be taken in all cases that do not meet all of the criteria for administrative actions. Incidents involving individuals with substantial experience or deliberate or reckless or repeat violations should be treated with the full force of the law. Procedural action guidelines are found in Order 1000.9C, April 26, 1979, Enforcement Policy.

Q Last May, I was selected for a supervisory position as an SATCS GS-2152-12. My previous grade was GS-13, Step 6. Under the Civil Service Reform Act and Office of Personnel Management, what will my save-pay or pay-retention status be? Will I be eligible for within-grade increases and comparability pay? For how long will I be eligible? What should my current base pay be? My regional personnel people aren't sure of the interpretation of the rules.

A The type of career-progression demotion action you have described would appear to meet the criteria for pay retention which were in effect last year. Since your existing rate of pay at the time of your demotion exceeded the rate of pay for the top step of the GS-12 grade to which you were demoted, you should have been placed in a pay-retention status. While in this status, you will receive one-half of the annual comparability raise for the top step of GS-12 until such time as your retained rate of pay is equalled or exceeded by the rate of pay for the top step of GS-12. At that time, your pay retention will cease and you will be paid at the top step of GS-12 and will get the full pay-comparability increase for all future years. You will not be eligible for within-grade increases because your rate of pay while on pay retention is beyond the top step of your grade. Your annual salary, including one-half of the October 1979 comparability increase, should be $33,075 as of January 1980. The answer to any other questions which you may have on this subject can probably be found in Order 3550.11, Grade and Pay Retention Under the Civil Service Reform Act.

Q I would like answers and published references to the following questions to end pilot-controller and controller-controller misunderstandings. *Control Zones*: When are they in effect—as indicated on VFR sectionals, at the times listed or continuously or only when the weather is reported as IFR at the controlling facility? Therefore, when must a VFR pilot request clearance through a depicted control zone? *Control Zone Extensions*: Some of the extensions from the five-mile radius do not appear to protect parts of the published approaches for that airport (procedure turns or missed approach). What is the source to satisfy the curiosity of why they are there? *Overflights*: The facility provides service to helicopters' landing and departing points within the airport traffic area control zone, not at or to or from the airport. A count is taken for an instrument operation during Special VFR, but no count is taken for the same operation VFR nor for a VFR overflight. What is the reasoning behind this? *Separation*: Given the weather as -X23/4H and the control zone is a five-mile radius with extensions to the seven-mile arc north and south and is within a Group 1 Terminal Control Area (TCA) "A" area (surface to 7,000 feet), then if an aircraft departs SVFR eastbound, how long is the aircraft given IFR separation? Is it until crossing the depicted control-zone boundary (five miles east) or until crossing the depicted TCA boundary (seven miles east)?

A The effective times of *control zones* are contained in the Airport/Facility Directory, which is published and distributed every eight weeks by the National Ocean Survey and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. A VFR pilot need only request clearance through a control zone during those hours when it is in effect and the reported weather is less than VFR. *Control zone extensions* are established wherever a Standard Instrument Approach authorizes descent to an altitude less than 1,000 feet above the surface at a point outside the basic control zone. Refer to Flight Procedures and Airspace Handbook 8260.19, Para. 534, and Handbook 7400.2B, Para. 175. *Overflights*: An instrument operations count is taken for an SVFR operation versus a VFR operation on the basis that IFR separation between aircraft is provided. Refer to Handbook 7210.3E, Paras. 1430 and 1432. Aircraft are afforded *SVFR separation* until crossing the depicted control zone boundary. Thereafter, aircraft are given Stage III TCA separation, provided they can comply with the provisions of basic VFR flight required within a TCA. Refer to Handbook 7110.65A, Paros. 470 and 1282.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D C 20591

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

Postage and Fees Paid
Federal Aviation Administration
THIRD CLASS BULK MAIL
DOT 515

U.S.MAIL

Heads Up

AERONAUTICAL CENTER

Thomas W. Perkins, chief of the Contract Management Branch, Procurement Division, made permanent.

CENTRAL REGION

Gordon M. Atzen, assistant manager of the Des Moines Airway Facilities Sector . . . **Cyril H. Schultze,** manager of the Des Moines AF Sector, from the St. Louis AF Sector.

EASTERN REGION

Robert L. Caramenico, assistant chief at the Philadelphia Tower, made permanent . . . **Robert E. Henderson,** chief of the Utica, N.Y., Tower, from the Griffiss AFB RAPCON . . . **Aubrey K. Johnson,** chief of the Teterboro, N.J., Flight Standards District Office.

GREAT LAKES REGION

Finley H. Downes, chief of the Cleveland General Aviation District Office, from the General Aviation Branch, Flight Standards Division . . . **Robert J. Mason, Jr.,** deputy chief of the Dayton, Ohio, Tower in Vandalia, made permanent.

NEW ENGLAND REGION

Ervin E. Lenentine, chief of the Bedford, Mass., Tower, from the Bradley Tower in Windsor Locks, Conn. . . . **Edward J. Sullivan,** chief of the Bangor, Maine, Tower, from the Quonset, R.I., Tower.

NORTHWEST REGION

William F. O'Connor, chief of the Lewiston, Ida., Tower, from the Oakland, Calif., Tower.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION

Richard R. Loveless, assistant chief at the Casper, Wyo., Flight Service Station, from the Cedar City, Utah, FSS.

SOUTHERN REGION

Corwin E. Denny, assistant chief at the Mobile, Ala., FSS, from the Pensacola, Fla., FSS . . . **Nelson V. Pritchett,** assistant chief at the Jackson, Miss., FSS.

SOUTHWEST REGION

Douglas B. Davis, chief of the England AFB, La., Tower and Air Traffic Representative . . . **Albert E. Gladu,** chief of the New Orleans AF Sector Field Office.

WESTERN REGION

Lawrence E. Arnold, assistant chief at the Oakland, Calif., FSS, from the Tucson, Ariz., FSS . . . **Lawrence R. Berg,** assistant chief at the Los Angeles FSS, from the Santa Barbara, Calif., FSS . . . **Clarence W. Bryant,** chief of the Half Moon Bay, Calif., ARSR Sector Field Office, made permanent . . . **Henry A. Harris,** chief of the Long Beach, Calif., AF Sector Field Office, made permanent . . . **Donald V. Haven,** assistant chief at the Oakland, Calif., FSS, from the Las Vegas, Nev., FSS . . . **Larry P. Suppan,** chief of the Hawthorne, Calif., Tower, from the Los Angeles Tower . . . **James H. Welton,** chief of the El Monte, Calif., Tower, from the Ontario, Calif., Tower . . . **Michael T. Wise,** chief of the Paso Robles ARSR Sector Field Office in the San Francisco AF Sector, made permanent.