FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Region, Jamaica, NY 11430

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AEA-01-98

February 3, 1998

Contact: Arlene Salac/Jim Peters

Phone: 718-553-3015

FAA Proposes Two Fines for Tower Air

New York - The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed two civil penalties totaling $276,000 against Tower Air, a New York based air carrier, for operating two aircraft in an unairworthy condition. An aircraft is considered unairworthy if it does not meet FAA regulation standards.

The first civil penalty involves a Boeing 747 which was operated between John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York and Ben-Gurion International Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel between April 14, 1997 and May 2, 1997. The aircraft was flown for 32 flights with a leaking check valve that caused a fuel migration problem. Tower Air incorrectly identified the problem as a faulty fuel quantity indicator which would show the pilot how much fuel is in each tank. The check valve restricts the direction of fuel flow preventing inappropriate entry of fuel into a tank. Fuel migration occurs when fuel travels from one tank to another. Because the check valve was not working properly fuel migrated into the #3 tank from other fuel tanks.

The second civil penalty involves a Boeing 747 that developed an internal air pressure problem in the # 4 engine on September 29, 1997 while enroute from Gray Army Airfield, Fort Hood, TX to George Air Force Base, Victorville, CA. Tower Air incorrectly identified the problem as an exhaust pressure ratio indicator problem. The carrier performed maintenance and continued to operate the aircraft until October 1, 1997 when the problem was correctly identified. Internal air pressure is regulated by vents in the sides of the engine that keep the engine from building excessive pressure. The exhaust pressure ratio indicator is a measure for the pilot to monitor engine pressure.

-more-

Tower Air has 30 days to respond to the civil penalty letters before the FAA takes any further action. In cases, as here, where the FAA's proposed penalty exceeds $50,000, the FAA has the authority to settle these penalties. If parties cannot amicably resolve the matter, the government must file a complaint with the appropriate U.S. District Court.

The announcement of the civil penalty proposal today is being made in accordance with FAA's policy of releasing information to the public on newly issued enforcement actions in cases that involve penalties of $50,000 or more.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 12-98
Wednesday, Feb. 4, 1998
Contact: Henry J. Price
Phone: 202-267-8521

MEDIA ADVISORY

FAA HOLDS FIRST COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FORECAST CONFERENCE

Tuesday, Feb. 10, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Wednesday, Feb. 11, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.

WASHINGTON -- The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) first Commercial Space Transportation Forecast Conference will be held on Tuesday, Feb. 10 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and Wednesday, Feb. 11 from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. The event will focus on commercial space transportation in the 21st century and will be held at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel, Arlington, Va.

The two-day conference will examine new technologies and the future environment of commercial space transportation in 2001 through 2025. FAA Acting Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation Patricia Grace Smith will welcome guests, and Vice Commander of the Air Force Space Command Lt. Gen. Lance W. Lord will conduct the keynote address on Feb. 11. NASA Chief Scientist Dr. Dan Mulville will be the luncheon speaker on Feb. 11 to discuss NASA's future space transportation architecture.

The event will also include representatives from industry, academia and government in panel discussions on important space transportation issues. The conference panels will focus on:

- Reusable launch vehicle development;
- Technologies of the future;
- Overview of space in the 21st century;
- The international market;
- Space beyond the communications era;
- Flight safety in a commercial environment; and
- Other perspectives.

Attached is a detailed conference agenda.

# # #

FIRST FAA COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FORECAST CONFERENCE AGENDA*

Tuesday, Feb. 10

9:00 a.m.	**Welcome** Patricia Grace Smith, FAA acting associate administrator for commercial space transportation
9:15 a.m.	**Keynote Address** Lt. Gen. Lance W. Lord, vice commander, Air Force Space Command
11:00 a.m.	**Break**
11:15 a.m.	**Panel: "Technologies of the Future"** Panel members: John Cole, Space Transportation Research Mgr. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center; and Michael Jacox, SOTV program manager, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.
12:15 p.m.	**Lunch** Speaker: Dr. Dan Mulville, chief scientist, NASA "NASA's Future Space Transportation Architecture"
1:30 p.m.	**Panel: "Overview of Space in the 21st Century"** Panel members: Ray F. Johnson, principal director, The Aerospace Corp.; and Shubber Ali, senior consultant, Space and High Technology Practice, KPMG Peat Marwick
2:45 p.m.	**Break**
3:00 p.m.	**Panel: "The International Market"** Panel members: Greg Gilmore, vice president, Marketing & Sales, International Launch Services; Marc Nance, manager, Mission Design, SeaLaunch; Marshall Kaplan, chairman, LaunchSpace; and Doug Heydon, Arianespace.
4:30 p.m.	**End of Day One**
6:00 p.m.	**Reception**

Wednesday, Feb. 11

9:00 a.m.	**Presentation: "A Vision of the Future"** Dr. William Gaubatz, director, Business Development, The Boeing Co.
9:45 a.m.	**Panel "Space Commerce Beyond the Communications Era"** Panel members: Gregg E. Maryniak, senior scientist, Futron Corp. (associate founder, International Space University) John Mankins, NASA Office of Space Flight Tom Rogers, president, Space Transportation Association
11:00 a.m.	**Break**
11:15 a.m.	**Panel: "Other Perspectives"** Panel members: Brenda Forman, director, Educational Programs, Lockheed Martin Corp.; James Banke, space journalist, *Florida Today* and manager, Space OnLine Dr. John Logsdon, chairman, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University
12:30 p.m.	**Lunch Break**
2:00 p.m.	**Special Public Session on Flight Safety in a Commercial Environment** Moderators: Manual Vega, chief of regulations, FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation.

*Scheduled items are subject to change

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, Feb. 4, 1998
Contact: John Clabes
Phone: 405-954-7500

FAA PROPOSES TO ASSESS $50,000
CIVIL PENALTY AGAINST MESA AIRLINES

FORT WORTH--The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today said it has issued a notice proposing to assess a $50,000 civil penalty against Mesa Airlines for failure to properly document changes in weight and balance records on four aircraft from December, 1996, through May 1, 1997.

The company was notified of the proposed civil penalty in a registered letter Jan. 21. It outlined several options the company can pursue within 30 days, including informal conferences and submitting information on the alleged violations to the FAA.

Mesa is accused of violating three Federal Aviation Regulations dealing with maintenance procedure manuals. FAA flight standards inspectors, who routinely check Mesa's centralized records at Farmington, N. M., and discovered the discrepancy.

The announcement is being made in accordance with the FAA's policy of releasing information to the public on newly-issued enforcement actions involving civil penalties of $50,000 or more.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via
The World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 13-98
Wednesday, February 04, 1998
Contact: Henry J. Price
Phone: 202-267-8521

Airworthiness Directive on General Aviation Aircraft Engine

WASHINGTON -- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is requiring general aviation operators to inspect crankshafts in some Textron Lycoming, Inc. piston engines. The Airworthiness Directive (AD) affects 9,814 private aircraft.

The directive requires general aviation operators to inspect their aircraft's piston engine crankshaft in Textron Lycoming engine models 320 with 160 horsepower or greater and 360 series engines with fixed-pitch propellers.

The crankshaft is a hollow metal rod that pistons turn to rotate the propeller. Today's AD requires operators to have the inside of the crankshaft inspected to look for any corrosive pits in the metal. If pits in the metal are found, a Fluorescent Penetrant Inspection must be performed to determine if a crack is present that could result in engine failure, propeller separation, forced landing, and possible damage to the aircraft. Fluorescent Penetrant Inspections use fluorescent dyes to highlight imperfections, corrosion or cracks. If a crack is found, the crankshaft is to be removed before further flight. If a crack is not found, the crankshaft must be repeatedly inspected every 100 flight hours.

When these aircraft engines are overhauled a corrosive-preventative treatment is applied to the inside of unpitted crankshafts. Operators of aircraft with engines that have never been overhauled are required to have the crankshaft inspected within 100 flight hours. Engines that have been overhauled and have more than 1,000 flight hours are also required to be inspected within 100 flight hours. The inspections take approximately eight hours and cost operators approximately $480 per inspection.

Six engine failures on aircraft more than 13 years old have occurred, mostly in England with one taking place in the Neatherlands. Four incidents in the United States occurred in 1972, 1982, 1984 and 1996. No injuries occurred as a result of these incidents.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 14-98
Wednesday, February 4, 1998
Contact: Kathryn B. Creedy
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Plans Public Meetings on 727 Cargo Issue

WASHINGTON -- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced today that it will hold public meetings in Seattle to discuss the issues surrounding payload limits for converted Boeing 727 cargo aircraft. The meetings will be held at the Radisson Hotel on February 18-19 and April 1-3.

In making the decision to schedule the public meetings, the agency cited the need for additional data to resolve conflicts raised during the comment period. After a thorough review of the comments from the public meetings and any additional technical data submitted, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey will make a final determination on the 727 cargo floor loading issues.

Inspections of the 727 floor structure and subsequent analysis raised concerns that the floor structure may not be strong enough to enable the aircraft to safely carry the currently allowed maximum payload. In July 1997, the FAA issued four proposed Airworthiness Directives (ADs) to limit the 727 cargo payloads for aircraft converted from passenger to all-cargo operations. The directives would limit the payload capacity of these aircraft from 8,000 to 3,000 pounds per container until the floor structure is modified or re-certified to carry higher payloads. The proposed AD would affect approximately 300 aircraft worldwide including 244 in the U.S.

The FAA expects that the meetings will resolve the methodology and technical assumptions used in the calculation of allowable loads on the floor structures of modified Boeing 727 aircraft. They will also offer an opportunity for all interested parties to submit any additional information that has not already been submitted to the FAA. The Radisson Hotel is located near the Seattle/Tacoma Airport at 17001 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, WA (206)244-6000.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Great Lakes Region, 2300 E. Devon Ave., Des Plaines, IL 60018

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Tanya Wagner
Office of Public Affairs
847-294-7427

MEDIA ADVISORY

FAA TO RELEASE AIR TRAFFIC TAPE
OF CESSNA - BEECH BONANZA ACCIDENT

On Friday, Feb. 6, at 10 a.m., CST, the Federal Aviation Administration will release the tape and transcript of air traffic communications with the Beech Bonanza and Cessna 172 that collided over Lake Michigan on July 19, 1997.

This will be strictly an informational release and will be made without comment. No interviews will be provided. The National Transportation Safety Board investigation of this accident is continuing and the probable cause has not yet been determined.

The tape and transcript will be available for pickup by accredited media or their representatives at the security desk in the main lobby of FAA's Great Lakes Regional Office, 2300 E. Devon Ave., Des Plaines, IL, at 10 a.m. CST, Friday, Feb. 6.

Arrangements to pick up a tape package should be made in advance by contacting FAA public affairs representatives Don Zochert or Tanya Wagner at 847-294-7427.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Region, Jamaica, NY 11430
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
AEA-03-98
February 6, 1998
Contact: Arlene Salac/Jim Peters
Phone: 718-553-3015

FAA To Start New Air Traffic Test at Newark to Reduce Noise

New York - On March 15, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will begin the testing of a new departure procedure at Newark International Airport designed to enhance safety, reduce pilot and controller workload, and reduce aircraft noise.

The test will involve aircraft departing from Newark's runways 22 left and right. Aircraft will follow an industrial corridor along the Arthur Kill waterway, and Route 1, and turn west between Rahway and Carteret, NJ. The test is expected to last for 180 days which will allow the agency time to collect sufficient data to validate the environmental impacts and operational effectiveness of the new pattern. FAA will work with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to place four of the Port Authority's noise monitors in appropriate areas in New Jersey and New York. The data collected from these monitors will be used to augment the FAA's noise modeling data.

The test is referred to as the "260 Turn" because of the compass heading which the aircraft will fly on departure. The "260 Turn" procedure test, scheduled to Jan. 1, 1998, was delayed to address concerns from citizens and elected officials. Data obtained from the noise monitors and modeling will validate the effects of the new procedure. FAA will hold community meetings in New Jersey and New York in the next few weeks to provide more details about the test.

Mitigating noise in New Jersey and New York remains a top priority for the agency, and FAA will continue to work with citizens groups on this issue.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 15-98
Monday, Feb. 9, 1998
Contact: Eliot Brenner
Phone: 202-267-3883

MEDIA ADVISORY

WASHINGTON, DC — FAA Administrator Jane F. Garvey will address the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) on Tuesday, Feb. 10, at a luncheon meeting of AIAA's corporate member committee. Garvey's remarks will address air traffic control modernization issues.

The luncheon will be held at the Ritz-Carlton Pentagon City Hotel, Grand Ballroom Salon III, with remarks scheduled to begin at 11:30 a.m.

For information about attending the luncheon, contact Michael Lewis of AIAA at 703-264-7515.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 17-98
Monday, Feb. 9, 1998
Contact: Marcia Adams
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Approves PFC Use for New York's JFK International Airport Light Rail System

WASHINGTON – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced the approval of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's request to impose and use passenger facility charge (PFC) revenue for an airport ground access project at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK).

"We agree with local officials that this project will increase access to the airport and reduce congestion," said FAA Administrator Jane Garvey. "Increased and more efficient access to JFK for millions of area residents who face significant challenges in reaching JFK will ultimately mean better utilization of the airport's capacity - a plus not just for the region but also for our national transportation network."

The airport ground access project or JFK Light Rail System (LRS), divided into three components, will include an on-airport circulator system or CTA Loop and two rail links – located at Howard Beach and Jamaica -- to the city's transit system. By providing alternative ground access to the airport, this project will alleviate congestion on roadways and in front of terminals.

While the FAA found that the Howard Beach, CTA Loop and Jamaica link projects totaling $1.148 billion met the basic eligibility requirements, certain portions of the application were deemed ineligible. The ineligible portions, potentially in excess of $200 million, include the system's operations and maintenance, storage facilities, fare collection equipment and any costs resulting from an over-designed system.

Because this is the largest single PFC project the FAA has approved, the agency spent considerable time examining the application. In making its decision, the agency by statute had to ensure that the PFC application met the following requirements:

- The project is eligible under the PFC program's legal framework ;
- The project will preserve or enhance capacity of the national air transportation system; and
- The project is adequately justified.

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In approving the application, FAA determined that New York City's airport systems face unique ground access challenges and the LRS project will benefit and advance the National Air Transportation System.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 18-98
February 9, 1998
Contact: Eliot B. Brenner
Phone: 202-267-3883

Donohue Withdraws Nomination, Will Leave FAA Later This Year

WASHINGTON – Dr. George L. Donohue, brought to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1994 to streamline the agency's acquisition system and nominated last year to be Deputy Administrator, has withdrawn his name from nomination and plans to leave the FAA for the private sector by early summer.

In a letter to Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater, Donohue, the FAA's Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisition since 1994, said he has "essentially completed what I came here to do, and it is time to move on." Donohue said that when he came to the FAA in the wake of the failed Advanced Automation System (AAS) program, his principal goals were "to help reform the FAA's acquisition management system and to chart a course for modernizing the air traffic control system infrastructure for the 21st century. Both of those efforts are well underway and in good hands," he said.

"George Donohue has provided outstanding leadership to help bring about unprecedented procurement reform and technology modernization at the FAA," said Slater. "His efforts to optimize those advances have led to a strengthened FAA that is better equipped to meet the aviation challenges of the 21st century."

"The work we do on modernization will be building on the excellent foundation laid by George Donohue," added FAA Administrator Jane Garvey. "He's rendered important service to the field of aviation."

The FAA's new Acquisition Management System, which went into effect April 1, 1996, has received high marks from two independent studies for cutting in half the time it takes to do major acquisitions. Donohue's ARA organization also is leading the way for the agency in personnel reform by piloting a Human Resources Management (HRM) program, including a compensation system based on industry standards. Acquisition reform and personnel reform are two key advances provided to the FAA by Congress.

Donohue said that with the NAS system architecture, developed in cooperation with industry, "we know what needs to be done, and now Jane Garvey has taken the next important step of seeking industry consensus to determine how much can be done and how fast, given available resources."

Nominated for the Deputy Administrator post in May 1997, Donohue cited the long, drawn-out process as a factor in withdrawing his name, adding that Ms. Garvey needed to have a Deputy Administrator in place to help with her agenda in the areas of safety, security, NAS modernization and FAA financing.

Donohue said he had no immediate plans, but intends to leave the FAA "sometime in late spring or early summer," after the appropriations hearings on the FY-99 budget and the work of the Administrator's task force on NAS modernization, of which he is a member, is completed.

Among his accomplishments at the FAA, Donohue was instrumental in restructuring the Advanced Automation System (AAS) and getting it back on track. The Display System Replacement (DSR) and the Standard Terminal Automation Radar System (STARS), the major components of the former AAS program and key platforms for future enhancements to the NAS, are both on track and moving toward implementation this year. DSR is scheduled for initial operation at the first site (Seattle) in October, and an early configuration of STARS is scheduled for implementation at National Airport this summer.

Donohue also is responsible for restructuring the GPS Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). In early January, the WAAS program was baselined with full Life Cycle Costing and the first production reference stations have been delivered.

Donohue also conceived the Flight 2000 concept which is scheduled for Alaska and Hawaii. Flight 2000 will be an operational evaluation of the technologies and procedures of Free Flight before they are implemented nationwide, beginning in 2005.

Before joining the FAA, Donohue served as vice president at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, Calif., where he directed Project AIR FORCE, overseeing research, quality control and financial management of the USAF's Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) for policy and analysis. He also was a member of the RAND Graduate School Faculty. Earlier, he served as director, Aerospace and Strategic Technology Office, for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in Washington, D.C.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 16-98
Wednesday, February 11, 1998
Contact: Drucella Andersen
Phone: 202-267-3883

Media Advisory - FAA to Release Air Traffic Tape of KAL801 Accident in Guam

On Friday, February 13 at 10:00 a.m., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will release the air traffic control tape of the accident involving Korean Airlines Flight 801 in Agana, Guam. Location: FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C., room 9AB. Credentialed media only.

Reporters will receive a copy of the transcript and will be able to record the tape. FAA will not comment on the ongoing accident investigation.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 19-98
Thursday, February 12, 1998
Contact: Alison Duquette
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Orders Fire Detection and Suppression Systems for Aircraft Cargo Compartments

WASHINGTON -- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today issued a final rule requiring fire detection and suppression systems in aircraft cargo compartments. The rule affects nearly 3,700 passenger aircraft and all newly manufactured aircraft.

The rule meets a recommendation of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which urged the installation of both fire detection and suppression systems in all aviation cargo holds.

"This rule will provide passengers with additional assurance about the safety of the aircraft on which they are traveling," said Vice President Al Gore, who chaired the Commission. "This, along with other measures the FAA has taken in response to the Commission's recommendations, will help ensure that airline travel remains as safe as possible for all travelers."

The airline industry, through the Air Transport Association (ATA), announced in December 1996 that the industry would voluntarily speed the installation of these systems in commercial aircraft. Some airlines already have FAA approval to retrofit their fleet. Air carriers may begin retrofitting their aircraft immediately, and the FAA continues to work in partnership with the airline industry to ensure that all affected aircraft are retrofitted within the next three years. Airlines will be required to report their progress quarterly to the FAA.

Currently, most wide-body passenger aircraft have fire detection and suppression systems in inaccessible compartments. This rule requires that the remainder of the passenger fleet be equipped with the same systems.

Approximately 300 all-cargo aircraft will be required to have detection systems and a means to shut off air flow to the compartment.

The total life-cycle cost to retrofit the fleet is estimated at $300 million. The approximate lifetime cost per aircraft is $90,000.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 20-98
Thursday, February 12, 1998
Contact: Alison Duquette
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Seeks Public Comment on Child Restraint Systems

WASHINGTON -- Continuing the work of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today asked for public comment on how the agency should proceed on a rule to require the use of child restraint systems (CRS) for children under the age of two traveling on U.S. air carriers. The Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) is being issued in response to a recommendation in the Commission's Feb. 12, 1997 report.

"Based on the information obtained from this notice and the results of our ongoing research, FAA will consider proposing specific regulations to improve child safety," said FAA Administrator Jane F. Garvey. "Meanwhile, we are continuing our nationwide campaign to educate parents about safe air travel with children."

The FAA is requesting information and comments on CRS performance, including:

- the impact an FAA regulation would have on passengers and air carriers;
- data on the number of children under 40 pounds that travel by air and the efficacy of that weight criteria;
- installation, fit or other safety problems with forward-facing and rear-facing restraints in aircraft;
- research on systems that may work in both automobiles and aircraft;
- supplemental platform and aircraft-specific CRS prototypes;
- changing anchor point locations for aircraft passenger seat belts to enhance the performance of existing CRS models;
- the impact child restraint systems have on aircraft emergency evacuation; and
- the impact of requiring air carriers or third parties to supply child restraint systems.

- more -

While current FAA regulations do not require parents to purchase a seat for children under two years of age or to restrain them in a CRS, the agency recommends that all children, regardless of age, be protected by an approved CRS that is appropriate to the child's size and weight. Based on FAA tests, the agency recommends that children weighing:

- under 20 pounds be restrained in an approved rear-facing CRS;
- between 20 and 40 pounds should use an approved forward-facing CRS;
- over 40 pounds should use the standard lap belt that is attached to all airline seats.

The FAA strongly recommends that all passengers keep their seat belt securely fastened at all times. In December 1996, the FAA launched a nationwide ***Turbulence Happens*** safety campaign to promote the use of seat belts and child restraints aboard commercial aircraft to prevent turbulence-related injuries. The multimedia campaign consists of print, television and radio public service announcements. ***Turbulence Happens*** is supported by the Association of Flight Attendants, National SAFE KIDS Campaign and the National Safety Belt Coalition, along with other organizations.

As part of its ongoing effort to enhance child safety, the FAA banned the use of booster seats and harness and vest child restraints aboard all U.S. air carriers on June 4, 1996. Tests showed that these devices, which provide an appropriate level of protection in automobiles, could cause unacceptable abdominal and head injuries to children involved in an aviation emergency.

Recently, the FAA and the Air Transport Association worked together to develop educational materials on turbulence for airline crewmembers, including pilots, flight attendants and dispatchers. The materials address how to avoid turbulence and what to do if turbulence is encountered.

Currently, child restraint systems must meet the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 213. The FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute continues to work with the NHTSA to improve CRS effectiveness and develop a CRS designed specifically for aircraft use. The FAA also continues to work toward improving the performance of forward-facing child restraint systems.

All comments received during the 120-day comment period will be considered by the FAA Administrator to determine whether to go forward with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to mandate the use of child restraint systems aboard commercial aircraft. The docket containing all comments is available for public inspection.

For a copy of "Tips for Safe Air Travel with Children," travelers may call the agency's consumer hotline at 1-800-FAA-SURE. Visit the FAA's ***Turbulence Happens*** Web site under "news & information" at www.faa.gov.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 21-98
Thursday, February 12, 1998
Contact: Les Dorr, Jr.
Phone: 202/267-8521

FAA Finds No Boeing Quality System Problems, but Some Improvements Needed

WASHINGTON –A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) examination of Boeing. plants where Boeing 737 horizontal stabilizers are manufactured and assembled found no problems that would affect flight safety. However, the review did uncover several minor violations of the company's FAA-approved quality control system.

During the Jan. 12-16 evaluation of Boeing plants in Renton, Wash., and Wichita, Kan., FAA inspectors found 12 instances where the company did not comply with its quality control system. These ranged from hinge plate mounting bolts that were .008 inch too short to paperwork deficiencies such as missing inspection stamps and dates on supplier packing sheets.

The FAA evaluation teams also made four "observations" ranging from a lack of written procedures for moving Wichita-produced horizontal stabilizers within the Renton plant to improperly completed paperwork for design actions. An observation is an isolated instance of quality management system non-compliance.

As soon as the FAA notified Boeing of deficiencies in the horizontal stabilizer manufacturing process, the company took immediate corrective action. Boeing also has informed the FAA that it is developing long-term action plans to improve its quality control system. FAA inspectors will follow-up to make sure the corrections are effective.

The Boeing evaluation was part of the FAA's Aircraft Certification Systems Evaluation Program (ACSEP), which examines the quality control process at hundreds of manufacturers and suppliers annually. The agency conducted 477 such evaluations in 1997, and 616 are scheduled for 1998, including six at various Boeing facilities.

NOTE: A summary of the Boeing ACSEP report is available at:
www.faa.gov/apa/publicat.htm

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SUMMARY REPORT

Date: February 5, 1998

Subject: Boeing Special Aircraft Certification Systems Evaluation Program (ACSEP)

A special ACSEP evaluation was conducted in response to a report from the SilkAir accident site stating that missing fasteners and a bolt were observed in the wreckage. Two FAA teams evaluated Boeing 737 horizontal stabilizer manufacturing areas in Renton, Washington and Wichita, Kansas from January 12 — 21, 1998. The evaluations focused on the Boeing 737 horizontal stabilizer build-up, assembly, and installation to determine if there was a production problem regarding the missing fasteners.

Twelve system findings and four observations resulted from the FAA's special evaluation. No safety findings were identified. "Findings" and "observations" are the terms used in ACSEP reports to describe various conditions. Findings are defined in two ways: (1) a safety-related noncompliance that requires immediate action or (2) a systemic noncompliance from the manufacturer's FAA-approved quality system. An observation is an isolated noncompliance or a recommended improvement to the existing quality system.

System Findings

The following paragraphs depict four areas of concern and identifies the related system findings that support the concern. Also, the *Action Taken* following each finding identifies the immediate actions taken by The Boeing Company during the evaluation to respond to the conditions noted by the FAA.

A. Boeing Quality System Procedure Noncompliances. All of the findings cited below are departures from the FAA-approved Boeing quality system procedures. In some cases, Boeing's internal audit process documented similar conditions. However, the corrective action plans were either not implemented or were not effective in resolving the issue.

Action Taken: Boeing recognizes that all FAA system findings are attributed to inconsistencies between the quality system procedures and the practices employed by the personnel. The FAA will follow up with Boeing's long-term corrective action for each of the system findings.

B. Product Deficiencies. Six findings are directed to the manufacturing process of horizontal stabilizer. When these conditions were identified by the FAA, Boeing immediately initiated the corrective action plans necessary to correct the cited conditions for the horizontal stabilizers currently in production.

1. On five airplanes, mechanics performed elevator and horizontal stabilizer functional tests without quality assurance inspectors present to verify the requirements of the test. Also, technicians who conducted certain tests did not have the proper qualifications or certifications. (Boeing, Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing determined that although the personnel were not qualified, the tests were performed to the test procedures. Boeing immediately reviewed the certification status of all mechanics and technicians and requalified those individuals requiring the functional test certification.

2. Hinge plate-mounting bolts are too short (approximately 0.008 inches) in length, which create the possibility of insufficient number of engaged threads that were required in accordance with the design. This condition was identified in the horizontal stabilizer elevators manufactured by another Boeing supplier, Xian Aircraft Company (XAC) in China. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing determined that the existing length of the bolts would perform the intended function. This condition was recorded on a Boeing rejection form and will be processed through engineering to record that these bolts are acceptable.

3. The horizontal stabilizer rigging document is not being followed in the section related to the cable installation and measurement of the cable tension. The mechanics could not successfully rig the stabilizer trim system because of errors in the engineering rigging document. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing engineering is evaluating the inconsistencies between the rigging document and the manufacturing process to devise a process that meets both the design and manufacturing needs.

4. Several electrical wiring installations were not completed in accordance with the drawing requirements for the hookup, routing and lockwire conditions of the horizontal stabilizer transmitters and wire bundles. One condition, identified exposed wires and contact to the metal band which may induce an electrical short. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing conducted an inspection of all 737-300 airplanes on the production line and corrected any similar electrical wiring conditions. Boeing internal auditors conducted an evaluation prior to the FAA ACSEP. Similar wiring conditions were noted, corrective action plans were being reviewed with manufacturing, and the immediate corrections were completed.

5. Five aircraft sets of horizontal stabilizers contained numerous radius gap fillers riding the elevator hinge structure. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing Service Engineering evaluated the conditions and determined that minimal loads would be applied and would pose no stress in the area cited.

6. Manufacturing personnel improperly recorded the minimum gap measurement on the elevator quadrant installation records. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing performed an inspection of the airplanes on the production line and determined that the actual gaps were found to be no less than 0.04 inches as required. The measurements were incorrectly documented on the records as 0.015 inches.

C. Tooling and Manufacturing Equipment. Two findings were identified to control tooling for the critical operations and tooling fixtures used in the manufacturing process.

1. Seven measuring tools used for critical inspections on the installations and adjustment of the elevator controls were not calibrated. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing determined that the measurements taken by these tools are acceptable because these tools are built to the airplane drawing dimensions and may not require calibration. Boeing is reviewing the calibration procedures to verify the calibration requirements for tools built from airplane drawings.

2. Bolts having the incorrect length were installed in the lifting fixtures for the horizontal and vertical stabilizers. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: This condition affected the moving and handling of the stabilizer within the facility. Boeing instructed their personnel to comply with the procedures for installing bolts with the correct length. The bolts were reidentified to the appropriate lifting fixtures.

D. Inadequate Paperwork - Four findings reflect inadequate or missing information in the assembly and test documentation for the horizontal stabilizer.

1. Manufacturing job instructions did not contain the required inspection witness torque operations. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing inspected the airplanes on the production line to ensure that the torque values were correct. Boeing added to the work instructions, the required job instructions for witnessing the torque operations.

2. The rejection system and Material Review Board process usually used to disposition were used to substitute parts. This practice is not in compliance with the approved procedures. The maintenance manuals were not revised to reflect the substitution of parts to the airline operators. (Boeing - Renton)

Action Taken: Boeing used this method to obtain engineering and quality assurance approval to install an equivalent substitution part. Boeing is evaluating the practice of documenting the substitution of parts on rejection forms.

3. Boeing source inspectors at Lucas Aerospace did not include their inspection stamp and date on the supplier packing sheets. Lucas Aerospace, supplier to Boeing Wichita, manufactures a significant portion of the horizontal stabilizer. (Boeing - Wichita)

Action Taken: Boeing is investigating to determine if the source representative actually conducted the Boeing inspections and missed stamping the packing sheets.

4. Receiving or source inspection is not being performed for parts received from Lucas Aerospace. (Boeing - Wichita)

Action Taken: Boeing is determining whether the parts should be inspected upon receipt or at the source. No hardware discrepancies were identified during the ACSEP evaluation.

Observations

The following documented observations are considered as recommendations only, and Boeing may respond with corrections, as needed.

1. Boeing Liaison Engineering did not properly complete the Liaison Design Action Request (LDAR) forms. (Boeing - Renton)

2. Procedures do not exist for moving horizontal stabilizers that were produced by Boeing Wichita within the Renton facility. (Boeing- Renton)

3. Corrective action plans have not resolved a recurring problem identified with the drill jig at a Boeing supplier in China: Xian Aircraft Company. (Boeing- Renton)

4. FAA-approved procedures for sampling had a conflict that could result in the acceptance of nonconforming material. (Boeing- Wichita)

Conclusion: In relation to the SilkAir accident, the FAA evaluation of the production airplanes found no evidence of missing fasteners on the horizontal stabilizer. The Seattle MIDO obtained a SilkAir maintenance job card for the airplane which identified no defects during a maintenance check of the right horizontal stabilizer for the particular SilkAir B737 airplane. The job card lists that the leading edge and elevator hinge fittings were inspected, completed, stamped, and dated December 10, 1997. The FAA has also viewed a picture of the elevator hinge fitting area from the accident site, and it showed evidence that the bolt was installed but was sheared off.

The evaluation of the production airplanes found no evidence of missing fasteners on the horizontal stabilizers. Also, the indications from this evaluation strongly show that Boeing needs to develop and implement system improvements to prevent further recurrences of the conditions. The ACSEP findings and observations will be addressed formally to Boeing for their commitment to address the cause. FAA will expect Boeing to address immediate and long term corrective action plans for each finding identified during the ACSEP. The Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO) will perform the necessary follow-up to determine if the corrections are effective.

The Aircraft Certification Service has six scheduled ACSEP evaluations for Fiscal Year 1998 as part of our surveillance program for facilities at The Boeing Company. The next Boeing ACSEP evaluation is on the 747 and 767 programs in Everett, Washington, from February 2 — 13, 1998.

Post-it® Fax Note 7671	Date	# of pages ▶ 6
To Marcia Adams	From	
Co./Dept.	Co.	
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NEWS:

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 18, 1998

CONTACT: Anne Eldridge

New GPS-Based Air Routes Promise Improved Access to Caribbean, South America

The Federal Aviation Administration Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center is testing an innovative route structure that promises to markedly improve air access to the Caribbean and South America, making way for the dramatic airline traffic increases predicted by aviation consultants.

Based on global positioning system (GPS) rather than ground-based navigational aids, the experimental route structure should increase system capacity by adding routes without requiring additional navaids. What's more, it could potentially reduce the cost of aircraft operations, decrease delays and enable more efficient handling of air traffic throughout the area.

"This is the first 100 percent use of GPS as primary means of navigation using domestic route separation standards. So far, we have proven that the routes can be flown with absolute accuracy. Now, we are refining the routes and testing further," said Dennis Koehler, FAA Southern Region Air Traffic Division Manager.

Until October when the test began, the Florida-Caribbean airway structure depended on only five ground-based navigational aids. Approximately 1,200 commercial flights travel the navaid-based Florida-San Juan routes every day.

The experimental route structure adds 13 GPS routes to the system. These routes take GPS-equipped aircraft directly to their destinations, rather than along navaid-to-navaid paths. That means less time in the air and less fuel required.

-more-

Eleven airlines are participating in this test, flying a combined 30-35 GPS routes per day Participating airlines have equipped their aircraft with certified receivers and trained their crews to fly the new routes.

American Airlines has been actively involved in testing the new routes, retrofitting 64 Boeing 727s with GPS receivers.

Robert W Baker, American's executive vice president for operations, noted, "GPS will provide air carriers with the ability to fly off the traditional air route system, which will optimize the efficiency of aircraft operations. American Airlines plans to utilize GPS both in domestic and international operations."

He added, "GPS is going to play an important role as the industry moves into the concept of Free Flight. Without it, the airlines would not get the efficiencies that Free Flight promises, such as getting the customer to his or her destination on time. That's why we at American were willing to help the FAA conduct its testing."

Free Flight is an FAA initiative to enhance the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS). The concept moves the NAS from a centralized command-and-control system between pilots and air traffic controllers to a distributed system that allows pilots, whenever practical, to choose their own route and file a flight plan that follows the most efficient and economical route.

"These GPS routes offer important benefits to our users, but airlines and passengers aren't the only winners," Koehler said. "Once we have fully incorporated the GPS routes into the existing structure and more planes are properly equipped, the workload for the air traffic controllers could decrease."

He added, "This is the future of air traffic control. Our results will be used to establish similar domestic routes and will have international applications as well."

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Advantages of GPS Air Routes to the Caribbean, South America

- GPS enhances the reliability of Florida-Caribbean flights by minimizing use of ground-based navigational aids. Plus, GPS adds an extra measure of precision.

- GPS-equipped aircraft can fly directly to their destinations, rather than navaid to navaid. That means shorter flights (1-30 minutes less) and less fuel, which reduces the operators' costs.

- GPS increases the number of air routes to 17, increasing the capacity of the airspace. Because of the reliability and precision of GPS navigation, FAA expects to be able to reclassify the airspace to require less separation between aircraft – another system capacity enhancement. Under the current classification, aircraft are required to maintain 50 miles of separation between airways as they fly over the ocean enroute to the Caribbean.

- Ultimately, GPS routes will decrease air traffic controllers' workload, as more aircraft are equipped with certified receivers and the new routes are incorporated into the existing route structure.

What Is GPS And How Does It Work?

Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite based radio system operated by the US Department of Defense. GPS provides continuous highly accurate position and velocity information from a constellation of 24 satellites to an unlimited number of properly equipped users.

Here's how it works:

Satellites orbiting 11,000 miles above the earth emit navigational signals to receivers on earth. By measuring the travel time of a signal transmitted from a satellite, a receiver can calculate its distance from the satellite. Satellite positions are used by a receiver as precise reference points to determine its location. When receiving signals from at least four satellites, a GPS receiver can determine latitude, longitude, altitude and time.

To access the satellite information for navigation, a plane must be equipped with a certified receiver, properly installed to maximize signal reception. The visual presentation of information is similar to other navigational aids that are typically used. But, the GPS data is unaffected by weather and provides a worldwide reference system to the aircraft's location. Aircraft can use GPS data to fly en route airways, terminal operations and certain instrument approach procedures.

During the test, air traffic controllers manage GPS-equipped aircraft just as they do other aircraft. Ultimately, controllers won't need to interact with pilots as often but will continue to monitor planes' progress.

AIRWAYS BASED ON GROUND NAVIGATION



FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 22-98
Wednesday, February 18,1998
Contact: Kathryn B. Creedy
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Finds Eight European Countries Comply With International Safety Standards

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- As part of an effort to provide the public with more information about aviation safety in international travel, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced the results of the agency's assessments of eight countries to provide safety oversight of their air carriers that operate in the United States. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland comply with international safety standards.

The assessments are not an indication of whether individual foreign carriers are safe or unsafe, rather they determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are in place and the extent to which those authorities ensure that operational and safety procedures are maintained by their air carriers.

The focus of the FAA's foreign assessment program is on the civil aviation authority and not individual carriers. These civil authorities are assessed for their adherence to International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) aviation safety standards, not FAA regulations.

Travelers may call 1-800-FAA-SURE (1-800-322-7873) to obtain a summary statement about whether a foreign civil aviation authority has been assessed and the results, if available.

Countries whose air carriers fly to the United States must adhere to the safety guidelines of ICAO, the United Nations' technical agency for aviation, which establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

The FAA, with the cooperation of the host civil aviation authority, only makes assessments of those countries whose airlines have operating rights to or from the United States, or have requested such rights.

- more -

Specifically, the FAA determines whether a foreign civil aviation authority has an adequate infrastructure for international aviation safety oversight as defined by the ICAO standards. The basic elements that the FAA considers necessary include: 1) laws enabling the appropriate government office to adopt regulations necessary to meet the minimum requirements of ICAO; 2) current regulations that meet those requirements; 3) procedures to carry out the regulatory requirements; 4) air carrier certification, routine inspection, and surveillance programs; and 5) organizational and personnel resources to implement and enforce the above.

The FAA has established three ratings for the status of these civil aviation authorities at the time of the assessment: (1) does comply with ICAO standards, (2) conditional and (3) does not comply with ICAO standards.

- **Category I, Does Comply with ICAO Standards:** A civil aviation authority has been assessed by FAA inspectors and has been found to license and oversee air carriers in accordance with ICAO aviation safety standards.

- **Category II, Conditional:** A civil aviation authority in which FAA inspectors found areas that did not meet ICAO aviation safety standards and the FAA is negotiating actively with the authority to implement corrective measures. During these negotiations, limited operations by the foreign air carriers to the U.S. are permitted under heightened FAA operations inspections and surveillance.

- **Category III, Does Not Comply with ICAO Standards:** A civil aviation authority found not to meet ICAO standards for aviation oversight. Unacceptable ratings apply if the civil aviation authority has not developed or implemented laws or regulations in accordance with ICAO standards; if it lacks the technical expertise or resources to license or oversee civil aviation; if it lacks the flight operations capability to certify, oversee and enforce air carrier operations requirements; if it lacks the aircraft maintenance capability to certify, oversee and enforce air carrier maintenance requirements; or if it lacks appropriately trained inspector personnel required by ICAO standards. Operations to the U.S. by a carrier from a country that has received a Category III rating are not permitted unless the country arranges to have its flights conducted by a duly authorized and properly supervised air carrier appropriately certified from a country meeting international aviation safety standards.

The FAA has assisted civil aviation authorities with less than acceptable ratings by providing technical expertise, assistance with inspections, and training courses. The FAA hopes to work with other countries through ICAO to address non-compliance with international aviation safety oversight standards.

The FAA will continue to release the results of safety assessments to the public as they are completed. First announced in September 1994, the ratings are part of an FAA program to assess all countries with air carriers that operate to the United States.

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News:

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Public Affairs Office
1601 Lind Ave., SW
Renton, Wash. 98055

425 / 227-2004

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming

A copy of this document can be obtained via the World Wide Web at:
http://www.tc.faa.gov/NM/news_releases/indx.htm

Feb. 20, 1998
Release Number 98-19
More information - Mitch Barker 425/227-1203
For immediate release:

FAA proposes to assess $90,000 civil penalty against Mesa Airlines

FAA has proposed fining Mesa Airlines of Farmington, N. Mex., $90,000 for improper transportation of hazardous materials on flights between Spokane, Wash., and Portland, Ore., and between Denver and Montrose, Colo.

Mesa holds a Federal Aviation Regulation part 121 operating certificate permitting scheduled cargo and passenger flights.

The FAA alleges two instances in which the company violated the Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations by transporting methyl ethyl ketone aboard Mesa Airlines passenger-carrying flights without proper packaging, labeling and other documentation.

Mesa has 30 days from the time it receives the FAA's notice of the proposed fine to respond.

The announcement of the civil penalty proposal is in accordance with FAA's policy of releasing information to the public on newly issued enforcement actions in cases that involve penalties of $50,000 or more.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 21, 1998

CONTACT: ANNE ELDRIDGE

FAA REVOKES FLAMENCO AIRWAYS, INC.'s CERTIFICATE

The Federal Aviation Administration has issued an Emergency Order revoking the air carrier certificate of Flamenco Airways, Inc. of Culebra, Puerto Rico.

The Order was issued following an FAA investigation that revealed numerous violations, including:

- Intentional operation of three aircraft on hundreds of flights beyond the compliance time for an airworthiness directive;
- Intentional falsification of maintenance records by Flamenco personnel;
- Use of commercial rated pilots on commuter operations (which require an airline transport pilot rating) under the pretense that the operations were on-demand operations.

The Emergency Order of Revocation is effective immediately. Flamenco may appeal the order to the National Transportation Safety Board; however, the order remains in effect pending appeal.

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U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

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Fax: (407) 812-5644

CERTIFIED - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
and HAND DELIVERED

98SO210063
98SO210050
98SO210051

Flamenco Airways, Inc.
Noemi Gonzalez, President
P.O. Box 224
Culebra, P.R. 00775

EMERGENCY ORDER OF REVOCATION

The Administrator has determined that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest require the immediate revocation of your Air Carrier certificate. Therefore, the following constitutes an Emergency Order of Revocation:

1. At all times material herein Flamenco Airways, Inc. (hereafter Flamenco Airways) was and is now the holder of Air Carrier Certificate No. FLMA162A.

2. On or about November 26, 1997, the Director of Maintenance for Flamenco Airways, Pedro Garcia, signed off as completed Flamenco Airways Maintenance Program Documents (inspection forms 9A-3 and 9A-4) indicating that on November 25, 1997, he had completed in part both a 50 hour inspection and a 100 hour inspection for civil aircraft N65323, a Britten Norman Model BN2A.

3. At the time of the maintenance and associated sign-offs referred to in paragraph 2 above, the Director of Maintenance had not performed either a 50 or 100 hour inspection as stated or otherwise even performed any maintenance on N65323 concerning the entries on forms 9A-3 and 9A-4.

4. On or about November 26, 1997, the Director of Maintenance approved N65323 for return to service by signing or otherwise entering in the logbook that the aircraft had received a 100 hour inspection on November 25, 1997.

5. The entries referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 were fraudulent or intentionally false.

6. Flamenco Airways personnel were advised by the FAA on December 16, 1997, that as a result of the fact that the inspection entries referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 above were false, and the fact that the aircraft had not had a 100 hour inspection as required, aircraft N65323 was not in an airworthy condition.

7. Flamenco Airways continued to operate N65323 without the required 100 hour inspection until December 14, 1997, for a total of 211 flights and 84.1 hours.

8. On or about January 20, 1998, through January 27, 1998, representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration conducted an inspection of Flamenco Airways.

9. During that inspection the following discrepancies concerning aircraft airworthiness were discovered:

a. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N121DW dated January 19, 1997, reflects that the ATC Transponder was deferred as per company approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedures, but no records were found releasing this equipment back to serviceable status and complying with the required test and inspection in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

b. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N121DW dated June 2, 1997, reflects that the ATC Transponder power supply was removed and replaced, but no records were found showing the required test and inspection had been accomplished in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

c. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N121DW dated June 12, 1997, reflects that the ADF antenna was removed and deferred as per company approved MEL procedures, but a log book entry was not found installing, testing and correcting the MEL opened discrepancy as per company maintenance procedures and FAR 43.9.

d. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N131JL dated July 14, 1997, reflects that the electrical harness on the Altimeter encoder was repaired, but no records were found showing the required test and inspection had been accomplished in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

e. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N131JL dated August 5, 1997, reflects that the common plug for the Altimeter Encoder was reconnected after encoder malfunction, but no records were found showing the required test and inspection had been accomplished in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

f. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N131JL dated August 6, 1997, reflects that the Altimeter power supply wires were repaired, but no records were found showing the required test and inspection had been accomplished in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

g. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N115DW dated July 25, 1997, reflects that the Altimeter Encoder was removed and replaced, but no records were found showing the required test and inspection had been accomplished in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

h. An aircraft log book entry for aircraft N115DW dated August 29, 1997, reflects the replacement of the fuse and fuse holder for the ATC Transponder system, but no records were found showing the required test and inspection had been accomplished in accordance with FAR Part 91.413(b) and FAR Part 43 App E(c).

i. On or about April 4, 1997, Flamenco Airways operated aircraft N115DW approximately 3.8 flight hours beyond the required compliance inspection time of Airworthiness Directive 83-10-06R1.

j. On or about October 4, 1997, Flamenco Airways made or caused to be made intentional false entries in the maintenance records of a DC-3 civil aircraft, N31MC, stating that the required 36 months weighing of N31MC had been accomplished and stating the results of the weighing. Flamenco Airways continued to operate this aircraft without the required weighing until at least January 29, 1998.

k. Flamenco Airways operated several aircraft without complying with the requirements of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-14-01, which was due and applicable to these aircraft, as follows: civil aircraft N121DW, a Britten Norman model BN2A, was operated approximately 1,141 landings beyond the required compliance of this AD (during the period of October 8, 1997, to January 20, 1998); civil aircraft N131JL, a Britten Norman model BN2A, was operated approximately 1,203 landings beyond the required compliance of this AD (during the period of October 8, 1997, to January 22, 1998), civil aircraft N412WA, a Britten Norman model BN2A MK III, was operated approximately 225 landings beyond the required compliance of this AD (during the period of October 26, 1997, to November 14, 1997).

l. As of on or about November 22, 1997, Flamenco Airways had operated aircraft N412WA approximately 32.6 flight hours beyond the manufacturer's and type certificate required inspection limitations for wings structure components, and also had operated this aircraft approximately 7,359 flights beyond the airworthiness limitation section reflected in the type certificate data sheet, required for the rear fuselage spar frame and top longeron.

m. On or about January 17, 1998, the Acting Director of Maintenance for Flamenco Airways made a logbook entry for aircraft N121DW that he had complied with Airworthiness Directive 75-24-07R, and that the aircraft was returned to service as airworthy. At the time of this entry, Airworthiness Directive 75-24-07R had been superseded by Airworthiness Directive 97-14-01, which had not been complied with; as a result N121DW was not in an airworthy condition.

n. Flamenco Airways maintenance records reflected that aircraft N131JL and aircraft N115DW, on 1/24/98 and 1/25/98, respectively, were subject to a 100 hour inspection and both aircraft records reflected that the inspection was performed in accordance with an Aircraft Approved Inspection Program (AAIP) for which Flamenco Airways has no operations specifications authorization.

10. During the above referred to inspection the following discrepancies concerning operations were also discovered:

a. Mr. Ramon Torres' and Mr. Juan Jose Reina's pilot records did not have a record of their initial qualification training for the DC-3 and BN2-A-MKIII aircraft, respectively. These pilots have been used as crewmembers in these aircraft on air carrier flights.

b. Flamenco Airways operated a total of 32 revenue cargo flights subject to part 135 of the FAR's, in DC-3, N31MC, on December 18, 20, 1997 and on January 1, 12, 21, 22 and 23, 1998. Of these flights, only eight (8) load manifests were available for inspection. On January 20 and 21, 1998, Flamenco operated a total of 29 passenger carrying revenue flights in BN2-A aircraft, N131JL and N115DW, but only 14 load manifests were available for inspection.

c. Flamenco Airways operated scheduled passenger flights with pilots that only held a commercial pilot certificate. Although the flights were most of the time manifested and recorded as on demand flights, they were operated according to Flamenco Airways' published flight schedule. The subject flights were:

DATE	ACFT NO.	PILOT	FROM	TO	DEPARTED
12/22/97	N121DW	Juan Ramos	Culebra (CPX)	Fajardo (FDO)	1611
01/02/98	N131JL	Ivan Carbia	Fajardo (FDO)	Culebra (CPX)	0925
01/02/98	N115DW	Ivan Carbia	Culebra (CPX)	Fajardo (FDO)	1615
01/20/98	N115DW	Ivan Carbia	Culebra (CPX)	Fajardo (FDO)	1220
01/20/98	N115DW	Ivan Carbia	Culebra (CPX)	Fajardo (FDO)	1600
01/22/98	N121DW	Ivan Carbia	San Juan (SIG)	Culebra (CPX)	0835

11. In further reference to the facts referred to in paragraph 9j above, on or about January 29, 1998, Flamenco Airways reweighed N31MC and the Acting Director of Maintenance signed the weight and balance statement. However, the aircraft was weighed in accordance with U.S. Air Force Technical Order (TO) 01-16-47, a method that had not been approved for this aircraft; the aircraft was not weighed in accordance with the manufacturer's procedures as set forth in Flamenco Airways' Operations Manual, Chapter 8, pages 8-37 and 8-38.

12. When asked about the above weight and balance procedures that were used, Flamenco Airways could not produce U.S. Air Force Technical Order (TO) 01-16-47.

13. Flamenco Airways has continued to operate N31MC in air carrier service without complying with the requirement for the weighing of the aircraft within the previous 36 months by an acceptable or approved method.

14. On or about December 16, 1997, the mechanic certificate of Flamenco Airways Director of Maintenance was revoked. Flamenco continued to operate its air carrier flights without a Director of Maintenance or Acting Director of Maintenance at least until December 26, 1997.

15. The violations referred to above directly or indirectly resulted from the actions and/or lack of compliance disposition of previous and current management personnel of Flamenco Airways, or of individuals with control over or a substatial ownership interest in, Flamenco Airways.

16. By reason of the foregoing, Flamenco Airways lacks the qualifications to be the holder of an air carrier certificate.

17. As a result, Flamenco Airways violated the following section(s) of the Federal Aviation Regulations:

a. Section 39.3 which states that no person may operate a product to which an airworthiness directive applies except in accordance with the requirements of that airworthiness directive.

b. Section 43.9(a) which states that, except as otherwise provided, each peson who maintains, performs preventive maintenance, rebuilds, or alters an aircraft, shall make an entry in the maintenance record of that equipment containing the prescribed information.

c. Section 43.11(a) which states that the person approving or disapproving for return to service an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or component part after any inspection performed in accordance with Part 91, 123, 125, Sec. 135.411(a)(1), or Sec. 135.419 shall make an entry in the maintenance record of that equipment containing the information listed in this section.

d. Section 43.12(a) which states that no person may make or cause to be made any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or report that is required to be made, kept, or used to show compliance with any requirement under this part, or reproduce or alter any record or report for fraudulent purpose.

e. Section 43.15(a)(1) which states that each person performing an inspection required by Part 91, 123, 125, or 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations shall perform the inspection so as to determine whether the aircraft, or its portions thereof under inspection, meets all applicable airworthiness requirements.

f. Section 91.7(a) which states that no person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.

g. Section 91.405(a) which states that each owner or operator of an aircraft shall have that aircraft inspected as required by Subpart E of Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations and shall between required inspections (except as otherwise provided) have discrepancies repaired in accordance with Part 43 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

h. Section 91.413 which states that (a) no person may use an ATC transponder, that is specified in Section 91.215(a), Section 121.345(c), Section 127.123(b) or Section 135.143(c), unless within the preceding 24 calendar months, that ATC transponder has been tested and inspected and found to comply with Appendix F of Part 43; and (b) following any installation or maintenance on an ATC transponder where data correspondence error could be introduced, the integrated system has been tested, inspected, and found to comply with paragraph (c), appendix E, of part 43 of this chapter.

i. Section 119.5(g) which states that no person may operate as a direct air carrier or as a commercial operator without, or in violation of, an appropriate certificate and appropriate operations specifications.

j. Section 119.69(a)(3) which states that each certificate holder must have sufficient qualified management and technical personnel to ensure the safety of its operations. Except for a certificate holder using only one pilot in its operations, the certificate holder must have qualified personnel serving in the following or equivalent positions: ... (3) Director of Maintenance.

k. Section 135.25(a)(2) which states that, except as otherwise provided, no certificate holder may operate an aircraft under this part unless that aircraft is in an airworthy condition and meets the applicable airworthiness requirements of this chapter, including those relating to identification and equipment.

l. Section 135.63(a) which states that each certificate holder shall keep at its principal business office or at other places approved by the Administrator, and shall make available for inspection by the Administrator, information required under this part.

m. Section 135.63(d) which states that the pilot in command of an aircraft for which a load manifest must be prepared shall carry a copy of the completed load manifest in the aircraft to its destination. The certificate holder shall keep copies of completed load manifests for at least 30 days at its principal operations base, or at another location used by it and approved by the Administrator.

n. Section 135.185 which states that no person may operate a multiengine aircraft unless the current empty weight and center of gravity are calculated from values established by actual weighing of the aircraft within the preceding 36 calendar months.

c. Section 135.243(a) which states that no certificate holder may use a person, nor may any person serve, as pilot in command in passenger-carrying operations--(1) Of a turbojet airplane, of an airplane having a passenger-seat configuration, excluding each crewmember seat, of 10 seats or more, or of a multiengine airplane in a commuter operation as defined in part 119 of this chapter, unless that person holds an airline transport pilot certificate with appropriate category and class ratings and, if required, an appropriate type rating for that airplane.

As a result of the foregoing, the Administrator has determined that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest require the revocation of your Air Carrier certificate. The Administrator further finds that an emergency requiring immediate action exists in respect to safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest and, accordingly, this Order shall be effective immediately.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator by 49 U.S.C. Sections 44709 and 46105, that any and all Air Carrier certificate(s) held by you including Air Carrier Certificate No FLMA162A, be and hereby are, revoked. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said certificate be surrendered to the undersigned immediately.

You may appeal from this Order in accordance with the paragraph below.

EDDIE L. THOMAS
REGIONAL COUNSEL

BY:
KEITH S. MAY
Managing Attorney, South Branch
Office of the Regional Counsel
Southern Region at Orlando, Florida

APPEAL

You may appeal from this Order within ten (10) days from the date it is served by filing an original and three copies of a Notice of Appeal with the Office of Judges, National Transportation Safety Board, Room 531, 5th Floor, 490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW, Washington, D.C. 20594, (202) 314-6150. An appeal must be filed within ten (10) days from the time of service of this Emergency Order. However, due to the fact that your Air Carrier certificate has been revoked on an emergency basis, the revocation will remain in effect during the pendency of any proceedings before the National Transportation Safety Board. Part 821 of the Board's Rules of Practice (49 CFR Part 821) applies to such an appeal. In the event you appeal, a duplication of your Notice of Appeal should be furnished to this office.

Whether or not you choose to appeal from the provisions of this order, you must surrender your Air Carrier certificate to Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, 5950 Hazeltine National Dr., Suite 510, Orlando, FL 32822, immediately.

In the event of an appeal to the NTSB, a copy of the Emergency Order will be filed with the NTSB and will serve as the Administrator's Complaint.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have hand delivered the foregoing Emergency Order and that it was mailed via Certified Mail this date to:

Flamenco Airways, Inc.
P.O. Box 224
Culebra, P.R. 00775

_____ _____
Date

cc: John Faulk, Esq.

FAA Nev

Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Region, Jamaica, NY 11430

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
AEA 3-98
February 23, 1998
Contact: Arlene Salac/Jim Peters
Phone: (718) 553-3015

FAA Proposes Fine against Skis Dynastar, Inc.

New York – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a civil penalty totaling $350,000 against Skis Dynastar, Inc., a Colchester, Vermont, distributor of snow skis and ski accessories, for violation of the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Hazardous Materials Regulations.

Between March 2 and 3, 1997, an employee of Skis Dynastar transported hazardous materials in his checked baggage on a passenger aircraft. The employee traveled from Oslo, Norway, to Zurich, Switzerland, on Swiss Airlines. In Zurich, he transferred to United Airlines to Washington Dulles International Airport. Upon arrival at Washington Dulles, he boarded United Airlines to Denver International Airport .

On March 3, while a United Airlines agent was loading the employee's checked baggage onto a conveyor belt, one piece of baggage - a metal container - exploded. Inspection of the employee's checked baggage revealed that it contained a butane torch, two butane fuel containers and one can of acetone. None of the materials were labeled or packaged as hazardous materials in violation of DOT Hazardous Materials Regulations.

Skis Dynastar has 30 days to respond to the allegations in the civil penalty notice before the FAA takes any further action. If the matter cannot be resolved amicably, Skis Dynastar may file a written request for a hearing with the FAA Hearing Docket Clerk.

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U.S. Department of Transportation

News:

Federal Aviation Administration
Office of Public Affairs
Southwest Region
Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0005

Feb. 23, 1998
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contacts: John Clabes, 817-222-5804
Roland Herwig, 405-954-7500

FAA PROPOSES THREE CIVIL PENALTIES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SHIPMENTS

FORT WORTH--The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today said it will propose to assess civil penalties ranging from $50,000 to $85,000 against three companies for shipping unmarked or improperly packaged hazardous materials aboard civil aircraft, a violation of several Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations.

The FAA said American Airlines in July 1997 accepted mislabeled hazardous materials (batteries) for shipment aboard American planes from Caracas, Venezuela, to Miami to Dallas/Fort Worth (D/FW). Acid was found to be leaking from the shipment at D/FW. The FAA alleged that American committed at least 11 regulatory violations regarding shipment. In addition to improper packaging, the FAA said American's employees involved in the shipment were not properly trained in handling or accepting hazardous shipments and failed to notify the pilot in command of the shipment. The FAA said it proposed to assess an $85,000 civil penalty in the case.

In a second case, the FAA proposes to assess a $50,000 civil penalty against an Arkansas company--W.D. Whinery Inc., of Russelville--for offering an undeclared shipment of hazardous materials from Federal Express for transportation by air from Little Rock, Ark., to Mount Vernon, Ind., through Evansville, Ind. The shipment of two one-gallon cans of epoxy, with a flashpoint of 69 degrees, leaked at Little Rock and Evansville. FAA security investigators found the shipment was not properly marked, labeled, described, packaged and in condition for safe shipment.

The third case involves an undeclared hazardous materials shipment aboard a Federal Express aircraft from Greensboro, N.C., to D/FW. The shipment of flame retardant liquid containing acid and formaldehyde was found leaking at the D/FW Federal Express cargo facility. FAA security investigators also found the packaging faulty. The FAA proposes to assess a $75,000 civil penalty against Collegiate Design Inc., of Dublin, Va., the company that offered the material for transportation.

The announcement of the proposed civil penalties is being made in accordance with the FAA's policy of releasing information to the public on newly-issued enforcement actions involving civil penalties of $50,000 or more.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 23-98
Tuesday, February 24, 1998
Contact: Kathryn B. Creedy
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Appoints New National Resource Specialist for Advanced Composites

WASHINGTON -- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification Guy Gardner today announced the appointment of Dr. Larry B. Ilcewicz to FAA's National Resource Specialist (NRS) team. The NRS program taps internationally recognized experts in their respective fields to serve as advisors to industry, government agencies and international aviation authorities.

Dr. Ilcewicz is the NRS specialist for advanced composite materials for the FAA's certification division. He is responsible for advanced composite materials training, structural certification consultation and national research program planning. Dr. Ilcewicz has more than 18 years of experience in the application of composite materials to aircraft structure, primarily with The Boeing Company. He supported design, production and sustaining efforts for 757, 767 and 777 aircraft, specializing in composite laminate durability, impact damage, residual strength and environmental effects.

He served as the principal investigator for the NASA-funded Advanced Technology Composite Aircraft Structures Program which focuses on the subsonic transport fuselage. For Boeing, he also supported the development of general composite design requirements and objectives, stress analysis methods, design cost models and implementation strategies for future commercial aircraft products.

Dr. Ilcewicz is on the editorial board of two technical journals, has taught courses on the mechanics of composite materials, and serves on the Industry Steering Committee for the Department of Metals and Materials at the University of British Columbia. He has authored or co-authored more than 70 scientific and technical publications, many of which included presentations on composite integrated product development, structural design, damage tolerance and durability.

Dr. Ilcewicz joins a team of 18 National Resource Specialists that are part of the FAA's Regulation and Certification organization.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov

FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 24-98
Thursday, February 26, 1998
Contact: Rebecca Trexler
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Proposes Fines Against American Airlines, DHL Airways And Bismuth Cartridge Company for Hazardous Materials Violations

WASHINGTON – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed fines of $60,000 each against Bismuth Cartridge Company, Dallas; DHL Airways Inc., Redwood City, Calif.; and American Airlines Inc., Dallas; for hazardous materials violations related to a shipment by air of 215 boxes of shotgun shell cartridges. The FAA issued notices of proposed penalties to each of the three entities on Jan. 23.

According to the investigative record, Bismuth offered the shipment to DHL on July 8, 1996, for transportation from Dallas to Birmingham, United Kingdom. On July 10, 1996, DHL offered the shipment to American Airlines for transportation from Dallas to the United Kingdom. The shipment flew aboard two of American's regularly scheduled passenger flights and arrived at London Gatwick Airport the same day.

On July 14, 1996, DHL collected the shipment from American Airlines, and a DHL employee handling the consignment noticed the boxes were marked "cases cartridge empty primed." Once the boxes were opened, DHL was able to confirm the shipment contained shotgun cartridges fitted with percussion caps, which are classified as hazardous materials. While the boxes appear to have been properly packaged, none had hazard class warning labels and none had the required dangerous goods transport documents required by Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations.

Bismuth Cartridge Company was cited for knowingly offering undeclared hazardous materials for transportation by air. DHL was cited for knowingly accepting the hazardous shipment, while American was cited for knowingly accepting and transporting the shipment by air.

This announcement is being made in accordance with FAA's policy of releasing information to the public on enforcement actions involving penalties of $50,000 or more. Each company has 30 days from receipt of FAA's notice to submit a reply.

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
APA 25-98
Friday, February 27, 1998
Contact: Alison Duquette
Phone: 202-267-8521

FAA Inspection of ValuJet/AirTran Airlines
Finds No Systemic Safety Problems

WASHINGTON – Following a scheduled, intensive inspection, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has found no evidence of systemic safety problems at ValuJet Airlines (now doing business as AirTran Airlines). However, the FAA did find areas of concern ranging from administrative issues to improper oversight of a contractor.

An FAA National Aviation Safety Inspection Program (NASIP) team performed a detailed examination of AirTran Airlines Oct. 20 - Nov. 7, 1997. As part of the validation process, a second team was drawn from around the nation to support the in-depth examination of the findings.

The ValuJet/AirTran Airlines report issued today contains 106 initial findings. After the detailed examination, 60 findings could not be validated and were closed. A finding is an initial observation requiring in-depth study by investigators from the office that supervises the airline. All of the remaining 46 findings have either been corrected by the airline or corrective action is in progress and being monitored by the FAA. The agency has initiated 19 enforcement actions that addressed 25 of those 46 findings.

"We've not only relied on the expertise of the NASIP team, but we also took advantage of the experience and knowledge of a second team of FAA inspectors who examined the initial findings," said Guy S. Gardner, associate administrator for regulation and certification. "This thorough approach is part of the agency's commitment to the American public to provide heightened surveillance of all new entrant carriers."

The NASIP included only aircraft for ValuJet Airlines, Inc. doing business as AirTran Airlines. Aircraft operated as AirTran Airways of Orlando were not part of this inspection. Major findings of the ValuJet/AirTran Airlines NASIP inspection:

- ValuJet/AirTran Airlines contracted with a company not listed in its Operations Specifications to paint 12 aircraft and perform interior modifications.

The airline failed to update the "Aircraft Weights" table or to issue an "Operations Bulletin" after the company changed the seating configuration on an aircraft from 115 to 106 passenger seats.

- Two weight and balance forms were calculated incorrectly.
- Some flight time records were not completed by flight crewmembers in accordance with ValuJet procedures.
- The airline needs to improve its Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program (CASP) which is designed to prevent repetitive problems.

Corrective actions on all of these findings are either complete or in progress.

NASIP allows a team of FAA inspectors to take a snapshot look at an air carrier or repair station. Each initial NASIP finding goes through a validation process prior to issuance of the final report. The agency conducts an average of 30 NASIPs each year.

The FAA has a heightened surveillance program for new entrant airlines, those that have been in business for less than five years. The agency plans to complete NASIPs on all new entrant airlines by end of fiscal year 1998.

A total of 22 FAA employees were dedicated to the ValuJet/AirTran Airlines NASIP and subsequent examination and validation. There are a total of 3,060 aviation safety inspectors in the FAA workforce.

ValuJet/AirTran Airlines currently operates 34 DC-9 aircraft serving 25 cities.

The report is available on the FAA's homepage at: www.faa.gov. Go to "news & information" followed by "reports & publications."

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FAA News

Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, February 27, 1998
Contact: Alison Duquette
Phone: 202-267-8521

Fact Sheet
National Aviation Safety Inspection Program (NASIP)

- The NASIP is one tool used by the FAA to examine the operations of an air carrier. Other tools include the initial certification, ramp inspections, flying in the jump seat to observer crews, onsite inspections, and reports from outside.
- A NASIP is a snapshot of a carrier's operations taken by a team of inspectors from outside the carrier, drawing on their own experiences, expectations and assumptions. They catalogue their observations, termed "findings," for later in-depth study by investigators from the office that supervises the carrier under scrutiny. The NASIP report is often written in detailed technical language to give specific guidance to local inspectors in their follow-up examination of the observations.
- A NASIP checks for compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations that apply to the carrier and its operations; compliance or adherence to guidance developed by the carrier and approved by the FAA; and the reliability or integrity of the carrier's systems or guidance to ensure it complies with aviation regulations.
- Typically, the NASIP team conducts its inspection, briefs its observations to the FAA office that manages the certificate and is responsible for the follow-up investigation, and it briefs the carrier. A draft report is prepared, and ultimately a final report is prepared. Then, the FAA office supervising the carrier has 120 days to examine the findings, determining which require any action such as a manual or procedure change, or enforcement action. Often, some findings are unsupported in the subsequent investigation.
- The ValuJet/AirTran NASIP used a team of inspectors which took an extremely conservative approach, leading to the high number of findings or observations. Because a few of the initial observations, if substantiated, could have serious safety implications, and because of differences of opinion between the NASIP team and local inspectors over the import of the observations, the FAA sent in senior inspectors – including members of the new Certification Standardization and Evaluation Team – to examine the most serious of the observations rather than waiting for the 120-day process to run its course. Meanwhile, the FAA office holding the carrier's certificate continued its work validating – proving or disproving – the observations found in the initial inspection. Ultimately, of the 106 findings, 60 were not substantiated.

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An electronic version of this fact sheet is available via the World Wide Web at: www.faa.gov