

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, August 2, 1996

APA 137-96 Contact: Les Dorr Tel.: (202) 267-8521

MEDIA ADVISORY

MEDIA TOUR OF AVIATION SECURITY LAB AT FAA'S WILLIAM J. HUGHES TECHNICAL CENTER

On Monday, August 5, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will conduct a tour of the Aviation Security Laboratory at the agency's William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, N.J., for credentialed media representatives. The lab is the nation's leading federal facility for research and development of civil aviation security technologies and systems.

At 2:00 p.m., Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) and center director Guy S. Gardner will make brief remarks in the laboratory conference room, followed by a tour of the lab. The tour will conclude with a brief question-and-answer session around 3:00 p.m.

Media representatives planning to attend should come to the Aviation Security Laboratory, Building 315, prior to the 2:00 p.m. briefing. Television crews should arrive no later than 1:45 p.m. to set up.

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Tuesday, August 6, 1996 APA 96-138 Contact: Anthony Willett (202) 267-3883

FAA SAYS UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION IS HARMFUL

The FAA values the role of the news media in a free and open society. However, the FAA believes the public's right to know must, in some circumstances, be balanced against the government's role in preserving national security.

The FAA has serious concerns that the unauthorized release of sensitive materials regarding security procedures at U.S. airports is harmful. America has entered a day and age where the threat of terrorism on our shores has become real, and any unauthorized release of sensitive security material serves only to aid those who would perpetrate criminal acts on our society.

It is well known that terrorists rely on information gained from "open sources." Those with criminal intent who monitor our media are aided by the dissemination of this sensitive and specific security information not intended for public disclosure.

Safety and security are the FAA's number one concerns. The FAA has increased aviation security since the completion of the tests mentioned in the sensitive materials, including actions taken last October and the further increase announced by the President on July 28. The sensitive material itself is an indication that the FAA has been aggressively testing screening to improve performance by the carriers at U.S. airports.

Senior FAA security officials will discuss these and other aviation security topics in executive session when the Congress reconvenes. Congress has agreed that the specifics of aviation security measures are not appropriately discussed in an open, public environment.

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, August 7, 1996

APA 139-96

Contact: Les Dorr, Jr. Telephone: 202/267-8521

FAA DEVELOPS ADVANCED CREW TRAINING TOOL FOR REGIONAL AIRLINES

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently released and has begun teaching airlines how to use a pilot training program that will enhance regional air carrier safety.

The FAA developed the new program, which includes a computer software tool, to help regional carriers create Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP). The software provides the analytical framework that allows individual carriers to integrate crew resource management into their pilot training programs. AQP training will help those airlines improve flight crew performance and reduce the adverse effects of errors in the cockpit.

"The FAA's goal is to ensure that training programs meet each carrier's specific requirements in the most efficient way possible," said FAA Administrator David R. Hinson. "At our safety summit workshops last December, the FAA made a commitment to accelerate Advanced Qualification Programs and make them more accessible to regional airlines. I commend the FAA's human factors team for developing this innovative training tool on time and within budget."

The Advanced Qualification Program is a comprehensive crew training plan designed to ensure the seamless integration of crew resource management and technical skills with all other flight procedures required by specific flight situations. It not only provides systematic training, but also evaluates that training and addresses weaknesses.

Proficiency training is central to AQP. Under the program, carriers develop their own proficiency objectives, which address the range of conditions and contingencies faced by pilots working within that carrier's operational domain. These objectives define the skills and tasks a pilot must be able to perform to be proficient on a given aircraft type.

Each airline's AQP must be approved by the FAA. Currently, 15 air carriers participate in the program, including United Airlines, American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines and USAir. AQP programs are expensive to create from scratch, so the FAA designed a "model AQP" for regional carriers. The software tool is an AQP data base that lets regionals create individualized programs by plugging data pertinent to their aircraft and procedures into the database. The computer then helps generate an AQP program.

The AQP for the regional airlines focuses on scenario-based training, where pilots are provided specific information and must use that knowledge to solve in-flight problems. For example, a training event might include a specific maneuver or procedures to deal with an engine loss. It also might present a particular flight condition, such as adverse weather or a malfunctioning aircraft system. To handle an event successfully, the crew must quickly and accurately assess the situation, plan how to manage the event and use technical and crew resource management skills appropriate for that event.

This program is just one part of the FAA's continuing effort to improve crew resource management techniques. Statistics show that approximately 65 percent of all fatal air carrier accidents list human error as a probable cause. The FAA's Human Factors Office is conducting research that will improve human performance and reduce the adverse effects of errors in the cockpit through improved systems design, procedures and training.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: http://www.faa.gov

Talking Points Venezuela's Status in FAA's International Aviation Assessment Program August 8, 1996

- The FAA was notified last night that two American Airlines aircraft had been inspected by Venezuela inspectors who determined that they did not meet international safety requirements.
- The airline was authorized to ferry the aircraft out of Venezuela without passengers.
- It is FAA's understanding that airlines are working on an alternate way to get affected
 passengers to their final destinations.
- The FAA informed the Venezuelan government in August 1995 that its civil aviation authority does not comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for air safety oversight. As a result of this finding, in November 1995, Venezuela was placed in Category 2 of the FAA's international aviation safety assessment program. This is a temporary "conditional" category designed to allow Venezuelan carriers to continue operations to the United States under heightened surveillance while the Venezuelan government corrects deficiencies in its safety oversight system.
- The Secretary of Transportation and the Minister of Transport for Venezuela were previously scheduled to meet today, August 8, to discuss the aviation relationship.

Vashington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, August 9, 1996

APA 141-96

Contact: Curtis Austin

Tele.: (202) 267-8521

FAA SIGNS MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION WITH SINGAPORE

Continuing its goal of further enhancing aviation safety worldwide, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has signed an agreement with Singapore to initiate work on establishing technical agreements between the two countries on satellite-based navigational systems.

"With the official signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) agreement between our authorities, we can formally begin cooperative work on future systems and development of regional activities," Administrator David R. Hinson said of the July 29 agreement between the FAA and the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS). The CAAS is responsible for all Singapore air transport matters, including negotiating bilateral civil aviation agreements, air traffic services, airworthiness, and accident investigation.

"Singapore has taken a lead role in the Asia-Pacific technological arena and the FAA believes that an aviation partnership between our authorities is very important. We look forward to more cooperative endeavors," Hinson said.

The MOC provides the FAA and the CAAS with a vehicle to initiate formal agreements on a variety of technical aviation issues. Of primary interest to the two authorities is having the FAA work with CAAS for the development of the Global Positioning System (GPS) through the MOC. The GPS is a constellation of 24 satellites in earth orbit that provide users with precise navigation and positional information on air, land and sea.

One of the additional agreements, or annexes, that will now be developed as a result of the MOC, is an annex on GPS to allow the two aviation authorities to exchange information and data on research, development and implementation of satellite-based technology for navigation systems and all phases of flight.

The GPS annex agreement is expected to be signed by the fall of 1996.

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: http://www.faa.gov

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, August 9, 1996

APA 142-96

Contact: Curtis Austin Tele.: (202) 267-8521

FAA SIGNS MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION WITH MEXICO

Continuing its goal of further enhancing aviation safety worldwide, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has signed agreements with Mexico to establish technical agreements between the two countries on satellite-based navigational systems and other navigational services.

"With the official signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) agreement between our two authorities, we can formally begin cooperative work on future navigation systems and cooperative programs," FAA Administrator David R. Hinson said.

MOCs are umbrella agreements providing the FAA and other aviation authorities with vehicles to initiate formal agreements on a variety of technical aviation issues.

The MOC with Mexico provides a working agreement between the FAA and Mexico's aviation authority — the Ministry of Communications and Transport, United Mexican States (SCT) — for the development of the Global Positioning System (GPS) through the MOC. GPS is a constellation of 24 satellites in Earth orbit that provide users with precise navigation and positional information on air, land and sea.

A second agreement, an annex to an existing MOC, also was signed. This annex establishes the specific functional areas of air navigation services under which cooperative programs may be instituted by mutual agreement between both the FAA and the Mexican Airspace Navigation Services, which operates Mexico's air traffic control system. This annex sets forth the general provisions for the implementation of these cooperative programs.

Mutual cooperative programs aimed at improving air navigation services between the United States and Mexico may be instituted in functional areas that may include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- · airspace management
- aeronautical information services
- search and rescue alerting services
- · air traffic control
- · air traffic flow management
- · aeronautical telecommunication services
- communication
- navigation
- surveillance, and
- · air traffic management

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An electronic version of this news release is available via the World Wide Web at: http://www.faa.gov

Washington, D.C.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, August 9, 1996

APA 143-96 Contact: Tim Pile Tel.: (206) 227-2004

FAA PROPOSES INSPECTIONS OF FUEL PUMPS FOR ALL BOEING 747 AND 757 AIRCRAFT

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today proposed a rule requiring repetitive visual inspections and testing to identify corrosion of fuel pumps on all Boeing 747 and 757 aircraft to prevent fuel leaks. If necessary, fuel pumps will be replaced. If not detected and corrected, a fuel leak could result in a fire at the location of the fuel pump.

Fuel pumps on some B-747 aircraft were removed after the FAA received eight reports of fuel leaks at the fuel boost and override/jettison pumps. One of the leaks resulted in a minor fire within the wheel well while the aircraft was on the ground. The agency has determined that B-757 aircraft may be subject to the same fuel leakage problem since they are of similar design. Following the reported leaks, Boeing issued service bulletins advising operators to conduct visual inspections and repetitive insulation resistance tests of the fuel pump wiring for B-747 and B-757 aircraft. Other Boeing models use a different fuel pump design.

"To date no fuel leaks have been found on the inspected aircraft," said FAA
Administrator David R. Hinson. "We're proposing this rule to have all affected aircraft inspected
and corrected to ensure the highest level of safety."

There are 1,084 B-747 and 716 B-757 aircraft in the worldwide fleet. Of these aircraft, 242 B-747 and 462 B-757 aircraft are registered in the United States. The cost to U.S. operators for the proposed rule is \$1,080 per B-747 and \$720 per B-757 aircraft.

Affected aircraft operators are: Atlas Air; United Airlines; American Airlines; Evergreen International Aviation, Inc.; Federal Express Corporation; United Parcel Service Airlines; Northwest Airlines; Polar Air Cargo; Southern Air Transport; Trans World Airlines; and Tower Air.

The FAA issues an average of 300 Airworthiness Directives (ADs) each year and has issued over 350 ADs affecting the B-747 since the aircraft entered service in 1970.

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Saturday, August 10, 1996

APA 144-96

Contact: Kathleen Bergen

Tel.: (404) 305-5100

U.S.-VENEZUELA REACH 30-DAY AGREEMENT ON CONTINUED AIR SERVICE

U.S. and Venezuelan officials signed an agreement Saturday to continue air service between the two countries for 30 days while Venezuela works to fully comply with international aviation safety standards.

The agreement was reached in talks that began Friday between Transportation Secretary Federico Peña, the Federal Aviation Administration, and a Venezuelan delegation led by Transport Minister Moises Orozco Graterol. In the course of the discussions, Venezuelan officials indicated a sincere desire to address long-standing areas of concern.

The Transport Ministry agreed to provide 100 percent safety oversight of all Venezuelan aircraft flying from Venezuela to the United States; to seek funding for the ministry from the Venezuelan Congress; to make substantial progress in certifying the safety of Venezuelan airlines; to develop a detailed outline of steps to be taken to meet the highest safety standard under the FAA's international safety rating system; and to forbid flights to the United States by any Venezuelan aircraft found by Venezuelan or U.S. inspectors to have safety problems.

The FAA informed the Venezuelan government in August 1995 that its civil aviation authority, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, did not comply with ICAO standards for safety oversight. The FAA placed Venezuela in Category 2 under its International Aviation Safety Assessment program (IASA) in November 1995. The conditional designation allowed Venezuelan carriers to operate to the United States under heightened surveillance while the MTC worked to correct safety oversight program deficiencies.

(more)

Saturday's agreement will run through Sept. 9. If at the conclusion of the 30 days all conditions of the agreement have been met, the United States will continue to work with Venezuela to bring its aviation system to the highest standard under the FAA rating system -- Category 1.

Air travel between the United States and Venezuela was temporarily affected this past week, although U.S. carriers have resumed service to Venezuela and Venezuelan carriers are continuing to serve U.S. destinations.

Countries whose air carriers fly to the United States must adhere to the safety guidelines of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations' technical agency for aviation which establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

The FAA, with the cooperation of the host country, only assesses countries whose airlines have operating rights to or from the United States, or have requested such rights. Specifically, the FAA determines whether a country has an adequate infrastructure for international aviation safety oversight as defined by the ICAO standards. The basic elements that the FAA considers necessary include: 1) laws enabling the appropriate government office to adopt regulations necessary to meet the minimum requirements of ICAO; 2) current regulations that meet those requirements; 3) procedures to carry out the regulatory requirements; 4) air carrier certification, routine inspection, and surveillance programs, and 5) organizational and personnel resources to implement and enforce the above.

The FAA has established three ratings for the status of these countries at the time of the assessment: (1) does comply with ICAO standards, (2) conditional and (3) does not comply with ICAO standards. Under Category 2, limited operations are permitted to the United States under heightened FAA operations inspections and surveillance. Operations to the U.S. by a carrier from a country that has received a Category III rating are not permitted unless they arrange to have their flights conducted by a duly authorized and properly supervised air carrier appropriately certified from a country meeting international aviation safety standards.

Vashington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Monday, August 12, 1996

APA 140-96

Contact: Alison Duquette

Tel.: (202) 267-8521

FAA ANNOUNCES ASSESSMENTS OF FOREIGN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS

As part of an effort to provide the public with more information about aviation safety in international travel, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced the results of the agency's assessment of three countries' capability to provide safety oversight of their air carriers that operate in the United States. Kuwait is rated as conditional under international safety standards. Poland and Aruba, previously rated conditional, have improved their rating to acceptable.

The assessments are not an indication of whether an individual foreign carrier is safe or unsafe, rather they determine whether or not the country has a civil aviation authority in place and the extent to which that authority ensures that operational and safety procedures are maintained by its air carriers.

The focus of the FAA's foreign assessment program is on countries, not individual carriers from that country. These countries are assessed for their adherence to International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) aviation safety standards, not FAA regulations.

Travelers may call 1-800 FAA-SURE (1-800-322-7873) to obtain a summary statement about whether a foreign country has been assessed and the results, if available.

Countries whose air carriers fly to the United States must adhere to the safety guidelines of ICAO, the United Nations' technical agency for aviation which establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

The FAA, with the cooperation of the host country, only assesses countries whose airlines have operating rights to or from the United States, or have requested such rights.

Specifically, the FAA determines whether a country has an adequate infrastructure for international aviation safety oversight as defined by the ICAO standards. The basic elements that the FAA considers necessary include: 1) laws enabling the appropriate government office to adopt regulations necessary to meet the minimum requirements of ICAO; 2) current regulations that meet those requirements; 3) procedures to carry out the regulatory requirements; 4) air carrier certification, routine inspection, and surveillance programs; and 5) organizational and personnel resources to implement and enforce the above.

The FAA has established three ratings for the status of these countries at the time of the assessment: (1) does comply with ICAO standards, (2) conditional and (3) does not comply with ICAO standards.

- Category I, Does Comply with ICAO Standards: A country's civil aviation authority has been assessed by FAA inspectors and has been found to license and oversee air carriers in accordance with ICAO aviation safety standards.
- Category II, Conditional: A country's civil aviation authority in which FAA inspectors
 found areas that did not meet ICAO aviation safety standards and the FAA is negotiating
 actively with the authority to implement corrective measures. During these negotiations,
 limited operations by this country's air carriers to the U.S. are permitted under heightened
 FAA operations inspections and surveillance.
- Category III, Does Not Comply with ICAO Standards: A country's civil aviation authority found not to meet ICAO standards for aviation oversight. Unacceptable ratings apply if the civil aviation authority has not developed or implemented laws or regulations in accordance with ICAO standards; if it lacks the technical expertise or resources to license or oversee civil aviation; if it lacks the flight operations capability to certify, oversee and enforce air carrier operations requirements; if it lacks the aircraft maintenance capability to certify, oversee and enforce air carrier maintenance requirements; or if it lacks appropriately trained inspector personnel required by ICAO standards. Operations to the U.S. by a carrier from a country that has received a Category III rating are not permitted unless they arrange to have their flights conducted by a duly authorized and properly supervised air carrier appropriately certified from a country meeting international aviation safety standards.

The FAA has assisted countries with less than acceptable ratings by providing technical expertise, assistance with inspections, and training courses. The FAA hopes to work with other countries through ICAO to address non-compliance with international aviation safety oversight standards

The FAA will continue to release the results of safety assessments to the public as they are completed. First announced in September 1994, the ratings are part of an ongoing FAA program to complete initial assessments, by the end of 1996, of all countries with air carriers that operate to the United States.

Poland

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration conducted an assessment of the government of Poland's civil aviation authority in June, 1996. The purpose of the assessment was to verify that the civil aviation authority was in compliance with the aviation safety oversight standards contained within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) (Chicago Convention). It is every government's obligation to establish an infrastructure (i.e. civil aviation authority) that implements oversight of international aviation safety standards and ensures compliance by the air carriers which that state licenses. The FAA found, at the time of the assessment, that Poland's civil aviation authority was in compliance with ICAO aviation safety oversight standards regarding operations to and from the United States. Typically the level of oversight provided by a civil aviation authority for operations by its air carriers to and from the United States would be applied to operations to other destinations. Further information can be obtained by calling the FAA at 1-800-322-7873.

Aruba

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration conducted an assessment of the government of Aruba's civil aviation authority in June, 1996. The purpose of the assessment was to verify that the civil aviation authority was in compliance with the aviation safety oversight standards contained within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) (Chicago Convention). It is every government's obligation to establish an infrastructure (i.e. civil aviation authority) that implements oversight of international aviation safety standards and ensures compliance by the air carriers which that state licenses. The FAA found, at the time of the assessment, that Aruba's civil aviation authority was in compliance with ICAO aviation safety oversight standards regarding operations to and from the United States. Typically, the level of oversight provided by a civil aviation authority for operations by its air carriers to and from the United States would be applied to operations to other destinations. Further information can be obtained by calling the FAA at 1-800-322-7873.

Kuwait

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration conducted an assessment of this government's civil aviation authority in March, 1996. The purpose of this assessment was to verify that the civil aviation authority was in compliance with the aviation safety oversight standards contained within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1994) (Chicago Convention). It is every government's obligation to establish an infrastructure (i.e. a civil aviation authority) that implements oversight of international aviation standards and ensures compliance by the air carriers which that state licenses.

The FAA found, at the time of the assessment, that this government's civil aviation authority was not in compliance with ICAO safety oversight standards regarding its air carrier's operations. In the interim, limited operations by this country's air carrier to the U.S. are permitted under heightened FAA operations inspections and surveillance. Active negotiations with this government are being conducted to implement a process to correct the identified deficiencies. Further information can be obtained by calling the FAA at 1-800-322-7873.

Specific Deficiencies Identified:

- Subject civil aviation authority lacks the technical expertise and/or resources necessary to license and oversee civil aviation in accordance with ICAO standards.
- Subject civil aviation authority does not maintain documents and records of of air carrier certification and continuing surveillance in accordance with ICAO standards.

8/7/96	FAA Flight Standards Service
	International Aviation Safety
	Assessment Program (IASA)

BER	COUNTRY	CATEGORY	
1	Argentina	1	
2	Aruba	1	
3	Australia	1	
4	Bahamas	1	
5	Bangladesh	1	
6	Belize (no current operators)	3	
7	Bolivia	2	
8	Brazil	1	
9	Brunei Darussalam	1	
10	Bulgaria	1	
11	Chile		
12	Colombia	1	
		2	
13	Costa Rica	1	
14	Czech Republic	1	
15	Dominican Republic (no current operators)	3	
16	Ecuador	2	
17	El Salvador	1	
18	Fiji	1	
19	Gambia (no current operators)	3	
20	Ghana	1	
21	Guatemala	2	
22	Guyana	1A	
23	Haiti	3	
24	Honduras (no current operators)	3	
25	Hungary	1	
26	Israel	1	
27	Jamaica	2	
28	Jordan	1	
29	Kiribati (no current operators)	3	
30	Kuwait	2	
31	Marshall Islands	1A	
32	Malaysia	1	
33	Mexico	1	
34	Morocco	2	
35	Nauru	1	
	Netherlands Antilles: Curacau, St. Martin,		
36	Bonaire, Saba, St.Eustatius) -	1	
37	New Zealand	1	
38	Nicaragua (no current operators)	3	
39	Oman	1	
40	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) covers: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis	1A	
41	Panama	1	
42	Paraguay (no current operators)	3	
43	Peru Peru	2	
44	Phillipines	2	
45	Poland	1	
46	Romania	1	
47	South Africa	1	
48	Suriname	3	
49	Swaziland (no current operators)	3	
50	Trinidad & Tobago	2	
51	Turkey	2	
52	Ukraine	1	
53	Uruguay (no current operators)	3	
54	Uzbekistan	1	
55	Venezuela	2	
56	Western Samoa	1	
57	Zaire (no current operators)	3	
58	Zimbabwe (no current operators)	3	

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, August 16, 1996

APA 145-96

Contact: Alison Duquette

Tel.: (202) 267-8521

FAA IMPLEMENTS NEW WAKE VORTEX SEPARATION STANDARDS

To further improve aviation safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will implement new aircraft separation standards beginning Saturday, August 17, for all aircraft operating in the United States. Separation of small aircraft traveling behind a Boeing 757 will increase from four to five nautical miles. Some 57 types of aircraft, including several business jets and some smaller commercial aircraft, will be moved from the large to small aircraft category.

Wake vortices are tornado-like disturbances created as an aircraft passes through the atmosphere. Currently, all aircraft are separated for wake vortex using three categories: small, large, and heavy. The new standards will retain these categories, but will increase the separation for small aircraft trailing the Boeing 757.

"Following two accidents involving wake turbulence, I committed this agency to review aircraft weight categories," said FAA Administrator David R. Hinson. "I am confident that the new wake vortex separation standards will improve aviation safety and move the aviation community closer to our shared goal of zero accidents."

A Wake Turbulence Government/Industry Team, comprised of representatives from the FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, air carriers, pilots, air traffic controllers, and manufacturers, provided the FAA with recommendations on how to best separate aircraft to prevent wake turbulence incidents and accidents. To date, the FAA has taken the following actions to address wake vortex concerns:

- In 1993, the FAA issued a letter to all pilots urging them to reacquaint themselves with available information on wake vortex.
- In May 1994, the FAA increased the separation between Boeing 757 and other aircraft from three to four nautical miles. Also that year, the FAA worked with industry to produce a wake vortex training aid and videotape that was distributed to the pilot community.


Washington, D.C.

FACT SHEET

NEW WAKE VORTEX SEPARATION STANDARDS

Beginning August 17, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will implement new wake vortex separation standards for all aircraft operating under instrument flight rules in the United States. The old and new weight classification definitions are as follows:

	Current Weight Criterion	New Weight Criterion
Small	Less than 12,500 lbs. Example: Cessna 152, BE90	Less than 41,000 lbs. Example: Cessna 152, Falcon 50
Large	12,500 lbs 300,000 lbs. Example: Jetstream 31, B-727, B-757	41,000 lbs 255,000 lbs. Example: DHC-8, B-727, B-757
Heavy	300,000 lbs. or more Example: B-747, DC-10	255,000 lbs. or more Example: B-747, DC-10





Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, August 21, 1996

APA 146-96

Contact: Curtis Austin Tele: (202) 267-8521

MEDIA ADVISORY FAA PROPOSES CHANGES TO FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS OF 737s

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will hold a media briefing at 2 p.m. Thursday, August 22, to unveil proposed changes to the flight control systems of the Boeing 737s.

The briefing will be held in conference room 9ABC on the ninth floor of the FAA headquarters building, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington D.C. Thomas E. McSweeny, director of Aircraft Certification Service, will be available to explain the proposed changes and to answer questions from the media. Due to the informal nature of the briefing no cameras will be permitted.

A telephone bridge will be available for those unable to attend the media briefing. Persons interested in using the listen-only phone bridge should dial 1-800-226-6588 approximately 10 to 15 minutes prior to the scheduled briefing.

Washing 17, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Thursday, August 22, 1996

APA 147-96

Contact: Curtis Austin Tele.: (202) 267-8521

FAA PROPOSES AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES ON CHANGES TO DESIGN OF 737s FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS

Taking another step to ensure the highest levels of safety for America's flying public, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will propose changes to the design of the flight control systems of the Boeing 737s, based on a comprehensive review of those systems that was unveiled last spring.

The Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for nine Airworthiness Directives (ADs) would require actions to address changes or improvements in components of the flight control system of the 737s.

"These proposed ADs are a reflection of our top priority -- continuing to ensure the highest level of safety for the flying public," FAA Administrator David R. Hinson said. "They are designed to make a safe plane even safer."

Some of the ADs would affect only the earlier model 737's, such as Model 737-100's and 200's, other ADs would affect only the newer models, while still other ADs would affect the entire 737 fleet of 2,830 aircraft worldwide and 1,037 U.S. aircraft, Hinson said.

The review of the 737's flight control systems, called a Critical Design Review (CDR), began in 1994 and was conducted by an FAA-assembled team of representatives from the FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board, other U.S. government organizations, and foreign airworthiness authorities. The review was prompted by questions that arose following two accidents involving Model 737's, one near Colorado Springs, Colo., and another near Pittsburgh.

The team found that the Boeing 737 is in compliance with FAA airworthiness requirements and that no design flaws were found that could have caused either accidents that promoted the review. However the team, which completed its review in May 1995, made several recommendations. The nine proposed ADs address some of those recommendations.

Hinson said the FAA is proposing actions to address discrepancies in various components of the flight control system that could possibly lead to reduced ability to control the aircraft. Hinson stressed, however, neither the recommendations made by the CDR team nor the ADs that addressed those concerns required immediate corrective action.

The proposed ADs would require corrective actions be taken within 90 days to 18 months, depending on the particular AD. The cost of implementing the corrective changes to the entire U.S. 737 fleet would range from about \$10,000 for one change, which would require inspecting, and replacing if necessary, control cable pulley brackets on the 737-300; to approximately \$5 million to replace certain outboard and inboard wheel rims.

The nine proposed ADs will be published in the federal register next week as docket numbers 96-NM-145-AD through 96-NM-153. A 60-day comment period will follow upon publication.

Proposed AD's: Boeing Model 737 Critical Design Review

Docket Number	CDR Team Recommendation	Cause / Unsafe Condition	Corrective Action	Models and Number Affected	Cost Impact (U.S. Fleet)
96-NM-145-AD	RECOMMENDATION #25: The Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) to determine the degree of incorporation of [Boeing Service Bulletin 27, 1033, dated February 13, 1970] in the B737 fleet; reassess its safety impact, and, as appropriate, require its incorporation on applicable models of the B737	Cause: Mechanical interference can occur within the alleron (lateral) transfer mechanism, and can result in one of the two control wheels jamming. When one control wheel jams, the movement of the other one may be limited. Also, the flight crew may need to use above-normal force on the control wheel to override the jam. Unsafe Condition: This condition could result in an unexpected, control upset if the flightcrew does not respond rapidly enough to override the jam, and if the airplane is already banked or at a low altitude.	Within 18 months: Replace or rework the aileron control transfer mechanism.	737-100 737-200 Worldwide: 236 U.S. Fleet: 157	Depending upon whether component is reworked or replaced: Between 20 and 70 hours (@\$60/hour) per airplane Between \$1,450 and \$15,343 for parts per airplane
96-NM-146-AD	RECOMMENDATION #26: The Seattle ACO, in conjunction with Flight Standards, to determine the degree of incorporation of [Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-27-71-A, dated June 19, 1992] in the B737 fleet; reassess its safety impact; and, as appropriate, require its incorporation on applicable models of the B737.	Cause: The filter screen of flow restrictor filter screen can deteriorate and fragments from it can partially jam the aileron/ elevator power control unit (PCU). Unsafe Condition: This jamming can cause reduced pitch or roll capability of the airplane.	Within 18 months: Replace flow restrictors of the aileron and power control unit (PCU) with improved units that have improved screens.	737's equipped with a specific alleron or elevator PCU Worldwide: 244 U.S. Fleet: 146	146 airplanes x [(12 hours @ \$60/hour) + (\$2,960 parts)] = \$537,280

96-NM-147-AD	RECOMMENDATION #15: The Seattle ACO to require appropriate action be taken to correct the galling condition of the standby rudder on the B737.	Cause: Corrosion has been found on the outside and on the inside passages of both the servo valve and bypass valve sleeves of the stand-by PCU. Also, galling has occurred between the stand-by PCU input shaft and the associated bearing. Unsafe Condition: These conditions can cause an uncommanded rudder movement or lock the rudder in a commanded position.	Each 250 flight hrs: Conduct operational tests of the stand-by rudder PCU, and correct any discrepancy. Each 3,000 flight hrs: Conduct inspections for galling on the shaft and bearing of the standby PCU; and replace the PCU actuator if galling is found. Within 3 years: Replace bearing with newly designed one	737-100 737-200 737-300 737-400 737-500 Worldwide: 2,830 U.S. Fleet: 1,037	1,037 airplanes x (3 hours @ \$60/hr) = \$186,660
96-NM-148-AD	RECOMMENDATION #25: The Seattle ACO to determine the degree of incorporation of [Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1154, dated August 25, 1988] in the B737 fleet; reassess its safety impact; and, as appropriate, require its incorporation on applicable models of the B737.	Cause: Incorrectly installed aileron control cable pulley brackets have experienced fatigue. This could lead to cracking or fracture of the pulley brackets. Unsafe Condition: Failure of the pulley brackets can result in slack in the cables and reduced ability of the flight crew to control the airplane laterally.	Within 18 months: Conduct an inspection for fatigue cracks in base trim and upper flange over-trim of pulley brackets of aileron control cables. Replace any cracked or over-trim item.	737-300 Worldwide: 262 U.S. Fleet: 169	169 airplanes x (1 hour @ \$60/hr) = \$10,140
96-NM-149-AD	RECOMMENDATION #10: The Seattle ACO to determine the requirement for and the feasibility of incorporating additional means to protect the components in the main wheel well of the B737 from the effects of environmental debris.	Cause: High pressure washing in the wheel well can lead to corrosion in systems and components in the hydraulic system located in the main wheel well. Unsafe Condition: Corrosion of these components or equipment can result in reduced controllability of the airplane.	Within 90 days: Revise the maintenance program to prohibit high pressure washing of wheel well and main landing gear.	737-100 737-200 737-300 737-400 737-500 Worldwide: 2,643 U.S. Fleet: 1,040	1,040 airplanes x (5 hours @ \$60/hr) = \$312,000

96-NM-150-AD	RECOMMENDATION #26: The Seattle ACO, in conjunction with Flight Standards, to determine the degree of incorporation of [Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-27-30, dated April 1, 1985] in the B737 fleet; reassess its safety impact; and, as appropriate, require its incorporation on applicable models of the B737.	Cause: Separation of the chrome plating from the side of the manifold cylinder bore located in the PCU has been reported. The separated plating fragments can partially jam the valves in the rudder PCU. Unsafe Condition. This jamming could result in reduced movement of the aileron, elevator, and/or rudder, and lead to reduced controllability of the airplane.	Within 18 months: Inspect the aileron/ elevator PCU and rudder PCU for manifold cylinder bores containing chrome plating. Replace those cylinder bores with reworked bores.	737-100 737-200 737-300 737-400 737-500 Worldwide: 2,675 U.S. Fleet: 1,091	1,091 airplanes x (5 hours @ \$60/hr) = \$327,300
96-NM-151-AD	RECOMMENDATION #12: The Seattle ACO to require failure analysis of the B737 yaw damper and any relevant tests be conducted to identify all failure modes, malfunctions, and potential jam conditions of these elements. AND RECOMMENDATION #13: To require corrective action(s) for those failure modes or malfunctions not shown to be extremely improbable.	Cause: Reports of uncommanded yawing have been attributed to (1) failure of the yaw damper coupler due to wear of its rotor bearing; and (2) corrosion in the electrical coils of the "engage" (solenoid) valve of the yaw damper Unsafe Condition: A sudden uncommanded yawing movement of the airplane can cause injury to passengers and crewmembers.	Within 3,000 flight hours and repetatively every 6000 flight hours: Repetitive tests to verify the integrity of the yaw damper; and correct any discrepancy. Within 18 months: Replace certain engage solenoids with improved solenoids that are not susceptible to corrosion.	737-100 737-200 737-300 737-400 737-500 Worldwide: 2,675 U.S. Fleet: 1,091	1,091 airplanes x [(1 hour @ \$60/hr) + (\$1,806 parts)] = \$2,035,806
96-NM-152-AD	RECOMMENDATION #11: The Seattle ACO to ensure the incorporation of wheels based on TSO-C26 Rev C or later revision.	Cause: Failure of the wheel flange can result in metallic debris hitting critical flight control elements in proximity to the wheel. Unsafe Condition: This could result in hydraulic failure, flight control jamming, and/or electrical power loss on the airplane.	Within 180 days: Replace certain outboard and inboard wheel halves with improved halves	737-100 737-200 Worldwide: 634 U.S. Fleet: 241	241 airplanes x [(6 hours @ \$60/hr) + (\$20,212 parts)] = \$4,957,852

96-NM-153-AD	RECOMMENDATION #25: The Seattle ACO to determine the degree of incorporation of [Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1155, dated October 26, 1989] in the B737 fleet; reassess its safety impact; and, as appropriate, require its incorporation on applicable models of the B737.	Cause: Springs in certain alleron centering units have fractured due to fatigue. Broken spring parts can become lodged in the centering cam weight reduction hole when the aileron control wheel is turned. Unsafe Condition: This can result in jamming of the aileron control wheel and consequent reduced lateral control of the airplane.	Within 18 months: Modify the aileron center spring and trim mechanism by installing improved springs and other components.	Any 737 equipped with certain spring/trim mechanism Worldwide: 1,631 U.S. Fleet: 830	Group 1: 485 airplanes x [(2 hours @ \$60/hour) + (\$707 parts)] = \$401,095 Group 2: 345 airplanes x [(2 hours @ \$60/hour) + (\$224 parts)] = \$118,680
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Vashington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Monday, August 26, 1996 APA 148-96 Contact: Eliot Brenner (202) 267-3883

FAA STATEMENT ON AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY

While the reliability of the U.S. air traffic control system is 99.4 percent, the FAA has undertaken an aggressive plan under the leadership of Administrator David Hinson to maintain and enhance reliability. The accelerated computer replacement ordered 18 months ago by Administrator Hinson at the three centers mentioned by AAA is 10 months ahead of schedule. Fewer than 3 percent of all delays are due to service interruptions, meaning fewer than 21 of the 700 average daily delays are due to FAA equipment problems. The AAA correctly points out that the FAA faces a critical funding shortage in the future. Without financial reform for the agency, FAA will be unable to make the investments necessary to meet the expected 35 percent increase in passengers by the year 2002. This funding shortfall will affect the safety and efficiency of the system.



Vashington, D.C.

EMBARGOED UNTIL 3:45 P.M.

Thursday, August 29, 1996

APA 149-96

Contact: Anthony Willett Tel.: (202) 267-8521

FAA APPROVES VALUJET'S AIR CARRIER CERTIFICATE

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today returned ValuJet Airlines' air carrier operating certificate. This action will permit ValuJet to resume operations at a future date if the airline is found to be managerially and financially fit by the Department of Transportation, which today issued a tentative finding of ValuJet's economic fitness.

The approval follows ValuJet's compliance with a June 18 consent order, and is the result of an intensive FAA review of ValuJet's revised maintenance and operations programs, as well as the airline's management capacity and organizational structure.

In accordance with the consent order, and as the result of the FAA evaluation, ValuJet will fly as a smaller airline upon returning to service, starting with up to nine aircraft and adding up to six more over the next few days. ValuJet had 51 aircraft in operation when it ceased operations June 18. The airline has also sharply reduced the number of outside contractors it will use, and will initially fly one configuration of the DC-9 aircraft instead of the 11 configurations previously in service.

When it returns to service, ValuJet will receive certificate management oversight from the FAA to focus on key areas which have been amended as a result of changes to its policies and procedures.

As part of its evaluation, FAA:

- Required ValuJet to revise its maintenance program and procedures, and retrain maintenance personnel in those procedures.
- Required ValuJet to revise its organizational structure and add additional maintenance and management personnel to increase oversight and strengthen control over its maintenance program.
- Conducted complete records review and conformity checks on each ValuJet aircraft before it was returned to service.
- Required ValuJet to retrain and recheck all ValuJet pilots, instructors, and check airmen.
- Reviewed all ValuJet maintenance and training contracts. Required the airline to include contractors performing substantial maintenance and training to be listed on its operations specifications.
- Inspected ValuJet line facilities, maintenance bases, maintenance controls, and dispatch operations.

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