FAA News

Washington, D.C.

March 2, 1995

APA-11-95
Contact: Liz Neblett
Tel. (202) 267-8521

STATEMENT: TB Infection

Today the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released an article in its *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.*

The report found that during an eight and a half hour airline flight four passengers were infected by a fellow passenger who had active tuberculosis. All those infected were seated in close proximity to the sick person. None have shown signs of active tuberculosis.

The CDC stressed that "the risk of transmission on a commercial aircraft is low. There is no reason to suspect that the risk of transmission of TB on aircraft is greater than in any other confined space including other forms of public transportation if the duration is the same."

Original engineering documents for aircraft list the range of air exchanges in aircraft from a high of 27.3 times an hour to a low of 9.7 times an hour. Office building air is exchanged 2-4 times an hour. The CDC states that hospital isolation rooms which are used to isolate persons with infectious tuberculosis change air 5 times an hour.

There were 25,313 new cases of tuberculosis reported to the CDC in 1993. This report is the first documented instance of apparent passenger-to-passenger transmission of tuberculosis.

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FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, March 14, 1995

APA 13-95
Contact: Liz Neblett
Tel: (202) 267-8521
Dave Duff
Tel: (206) 227-2004

THE FAA ORDERS 737 OPERATORS TO INSPECT FOR POWER CONTROL UNITS MODIFIED BY AERO CONTROLS, INC.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today issued an Airworthiness Directive ordering all operators of Boeing model 737 series airplanes to inspect the main rudder power control units (PCUs) and replace parts -- where necessary -- that were modified by Aero Controls, Inc., a repair station in Auburn, WA.

On March 9, the FAA received reports indicating that two of 36 PCUs modified by Aero Controls, Inc., failed functional tests that were required by an agency airworthiness directive dated January 3, 1994.

The January 3, 1994 directive requires repetitive tests of the main rudder power control unit to detect excessive internal leakage of hydraulic fluid, stalling or reversal; and the eventual replacement of the unit with a modified model. Results of a preliminary investigation indicate that the repair station may not have been using the proper tooling and/or procedures during the modification of the PCU. Such an improper modification could result in the aircraft's rudder operating with reduced force or not moving in the intended direction. This could affect the controllability of the aircraft.

Twenty-six airplanes registered in the U.S. and an additional 10 airplanes worldwide are equipped with rudder PCUs that were tested by Aero Controls and may have been modified incorrectly. Because the location of the 36 PCUs cannot be identified, each 737 operator must immediately determine from maintenance records if their airplanes have these parts. The agency is requiring, within five flights, identification of the part number and serial number of the main rudder PCU, and replacing them with serviceable parts, if necessary.

-- more --

The FAA has confirmed that the PCU installed on the USAir model 737 series airplane involved in the September 1994 accident near Pittsburgh was not modified and/or tested by Aero Controls, Inc. The PCU from that airplane has been subjected to thorough functional testing and no evidence of failures or deficiencies has been found. That accident is currently under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board.

There are several initiatives in progress related to this subject::

1. The FAA has a new congressionally-directed research initiative to assess the effect--if any--of air carrier environment on passengers and crews. The initiative is in cooperation with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) which is an element of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The long-term study is expected to be complete in five years.

2. The FAA is working in close cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Air Transport Association (ATA) on the issue of transmission of tuberculosis in air carrier aircraft and has assisted the CDC in development of a protocol for use by public health offices and air carriers for notification of passengers of possible exposure to tuberculosis.

3. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) is reviewing air quality standards for aircraft.

4. The FAA will also participate with the International Civil Aviation Organization in a study of air quality standards in aircraft and the transmission of communicable diseases in air transportation.

FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, March 14,1995

APA 12-95
Contact: L. Neblett
Tel.: (202) 267-8521

FAA SEEKS COMMENTS ON NEED FOR
MORE FLIGHT DATA INFORMATION

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will hold a public meeting on April 20 to hear comments on recommended changes to Flight Data Recorder (FDR) parameters on commercial aircraft. The meeting will begin at 9 a.m. in the FAA Auditorium in Washington, D.C.

The meeting is scheduled to last all day, or until all comments from interested parties have been heard by a panel of FAA officials.

On February 22, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked the FAA to require operators to retrofit certain airplanes currently in operation, or those newly manufactured, with enhanced FDRs to provide more flight data information to aid in the investigation of accidents and incidents.

The FAA will seek information from the public and industry on all aspects of the recommendations to prepare regulation changes and analyze specific exceptions or alternatives that should be considered.

Written comments on the NTSB's recommendations should be mailed for receipt by March 31, to: FAA, Attention: Rules Docket (AGC-200) -- Docket # 28109, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. Comments can be sent electronically via Internet to: nprmcmts@mail.hq.faa.gov, or Fax to (202) 267-7257.

To present oral statements, contact Jeanne Trapani, Office of Rulemaking, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C.; (202) 267-7624.

Media who wish to attend the meeting should contact Liz Neblett, (202) 267-8521.

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FAA NEWS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, March 15, 1995

AEA-04-95
Contact: Holly Baker
Phone: (718) 553-0262

AIR CARRIER FLIGHTS STOP FOLLOWING FAA INSPECTIONS

Westates Airlines, Inc., a Rochester, N.Y., based charter and scheduled air service operator, today has agreed to ground three aircraft following Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety inspections that found numerous maintenance and record-keeping discrepancies.

Westates is a charter and scheduled air service operator. Based on allegations that three of the aircraft were operating using an improper maintenance system, the FAA conducted three en route inspections. In each inspection, agency inspectors observed numerous instances that corroborated allegations concerning aircraft condition and record keeping.

"The FAA regrets any passenger inconveniences due to the grounding of these aircraft. However, the agency's paramount mission is to ensure the utmost safety in the skies," said Anthony J. Broderick, associate administrator for regulations and certification.

Westates entered into a Consent Order with the FAA in which it agreed to ground its three aircraft. Westates will not be permitted to fly these aircraft until a complete validation of the airworthiness condition is confirmed by the agency. The agency's investigation of Westates' operation and maintenance practices is ongoing.

Westates also does business as Gray Line Air, and holds operating authority as a Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 commercial and charter air service. The carrier has conducted operations out of Niagara Falls, N.Y.; Greensboro, N.C.; Miami, Fla.; Atlanta, Ga.; and Cap-Haiten, Haiti. Westates' fleet consists of four Convair 580 aircraft with one undergoing maintenance at this time.

Passengers booked on Westates or Gray Line flights should call the airline or FAA's consumer affairs hotline at (202) 366-2220 for additional information.

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OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)
FAX TRANSMITTAL
# of pages ▶
To Lucie Anderson
From Holly Baker
Dept./Agency
Phone #
Fax #
Fax #
NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, March 17, 1995

Contact: Hank Price
Phone: (202) 267-3447

PRESS AND MEDIA ADVANCE

FAA TO HOLD ~~UNSCHEDULED~~ PRESS CONFERENCE ~~CONFERENCE~~ TODAY

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will hold a press ~~conference~~ today at (~~insert time~~) regarding enforcement proceedings the agency will carry out this evening.

The press conference will be held in Room 9 A-B-C of FAA's Headquarters, 800 Independence Ave., S.W.

FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, March 17, 1995

APA-14-95
Contact: Hank Price
Phone: (202) 267-8521

AIR CARRIER FLIGHTS GROUNDED FOLLOWING FAA INVESTIGATION

Arrow Air Inc., a Miami, Fla., passenger and cargo air carrier, today agreed to voluntarily ground its fleet of 18 aircraft following an extensive Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigation that uncovered serious violations pertaining to required record keeping and documentation of maintenance on critical engine components. The company also failed to produce fleet-wide proof of compliance associated with vital airworthiness directives.

Arrow Air is a scheduled, charter and cargo air carrier. Based on allegations concerning unairworthy aircraft and unacceptable maintenance practices, a team of FAA inspectors investigated the charges.

The FAA investigation found the carrier could not produce proper documentation of critical maintenance and inspection work done on the aircraft fleet's engines. The agency's team of inspectors also revealed that the carrier failed to provide adequate proof of compliance with a variety of agency-issued airworthiness directives.

In accordance with an agreement between Arrow Air and the FAA, the fleet will remain grounded until the carrier can validate its aircrafts' airworthiness and proper adherence to Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).

"The FAA cannot tolerate any violation of vital air safety rules and regulations. While we regret any inconvenience to passengers or companies that relied on the carrier, the agency must take swift action when problems come to light. The agency's highest priority is safety," said William J. White, deputy director of FAA's Office of Flight Standards.

-- more--

Arrow Air has operated as a FAR 121 commercial air carrier. The carrier has conducted scheduled operations in North America out of Brownsville, Texas; Columbus and Dayton, Ohio; Hartford, Conn.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Milwaulkee, Wisc.; Shreveport and New Orleans, La.; New York, N.Y.; Miami and Tampa, Fla.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Phoenix, Ariz; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Juan, Puerto Rico; as well as Ontario, Canada. The airline has also operated in the Caribbean, Central America, South America; the Pacific; Europe, Africa and the Far East.

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3/7/95

ENGINE BOLT AD SUMMARY

SUBJECT: Priority Letter Airworthiness Directive - Textron Lycoming O-360, LO-360, HO-360, HIO-360, TIO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, O-540, IO-540, TIO-540, LTIO-540, IVO-540, AEIO-540, TIO-541, and IO-720 series reciprocating engines containing suspect unapproved rod bolts shipped from Superior Air Parts, Inc, between February 15, 1994, and December 20, 1994.

BACKGROUND: In a letter dated December 15, 1994, Superior Air Parts, Inc., advised the FAA that a connecting rod bolt had fractured in service on a Cessna 177RG on December 9, 1994. The pilot completed a power-off landing with no injuries. In a letter dated January 24, 1995, Textron Lycoming advised the FAA that their laboratory analysis indicated that the failed connecting rod bolt appeared to be a suspected unapproved part. A Superior Air Parts, Inc., report of their own laboratory analysis, dated January 3, 1995, was presented to the FAA in mid-February. Another connecting rod bolt failure was identified during maintenance on a Piper PA-60 on February 21, 1995. Superior Air Parts, Inc. advised the FAA of the second failure. The FAA had already initiated an independent laboratory analysis of a sample of suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts and received a report on February 23, 1995, which concluded that the connecting rod bolts did not meet material or design specifications. That report corroborated Superior Air Parts, Inc.'s and Textron Lycoming's earlier findings. Subsequent investigation revealed that of the 3,382 connecting rod bolts in the original Superior Air Part, Inc., inventory, 2,473 had been shipped. The FAA considered all possible actions and concluded that the only prudent course of action was to issue this priority letter AD. The Engine & Propeller Directorate has been coordinating with various consumer groups such as AOPA, EAA, GAMA, and Aeronautical Repair Station Association.. AOPA and EAA have advised the FAA that they have "stopped the presses" until they receive our airworthiness information, and that the Aeronautical Repair Station Association has agreed to informally report suspect unapproved parts to the FAA.

UNSAFE CONDITION: Engine failure due to suspect unapproved connecting rod bolt installed in the engine, which could result in damage to or loss of the aircraft.

ACTION: Inspect for installation of suspected unapproved connecting rod bolts , and replace unapproved parts with approved serviceable parts prior to further flight.

COST IMPACT: There are approximately 85,000 Lycoming engines currently in service, and a typical reciprocating engine may be rebuilt every 10 years. Since the suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts have been in distribution for slightly over one year, it is reasonable to assume that 10% or 8,500 of the fleet will be directly affected by this AD. Of those, approximately 30% have probably been overhauled at the Textron Lycoming Factory, or can prove conclusively that they have installed Textron Lycoming parts, leaving approximately 6,000 engines which must be inspected. Parts and labor for an inspection will cost approximately $1,500 per engine, resulting in $9,000,000 for inspections only. The FAA estimates that 300 engines will require complete tear down to replace the suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts at a cost of approximately $5,000 per engine for labor and parts, for a total expenditure of $1,500,000. Therefore, the total expenditure for fleet inspection and overhaul is estimated to be approximately $10,500,000.

AFFECTED U.S. OPERATORS: General Aviation, Air Taxis, Air Freight, and Part 135.

TO: Office of Aviation System Standards
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
ATTN: Manager, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, AFS-613

Emergency distribution by priority letter is required.

Send to all U.S. owners and operators of Textron Lycoming O-360, LO-360, HO-360, HIO-360, TIO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, O-540, IO-540, TIO-540, LTIO-540, IVO-540, AEIO-540, TIO-541, and IO-720 series reciprocating engines installed on but not limited to the following aircraft: Beech series 95, 23, 76,60; Piper series PA-24, PA-44, PA-28, PA-34, PA-23, PA-25, PA-32, PA-60, PA-31; Aero Commander (Intermountain, Callair, Aeronautical Agricola Mexicana, Twin Commander Aircraft Corp.) series A-6, A-9, 100, 500; Lake Aircraft Corporation (Consolidated Aero., Inc., REVO) series C-2, LA-4; Mooney Aircraft Corp. series M-20, M-22; Sud Aviation GY-180; Partenavia series P-68; Siai-Marchetti (Agusta S.p.A) series S.205, S.210, F.260, S.208; Procaer series F 15; SOCATA series TB10, MS-893, 235, TB20, TB21; Teal Aircraft Corporation (Bohica) TWC-1; Avions Mudry et Cie CAP 10; Augustair (Montanair, Inc.) 2150; Grumman American (American General Aircraft Holding Co., Inc.) AA-5 series; Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. FA-200 series; Bellanca (American Champion Aircraft Corp.) Aircraft 8GCBC, 8KCAB; Maule Aerospace Technology Corp. series MX-7, M5, M-6; Christen A-1, (Pitts) S1T; Schweizer Aircraft Corp.(Hughes, McDonnell Douglas) 269A series; Rockwell (Commander Aircraft Company) series112, 114; Moravan ZLIN Z 242L; Slingsby Aviation Limited T67M; Enstrom F-28 series; Found Brothers Aviation Ltd. FBA-2C, FBA Centennial "100"; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH DO-28 series; Spinks Industries, M.H. Spinks, Sr. Rawdon T-1; Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2 series; Omega Aircraft Corporation BS-12D1; Robinson R-44 series; Aerostar Aircraft Corp. (Piper, Ted Smith); Brantly Helicopters Industries U.S.A. Co., Ltd.305; Pacific Aerospace Corp., Ltd. FU-24-954 series.

This priority letter Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by reports of connecting rod bolt failures on Textron Lycoming O-360, LO-360, HO-360, HIO-360, TIO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, O-540, IO-540, TIO-540, LTIO-540, IVO-540, AEIO-540, TIO-541, and IO-720 series reciprocating engines. These connecting rod bolts failed with no particular pattern. The head of the bolt sheared off on some, while others failed at the threads and some at the shank. Examination of test specimens indicate that these connecting rod bolts were fabricated by machining bar stock material, including the head region, thus exposing end-grains

in the head-to-shank radius. These connecting rod bolts exhibit extremely small fillet radii, numerous deep machining grooves, and inadequate material selection.

In a letter dated December 15, 1994, Superior Air Parts, Inc., advised the FAA that several connecting rod bolts had fractured in service on a Cessna 177RG on December 9, 1994. The pilot completed a power-off landing with no injuries. In a letter dated January 24, 1995, Textron Lycoming advised the FAA that their laboratory analysis indicated that the failed connecting rod bolts appeared to be suspected unapproved parts. A Superior Air Parts, Inc., report of their own laboratory analysis, dated January 3, 1995, was presented to the FAA in mid-February. Another connecting rod bolt failure was identified during maintenance on a Piper PA-60 on February 21, 1995. Superior Air Parts, Inc. advised the FAA of the second failure on the following day. The FAA had already initiated an independent laboratory analysis of a sample of suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts and received a report on February 23, 1995, which concluded that the connecting rod bolts did not meet material or design specifications. That report corroborated Superior Air Parts, Inc.'s and Textron Lycoming's earlier findings. Subsequent investigation revealed that of the 3,382 connecting rod bolts in the original Superior Air Parts, Inc. inventory, 2,473 had been shipped. The FAA considered all possible actions and concluded that the only prudent course of action was to issue this priority letter AD.

These connecting rod bolts were shipped from Superior Air Parts, Inc., between February 15, 1994, and December 20, 1994, as replacements for Textron Lycoming connecting rod bolts, Part Number (P/N) 75060, or Superior Air Parts, Inc., connecting rod bolts, P/N SL75060, or Aircraft Technologies, Inc. P/N AL75060. However, the failed parts have no markings to identify them. The traceability of these bolts is extremely difficult, and the FAA has determined that the vast majority of the bolts distributed cannot be recovered, nor can they be identified by a routine records search of engines which have been overhauled since February 15, 1994. The FAA has concluded that all engines which may have been overhauled using these connecting rod bolts must be visually inspected for the installation of unmarked connecting rod bolts. Further, since it is impossible to analytically determine how long these connecting rod bolts as installed may remain intact, this AD must be complied with before further flight. Therefore, all connecting rod bolts with no markings must be considered suspect unapproved parts. This condition, if not corrected, could result in engine failure due to connecting rod bolt failure, which could result in damage to or loss of the aircraft.

Also, during the investigation the FAA determined that only unmarked 75060 connecting rod bolts shipped from Superior Air Parts, Inc., between February 15, 1994, and December 20, 1994, are considered suspect unapproved

parts. Approved serviceable parts can be readily identified by raised letters SPS, S, C, or FC, identifying them as Textron Lycoming parts, or SL75060 etched on the head, identifying them as PMA parts manufactured by Superior Air Parts, Inc., or AL75060 forged into the head, identifying them as PMA parts manufactured by Aircraft Technologies, Inc.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other engines of this same type design, this AD requires removal prior to further flight of suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts and replacement with serviceable connecting rod bolts. Suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts may be identified as those bolts that are not clearly marked on the head by raised letters SPS, S, C, or FC, identifying them as Textron Lycoming parts, or not clearly marked with SL75060 etched on the head, identifying them as PMA parts manufactured by Superior Air Parts, Inc., or not clearly forged into the head with AL75060, identifying them as PMA parts manufactured by Aircraft Technologies, Inc.

This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 (formerly section 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958) pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this priority letter.

95-07-01 **Textron Lycoming**: Docket No. 95-ANE-14.

Applicability: The following Textron Lycoming reciprocating engine models, assembled on or after February 15, 1994, and that contain connecting rod bolts shipped directly or indirectly from Superior Air Parts, Inc., on or after February 15, 1994:

O-360-A1A, -A1AD, -A1C, -A1D, -A1F6, -A1F6D, -A1G6, -A1G6D, -A1LD, -A2A, -A2D, -A2E, -A2F, -A2G, -A3A, -A3AD, -A4A, -A4G, -A4J, -A4K, -A4M, -A4N, -A5AD, -B2A, -C1A, -C1C, -C1E, -C1F, -C1G, -C2A, -C2C, -C2D, -C2E, -D2A, -D2B, -F1A6; IO-360-A1A, -A1B, -A1B6, -A1B6D, -A1C, -A1D, -A1D6, -A2A, -A2B, -A3B6D, -B1A, -B1B, -B1D, -B1E, -B1F, -B2F, -B2F6, -B4A, -C1A, -C1B, -C1C6, -C1D6, -C1E6, -C1F, -J1A6D; AIO-360-A1A, -A1B, -B1B; LO-360-A1G6D; HO-360-B1A, -B1B; HIO-360-A1A, -B1A, -C1A, -C1B, -E1AD, -E1BD; LIO-360-C1E6; TIO-360-A1B; AEIO-360-A1E, -B1G6, -H1A; O-540-A1A, -A1A5, -A1B5, -A1C5, -A1D, -A1D5, -A2B, -A3D5, -B1A5, -B1B5, -B2B5, -B2C5, -B4B5, -E4A5, -E4B5, -E4C5, -F1A5, -F1B5, -G1A5, -G2A5, -H1B5D, -H2B5D, -J1A5D, -J3A5D, -J3C5D, -L3C5D; IO-540-A1A5, -B1A5, -B1C5, -C1B5, -C4B5, -C4C5, -C4D5D, -D4A5, -E1A5, -E1B5, -G1A5, -G1B5, -G1C5, -G1D5, -G1E5, -G1F5, -J4A5, -K1A5, -K1A5D, -K1B5, -K1C5, -K1D5, -K1E5, K1K5, -M1A5, -N1A5, -P1A5, -R1A5, -T4C5D -K1F5, -K1F5D, -

K1G5, -K1G5D, -K1J5D, -K1K5, -M1QA5, -M1B5D, -N1A5, -P1A5, -R1A5, -S1A5, -T4A5D, -T4B5D, -T4CTD, -V4A5D, -W1A5D, -W3A5D, -AA1A5; TIO-540-A1A, -A1B, -A2A, -A2B, -A2C, -C1A, -E1A, -G1A, -H1A, -J2B, -F2BD, -J2BD, -N2BD, -R2AD, -S1AD, -AA1AD, -AB1AD; LTIO-540-J2B, -F2BD, -J2BD. -N2BD, -R2AD; IVO-540-A1A; AEIO-540-D4B5; TIO-541-A1A, -E1A4, -E1B4, -E1C4; IO-720-A1A, -A1B, -B1B, -B1BD, -C1B, and -D1B.

These engines are installed on but not limited to the following aircraft: Beech series 95, 23, 76, 60; Piper series PA-24, PA-44, PA-28, PA-34, PA-23, PA-25, PA-32, PA-60, PA-31; Aero Commander (Intermountain, Callair, Aeronautical Agricola Mexicana, Twin Commander Aircraft Corp.) series A-6, A-9, 100, 500; Lake Aircraft Corporation (Consolidated Aero., Inc., REVO) series C-2, LA-4; Mooney Aircraft Corp. series M-20, M-22; Sud Aviation GY-180; Partenavia series P-68; Siai-Marchetti (Agusta S.p.A) series S.205, S.210, F.260, S.208; Procaer series F 15; SOCATA series TB10, MS-893, 235, TB20, TB21; Teal Aircraft Corporation (Bohica) TWC-1; Avions Mudry et Cie CAP 10; Augustair (Montanair, Inc.) 2150; Grumman American (American General Aircraft Holding Co., Inc.) AA-5 series; Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. FA-200 series; Bellanca (American Champion Aircraft Corp.) Aircraft 8GCBC, 8KCAB; Maule Aerospace Technology Corp. series MX-7, M5, M-6; Christen A-1, (Pitts) S1T; Schweizer Aircraft Corp.(Hughes, McDonnell Douglas) 269A series; Rockwell (Commander Aircraft Company) series112, 114; Moravan ZLIN Z 242L; Slingsby Aviation Limited T67M; Enstrom F-28 series; Found Brothers Aviation Ltd. FBA-2C, FBA Centennial "100"; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH DO-28 series; Spinks Industries, M.H. Spinks, Sr. Rawdon T-1; Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2 series; Omega Aircraft Corporation BS-12D1; Robinson R-44 series; Aerostar Aircraft Corp. (Piper, Ted Smith); Brantly Helicopters Industries U.S.A. Co., Ltd.305; Pacific Aerospace Corp., Ltd. FU-24-954 series.

NOTE: This AD applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (g) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different action necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any engine from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent engine failure due to connecting rod bolt failure, which could result in damage to or loss of the aircraft, accomplish the following:

(a) Prior to further flight, determine if the engine has been assembled on or after February 15, 1994. This AD does not apply to engines assembled prior to February 15, 1994.

(b) For the purpose of this AD, assembled is defined as the construction of an engine from its component parts for any purpose, such as but not limited to overhaul and inspection.

(c) For engines assembled on or after February 15, 1994, prior to further flight, determine if any connecting rod bolts were replaced during assembly. This AD applies only to engines that had connecting rod bolts replaced on or after February 15, 1994.

(d) For engines that contain replacement connecting rod bolts installed on or after February 15, 1994, prior to further flight, determine if any of those replacement connecting rod bolts were purchased directly from Textron Lycoming or Aircraft Technologies, Inc. This AD does not apply to engines with replacement connecting rod bolts purchased directly from Textron Lycoming or Aircraft Technologies, Inc. In addition, this AD does not apply to engines that were manufactured or remanufactured at Textron Lycoming.

(e) For engines that contain replacement connecting rod bolts installed on or after February 15, 1994, that were not purchased directly from Textron Lycoming or Aircraft Technologies, Inc., prior to further flight, visually inspect to determine if the connecting rod bolts are clearly identified by raised letters SPS, S, C, or FC, identifying them as Textron Lycoming parts, or SL75060 etched on the head, identifying them as PMA parts manufactured by Superior Air Parts, Inc., or AL75060 forged into the head, identifying them as PMA parts manufactured by Aircraft Technologies, Inc. If the connecting rod bolts can be positively identified as provided in this paragraph, no further action is required.

(f) If the connecting rod bolts can not be positively identified in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD, prior to further flight remove unapproved connecting rod bolts and replace with serviceable parts.

NOTE: Further information may be found in Superior Air Parts Service Bulletin No. 95-002, dated March 3, 1995, or by contacting Superior Air Parts, Inc., 14280 Gillis Rd., Dallas, TX 75244-3792; telephone (800) 487-4884.

(g) An alternative method of compliance that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Special Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Special Certification Office. Special flight permits shall not be issued.

NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Special Certification Office.

(h) Priority Letter AD 95-07-01, issued March 17, 1995, becomes effective upon receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard D. Karanian, Aerospace Engineer, Special Certification Office, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, TX 76137-4298; telephone (817) 222-5195, fax (817) 222-5959; or Locke Easton, Aerospace Engineer, Engine and Propeller Standards Staff, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803-5299; telephone (617) 238-7113, fax (617) 238-7199.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts on March 17, 1995

James C. Jones,
Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.

FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, March 20, 1995

APA-15-95
Contact: Drucella Andersen
Phone: (202)267-3883

FAA APPROVES EXPANDED ATR DEICING BOOTS

The Federal Aviation Administration today approved new, larger deicing boots for ATR-42 and -72 aircraft that will prevent the formation of an ice ridge on the wing by nearly doubling the effective coverage of the boots.

Installation of the modified deicing boots on the U.S. fleet will begin immediately, and will be completed by June 1, 1995, a deadline established earlier by the FAA in an Airworthiness Directive issued on January 11, 1995.

This approval follows a four-month review of all available technical data by the FAA and the Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), the French airworthiness authority.

Both agencies reviewed and approved extensive technical design data and wind tunnel test data produced by Aerospatiale, the manufacturer of the ATR aircraft. The FAA and the DGAC also participated in numerous flight tests that validated the performance of the new deicing boots. Flight tests took place in natural icing conditions, and also included special flights behind an "icing tanker." Results of these tests confirmed that the new, larger deicing boots will indeed prevent the formation of a ridge of ice along the wing in front of the ailerons, and will prevent the resulting lateral control problem that is suspected to have existed in the accident that occurred on October 31, 1994, in Roselawn, IN.

- more -

This modification is not terminating action for the Airworthiness Directive issued on January 11. Those required procedures, which are still in effect:

- reiterate the prohibition of dispatch or operation into known or forecast freezing drizzle or freezing rain.
- require pilots to monitor the airplane for unique signs of freezing rain or freezing drizzle.
- prohibit the use of flaps when holding in icing conditions.
- require flight crews to turn off autopilot controls immediately if freezing rain or freezing drizzle are encountered.
- require flight crews immediately to fly out of freezing rain or freezing drizzle.
- require that flaps not be retracted if they are extended in freezing rain or freezing drizzle.

A new Airworthiness Directive will be issued as soon as possible that will address the operational and flight crew procedures that are to be used in conjunction with the newly modified deicing boots.

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FAA approves modified deicing boots on the ATR-42 and ATR-72

On Monday, March 20, the FAA approved a modification to the pneumatic deicing boots on the Aerospatiale ATR-42 and ATR-72 airplanes. The modification increases the size of the deicing boots on the upper surface of the leading edge of the wing. A ridge of ice forming along the wing behind the original, smaller-sized deicing boots is suspected as a possible factor in the October 31, 1994, ATR-72 accident near Roselawn, Indiana.

This approval follows a four-month review of all available technical data by the FAA and the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the Airworthiness Authority of France. During the review, the FAA and DGAC concluded that flight in icing conditions more extreme than those described in the certification rules could result, under certain circumstances, in a ridge of ice forming behind the area protected by deicing boots on the ATR-42 and -72. In order to eliminate the hazard caused by this ice ridge, Aerospatiale decided to increase the size of the deicing boots to include the area covered by the ice ridge.

The FAA and DGAC reviewed and approved extensive technical design data and wind tunnel test data produced by Aerospatiale. The FAA and DGAC also participated in numerous flight tests intended to validate the performance of the new deicing boots. Flight tests took place in natural icing conditions, and also included special flights behind an "icing tanker." Results of these tests confirmed that the new, larger deicing boots will indeed prevent the formation of a ridge of ice along the wing in front of the ailerons, and will prevent the resulting lateral control problem which is suspected to have existed on the accident airplane.

Installation of the modified deicing boots on the U. S. fleet will begin immediately, so as to complete the installation by June 1, 1995, a deadline established earlier by the FAA in an Airworthiness Directive. A new Airworthiness Directive will be issued as soon as possible which will address the operational and flight crew procedures which are to be used in conjunction with the newly modified deicing boots.

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Talking Points and Memory Joggers

- 10/31/94: ATR-72 accident at Roselawn, Indiana.
- 11/7/94: NTSB issues recommendation for a Special Certification Review Team.
- 11/15/94: FAA forms 6-person multi-discipline team, adds 3 DGAC specialists.
- FAA/DGAC team travels to Toulouse, Washington DC, Seattle, Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Edwards AFB (twice), to review data and conduct flight tests.
- During first Edwards test (12/13/94 - 12/21/94), a ridge of ice is noted aft of the deicing boots while flying in icing conditions well outside the Appendix C envelope:
  - Water droplet mean volumetric diameter (MVD) of about 180 microns, liquid water content (LWC) about 0.45 g/m^3. For reference, Appendix C conditions = MVD of 40 microns, LWC of 0.15 g/m^3
  - Ice ridge formed just aft of boots at about 7.5% of chord flaps up, 8.5% of chord flaps 15°
  - Active area of old boots is about 7.0%
  - New boots will extend to 12.5% of chord (active area of protection), well behind the observed ice ridge
- Edwards ice ridge locations were subsequently duplicated, verified, and flight tested by Aerospatiale.
- Second Edwards flight testing (3/6/95 - 3/7/95) verified the following:
  - Performance of the modified deicing boots in Appendix C conditions is entirely satisfactory (no change to previously approved boot performance)
  - Side-window cues for freezing rain/freezing drizzle recognition by the crew are repeatable and reliable
  - The modified deicing boots prevent the formation of the ice ridge during freezing rain and freezing drizzle conditions believed to have existed at Roselawn, both at flaps up and at flaps 15°
  - No ice accumulated aft of the enlarged deicing boots
- The modified boots are being approved on the ATR-42 and -72 as a major change to the type design, within the requirements of FAR Part 25, Appendix C only. No approval will be granted for flight in freezing rain or freezing drizzle.
- The existing AD T95-02-51 will not be affected by this modification, but will be superseded by a new NPRM AD at a later date. In the interim, the flight crew training and operational requirements of the AD will remain in force, even on airplanes with the extended deicing boots.
- The new AD will retain some of the procedures and restrictions (side window identification of freezing drizzle, flap overspeed logic inhibit, no movement of flaps with ice accretion), and some procedures may be dropped (restriction on the use of autopilot, additional crew training). Discussions on the content of the new AD is continuing between FAA, DGAC, and ATR.

DRAFT

FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, March 24, 1995

APA-17-95
Contact: Drucella Andersen
Phone: (202) 267-3883

FAA PROPOSES TO REVOKE ARROW AIR'S OPERATING CERTIFICATE

The Federal Aviation Administration today proposed to revoke Arrow Air's air carrier operating certificate. This is the first step that could lead to revocation of the carrier's operating certificate.

Revocation of a carrier's certificate is the strictest enforcement action available to the agency. If a final order of revocation is issued, the carrier will not be able to operate in commercial service until it applies for a new certificate, requiring the company to go through a complete recertification process.

The FAA was prepared to take emergency action against the carrier, however, because Arrow Air is not operating in air commerce, emergency action was not required.

Today's action follows a voluntary agreement to discontinue operations on March 17 by the company after the FAA uncovered serious violations in recordkeeping and documentation of maintenance on critical engine components and failure by Arrow Air to provide proof of compliance with vital airworthiness directives.

The FAA has, for several weeks, requested that Arrow Air provide vital documents to confirm the safety of the company's aircraft as well as flight and pilot records. The company has been unable to meet the agency's request.

Among other things, FAA investigators found that critical airworthiness directives -- issued only when safety problems are cited -- were not carried out. For example, 727 and DC-8 aircraft were operated in excess of 100 cycles to as much as above 1600 cycles beyond FAA requirements. In

another case, the company failed to replace cargo door latch bolts as mandated by the FAA.

Further, the FAA alleges that Arrow Air:

- Did not follow maintenance manual requirements when performing maintenance on aircraft;
- Did not use inspectors that were properly certified, trained, qualified and licensed;
- Falsified maintenance records;
- Did not maintain a current listing of the functions inspectors were authorized to perform;
- Did not perform maintenance safety audits as required by regulation;
- Failed to record the maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding and alteration of aircraft, airframes, engines, propellers, or component parts;
- Improperly reported corrosion levels on aircraft after repairs;
- Had discrepancies in pilot and personnel training records;
- Performed major repairs without FAA approval; and
- Used undocumented aircraft parts with no traceable maintenance history.

"Safety of the traveling public is our charge and we must ensure the safe operation of every carrier in the system. The traveling public expects no less," said FAA Administrator David R. Hinson.

"Violation of rules and regulations that govern safe commercial aviation cannot be tolerated. Through an exhaustive investigation into the practices of Arrow Air, the FAA has now proposed to revoke its operating certificate. Precise records regarding maintenance and aircraft operation are a vital and necessary means to establish the safety of those who rely on the company for air services," he said.

The 18 aircraft owned by the company have not been permitted to fly since March 17, with the exception of one 727, which had been approved on March 20 for Part 91 operations that prohibit passenger or cargo revenue flights.

Arrow Air is a Miami, Fla., based passenger, charter and cargo air carrier. While a major portion have been air cargo and charter services, the carrier has operated scheduled flights in Texas, Ohio, Connecticut, Hawaii,

Wisconsin, Louisiana, New York, Florida, Oklahoma, Arizona, Utah, Puerto Rico and Canada. The company also has provided services in the Caribbean, Central America, South America, the Pacific, Europe and the Far East.

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FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, March 24, 1995

APA 18-95
Contact: Kay Templeton Garvey
Tel.: 202-267-8521

FAA GRASSROOTS PARTNERSHIPS HELP "REINVENT" RULEMAKING

Consistent with the Administration's commitment to "reinvent" and streamline the regulatory process, FAA Administrator David R. Hinson will meet with nearly 200 representatives from the aviation maintenance industry nationwide to improve the grassroots partnership.

The first in a new series, this meeting will take place at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City on March 27 at 1:15 p.m.

"These partnership meetings at the grassroots level are designed to continue to get our FAA regulators and the folks FAA regulates talking and working together more closely -- face to face. With this effort, we can create a regulatory process that is tailored in a sensible way for regulators and that is 'user friendly' for the public," said Hinson.

Such open, two-way communication between FAA and the community it regulates is expected to increase cooperation and coordination and to produce mutually beneficial regulatory decisions. While topics for the March 27th meeting are open to participants' interests or concerns, interaction between FAA front-line personnel and the regulated community, refinement of FAA's compliance responsibility and creation of a constructive regulator/regulated partnership are among expected discussion items.

To get ideas from a broad cross-section of people, meetings also will be scheduled around the country at sites and workplaces affected by FAA rules. For information, contact Joe Hawkins, (202) 267-9680.

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FAA News

Washington, D.C.

MEDIA ADVISORY
Monday, March 27, 1995

APA-16-95
Kay Templeton Garvey
Tel.: (202) 267-8521

SIGNING CEREMONY ON FAA/HAI COMMUNICATION PARTNERSHIP SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 31

On Friday, March 31 at 10 a.m., FAA Administrator David R. Hinson and Helicopter Association International (HAI) President Frank L. Jensen, Jr., will sign a proclamation to renew a formal communication partnership for public awareness and aviation education regarding helicopters/vertical take off and landing aircraft.

The signing ceremony will take place in the McCracken Room on the tenth floor of the FAA headquarters building, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C.

FAA Administrator Hinson and HAI President Jensen will be joined by other aviation industry officials who represent new technologies, advanced transportation concepts and vehicles and intermodal system partnerships.

For additional information, contact Marcia Adams, (202) 267-3488 or Dianne Speed, (202) 267-3445.

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U.S. Department of Transportation

News:

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20590

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, March 27, 1995

CONTACT APA 19-95
Sandra Allen
202 267 3883

PRESIDENT CLINTON COMMITS TO GPS WORLDWIDE

President Clinton today told the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that "the United States remains committed to provide Global Positioning System (GPS) signals to the international civil aviation community and to other peaceful users of radio navigation and positioning systems."

In his message to ICAO, the President said the satellite-based "GPS, which was originally developed for military use, rapidly has gained wide acceptance in commercial applications." He said the "United States looks forward to the growing use of GPS and to its incorporation in an integrated global navigation satellite system."

The President's message was addressed to delegates from more than 150 nations gathered at a special two-week meeting in Montreal. The delegates have convened to determine the global air navigation systems of the future.

Simultaneously, in Washington, Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña announced that the Department of Transportation (DOT) is moving ahead as planned with the implementation of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). With augmentation supplied by WAAS, GPS provides the navigational integrity, availability, and accuracy necessary to make GPS fully usable for all phases of civil flight.

Peña's announcement follows an agreement between the DOT and the Department of Defense (DOD) to continue implementation of WAAS. The agreement is based on the expectation of successful joint testing and review of WAAS. Processes are already in place to manage inter-Departmental activities involving dual use of GPS. Procurement of WAAS is currently underway at the FAA and a contract award is expected by May 15.

The President's commitment to continued provision of GPS signals to the international aviation community underscores a pledge made to ICAO last fall by FAA Administrator David R. Hinson.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense

WASHINGTON

March 16, 1995

Greetings to all those gathered in the beautiful city of Montreal for this important meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

As we approach the twenty-first century, civil aviation is becoming increasingly dependent on technological innovation. Satellite-based positioning and navigation technologies will play pivotal roles in the global aviation system of the future. This technology, available today through the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), can serve to improve safety and reduce costs for operators of all types of aircraft.

GPS, which was originally developed for military use, has rapidly gained wide acceptance in commercial applications. The United States looks forward to the growing use of GPS and to its incorporation in an integrated global navigation satellite system.

The United States remains committed to provide GPS signals to the international civil aviation community and to other peaceful users of radio navigation and positioning systems.

Best wishes for a successful and productive meeting.

Bill Clinton

FAA News

Washington, D.C.

MEDIA ADVISORY
Tuesday, March 28, 1995

APA-20-95
Contact: Marcia Adams
Tel.: (202) 267-3488

FAA ADMINISTRATOR TO HOLD MEDIA BRIEFING ON MARCH 31

WASHINGTON -- FAA Administrator David R. Hinson will hold a media briefing -- limited to working press only -- to discuss agency announcements, initiatives, and upcoming activities. The briefing, the sixth in a monthly series, is scheduled for Friday, March 31, from 11 a.m. - 12 noon.

This month, Administrator Hinson will be joined by Christopher Hart, assistant administrator for System Safety; Monte Belger, associate administrator for Air Traffic Services; Tony Broderick, associate administrator for Regulation and Certification; Cindy Rich, associate administrator for Airports; and George Donohue, associate administrator for Research and Acquisitions.

The briefing will be held in conference room 9ABC on the 9th floor of the FAA headquarters building, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. All media are invited, but due to the informal nature of the briefing, no cameras please.

Please contact Marcia Adams if you plan on attending.

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FAA News

Washington, D.C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, March 31, 1995

APA 21-94
Contact: Liz Neblett
Tel.: (202) 267-8521

FAA CERTIFIES FIRST CHINESE AIRCRAFT

In a landmark move, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified for the first time an aircraft designed and manufactured in the People's Republic of China. The certification permits the Model Y-12 Harbin aircraft -- which meets the highest United States airworthiness standards -- to be imported and operated in the United States, putting the Chinese on the same level with other worldwide aircraft manufacturers.

Since 1991, the United States has had a bilateral airworthiness agreement with the People's Republic of China, enabling the FAA to receive technical assistance and production surveillance from the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China for U.S. products manufactured in China. The provisions of that agreement have now expanded to allow United States acceptance of small airplanes, like the newly certified Harbin aircraft, and certain aircraft components.

The newly certified 17-seat aircraft is manufactured by the Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation in Harbin, a city in Northern China. The FAA has been overseeing the Chinese aircraft certification system for the past three years to ensure strict adherence to U.S. airworthiness standards.

The FAA has established a presence in China since the mid-1980s to mutually promote the highest level of public confidence in the safety of the international air transportation system. In the past, the agency provided technical expertise in airworthiness certification to the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China when McDonnell Douglas was permitted by FAA to manufacture the MD-80 series aircraft in Shanghai in the late 1980s.

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