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RETIREMENT OF GENERAL MC KEE

GENERAL MC KEE: On Friday of this week, July 31, 1964, I will retire after more than 35 years' service. I must say that I have enjoyed thoroughly the entire 35 years. And during this time, of course, I have had many assignments both in the Army and in the Air Force, in the staff and in the field.

I am now completing my third tour in the Pentagon. I first came in the Pentagon in 19--late 1942, and the building was not even finished. My first tour was for a period of four years. My next tour, which started in 1947, I was Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. That was at the beginning of the United States Air Force as a separate service. That tour lasted for six years. I am now completing my third tour.

The suggestion was made that I record some of my observations both for today and looking to the future, and that possibly I could make some suggestions that might be helpful to those that come after me. My tours in the Pentagon have been very strenuous but I must say most rewarding.

As I have told many people in the Air Staff, both civilian and military, I know of no education as rewarding, no education as instructive and no education that will so fit you for your future as a tour in the Pentagon, in a re-

sponsible position. This I have found to be invaluable. Personally I feel that no officer should be promoted to the grade of general who has not had a tour in the Pentagon.

Now I would like to spend a few moments looking at the changes that have taken place in the last few years.

With the National Defense Act of 1958 to set up the unified and specified commands, and placed the conduct of operations of the unified and specified commands in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the responsibilities of the services changed considerably. In the Air Force, for example, internally, we are now charged of course with training, with logistics, with research and development, and other similar matters.

The Joint Chiefs are charged with the overall war-planning, with the conduct of operations regardless of where they happen to be in the world. Also in the past few years there has been a much greater trend toward centralization of government, and this has been particularly true in the Pentagon Building.

We now have the Defense Supply Agency under the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and there are others. My guess is, in the future, there will be more.

Whether this is good or bad is sometimes open to question, but nevertheless, as in everything else in govern-

ment, when a decision is made in this regard it is our responsibility and duty to carry out these decisions and to make the organization work.

So far I think that the functioning of the Defense Supply Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, have been good and I find no serious fault with them. On the other hand, I would not like to see centralization at this level go much further.

The operation of the Defense Department, of course like all other departments , will change from time to time, based on the incumbent as Secretary of Defense. I have known, worked with, and sometimes directly under, every Secretary of Defense since Mr. Forrestal. Each one of them have operated in a different fashion. All, obviously operate under a charter which is outlined in legislation by the Congress. But it's like any organization, you can draw the blocks, but the way the organization works will depend on the faces in those blocks.

Under Secretary McNamara today we have a very strong, vigorous operation. Mr. McNamara is a brilliant man an aggressive man, an extraordinarily hard worker and one who demands as near perfection as you can get. As I tell our people on the Air Staff, when they're complaining about not getting a paper approved, a study or a project down on the third floor, maybe we should point the finger at ourselves

and ask if we have done the job properly.

I further told them that we cannot expect to get our projects approved unless we have done our homework and unless our recommendations or the study will stand up to the most severe analysis and scrutiny by some very brilliant people working for Mr. McNamara.

I might add that there has been significant improvement over the past few years in the operation of the Air Staff and I would hope this improvement would continue at a rapid rate.

Also today, I think we should look at the wide spectrum of activities with which the Air Force is confronted. The war in Viet-Nam is now going on and a great deal of effort on the part of the Administration is pointed toward winning that war at the earliest possible time. What the future holds here, I do not know. The Air Force is placing a major effort in this area, and will continue to do so as long as necessary and as long as directed.

Now, while this is going on and the major effort is now pointed in this direction, we are also charged with the responsibility for conducting limited war anywhere in the world and conducting conventional war, in conducting nuclear war, up to the point of all-out general war and conducting all-out general war should that become necessary.

general war (sic)

We are also charged with military operations, or

planning for military operations in space. As you look ovwr the next 15 or 20 years, I am sure that we will see operations in space and consider them as a routine operation. To me we are just about today in space from a military point of view where we were with the airplane in 1907 or 1908.

There are many people today in all levels of the government, many people in civilian life, who say that there will never be any military applications in space. This same thing was said about the airplane in 1907. There are still papers in the War Department files which state that the airplane would have no military application whatsoever, that the airplane would never be able to fly the ocean, and in effect that it was only a feat.

We now have many people who say that any operations in space, obviously it will be only for peaceful purposes, and that space must be kept peaceful. To this I completely agree. We're trying to keep the seas peaceful. We're trying to keep all of the land peaceful. To do so we maintain a strong Navy and a strong Air Force and a strong Army. I think if we are to keep space peaceful, it is clear that we must have a capability to insure that peace, just as we have on the surface of the earth and in the atmosphere.

I can foresee very clearly orbiting space vehicles, orbiting space laboratories, a clearcut capability to rendezvous with such vehicles in space, to maintain these vehicles,

to take up crews, to bring them back. And if any of you happen to be listening to this 20 years from now, you'll probably say that I am--was conservative indeed. I can well remember a talk made by the great General "Hap" Arnold in 1945, to the Air Staff, in which he predicted very clearly where we stand today, and I must say he didn't miss it very far. Many people at the time, as the 'ole man said, thought that he had lost his marbles. He hadn't lost his marbles at all.

There's much talk today about manned and unmanned weapons systems. It is our view,and the future will state whether or not we are correct, that we need both manned and unmanned weapons systems. We feel that we need the missiles that we have and the missiles that are coming up--I'm talking about the ICBMs. We feel also very strongly that to give us flexibility and flexibility of response that we need unmanned weapons systems. Our B-52s today are getting old, they will not last very many more years, and I'm sure that we will find we must have a follow-on to that system. I can discuss the reasons for this at some length, but I think to the audience to whom I may happen to be talking, that these reasons will have become clear indeed.

Certainly we cannot say the ICBM is the ultimate weapon, anymore than at one time people would say that the airplane was the ultimate weapon or that the thermonuclear

bomb is a ultimate weapon. Personally I don't think that there's any such thing as an ultimate weapon and as science and technology move ahead at an ever-increasing rate, there are things over the horizon in this area that none of us can possibly dream about today.

Now I would like to talk for a few minutes about organization. When we set up the Air Staff in 1947, a number of people were involved. General Spaatz was the Chief of Staff. General Vandenberg was the Vice Chief of Staff, and I occupied the position of Assistant Vice Chief of Staff.

The three of us, along with General Norstad and Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, who was Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), did most of the work on the organization of the Air Staff.

All of us have seen the experiences in the War Department General Staff in the early part of the war when General Marshall found it imperative to make the reorganization because he couldn't run the war with the organization that he had.

We were determined therefore that the organization of the Air Staff would be one which could function effectively in time of peace and just as effectively in time of war. This was shown conclusively during Korea. No major changes had to be made to conduct that war from the Air Force point of view. I'm sure if we got in a war again tomorrow, which God forbid,

that we would need no major changes in the air staff. There have been some changes, but they have not been major. The concept has remained the same. I don't know what they will look like today--and by today I mean whatever point in time some of you happen to be listening to this or hearing it--but we have concentrated on giving authority and responsibility at the directorate level, expecting the directors to take full responsibility in their particular areas, expecting them to work across the board in getting an Air Staff solution.

As Vice Chief of Staff I would expect when a paper reaches my desk signed off by a director that he has properly coordinated that paper or project across the board with those people who have a collateral interest. My door as Vice Chief is always open to any director. I do not necessarily expect him to go through his appropriate Deputy Chief of Staff. All of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff have a very wide area of responsibility, are very busy, are very tied up in conferences and meetings. I do expect the directors, however, when they come to my office and I sign off on a paper or give a directive to them that they will touch base at the appropriate time with their Deputy Chief of Staff in order that they may know what is going on.

In short, we expect, on the Air Staff, a team approach.

Now, in talking about organization, I think we'll

also have to talk about the operation of that organization. Many people wonder exactly how the front office works, that is, the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief and the Assistant Vice Chief. I have always envisaged the Office of the Chief of Staff as one. That office includes the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief and the Assistant Vice Chief. They cannot operate effectively as three separate offices.

Today, General LeMay as Chief of Staff, is a very busy man indeed. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he spends at least three days a week down in the Joint Chiefs. Preparation for meetings of the Joint Chiefs takes many, many hours. It is essential to go through this preparation, as the Joint Chiefs is where the military policy in this country is made.

In addition to his meetings and the time taken to prepare for these meetings of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff also has many meetings with members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Secretary of the Air Force, meetings with Members of Congress, both the Senate and the House, frequent appearances before the various committees of the Congress, frequent public appearances. The demands on his time are almost overwhelming.

This being so he has had to place in the hands of the Vice Chief the primary job of running the internal part of the Air Force. As General LeMay has said to me many times,

"I give you 100 per cent of my authority. I wish I could give you my responsibility. And that I cannot do." I understand this loud and clear. Although he cannot pass to me his responsibility, I feel that responsibility just as deeply as though I had it.

During the past two years, in working with General LeMay, we have, the two of us, have felt that we are one person. General LeMay told his commanders and told his staff, when I came in, that at any time when I made a decision to which they disagreed that his door was open, he would listen to both sides of the question and if necessary, make the final decision. I'm proud to say that for the two years I've been here, working with General LeMay, that has not occurred once.

And there's one reason for that. I keep General LeMay informed as to what's going on; he keeps me informed and we act as one. When General LeMay leaves, which he has to do frequently on trips overseas and is sometimes gone for two weeks or three weeks at a time, I'm empowered to make all of the decisions. I never once have held back a single decision awaiting his return.

Things move too fast. You can't hold them back. You have to move ahead, even if sometimes you make a mistake. After all, all of us can't be perfect, as hard as we may try.

Now I have talked here quite a long time. I can go on for a lot longer, but I don't want to bore you, and,

also, you can imagine, I have an awful lot of things to do and I'm retiring in about three days, although the Secretary and the Chief treat me as though I'm going to be around here for another 10 years, so I'm coming down to this line in high blower, I might add.

I thought I might leave with you a few suggestions that might be helpful to you in operating as a member of the Air Staff or, as a matter of fact, as a commander in the field, or as a member of a staff in the field.

First and most important I think is, we must, as officers and as civilians in the Air Force, operate with total and complete integrity. And I mean both personal integrity and official integrity. Many people say they don't quite understand what I mean by personal integrity and official integrity. They say "Why don't you just say integrity".

Well, over the years I have seen people who, in their personal life, have not shown too much integrity and yet have been completely spotlessly clean officially. I have seen the opposite, where people in their official life have lacked the integrity they should have, and yet in their personal life had complete integrity. We have to have both and this is very essential.

And in this regard, I think, in our daily work, we have to recognize that we are reporting to some 200 million stockholders in this country and that we have to make sense

to them and that we can stand up before them, or stand up before their representatives in the Congress without any fear or any bias and speak our piece, even though we have done wrong, if we did it in honesty and sincerity, you may be criticized but that is all.

Many times many Members of Congress have told me that if we make a mistake we should step over to the Congress and look at them square in the eye and say you made a mistake. If it's an honest mistake you may be sure they will forgive you. However, if its a dishonest mistake or you were playing politics or you were trying to favor one side over another, you may be sure there are always two sides of it and you're going to get clobbered and you deserve to be clobbered.

Another point we should remember in our day-to-day dealings, and this is particularly true in working with the Army, the Navy, and the other Services, as well as internally and working with the Congress, that we should learn to put ourselves in the other man's seat and see what the problem looks like from his vantage point. If you make a major effort in this regard, I think many times you will find that the problems looks a lot different and you'll come up with a different answer. Many times when people come up to my office with a directive for me to sign, or the Chief to sign out to the commander in the field, I look at it and I ask the officer this question: "You are the Commander of SAC (or TAC) and

you get this directive, you tell me what you'd do." And very frequently the officer will say, "General, let me have the paper back. I want to think it over a little more." Sometimes I never see the paper again, or if I do, it's a completely different paper.

It was interesting to me a few months ago at the first meeting of the National Security Council held by President Johnson after the Assassination of the late President Kennedy, that Mr. Johnson made this point loud and clear, and he said to the members of the National Security Council, and I happened to be present in the absence of General LeMay. He said, you know many of the controversies between agencies of the Government and within agencies of the Government and many of the misunderstandings between our country and other countries in the world I think would largely disappear if all of us would make a major effort to put ourselves in the other man's seat and take a look at the problem from that viewpoint.

I must say I couldn't agree with President Johnson more, and I have tried to practice this throughout all my service, and I hope I never forget it.

I would hope that each one of you would always fight, bleed and die for what you believe in. A good staff officer in any command, and regardless of what level, should when he really believes in something,he feels confident that he is

right, should express his views and should fight for those views up until the point at which the responsible person makes a final decision. When that final decision is made, however, it is your duty to fully support it, never once go around the back door talking about it, how stupid it was, and fighting the decision.

Many people will make that mistake. Once that decision is made by responsible authority, you should support it and if you can't support it, then you ought to turn in your suit and get out.

I think one of the major problems that we have in the Pentagon Building, being as big as it is, looking at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Offices of the Departmental Secretaries, the big staffs involved, is communications. We write too many memorandums; we write too many papers, and sometimes we're too lazy to get up out of our chair and walk down a hall or across the Pentagon to sit down and talk with the other man who is involved, be it in the Army, or the Navy, or the Marines, or what. Eyeball to eyeball contact, stating the facts on both sides, making an honest attempt to reach a decision or reach agreement, again remembering trying to make as much sense as we can to the 200 million stockholders to whom we report, will do more to clear the air, will do more to speed things up and do more to get the right answers than anything I know.

In doing this, however, in communicating, in trying to get your work done, always be sure of your facts. I'll tell you a little story. I remember very distinctly when a general officer who was in Mr. Symington's office when he was Secretary of the Air Force, gave an answer to a question raised by Mr. Symington which Mr. Symington immediately used with the Secretary of Defense.

The officer obviously was not sure of his facts. Mr. Symington ended up being very embarrassed because Mr. Forrestal did have the facts and I remember when Mr. Symington returned, he talked to General Spaatz. He said, "I have been very embarrassed. This was a major question and I hope that I never see that officer in my office again." And you may be sure he never went in there again.

So again when you're dealing at any level, and particularly at the top levels, I think that you must recognize that what you say may be used at the level of the Secretary of Defense within a matter of hours or minutes or days, or, even at the level of the President of the United States, or at the top levels of the Congress. So you've got to be sure of your facts.

Many times people will press you for a deadline. They'll say,"We've got to have it right away!". I've had this happen to me many hundreds or thousands of times. I've always taken the approach, "I'm sorry. I don't have the facts

yet, and I refuse to give you information that may turn out two hours from now to be wrong, because you're going to act on it and whatever action you take on the facts that turn out not to be facts, then you're going to be wrong, and I don't want you to be embarrassed, and I'm not going to be embarrassed. I'll get the information for you as soon as I possibly can."

You hear a great deal about passing the buck. Sometimes I think that our promotion system may lead somewhat to this although we've worked as hard as we know how in the promotion system. We've tried to make it as nearly perfect as we can, but it is not perfect and many of you who may be listening to this will echo this I am sure. But I find a tendency in government and this is just not confined to the Pentagon and to the military, to pass the buck up to the superior.

In talking to all the colonels who come into the Air Staff and General LeMay and I see all of them and talk to them briefly, I always make this point, that You have been especially selected for the Air Staff. Both General LeMay and I want to be sure that you have both the authority to carry out your responsibilities. Your responsibilities should be clear. As far as we're concerned you have the authority to meet those responsibilities. And you should make those decisions that are rightfully yours. Don't pass

them up to your boss because you feel that you might get in trouble if you make the wrong one. You have to stand or fall on your own. And if you're going to get someplace in this Air Force, I strongly recommend that you stand up, meet your responsibilities, make the decisions that are yours, and stand or fall on those decisions."

I'd like to now talk a few minutes about civilian-military relationships. As you look over the history of the War Department, if you look over the past few years, there have been many examples of controversies between the military side of the house and the civilian side. We have made a major effort here in the Air Staff to improve the relationships.

After all, again, we're all working for the same government, we're all working for the same stockholders, and it really shouldn't make any difference whether you have on a civilian suit or a military suit insofar as pursuing our objectives are concerned. We are inclined, those of us in suits, to blame the civilians. I think personally that there's more blame to be placed on the military than there are on the civilian. After all, this is our field, this is our chosen profession. Most of us have been in it for years. We understand what it's all about. The civilian levels, they change. I'm now talking about the Secretary level, both departmental and OSD; the appointed civilians change from time to time. I have known dozens of Secretaries,

many more dozens of Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries. They come from civilian life. This is new to them. They have to find their way around and it always takes at least a year to find out where you are and where you're going and we in the military should recognize this and be helpful to these people. And we can. And I have yet, in all my experience, to see one who wasn't really grateful for that help.

And believe me, I have taken many of them by the hand and they still come around to see me and still express their thanks.

In short, let us not ever have any part of building up a brickwall between the military side of the house and the civilian side. And you can do a great deal to see that this wall never builds up. I think that we are very fortunate today to have a Secretary of the Air Force who has had very broad experience in government, Mr. Eugene Zuckert. And in addition to this broad experience in Government, Mr. Zuckert spent several years as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force under Mr. Symington, now Senator Symington. He has fortunately, a very deep understanding of the importance of human relationships. I think he feels, as do I, and as does General LeMay, that we must never permit a brick wall to be built up between the civilian side of the house and the military side.

And I would hope that future Secretaries would have this same fine sense of the importance of this problem.

And finally, I want to say one thing which I hope you don't forget. Never say "Yes, sir" when, in your heart, you mean "No, sir". I have seen this happen so many times at the top levels of government. Says a Chief or a Secretary, "Don't you think this is a fine idea?", and somebody says, "Yes, sir" and down here (indicating heart) he really says "I think it's a stupid idea."

When they ask me if I think it's a fine idea and I don't think so, I step up and say so. Otherwise what use are you to your boss? My statement is you're less than no use at all, because he is depending on you to tell him what you think. He can't have all the ideas. You've got to help. General Arnold used to say, "I can't pull this little red wagon all by myself. It takes a helluva lot of people and I need all the help I can get."

Let's be sure that is good help.

Gentlemen--ladies--I enjoyed talking with you, even though it gets a little tiresome looking at this television camera I'm looking at and I hope that what I said may be of some use to some of you.

Thank you very much.

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AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
WILLIAM F. McKEE, ADMINISTRATOR
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Mr. Neff, Mr. Halaby, General Quesada, Mr. Pyle, other distinguished guests and friends. It is a pleasure to be here and talk with you about aviation.

Just a little more than an hour ago, I was at my desk in my office in Washington. It was time to go. I climbed the one flight of stairs to our roof-top heliport, boarded a helicopter and then zipped across the Potomac to Washington National Airport. I flew by jet to Kennedy where another chopper waited. Flying time from Kennedy to the new Pan Am heliport -- seven minutes. Then down the elevator and through the tunnels to the Biltmore and here I am.

It may be that I now hold the speed record from downtown Washington to downtown New York.

This is truly the transportation of the future! Downtown to downtown by air! I congratulate Pan American and the New York airways for their initiative. May this be the beginning of downtown-to-downtown service everywhere in the country. We in aviation must show the world what we can do.

Sometimes, we are not quite so modern as we seem.

In preparing for my job with FAA last summer, I very carefully read the 1958 Act which established our Agency.

I went over countless official papers and memoranda -- I spent many hours with Jeeb Halaby. I met with all the previous Administrators as well as with many other top officials both in and out of FAA. None of this preparation, however, offered any indication of what could happen. Nowhere did I see or hear the word "Blackout," which I thought went out of style at the end of World War II.

Aviation's noise problem is now in what might be called the third stage. The first, or early phase, was the realization that as aviation grew, and the numbers of airports increased, aircraft noise would affect a larger number of our citizens. This knowledge was coupled with the belief that suitable answers would be found. The second phase was the voluntary efforts by industry, local authorities and the Federal Government to put to work a variety of noise abatement techniques. Noise suppressors were developed and installed on the carriers; preferential runways were specified at various airports; special noise abatement procedures were put into effect; airport planning guides were drawn up; and industry and government spent many millions of dollars on research in an effort to find a breakthrough.

Some success was gained. A measure of relief was achieved.

Unfortunately, however, the noise problem is still with us. It is, in fact, more serious now than ever. There is no point in mincing words. I say to those of you who earn your living through aviation, the noise problem, as it now exists, represents a growing barrier to the future growth of our industry. A solution must, therefore, be found. And a solution will be found. But it will not be quick. Nor will it be easy. Nor will it be cheap.

There are many things that must be understood as we in aviation move out in a joint action on this problem.

We ask that those affected by aircraft noise understand that there is no one in government or industry who is oblivious to this problem. We are bothered. We are concerned. We are at work.

From those of us who will be working together to find the answer, I ask only that we turn to and get the job done. We shall achieve nothing if our first order of business is attaching blame, faultfinding or buckpassing.

Those who share in, or derive benefits from, the airliner are many -- the local citizens, their government, the airport, the state, the carriers, the manufacturer, the Federal Government and so on.

It is only just and reasonable that all those who share in the dividends of airline service be prepared to assist in resolving some of the problems it creates.

As more and more Americans turn to the airplane for transportation, our biggest single task in support of safety of flight is the operation of the air traffic control system. The major improvement needed -- and one recognized by previous Administrators -- is to provide our air traffic controllers with unmistakable identity and altitude information on a continuous and automatic basis.

The technical problems involved in the design of the SST have tremendous glamour. The speeds it will fly -- the loads it will carry -- all the operating statistics are equally exciting. They are of such newsworthy quality, in fact, that they tend to obscure other equally new and different concepts that are also a part of the SST program.

The all important requirement in the SST program is that the final product must -- to begin with -- sell in the business market.

Later, it must operate successfully in commercial service and it must show a favorable return on investment. And it must both sell and operate in a highly competitive market. Finally, it must be able to do all this and, at the same time, be capable of returning its development costs to the government.

This is a highly challenging departure in government-industry relations. These requirements are, we think, most reasonable. We intend to meet them.

These demands must be taken into account in any financial plan for developing the Supersonic Transport.

We are developing proposals for this agreement now. These proposals include the provision that industry will cost-share in the development -- that industry will cost-share in the risk.

We shall in the near future be meeting with various elements of industry and government to work out the proportions of cost sharing. The final agreement will take long, patient and hard negotiating. I am certain that at the end we shall come up with an understanding that will be acceptable. It will probably be one that will make no one of the participants very happy. It will, rather, be one about which each participant will say, "It's about the best we can do... We can live with it."

We, in the FAA, as partners in the negotiations, will not at this time announce our thinking on this matter. Such an announcement would be most unfair to ourselves and our partners in the program. We shall, however, have a preliminary plan on the table soon after Congress reconvenes.

The design program goes well. Each proposed plane is having its own problems. These are, however, the normal difficulties all new aircraft go through at this stage of their development. I see no cause for concern. There is, in fact, every cause for confidence that all criteria will be met.

important project. This knowledge will make the construction of a commercial supersonic plane easier and, I might add, less expensive.

Our principal concern now is bringing together technical advance and cost. All things are possible. Our problem is to make them economical.

Our interest, at present, is with the management of this program. We, in government, are the sponsors. Yet we are neither the makers nor the users. We must improve our communications with the airlines. We must also improve our management control system. This is a big problem -- even now. A rough estimate indicates that at this stage about four thousand persons are at work on various supersonic transport projects. These people will grow to a labor force of 50,000.

How much influence should government exert? How should this influence be used? These are the kinds of problems we face.

And so we shall continue to work. It is most important that we move ahead with firmness and dispatch. There is now little room for uncertainty. Time grows short. In the world of 1975, none of us will be able to offer a reasonable excuse if there is no U.S. Supersonic Transport. I remind you that we in aviation are now -- as always -- obligated to the future.

Thank you.

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