

WMATA Close Call Program

2013-2024 Report



U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of the Secretary of Transportation



About the Bureau of Transportation Statistics

Leadership

Patricia Hu, *Director, Office of Director*
Rolf R. Schmitt, *Deputy Director, Office of Director*

About This Report

Produced under the direction of

Allison Fischman, *Director, Office of Safety Data and Analysis*

Report DOI

10.21949/1530062

Publication Date

January 2025

Key Words

Safety; close call; transit

Title

WMATA Close Call Program Report:
2013–2024

Abstract

The *WMATA Close Call Program Report* describes the results of the WMATA Close Call Program and its role in improving safety in WMATA operations. Under the voluntary program, employees confidentially disclose safety risks or unsafe conditions to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, which serves as the independent third-party data steward. All reports are evaluated by a peer review team with representatives from WMATA, labor, and BTS, who make recommendations to WMATA management for preventive safety actions to address the identified risks. This report is based on data collected from 2013 to 2024.

Recommended Citation

United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics. *WMATA Close Call Program Report: 2013–2024*. Washington, DC: 2025. <https://doi.org/10.21949/1530062>.



U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of the Secretary of Transportation

Bureau of Transportation Statistics

All material contained in this document is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without special permission. Source citation is required.

BTS information service contact information:

Ask-A-Librarian <https://transportation.libanswers.com/>

Phone 202-366-DATA (3282)

Quality Assurance Statement

The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) provides high quality information to serve government, industry, and the public in a manner that promotes public understanding. Standards and policies are used to ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of its information. BTS reviews quality issues on a regular basis and adjusts its programs and processes to ensure continuous quality improvement.

Notice

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The U.S. Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
1. Program Overview.....	4
1.1. Program Objectives and Principles	4
1.2. Reporting Process	6
1.3. Program Administration	7
2. What Was Reported.....	9
2.1. Numbers at a Glance	9
2.2. Safety Concerns Reported	10
2.2.1. Metrorail	11
2.2.2. Metrobus	14
2.3. Location of Close Calls Reported	16
2.3.1. Metrorail	16
2.3.2. Metrobus	17
2.4. Experienced vs. Observed Close Calls	18
3. What Have We Learned	19
4. Actions & Results	22
4.1. Preventive Safety Actions	22
4.1.1. Metrorail	22
4.1.2. Metrobus	23
4.2. Enhanced Analytical and Outreach tools	25
5. Looking Ahead	26
5.1. Increasing Participation Rates	26
5.2. WMATA and Labor Leadership Engagement.....	26
Appendix A. Memorandum of Understanding	28
Appendix B. Implemented Metrorail Preventive Safety Actions	29
Rule Modification/Administrative Procedures	29
Training	30
Guidance to Employees and/or Supervision	30
Equipment.....	31
Housekeeping	32
Signage.....	32
Environmental	32
Appendix C. Implemented Metrobus Preventive Safety Actions.....	33
Bus Equipment and Routes.....	33
Maintenance Equipment and Facilities	34
Rules/Procedure Modification.....	34
Guidance to Employees and/or Supervision	35
Appendix D. Updated Communications and Outreach	36
Appendix E. Glossary of Terms.....	38
Appendix F. Acronyms	41

List of Figures

Figure 1. Close Call Reporting Process	7
Figure 2. Close Call Reports Received, 2013-2024	9
Figure 3. Most Common Reporting Categories, 2013–2024	10
Figure 4. Metrorail Close Call Safety Concerns, 2013–2024 (total = 170 reports).....	12
Figure 5. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Metrorail Close Call Safety Concerns.....	13
Figure 6. Metrobus Close Call Safety Concerns, 2016-2024 (total = 103 reports).....	14
Figure 7. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Metrobus Close Call Safety Concerns.....	15
Figure 8. Locations of Metrorail Close Calls, 2013-2024 (total = 170 reports)	17
Figure 9. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Locations of Metrorail Close Calls	17
Figure 10. Locations of Metrobus Close Calls, 2016-2024 (total = 103 reports)	18
Figure 11. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Locations of Metrobus Close Calls	18
Figure 12. MCIA Evaluation Process	19
Figure 13. Contributing Factors of Reported Close Calls, 2013-2024.....	20
Figure 14. Examining Past Versus More Recent Factors Contributing to Unsafe Conditions.....	21
Figure 15. Contributing Factors of Reported Close Calls by Mode, 2019-2024	21
Figure 16. Status of Metrorail Close Call Preventive Safety Actions (total = 119 recommended actions).23	
Figure 17. Preventive Safety Actions Taken for Top-Reported Metrorail Safety Concerns	23
Figure 18. Status of Metrobus Preventive Safety Actions (total = 61 recommended actions)	24
Figure 19. Preventive Safety Actions Taken for Top-Reported Metrobus Safety Concerns	24

List of Tables

Table 1. Close Call Reports Received per Branch by Year.....	9
Table 2. Topics of Reported Close Calls, 2019–2024	10

Executive Summary

Program Overview

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Confidential Close Call Reporting Program (Close Call Reporting Program or Close Call Program) is a collaborative effort among the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), WMATA, the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689 (L-689), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 922 (L-922), and the Office of Professional Employees International Union Local 2 (OPEIU Local 2). This partnership developed the Close Call Reporting Program to support employee reporting of close call safety events, to determine their root causes, and to develop preventive safety actions. The Close Call Reporting Program responded to a recommendation from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) following the 2009 collision of two trains near Fort Totten Station in Washington, D.C.¹

Key Point

Close calls act as red flags that highlight potential dangers before they lead to actual accidents or injuries. By reporting close calls, employees help WMATA identify the root cause of the issue and implement preventive actions.

A close call, or near miss, is an unsafe situation or circumstance that has the *potential* for safety consequences but has not yet resulted in an adverse safety event, such as a crash or injury. The Close Call Reporting Program is part of WMATA's proactive approach to improving safety. Close calls act as red flags that highlight potential dangers before they lead to actual accidents or injuries. By reporting close calls, employees help WMATA identify the root cause of the issue and implement preventive actions. To encourage employee participation, the Close Call Reporting Program is entirely voluntary, nonpunitive, and confidential. The program removes fears and barriers that discourage employees from disclosing safety risks or unsafe conditions.

The Close Call Reporting Program has two branches that mirror WMATA's service delivery, including Metrorail reporting, which began in 2013, and Metrobus reporting, which began in 2016. BTS is a principal federal statistical agency and independent third party that administers the program and protects submitted reports under the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA).² Through the reporting system, BTS receives voluntary confidential close call reports submitted by WMATA employees, conducts confidential interviews, performs root-cause analyses (RCAs), and disseminates results of RCAs to peer review teams (PRTs) comprising representatives from WMATA rail and bus transit operations management and maintenance management, the WMATA Department of Safety, each union, and BTS.

Reporting Timeframe

In 2018, BTS reviewed the first five years of program data and trends from the Close Call Reporting Program as part of the [WMATA Close Call Program Report 2013-2018](#). The present

¹ National Transportation Safety Board. 2009. *Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station*. Railroad Incident Report NTSB/RAR-10/02, PB2010-916302. <https://www.nts.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/rar1002.pdf>.

² Public Law 115-435, Title III, Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (reauthorizing the 2002 CIPSEA law). <https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ435/PLAW-115publ435.pdf>.

report extends through the next six years of the program, covering from 2013 to 2024. In all, this report illustrates data on reported close calls and actions taken to prevent adverse safety events based on those reports—efforts that would not have been possible without input from willing and committed participants.

Data, Analysis, and Actions Summary

Since the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program's beginning in 2013, WMATA employees have contributed more than 275 reported events that have resulted in improvements to WMATA Metrorail and Metrobus facilities, processes, and procedures to reduce the likelihood of safety events.

In its first five years, the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program received 22 Metrorail and 13 Metrobus close call reports on average annually, resulting in more than 100 preventive safety actions over the period to address the underlying conditions of reported close calls. Participation continued to grow through 2019, reflecting the commitment of program stakeholders including WMATA management and labor leadership in implementing a uniquely structured program that fosters a voluntary, cooperative, and non-punitive environment to communicate safety concerns.



Although the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, which brought significant changes to commuting patterns and transit ridership to the DMV region, led to fewer reports in the most recent years, WMATA and labor organizations have supported assessing each reported close call through the program's established peer review process and developing and monitoring the implementation of new preventive safety actions.

Key Point

WMATA has implemented more than 90 percent of preventive safety actions recommended by close call peer review teams from 2013 to 2024.

The top three safety concerns reported for Metrorail were roadway worker protection, unsafe work practices, and defective equipment, and the top three safety concerns reported for Metrobus were bus design issues, bus route concerns, and unsafe work practices. Each safety concern is linked to multiple contributing factors. For example, 80 percent of all roadway worker protection concerns cited organizational procedures and operator/individual (e.g., human factors) as contributing factors for the close call. WMATA addressed these concerns through a variety of PrSAs which included enhanced training/retraining, rule clarification, and rule changes. Preventive safety actions implemented by WMATA are discussed in more detail in section 4 of this report.

A significant number of substantive safety improvements have been implemented since 2013 because of the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program, comprising greater than 90 percent of preventive safety actions recommended by the peer review teams. The program has successfully assisted WMATA management and L-689, L-922, and Local 2 leadership in

heightening awareness of safety risks, identifying new risks, and developing and implementing controls to prevent safety risks from occurring.

WMATA continues to be the first and only public transit organization with a program of this type. The program has seen a decade of partnership between WMATA management, labor leadership, and BTS for improving safety through employee reporting. Looking ahead, the stakeholders propose renewed focus on employee engagement and further integration of the Close Calls Program as an important component of WMATA's overall approach to safety.

1. Program Overview

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Confidential Close Call Reporting Program (Close Call Reporting Program) is a collaborative effort among the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689 (L-689), International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 922 (L-922), the Office of Professional Employees International Union Local 2 (OPEIU Local 2), and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).

This partnership developed the program in response to a recommendation from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) railroad accident report following the collision of two trains near Fort Totten Station in Washington, DC, on June 22, 2009. Since that time, WMATA remains the only transit agency with a Confidential Close Call Reporting system in place, and the Close Call Reporting Program, along with a portfolio of other voluntary reporting mechanisms and safety programs, is integrated as part of a culture of safety at WMATA.

The WMATA Close Call Program has two components, including the Metrorail program (launched in 2013) and the Metrobus program (launched in 2016).

1.1. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The Close Call Reporting Program is designed to improve the reporting of close call events and unsafe conditions to increase the overall safety of WMATA employees and the riding public. A close call is a situation or circumstance that has the potential for negative safety consequences but has not yet resulted in an adverse safety event, such as injury or vehicle collision.

The WMATA Close Call Reporting Program is entirely voluntary, nonpunitive, and confidential. These critical aspects of the program help increase trust and remove fears and barriers that can typically discourage employees from reporting unsafe conditions.

Key Point

The WMATA Close Call Program is designed to improve the reporting of close call events and unsafe conditions by employees to increase the overall safety of WMATA staff and the riding public.

Program Objectives

The Close Call Reporting Program is designed to achieve the following objectives identified in collaboration by the program partners:

- Improve safety culture by encouraging and increasing voluntary employee reporting of safety concerns.
- Mitigate the impact of known safety risks.
- Learn about unknown safety risks.
- Increase awareness of safety risks and emerging trends related to safety.
- Address potential safety risks through the development of preventive safety actions (PrSAs).

The Close Call Reporting Program complements other ways WMATA employees can report safety concerns, including contacting the Safety Hotline, the Office of the Inspector General's Hotline, and Safety Committees, or reporting directly to a supervisor. These diverse reporting systems allow employees to choose a method that best fits their needs while ensuring the organization is aware of potential safety concerns.

While all of these options are confidential and protect the identity of the person reporting an incident, BTS administers the Close Call Reporting Program under the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA),¹ which protects WMATA employees by ensuring that willful disclosure of confidential information is punishable as a class E felony.

Program Principles

The Close Call Program fosters a voluntary, cooperative, and nonpunitive environment to communicate safety concerns. Programs of this type are more likely to succeed when employees trust that they will not suffer adverse consequences for reporting unsafe conditions. The commitment of an organization's management to place safety first must be felt throughout the organization. To this end, the program has been structured around key principles of a close call reporting program: a nonpunitive environment, confidential reporting, and third-party collection of reports.

Nonpunitive Environment

Because the primary objective of the Close Call Reporting Program is for WMATA, L-922, L-689, and Local 2 to learn directly from employees about the safety concerns through voluntary reporting, it is essential for management to provide a nonpunitive environment.

Confidential close call reporting programs use reported information to learn about safety concerns and address employees' noncompliance to rules through coaching instead of disciplining. The nonpunitive nature of a program encourages employees to report unsafe conditions and suggest actions in a supportive environment in which the organization wants to learn causal factors and focus on improvement.

Using specific events or trends in data to identify, target, or discipline employees is outside the spirit of this program and is a direct violation of the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA), which authorizes BTS to conduct confidential data collection.

Confidential Reporting

All data collected by BTS from WMATA employees falls under CIPSEA. As such, WMATA is prohibited from using any information contained in a close call report filed with BTS to pursue disciplinary or enforcement actions. This includes information from the retrospective discovery of events involving violations of operating practices. Additionally, and in alignment with CIPSEA practices, BTS staff and Peer Review Team (PRT) members sign confidentiality agreements. Unauthorized release of CIPSEA data is a class E felony, punishable by up to \$250,000 in fines and up to 5 years of imprisonment.

¹ Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2018, 44 USC 3561–3583, also known as Title III of the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-435) (reauthorizing CIPSEA 2002).

BTS has strict protocols in place for collecting and protecting confidential data. CIPSEA protections for confidential data include but are not limited to the following:²

- Exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and immunity from legal process.
- Protection from release to the public or any other government agency.
- Protection from uses other than statistical purposes.

Third-Party Reporting

BTS is a federal statistical agency within the USDOT that serves as an independent third-party data collector and custodian of the Close Call Reporting Program. BTS collects, processes, analyzes, and protects the confidentiality of close call data provided by WMATA employees.

As an independent third party, BTS gives employees, who might not otherwise report close calls or unsafe conditions due to fear of retaliation, a safe, nonbiased option for reporting such concerns.

As a federal statistics agency, BTS is also responsible for efforts to continually improve data collection, quality, and analysis, as well as accessibility to and participation in its programs.

1.2. REPORTING PROCESS

As outlined in the MOU, eligible WMATA employees can report to BTS any safety concern, including a condition or event that is perceived as potentially endangering employees, the public, equipment, or the environment. An eligible employee can submit a close call report regardless of whether they experienced, observed, or have direct knowledge of a close call.

Figure 1 outlines the reporting process from observation of a safety event by a WMATA employee through the implementation of a Preventive Safety Action (PrSA) to address a specific concern:


1. The close call reporting process begins when an employee observes or experiences an unsafe condition and submits a close call report to BTS on the program website or over the phone.
2. After receiving the close call report, BTS reviews the information for accuracy, relevance, and completeness, and if necessary, interviews the reporting employee for additional contextual information.
3. BTS identifies potential contributing factors for each close call based on the employee's report and interview. The team cross-references the cause with WMATA rules and regulations.
4. BTS conducts multiple-cause incident analyses (MCIAs) to identify the root cause(s) of the reported close call/unsafe condition with input from subject matter experts on the PRT during PRT meetings.

² 44 USC 3572. See also *Baldrige v. Shapiro*, 455 U.S. 345 (1982).

5. The PRT uses the identified root cause(s) to formulate Preventive Safety Actions (PrSAs). The PRT is also empowered, in accordance with the MOU, to make decisions about whether to implement the PrSAs directly or forward the action to WMATA management for approval and implementation.
6. WMATA then implements the PrSAs.

For additional details about the reporting process, refer to the MOU in Appendix A.

Figure 1. Close Call Reporting Process



Source: BTS.

1.3. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

The Close Call Reporting Program partners have pledged to support the program by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU outlines the governance and functions of the program, including conditions for participation, roles and responsibilities of each partner, and reporting form and process. Each signee of the MOU plays a role in administering the WMATA Close Call Program:

- The labor unions (L-689, L-922, and Local 2), whose members are eligible to participate, are committed to informing and explaining the program to their members.
- WMATA provides funding, resources, and program oversight for all aspects of the program and implementation of PrSAs.
- BTS developed and manages the reporting system for data collection, storage, and analysis.

All stakeholders have equal representation on PRTs and are responsible for providing subject matter expertise for close call analyses. The signees of the MOU collaborate closely regarding employee outreach to promote employee engagement and program success. For additional information about the roles of each signee, refer to the MOU in Appendix A.

Role of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics

As a designated principle federal statistical agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), through CIPSEA, BTS has the authority to protect the confidentiality of close call

reporters. BTS exercises its authority for this program under a reimbursable agreement with WMATA.

BTS has the following primary responsibilities as the third-party data collector and custodian of the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program:

1. Accept reports of close calls (i.e., safety events that do not rise to the WMATA criteria of an accident).
2. Conduct interviews with reporting employees to collect contextual information if needed.
3. Perform data quality analyses on reported close call events or unsafe conditions.
4. Provide oversight to the work of the PRT.
5. Conduct MCIA's for reported close call events with input from subject matter experts on the PRT.
6. Track WMATA's reports on preventive safety actions.
7. Analyze reported close call events at an aggregate level to understand higher-level trends and opportunities.
8. Produce and disseminate reports on trends and other characteristics of close calls to improve WMATA safety.
9. Continue to identify ways to improve the effectiveness of the reporting system.
10. As the owner of the data collected, protect the confidentiality of the data through BTS' own governance and CIPSEA.

2. What Was Reported

2.1. NUMBERS AT A GLANCE

Since the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program's beginning in 2013, WMATA employees have contributed more than 275 reported events (refer to Table 1 and accompanying plot in Figure 2) that have resulted in improvements to WMATA Metrorail and Metrobus facilities, processes, and procedures to reduce the likelihood of safety events.

In its first five years, the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program received 22 Metrorail and 13 Metrobus close call reports on average annually, resulting in more than 100 preventive safety actions over the period to address the underlying conditions of reported close calls. Participation continued to grow through 2019, reflecting the commitment of program stakeholders including WMATA management and labor leadership in implementing a uniquely structured program that fosters a voluntary, cooperative, and non-punitive environment to communicate safety concerns.

Although the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, which brought significant changes to commuting patterns and transit ridership to the DMV region, led to fewer reports in the most recent years, WMATA and labor organizations have supported assessing each reported close call through the program's established peer review process and developing and monitoring the implementation of new preventive safety actions.

Table 1. Close Call Reports Received per Branch by Year

Division	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Rail	14*	13	17	11	30	26	16	12	17	4	5	5
Bus	—	—	—	9*	14	17	26	17	12	3	5	**

Note: To ensure employee confidentiality, multiple reports on the same condition by the same person are counted as one report.


*Rail data for 2013 and bus data for 2016 are partial as these were the years of initial program deployment for each branch.

—Not applicable. Bus program started in 2016.

**The exact count of bus reports is masked for 2024. Counts are masked if the number of reports does not exceed the threshold required to preserve confidentiality.

Source: BTS.

Figure 2. Close Call Reports Received, 2013-2024




Source: BTS.

2.2. SAFETY CONCERNS REPORTED

Reports of close call events or unsafe conditions are categorized into areas of safety concern to facilitate analysis of contributing factors, root causes, and safety trends across rail and bus. During 2013 to 2024, the most reported areas of concern that apply to both rail and bus are unsafe work practices and COVID-19, the most common for rail are roadway worker protection and defective equipment/infrastructure, and the most common for bus are bus design issue and bus route concern (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Most Common Reporting Categories, 2013–2024



Source: BTS.

Table 2 summarizes topics of reported close calls from 2019 to 2024. The following sections discuss the safety concerns associated with these topics. Preventive safety actions taken in response to the reported close calls are discussed in section 4.

Table 2. Topics of Reported Close Calls, 2019–2024

Year	Rail	Bus
2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Station Kiosk Infestation Car Wash Procedural Training Proper Securement of Trains Rail Yard Equipment Design 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bus Shield Glare 8000 Series Bus Compartment Bus Division Housekeeping Bus AC Maintenance Issue Road/Traffic Condition Bus Engine Lift
2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covid-19 Roadway Worker Protection - Watchmen Lookout Facilities Housekeeping Equipment Engineering Revaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covid-19 Bus Stop/Station Lighting Issue Handicap Parking Bus Division Housekeeping Smoking on Property 8000 Series Bus Compartment


Year	Rail	Bus
2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Covid-19 • Rail Station Lighting • Facility – Mold • Roadway Worker Protection - Improper Movement • Roadway Worker Protection - Watchmen Lookout • Vehicle Safety Procedures • Unauthorized Person(s) on Track • Foul Time Requested/Train in Area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Covid-19 • 8000 Series Bus Compartment • Bus Division Housekeeping • Bus Lighting Maintenance Issue
2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roadway Worker Protection - Snowmelter PMI • Facility Heating System • Training • Facilities Housekeeping - Landscaping 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8000 Series Bus Compartment
2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Near-Miss Electrical • Facility AC Leakage • Environmental Material Disposal • Roadway Worker Protection - Inadequate Safety Briefing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8000 Series Bus Compartment • Road/Traffic Condition • Bus Division Housekeeping
2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station Housekeeping • Foul Time Requested/Train in Area • Roadway Worker Protection - Watchmen Lookout 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road/Traffic Condition

2.2.1. Metrorail

The Metrorail Close Call Program includes WMATA's six metro lines, 98 stations and 130 miles of mainline track.¹ Figure 4 shows the types of close call safety concerns reported for Metrorail during 2013 to 2024, and Figure 5 compares safety concerns during the first five years of the program to more recent years.

¹ *Your Metro, The Way Forward: Strategic Transformation Plan*, Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, February 2023, https://www.wmata.com/initiatives/strategic-plan/upload/230314_STP_Report.pdf.

**Figure 4. Metrorail Close Call Safety Concerns, 2013–2024
(total = 170 reports)**



Source: BTS.

The three primary reported safety concerns for Metrorail during 2013 to 2024 were:

1. Roadway worker protection
2. Unsafe work practice
3. Defective equipment/infrastructure


As shown in Figure 5, during the first five years of the program, these concerns represented similar percentages of the total (about 13 to 17 percent each). Since 2019, roadway worker protection concerns have outpaced other categories, representing more than 35 percent of the total reports from 2018 to 2024. This increase could be attributed to increased systemwide and focused maintenance work during pandemic periods of lower ridership.

Reports related to roadway worker protection were systemic in nature and not limited to a particular line, due to the mobile nature of the work being performed. Reports in this area from 2013 to 2024 were related to procedures not followed by Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC), Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC), or supervisors, and most were related to communication failures between ROCC and wayside worker crews. During 2019 to 2024, roadway worker protection reports involved the Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) cardinal rules, ROCC communications, and procedures not being followed with the RWP guide.

Many of the reports related to unsafe work practices in recent years involved situational environments that could create an adverse safety event for an employee. Reports related to defective equipment/infrastructure involved general and preventive maintenance issues, including facility upkeep.


Figure 5. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Metrorail Close Call Safety Concerns

2013–2018
(total = 111 reports)



Source: BTS.

2019–2024
(total = 59 reports)




Source: BTS.

2.2.2. Metrobus

The Metrobus Close Call Program includes WMATA's bus divisions, which have more than 1,500 buses serving 11,500 bus stops and 132 lines of service in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia network.^{1,2} Figure 6 shows the types of close call safety concerns reported for Metrobus during 2013 to 2024, and Figure 7 compares safety concerns during the first three years of the program to more recent years.

Figure 6. Metrobus Close Call Safety Concerns, 2016-2024
(total = 103 reports)



Source: BTS.

The three primary reported safety concerns for Metrobus during 2016 to 2024 were:

1. Bus design issue
2. Bus route concern
3. Unsafe work practice

As shown in Figure 7, these were the top-reported areas of concern during the first three years of the program, although bus route concern was more common than bus design issue in the earlier period. Many reports related to unsafe work practices in recent years involved situational environments that could create an adverse safety event for an employee. These reports were address through cleaning, providing PPE, implementing social distancing, and enhanced pandemic response documentation.


¹ *Your Metro, The Way Forward: Strategic Transformation Plan*, Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, February 2023, https://www.wmata.com/initiatives/strategic-plan/upload/230314_STP_Report.pdf.

² *Better Bus: Existing Conditions Technical Report*, Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, January 2023, https://www.wmata.com/initiatives/plans/Better-Bus/upload/BBNR_ExistingConditions_FINAL_011223-1-2.pdf.


For the first three years of the program, reported bus design issues included placement of mirrors, bus shield glare, placement of fare boxes, and seatbelt adequacy. From 2019 to 2024, safety concerns were reported involving the 8000-series bus operator's compartment. These concerns affected operators across demographics and other characteristics. The PRT recommended the WMATA ergonomics group perform an evaluation on the 8000 series bus operator's compartment. This was done and a prototype was created for the 8000 series with enhancements. In addition, a bulletin was sent to all operators regarding use of the 8000s and what to do if they did not feel safe to operate the vehicle.

Bus route concerns involved traffic congestion or traffic patterns that created unsafe bus navigation while enroute. Other factors that compounded the concern included bike lines, double parked cars, street size (number of lanes and their width), jaywalkers, and other road hazards. Some reports received since 2019 related to changes in the operating environment for the bus system in DC due to the incorporation of additional bike lanes in the DMV area.

Figure 7. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Metrobus Close Call Safety Concerns



Source: BTS.



Source: BTS.

2.3. LOCATION OF CLOSE CALLS REPORTED

2.3.1. Metrorail

Most reported Metrorail close calls from 2013 to 2024 occurred on mainline tracks (Figure 8), which are the operating railroad outside of the yards. Close calls occurring on the mainline have the potential to lead to serious accidents due to trains carrying passengers. Examples of areas of reported safety concerns on the mainline include events involving track maintenance, communication and equipment failures, and infrastructure damage. Mainline close call reports did not indicate higher safety concerns for a specific line segment; rather, they indicated systemwide concerns that were addressed through preventive safety actions at relevant locations. Preventive safety actions are discussed in section 4 of this document, titled Actions & Results.

Other locations of reported close calls include shops, stations, and yards:

- The shop is the area within the yard where repairs are made. Not every yard has a shop. Examples of areas of reported safety concerns in the shops include equipment failure and procedural error or improper procedures.
- The station is a platform location where revenue trains discharge and pick up passengers. It is also the location of the station manager's kiosk and other station maintenance rooms. Examples of areas of reported safety concerns in the stations include events involving station and equipment maintenance as well as housekeeping.
- The yard is a system of tracks used for connecting and storing trains. Vehicle movements in the yards are under the authority of the tower operator. Examples of areas of reported safety concerns in the yards include communication challenges and equipment and facility hazards or damage. The percentage of close call reports occurring in the yard increased compared to the first five years of the program (Figure 9), with several reports involving train securement, yard equipment or adherence to rules and procedures.

Reported close calls occurring off WMATA property are categorized as "other" location.

**Figure 8. Locations of Metrorail Close Calls, 2013-2024
(total = 170 reports)**






Figure 9. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Locations of Metrorail Close Calls

**2013-2018
(total = 111 reports)**



**2019-2024
(total = 59 reports)**




2.3.2. Metrobus

Most reported Metrobus close calls from 2016 to 2024 occurred during operations, as shown in Figure 10. Operations concerns are those that involved a bus and/or bus operator while the bus was in service, including pre- and post-trip inspections. Maintenance concerns are those that occurred in a maintenance facility or before/during/after maintenance was performed on a bus. Systemwide concerns are those that were not isolated to a specific location and instead could affect the entire system.

The distribution of close calls between Metrobus operations and maintenance roughly aligns with the size of each component; Metrobus operations is about three quarters of all Metrobus employees and Metrobus maintenance represents about one quarter. The distribution of

locations has remained relatively consistent in recent years compared to the first three years of the program (Figure 11).


**Figure 10. Locations of Metrobus Close Calls, 2016-2024
(total = 103 reports)**



Source: BTS.


Figure 11. Reviewing Past Versus More Recent Locations of Metrobus Close Calls

**2016-2018
(total = 40 reports)**



Source: BTS.

**2019-2024
(total = 63 reports)**



Source: BTS.


2.4. EXPERIENCED VS. OBSERVED CLOSE CALLS

The WMATA Close Calls Program is designed to accept reports from employees who experienced a close call firsthand as well as from those who might have observed or become aware of a close call event through another party. During the first five years of the program, 80 percent of Metrobus close call reports and nearly 70 percent of Metrorail close call reports were experienced firsthand. Most reports received since then were also experienced firsthand, with no Metrobus observational reports and only a few Metrorail observational reports.

3. What Have We Learned

Learnings from reported close calls are developed through a structured review process carried out by peer review teams (PRT), which include representatives from WMATA management, labor organizations, and BTS. BTS performs a preliminary analysis on each close call to identify potential contributing factors for PRT review. In reviewing a close call, the PRT conducts a Multiple Cause Incident Analysis (MCIA) to identify the significant contributing factors to the close call. Contributing Factors are an important part of the evaluation phase because they help identify aspects of the close call which ultimately lead to root cause determinations. This process in which the PRT analyzes each close call report is represented in Figure 12.

Figure 12. MCIA Evaluation Process



A contributing factor of a close call report is anything that aids in triggering the close call. Though they may be closely related, contributing factors are different from characteristics of close calls. Characteristics describe the nature of close calls, while contributing factors capture the conditions that trigger or lead to the close call.


A root cause is the fundamental cause of a close call. The difference between root cause and contributing factor is that a contributing factor may be one or more related things that worked together to cause a close call; a root cause is the source from which other contributing factors originate. It is important to note that one root cause can be responsible for multiple close calls, and one close call can have multiple root causes. The root cause analysis is performed by BTS with input from subject matter experts on the PRT.

Unsafe conditions and unsafe events are often at the root of why events occur. The following subsections describe six contributing factors and their influences on WMATA close call reports.

- **Organization/WMATA** – This factor covers the organizational characteristics of WMATA as an operating entity that may contribute to close calls. These characteristics include organizational goals and priorities; management structure, reporting relationships and communication channels; rules and regulations; procedures and safety assurance policies/methods; and audits, etc.

- **Equipment/Tools** – This factor focuses on the physical characteristics of the equipment and tools employed in WMATA operations that may aid in causing close calls, including the size, shape, weight; speed of equipment or tools; condition and readiness for use; and accessibility and ergonomics, etc.
- **Operator/Individual** – This factor covers all aspects pertaining to workers and individuals who are directly involved in close calls. The aspects include crew knowledge, skill and ability to do the job; crew familiarity and experience with work site; equipment, tools and materials required for the job; crew functional mix; planning and preparation for the job; crew relationships with one another; clarity of communication channel and protocol to crew; and crew physical and mental readiness for the job (fatigue, stress, and distraction), etc.
- **Supervision** – This factor covers aspects pertaining to supervision at all levels. The aspects include supervisor knowledge, skill and ability to do the job; supervisor familiarity and experience with work site; equipment, tools and materials required for the job; supervisor functional mix; planning and preparation for the job; supervisor relationships with one another; supervisor relationships with crew; clarity of communication channel and protocol for supervisor/crew; and supervisor physical and mental readiness for the job (fatigue, stress, and distraction), etc. In this factor, the focus is on how the states of the covered aspects of supervisors or other authority-holding individuals affect the clarity, accuracy, and effectiveness of the guidance and instructions provided to the crew.
- **Work Space/Environment** – This factor covers the physical aspects of the work space and environment that may cause close calls, such as worksite condition and cleanliness; accessibility and ergonomics; visibility and lighting; and the organizational aspects that affect the physical aspects of the work space and environment, such as housekeeping standards and inspection frequency, hazardous materials inspection, and protection audits.
- **Other** – This factor covers all other aspects of the WMATA operations that may aid in triggering close calls but are not covered by the above five factors. Offsite factors including other governing bodies is coming that specifically affects the DMV area and WMATA operations.

Figure 13. Contributing Factors of Reported Close Calls, 2013-2024




Note: Percentages are of 403 contributing factors. One report may have multiple contributing factors.
Source: BTS.

As seen in Figure 13, organization/WMATA was the leading contributing factor among close calls from 2013 and 2024, accounting for one third of the total. Within this factor, subfactor rules/regulations/procedures was the most common. Design in equipment/tools operation was the most common subfactor under the second most significant contributing factor of equipment/tools.

The percentage of contributing factors classified as “other” increased in recent years compared to the first five years of the program, as shown in Figure 14. Many of these were bus-related and due to changes in the bus system operating environment from the incorporation of additional bike lanes in the District and additional lighting in Prince George’s County.

Operator/individual and supervision, the two human factors among the six contributing factors, together represented more than 25 percent of all identified contributing factors. The most common subfactors within these factors included crew familiarity, relationship, communication, and adherence to procedures. During 2019 to 2024, operator/individual was a commonly reported contributing factor for Metrorail close calls, but not Metrobus (Figure 15).


Figure 14. Examining Past Versus More Recent Factors Contributing to Unsafe Conditions



Note: Percentages are of 175 contributing factors. One report may have multiple contributing factors.
Source: BTS.

Note: Percentages are of 228 contributing factors. One report may have multiple contributing factors.
Source: BTS.

Figure 15. Contributing Factors of Reported Close Calls by Mode, 2019-2024



Note: Percentages are of 228 contributing factors. One report may have multiple contributing factors.
Source: BTS.

4. Actions & Results

This section describes the actions taken by WMATA to improve safety in its operations based on data collected by BTS and the recommendations provided by the Peer Review Team (PRT). It also describes improvements to analytical and outreach tools in recent years to improve the quality of information collected from WMATA employees and developed by the PRT.

4.1. PREVENTIVE SAFETY ACTIONS

As part of WMATA's implementation process, every Preventive Safety Action (PrSA) is assigned to a WMATA manager/supervisor who oversees its successful completion. A PrSA could involve a wide range of actions, including:

- Revising, clarifying, or expanding an SOP;
- Issuing a bulletin or memorandum to employees;
- Performing a quality assurance audit;
- Installing new signage;
- Distributing placards;
- Providing/expanding training;
- Identifying additional safety topics for the "safety tip of the day" at the job briefings (tool box meetings); and/or
- Revising/improving equipment.

A list of PrSAs can be found in Appendix B for Metrorail and Appendix C for Metrobus.

Since the program's beginning in 2013, WMATA has maintained a clear commitment to close call reporting as demonstrated in the high implementation rates of recommended preventive safety actions. During 2013 to 2024, WMATA implemented more than 90 percent of all preventive safety actions recommended by the Peer Review Team, including more than 95 percent of rail recommendations and 85 percent of bus recommendations.

4.1.1. Metrorail

The WMATA Metrorail PRT reviewed and analyzed each of the reported close calls to understand what happened, what the contributing factors were, and what could be learned and implemented. For most reported close calls—where sufficient information was collected from the reports and interviews—the PRT performed a Multiple Cause

Incident Analysis (MCIA) to identify the root causes. Based on the results of the MCIA, the PRT developed and submitted 119 preventive safety actions (PrSAs) for the approval of WMATA management for implementation. All but five (95.8 percent) of the submitted PrSAs have been approved and implemented under the WMATA Metrorail Program.


Achievements:

PrSAs Recommended:	119
PrSAs Implemented:	114

Figure 16 shows the implementation status of the 119 PrSAs developed by the Metrorail PRT. The 114 PrSAs implemented include 99 implemented by WMATA management and 15 that were addressed through other WMATA programs because those programs had identified similar

safety concerns. For the five disapproved PrSAs, WMATA decided to address the issue differently than the PRT had recommended.


**Figure 16. Status of Metrorail Close Call Preventive Safety Actions
(total = 119 recommended actions)**



Source: BTS.

The top three safety concerns reported for Metrorail were: roadway worker protection, unsafe work practices, and defective equipment. Each safety concern is linked to multiple contributing factors, as shown in Figure 17. For example, 80 percent of all roadway worker protection concerns cited organizational procedures and operator/individual (e.g., human factors) as contributing factors for the close call. WMATA addressed these concerns through a variety of PrSAs which included enhanced training/retraining, rule clarification, and rule changes.

Figure 17. Preventive Safety Actions Taken for Top-Reported Metrorail Safety Concerns



Source: BTS

4.1.2. Metrobus

The WMATA Metrobus PRT reviewed and analyzed each of the 103 reported close calls to identify the contributing factors and develop recommendations. For the majority of reported close calls—where sufficient information was available from the reports and interviews—the PRT performed a Multiple Cause Incident Analysis (MCIA).

Based on the results of the MCIA, the PRT developed and submitted 61 preventive safety actions (PrSAs) for the approval of WMATA management for implementation. Fifty-two (85.2 percent) of the submitted PrSAs have been approved and implemented under the


Achievements:

PrSAs Recommended: 61
PrSAs Implemented: 52

WMATA Metrobus Program. An additional six PrSAs are approved and pending implementation by WMATA.

Figure 18 shows the implementation status of the 61 recommended PrSAs. The 52 PrSAs implemented include 45 implemented by WMATA management and 7 that were addressed through other WMATA programs because those programs had identified similar safety concerns. In addition to the PrSAs pending implementation by WMATA, three PrSAs are pending implementation outside WMATA. A PrSA may be pending implementation outside WMATA if the recommendation is directed towards a local government, for example.


Figure 18. Status of Metrobus Preventive Safety Actions
(total = 61 recommended actions)



Source: BTS.

The top three safety concerns reported for Metrobus were: bus design issues, bus route concerns, and unsafe work practices. Each safety concern is linked to multiple contributing factors, as displayed in Figure 19. For example, 80 percent of all bus design issues cited organizational procedures and 62 percent cited insufficient or defective tools and equipment as contributing factors for the close call. WMATA addressed these concerns through a variety of PrSAs which included enhanced guidance to bus operators, performing engineering analysis, and bus design modifications.

Figure 19. Preventive Safety Actions Taken for Top-Reported Metrobus Safety Concerns



Source: BTS.

4.2. ENHANCED ANALYTICAL AND OUTREACH TOOLS

Updated Website and Online Form

In 2022, the team updated the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program website, hosted by BTS, to simplify navigation, update the design to align with current communications materials, and improve opportunities for visitors to find information and the reporting form.

As part of this work, the online reporting form was improved with more consistent formatting, consolidated layout, and other changes designed to aid WMATA employees in providing the requested information more quickly and easily.



In 2024, the team updated the website and form to be mobile responsive, making it easier for employees to report close calls on location.

Updated Multiple Cause Incident Analysis Tool

The Multiple Cause Incident Analysis (MCIA) tool was incorporated within the WMATA Close Call Process Manager. This change was made to have a fully incorporated system and update the look and feel of the MCIA tool. The contributing factor and root cause evaluation processes were also updated to aid the PRT in performing a comprehensive review and recommendation for each close call received.

Updated Outreach Materials

With input from program stakeholders, BTS developed a communications strategy in 2024 to build on recent updates to the program website and online form and build employee awareness and knowledge of the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program. The objectives of the strategy include: 1) increasing program awareness across existing and new employees, 2) promoting the importance of reporting close calls and near misses in preventing accidents and improving safety, 3) setting metrics for increasing employee engagement, 4) establishing channels for employees to provide feedback on the program, 5) helping employees understand their role in promoting safety through the program, and 6) establishing key performance indicators to track the effectiveness of our efforts.

The team created or refreshed various outreach materials to support the strategy, including digital and printed poster and flyer designs. The strategy also calls for a cadence of communications to employees, such as digital newsletters, periodic articles in WMATA and labor e-newsletters, posts on the WMATA intranet, and leadership messaging about the program. BTS is continuing to collaborate with WMATA and labor to implement the strategy.

5. Looking Ahead

A significant number of substantive safety improvements have been implemented since 2013 because of the WMATA Close Call Reporting Program. The program has successfully assisted WMATA management and L-689, L-922, and Local 2 leadership in heightening awareness of safety risks, identifying new risks, and developing and implementing controls to prevent safety risks from occurring.

WMATA continues to be the first and only public transit organization with a program of this type. The program is uniquely structured to overcome known barriers to reporting by ensuring a nonpunitive environment, confidential reporting, and third-party collection of reports. It leverages a robust, collaborative, and accountable peer review process for evaluation of close call reports. By sharing information with employees about how their reports are addressed, they are more likely to continue to share important information that could prevent an adverse safety event.

5.1. INCREASING PARTICIPATION RATES

Increasing employee awareness of the program and participation rates should remain a central requirement as the program continues. Increasing employee participation is key to achieving program objectives. Participation is likely to increase with more frequent and consistent promotion through the implementation of a communications strategy. BTS proposes to continue ongoing work with WMATA and labor organizations to refine and implement a unified strategy together that places the Close Call Reporting Program in context as a complement to other WMATA reporting mechanisms, allowing employees to choose the method that best fits their needs.

Communications objectives for the Close Call Reporting Program involve aligning messaging and activities to foster a culture of safety and encourage employee participation. BTS proposes the following, for future refinement and development with program stakeholders:

1. Increase Awareness - Ensure that all WMATA employees are aware of the Close Call Reporting Program, its purpose, and its benefits.
2. Promote Understanding - Educate employees about the importance of reporting close calls and near misses in preventing accidents and improving safety.
3. Inspire Participation - Set metrics for increasing employee engagement.
4. Provide Feedback Loops - Establish channels for employees to provide feedback on the Close Call Reporting Program, including suggestions for improvement or areas of concern.
5. Provide Guidance and Resources - Offer guidance and other resources to help employees understand their role in promoting safety through the program.
6. Measure Success - Establish key performance indicators to track the effectiveness of internal communications and engagement efforts.

5.2. WMATA AND LABOR LEADERSHIP ENGAGEMENT

Support from managers at all levels of WMATA and labor leadership are essential not only for successful outreach efforts and increased employee participation, but also to strengthen integration of the Close Call Reporting Program with other safety program within WMATA and

the labor organizations. The Close Call Reporting Program is unique in its structure and administration by a neutral third party; still, it is an important part of WMATA's overall approach to improving and ensuring safety. Information from reported close calls can be used to support proposals and safety intervention programs that stem from other existing efforts at WMATA, and vice-versa. To continue to improve and strengthen a culture of safe workplace practices, BTS, WMATA, and labor can consider ways to better leverage and exchange learnings from close calls within WMATA's broader safety strategy.

Appendix A. Memorandum of Understanding

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) describes the provisions of the WMATA Confidential Close Call Program and explains the rights, roles, and responsibilities of the participants.

The program partners—including WMATA, the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) Local 689, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) Local 922, the Office & Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU) Local 2, and BTS—most recently updated the MOU in 2024.

[The document is available on the WMATA Close Call Program website.](#)

Appendix B. Implemented Metrorail Preventive Safety Actions

RULE MODIFICATION/ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

- Create a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) safety bulletin reminding all supervisors and employees that switching orders must be in their possession before finishing the job safety briefing and starting work racking power breakers. (October 2013)
- Performed audit for employee compliance of the Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) procedures in the track maintenance department. (February 2014)
- Clarified operating procedures for leaving an unstaffed terminal. (May 2014)
- Created a uniform procedure for reporting on-the-job injuries. (October 2014)
- Created a standard RWP tool box briefing (job safety briefing). (January 2015)
- Evaluated the RWP Manual/Roadway Access Guide for discrepancies. (April 2015)
- Reviewed SOPs related to proper handling of defective track conditions reported to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC). (November 2015)
- Improved RWP training procedures. (February 2016)
- Implemented procedures for employees to acknowledge proper use and storage of flashlights, to minimize likelihood of overheating. (June 2016)
- Improved radio communication SOPs. (September 2016)
- Initiated an audit to identify and correct intermittent radio communication outages. (November 2016)
- Developed a standardized Lock-Out/Tag-Out (LOTO) procedure to include the proper personal equipment (PPE) required, radio communication, personal responsibilities, and other applicable rules. (September 2017)
- Conducted a compliance audit of SOP #12 which revealed the evening and night shifts were lacking in SOP #12 compliance. A detailed plan was developed to discuss SOP #12 in the shops and retraining all employees on the SOP. (September 2018)

TRAINING

- Improved training and monitoring of the SOPs for flagging trains into and out of the shops. (October 2014)
- Provided additional training regarding the use of PPE for fall protection when using an aerial lift. (April 2015)
- Improved RWP training procedures. (February 2016)
- Improved radio communication training. (September 2016)
- Trained flagmen personnel to pair headsets to the prime mover onboard equipment to establish proper communication while operating. (January 2017)
- Developed and instituted a 14-week training program with an emphasis in Electrical Safety for the Traction Power Maintenance (TRPM) department. (August 2017)
- Developed a training course on SOP#41 for all escorts to familiarize personnel with the escorting procedures for non-roadway environments. (October 2017)
- Trained all TRPM employees regarding the new Lock-Out/Tag-Out (LOTO) procedure. (November 2017)
- Conducted a mandatory High Voltage National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) refresher to focus on working around energized equipment to all affected personnel. (June 2017)

GUIDANCE TO EMPLOYEES AND/OR SUPERVISION

- Issued a safety bulletin reemphasizing the importance of compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations for fall arrest systems and WMATA rules for use of protective equipment. (April 2015)
- Ensured a definitive understanding of the authority and responsibilities of the Roadway Worker in Charge (RWIC) to provide escort services, work zone protection, and to protect against unauthorized personnel on the track. (January 2015)
- Issued a reminder to all certification instructors and train operators regarding the proper procedures during recertification. (November 2017)
- Issued a safety bulletin articulating the proper RWP procedures that should be followed when work is fouling the track. (October 2017)
- Ensured maintenance and ROCC controllers are aware of the special condition surrounding the Greenbelt Test Track. (February 2017)

- Issued a statement in the weekly General Manager's message regarding smoking in unauthorized areas. (October 2017)
- Issued memo regarding removal of train car barriers. (July 2019)
- Pandemic response and procedures added to the Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLF) documentation. (Dec 2020)
- Rules committee evaluated and updated SOP 28, as it relates to the snowmelter PMI. (July 2021)
- Bulletin went to employees regarding the role of a watchmen/lockout when performing ATC job duties. (March 2022)

EQUIPMENT

- Equipped all company vehicles with a log book including a vehicle inspection sheet and maintenance history. (February 2014)
- Installed new bulkhead door seals on the 2000/3000 series rail cars to improve accessibility during inclement weather. (May 2014)
- Conducted a job hazard analysis of lift-related job tasks. (April 2015)
- Established a Preventive Maintenance Inspection (PMI) schedule for the track equipment headsets to ensure functionality. (January 2017)
- Replaced batteries in older headsets on Class 2 vehicles and procured additional batteries and spare headsets. (January 2017)
- Conducted a decibel level test on the newly purchased stinger alarm system installed in the shops. After the evaluation, the sirens were adjusted at all yards. (July 2017)
- Repaired a rusted under platform exhaust (UPE) duct for an interim fix while the entire system is being replaced. (November 2017)
- Identified and corrected water damage caused by a leaking copper pipe in a maintenance building at a WMATA facility. (December 2017)
- Replaced 450 feet of missing third rail cover boards at a Metrorail yard location. (January 2018)
- Replaced approximately 50 lights and re-lamped tunnel lighting between Prince George's Plaza and West Hyattsville Metrorail Stations. (August 2018)

- Lighting at Shady Grove Yard replaced. (March 2022)

HOUSEKEEPING

- Completed clean-up, trash removal, and repair of manholes for the yard tracks at Shady Grove Rail Yard. (May 2018)
- Performed exterminator services on a weekly basis at DuPont Circle Metrorail Station to reduce rat infestation. (October 2018)
- Placed raccoon traps at Fort Totten Metrorail Station and continual monitoring will occur until all raccoons are removed. (July 2018)
- Perform extermination in the DuPont Circle Station for rat infestation (July 2018)
- Performed extermination and odor removal at NOMA kiosk. (July 2019)
- Inspection performed at Pentagon City bathrooms. (Feb 2020)
- Lighting improved at L'Enfant Metrorail station for customer and employee safety. (Feb 2023)
- Air condition leak fixed at CTF to address slip, trip, and fall hazard. (August 2023)

SIGNAGE

- Placed laminated placards in every railcar cab to instruct train operators on the proper procedure for passing a red signal, if instructed by ROCC/Yard Tower Interlocking Operator. (September 2013)
- Installed signage outside of shop apron doors specifying the proper communication procedures prior to entering a shop with train equipment. (October 2013)

ENVIRONMENTAL

- Conducted an air quality audit by independent third party, to ensure kiosk, platform, and end gate locations are compliant with OSHA regulations for airborne dust and metals. The evaluation was conducted in nine stations at AM and PM rush hour times. (November 2017)
- Removed of hazardous material at shop. (March 2022)

Appendix C. Implemented Metrobus Preventive Safety Actions

BUS EQUIPMENT AND ROUTES

- Exchanged the Transportation Association of Greater Springfield (TAGS) Ford Econoline buses with six (6) Orion VII transit buses painted in the TAGS colors to eliminate the visibility hazard caused by the fare box location in the Ford Econoline. (December 2016)
- Conducted a special study on the Bus Shield – Glare, Reflection, Mirage concern and presented findings. WMATA, L-689, and L-922 have met and agreed on a new bus shield. (November 2016)
- Retrofitted all New Flyer LFA buses are being retrofit with the mirror in the lower location to avoid bus operator visibility obstruction. During the time, midlife overhaul completed the equipment relocation. (Started June 2017; Completed June 2018)
- Created an alternate bus route for WMATA route 52 to reduce the congestion around the L'Enfant Plaza Metrorail Station and help bus operators safely service this area. (June 2018)
- Evaluated several bus routes for potential safety concerns. Correction for unsafe situations have varied to include: by contacting local jurisdictions to correct traffic patterns, Metro Transit Police present along routes, and switching bus types to better service a specific route. Concrete was trimmed off the median to help with turning radius and no parking signs have been installed. (May 2018)
- Retrofitted all 2100 series buses with a three-point seat belt. (June 2018)
- Evaluation of the Dunn Lorin metro for bus mobility performed (Sept 2018)
- Ergonomics Group to evaluate the 8000 series bus operator compartment for drive ability, position of mirrors, the pedal placement, windshield design, and small left-side window design (April 2019)
- Improvements made to lighting and traffic flow at Silver Spring Transit center to aid in pedestrian and operator safety (April 2019)
- Evaluation of Takoma Metrorail station performed for driver safety while navigating the area. Bus planning developed preventive action (June 2019)

- Evaluation of Fort Totten Metrorail station performed for driver safety while navigating the area. Bus planning developed preventive action (June 2019)
- Engineering evaluation regarding lighting of 4400, 4500, and 4600 buses (Dec 2021)
- Vapor system door evaluation (Dec 2021)
- Evaluation on 3000 series bus shield latches performed and fixed implemented affected equipment (Dec 2023)
- Petco improved lighting along the Landover Road & Hospital Drive (Feb 2024)

MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

- Identified a defective solenoid valve was identified on the DEF dispensing system at Sheppard Parkway causing leakage. The issue was evaluated by SAFE and Bus Maintenance resulting in a contractor repairing the defective solenoid valve. (October 2017)
- Fenced and installed restricted access gates around the Landover Employee Parking Lot to add a safety measure against theft and vandalism. (December 2018)
- Lighting updated at the Anacostia Metrorail station for bus and rail safety (Feb 2020)
- Bus Shelter added for smoking at CTF and Landover (Oct 2021)
- Full handicap parking assessment conducted (Dec 2020)
- Patched concrete curb at the entrance to the Landover Bus Division (April 2022)
- Fix concrete curb at the entrance to the Landover Bus Division (April 2024)
- Added handicap parking to comply with ADA system-wide (March 2022)
- Multiple crosswalk repainting at WMATA facilities (2018–2024)
- Enhanced cleaned at bus facilities during Covid-19 pandemic (Dec 2020)

RULES/PROCEDURE MODIFICATION

- Developed an updated Hot Work Policy to include the custody process for Hot Work and signage on oxi/acetylene tanks at all affected locations. Employees who infrequently perform welding and cutting will receive refresher certification. (Started January 2017; September 2018)


GUIDANCE TO EMPLOYEES AND/OR SUPERVISION

- Issued a bulletin to notify bus operators of the left high mounted mirror obstruction with the high-mounted mirror placement on the New Flyer LFA buses and to operate with caution. (June 2017)
- Issued a statement in the weekly General Manager's message, which is sent to all WMATA personnel, to remind them of the 25-foot distance smoking policy while on all WMATA property. (October 2017)
- Issued a bulletin reminding supervisors that non-bus vehicles are not to park in a bus loading/unloading zone, unless in an emergency, so the buses are able to make a safe stop. (April 2017)
- Issued a bulletin issued regarding the 8000 series bus ergonomics and policy for requesting alternate bus. (Sept 2018)
- Issued a notice to board at the bus during pandemics (May 2020)

Appendix D. Updated Communications and Outreach

Examples of updated communications and outreach activities include the following:

Website



Printed and Produced collateral

Poster



CLOSE CALL REPORTING

The Close Call Reporting Program is administered by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) and encourages Metro employees to report close calls and unsafe conditions without the fear of discipline.

It's confidential.
It's quick.

It helps make Metro safer.

REPORT A CLOSE CALL
www.closecall.bts.gov
 1-888-568-2377

WMATA has partnered with ATU Local 689 (L-689), IBT (L-822), OPEIU Local 2 Union (L-2) and BTS to implement the Confidential Close Call Reporting Program.

Logos: WMATA, Metro, and various union logos.

Flyer



CLOSE CALL REPORTING

A voluntary, confidential and nonpunitive reporting program administered by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).

The Close Call Reporting Program encourages employees to report unsafe conditions, without the fear of discipline. It is operated by BTS, an impartial, third party. It's confidential. It's quick. It helps make Metro safer.

WHAT IS A CLOSE CALL?

A close call is a situation or circumstance that had the potential for safety consequences but did not result in any adverse safety event.

The following are examples of close calls:

- Any condition or event that is perceived to endanger employees, the public, equipment, or environment.
- Unsafe bus turnaround areas.
- Near miss incidents due to blind spots or equipment issues.
- Roadway worker protection concerns.
- Non-compliance with safety procedures or processes.


MAKE A DIFFERENCE

When you report a close call, you help Metro create new safety procedures (preventive safety actions) that can help avoid future accidents/incidents.

REPORT A CLOSE CALL
www.closecall.bts.gov
 1-888-568-2377

QR code

Sticker and Magnet Designs



REPORT A CLOSE CALL
 It's confidential. It's quick.
 It helps make Metro safer.
www.closecall.bts.gov • 1-888-568-2377

QR code

REPORT A CLOSE CALL
 It's confidential. It's quick.
 It helps make Metro safer.
www.closecall.bts.gov • 1-888-568-2377

QR code

Other planned communications activities

- Variable message board content
- WMATA intranet content
- Employee newsletter (you can find previous newsletters and other publications online [on the WMATA Close Call Program website](#))

Appendix E. Glossary of Terms

Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689 (ATU L-689): Labor organization that represents employees in the CFO, COO and IT directorates who are eligible to participate in the Close Call Program. Member of the Close Call Steering Committee and the Peer Review Team.

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS): BTS is a federal statistical agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation that serves as an independent third party that collects, analyzes, and maintains the confidential close call data collected for WMATA. BTS also identifies safety trends and emerging risks and writes and distributes publications to share this information with WMATA participants and the transit industry.

Chief Operating Officer (COO): Directs the daily operation of the Bus Services, Rail, Access Services, Support Services, Metro Transit Police, Budget, Performance and Planning and Strategic Initiatives. ATU and IBT-represented and front-line supervisory employees of COO's organization are participants in the Close Call Program. Via participation on the CCSC, directs program implementation and provides budget for the program. Reviews and approves, if necessary, PRT's preventive safety actions and provide oversight for and direct implementation of approved preventive safety actions. In partnership with SAFE, tracks preventive safety actions taken in response to close call events.

Close Call: A situation or circumstance that had the potential for safety consequences, but did not result in an adverse safety event. It can be any safety concern that could lead to an unsafe event or condition, or any event that is perceived as potentially endangering one's own safety or someone else's safety at work, including employees, contractors, or the public. It can also relate to equipment or the environment. Knowledge about a close call presents an opportunity to improve safety practices and culture.

Close Call Steering Committee (CCSC): Developed and oversees implementation of the Close Call Program. Includes representatives from program stakeholders (WMATA, L-689, L-922, Local 2, and BTS) and oversees the Close Call Program. Developed the program's Memorandum of Understanding. Coordinates with BTS and PRT to ensure consistency in the work products and other project documents.

Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA): The most relevant statute which governs Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) confidentiality is the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA). This statute prohibits disclosure or release, for non-statistical purposes, of information collected under a pledge of confidentiality. Under CIPSEA, data may not be released to unauthorized persons. Willful and knowing disclosure of protected data to unauthorized persons is a felony punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and up to a \$250,000 fine.

BTS shall act as the owner of the data reported to it by transit agency employees under the Close Call Program and protect the confidentiality of this information through its own statutory authority (e.g. Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA)). After BTS has determined that all relevant data from a close call event has been collected, the close call report shall be de-identified so that the employee's identity or anyone mentioned in the report can no longer be determined.

BTS shall protect the following information from disclosure when provided in a close call report:

1. The employee's report and its content;
2. The name of the reporting employee;
3. Names of any other employees mentioned, regardless of program participation;
4. Any other information that would make it obvious that only a few, easily identifiable people could have made the report; and
5. Evidence and other information gathered during a PRT evaluation of a close call report.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 922 (IBT L-922): Labor organization that represents employees in the BUS directorate who are eligible to participate in the Close Call Program. Member of the Close Call Steering Committee and the Peer Review Team.

Mainline: All tracks on the operating transit system, except yards and terminals.

Office and Professional Brotherhood of Teamsters Union, Local 2 (OPEIU Local 2): Labor organization that represents the professional, technical, administrative, and clerical WMATA employees who are eligible to participate in the Close Call Reporting program. Member of the Close Call Steering Committee and the Peer Review Team.

Peer Review Team (PRT): The PRT consists of representatives from WMATA bus and rail transit operations management, WMATA bus and rail maintenance management, L-689, L-922, and Local 2 union representatives, WMATA Safety, and BTS. The PRT meets monthly to review the prior month's close call reports. They promote the Close Call Program, identify why close calls occur, approves preventive safety actions, and evaluate the effectiveness of any such action that was implemented.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Equipment or gear designed for protective use in environments contaminated by weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Ordinary industrial protective equipment, in most cases, will NOT protect its user from personal contamination by WMD agents.

Safety and Environmental Management Department (SAFE): Ensures that WMATA's rail, bus and paratransit systems and other facilities are operationally safe and environmentally sound for all WMATA employees, customers and surrounding communities. Manages and/or complies with policies and procedures in the areas of system safety, occupational safety and health, accident and incident investigation, the continuous hazard management process, internal safety audit process, oversight of construction safety, safety and security certification, environmental management, safety data and analysis, industrial hygiene, safety training, corporate safety programs, and corporate quality assurance. In partnership with COO, tracks preventive safety actions taken in response to close call events.

Shop: The maintenance building in the yard where repairs are made by Car Maintenance.

Stakeholders: The primary organizations involved in the project are: WMATA, L-922, L-689, Local 2, and BTS.

Station: The platform location where revenue trains discharge and picked up passengers.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA): Transit agency participating in the Close Call Program. WMATA works with the other stakeholders to implement the Close Call Program and take Preventive Safety Actions in response to close call events.

Yard: A system of tracks used from connecting and storing trains. Vehicle movements in the yard are under the authority of the tower operator.

Appendix F. Acronyms

ATC	Automatic Train Control	OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
ATU L-689	Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689	PMI	Preventive Maintenance Inspection
BTS	Bureau of Transportation Statistics	PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
CIPSEA	Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act	PrSA	Preventive Safety Action
		PRT	Peer Review Team
CCSC	Close Call Steering Committee	RCA	Root Cause Analysis
COMM	Communications	ROCC	Rai Operations Control Center
COO	Chief Operating Officer	RWIC	Roadway Worker In-Charge
ESC	Executive Safety Committee	RWP	Roadway Worker Protection
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act	SAFE	Safety and Environmental Management Department
FTA	Federal Transit Administration	SME	Subject Matter Expert
FRA	Federal Rail Administration	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
GM	General Manager	TAGS	Transportation Association of Greater Springfield
IBU L-922	International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 922	TRPM	Traction Power Maintenance
LOTO	Lock Out/Tag Out Procedure	TSSM	Track and Structure System Maintenance
MCIA	Multiple Cause Incident Analysis	UPE	Under Platform Exhaust
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding	WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
NFPA	National Fire Protection Agency	WSAD	Warning Strobe and Alarm Device
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board		
OPEIU Local 2	Office and Professional Employees International Union		