

# Advisory Circular

Federal Aviation
Administration

Subject CERTIFICATION OF NORMAL Date: 9/30/98 AC No 27-1A CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Initiated by ASW-I 10 Change 1

PURPOSE This change revises existing material in one paragraph and adds new material for one appendix. The change number and the date of the changed material are show" at the top of each changed page. Vertical bars in the margin indicate the changed material. Pages having no changes retain the same heading information.

# 2 PRINCIPAL CHANGES

- a Paragraph 531 is revised
- b New **Appendix** 2, **Advisory Material** for **Substantiation** of Emergency **Flotation** System, **is** added to Chapter 3

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# SECTION 30 INDUCTION SYSTEM

# 531 § 27 1091 (Amendment 27-2) AIR INDUCTION

#### a Explanation

- (1) The **air induction** system **for** each **engine** should be of a **configuration** to supply the air **required** under the **operating** conditions for which **certification** is required
- (2) The intake system shall be **designed** such that **if** a backfire flame occurs, **it** will emerge outside the engine compartment cowling
- (3) Where required in the induction system, drains must be provided which discharge clear of the rotorcraft and out of the path of exhaust flames
- (4) For rotorcraft powered by a **turbine**, the inlets should be located or protected to **minimize** foreign object **ingestion** as defined **in** the regulation. The **inlets** must be protected **during** takeoff, **landing**, and taxiing. There must also be means to prevent leakage of hazardous amounts of flammable **fluids** from entening the engine intake system.

# b Procedures

- (1) For turbine-engine installation, the induction system should supply air of suitable quality to meet the installation requirements of the engine manufacturers. The installation requirements should be met throughout the operating envelope of the rotorcraft. In addition, the design and location of the air induction system should prevent accumulations of rain or hall, either external or internal to the induction system, that could adversely affect engine operation
- (2) The inlet **design** should account for the prevention of hazardous fluids entering the **engine** Some **designs will** have inlet duds **which** are free from any **fluid lines**, however, other designs may route the **engine** inlet air through a compartment **which** has flammable **fluid lines** When the **condition** exists, test **demonstrations** of critical leakage **during operations** have been used to substantiate the **installation** The fluid leakage may not have an adverse effect on engine operation
- (3) The air Induction system **design** should also account for and minimize the **possibility** of foreign matter **ingestion** during takeoff, landing, and **taxing**
- (4) For **reciprocating engine installations**, the **induction** system should supply air of suitable quality and quantity to the carburetor inlet of the **engine** The **condition** of the air at the entering face of the carburetor is extremely Important. For proper operation, it is essential that the airflow be smooth, **uniform**, clean, and unrestricted throughout the very **wide** range of horsepower expected from the **engine**

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# **531A** § 27 1091 (Amendment 27-23) AIR INDUCTION

a <u>Explanation</u> Amendment 27-23 removed § 27 1091 (d) since the specific test defined by this paragraph was not critical for certain rotorcraft. The turbine inlet foreign-object-ingestion protection provided by § 27 1091 (d) is adequately evaluated by existing requirements in § 27 1091 (e)(2)

b <u>Procedures</u> This rule change did not change the current suggested methods of compliance

# 532 § 27 1093 (Amendment 27-20) INDUCTION SYSTEM ICING PROTECTION

#### a Reciprocating Engines

# (1) Explanation

- (i) **Atmospheric** moisture, even **in** clean air and temperatures above freezing, can result in **iceaccumulations** in induction systems to a degree **which** can easily cause engine **failure**
- (A) Impact Ice This forms as supercooled water droplets impact on engine induction system components Particularly heavy accumulations must be expected where bends or turns in the Induction system force changes in the airflow direction thus centrifuging the droplets out of the air stream where they freeze on impact with induction system components A serious form of impact ICe the collection of Ice on fuel metering elements of the carburetor, the alternate (preheat) valve, and any screens in the system
- (B) Throttle Ice This type of ice forms at or near the throttle in a partly closed position (up to 30° F) due to cooling effect resulting from the increase in kinetic energy (Increased velocity) of the air in the restricted flow area
- (C) Refrigeration lce This forms as a result of the cooling effect of the fuel evaporating after the fuel sIntroduced into the airstream. For some float type carburetors, it spossible in rare Instances to accumulate serious iceduring a closed throttle glide with ambient air temperatures as high as 93" F and relative humidity of 30 percent. At low cruise power, ice can occur at outside air temperatures as high as 62" F and relative humidities as low as 60 percent. Most of the heat necessary to evaporate fuel is supplied from the air as it drops in temperature. Fuel evaporation ice can affect airflow by blocking the throat of the manifold riser, it can affect the fuel-air-ratio by Interfering with the fuel flow, and it can affect mixture distribution or quantity of mixture flowing to individual cylinders by upsetting the fuel flow distribution or quantity of mixture flowing to individual cylinders by upsetting the fuel flow distribution at the fuel nozzle or airflow distribution in the manifold throat. This refrigeration phenomenon sthe most serious of all factors causing carburetor ice

694 Par 531A

# APPENDIX 2 ADVISORY MATERIAL FOR **SUBSTANTIATION**OF EMERGENCY FLOTATION SYSTEM

REFERENCE FAR sections 27 521, 883(b), 751, 753(a)(l), (a)(2), 801(b),(d), **807(d)** 

#### 2 EXPLANATION

- a **This section pertains** to emergency **flotation** systems used to provide buoyancy for rotorcraft not **specifically** certificated for **ditching** but performing over-water operations. According to Paragraph 338, AC **27-1A**, ditching may be defined as an emergency landing on the water deliberately executed **with** the **intent** of abandoning the **rotorcraft** as soon as practical Currently, **ditching certification** is not required by FAR 27, however, **certification** requirements are prescribed for applicants **requesting ditching** certification approval **if** a rotorcraft operates over water during a Part 135 operation, the **rotorcraft** must comply **with** FAR 135 183, **which** may require floats
- b There are no airworthiness rules **specifying** the **minimum** standards for emergency flotation systems on **rotorcraft** not **certificated** for **ditching** requirements Equipment presented for evaluation must perform its intended function and not create a hazard for the **rotorcraft** or occupants. The objective in evaluating emergency flotation systems is safe flight and evacuation of the **rotorcraft** in emergency situations. Adequate emergency flotation systems would aid in keeping **rotorcraft** sufficiently upright and in adequate **trim** to **permit** safe and orderly evacuation in an emergency water landing
- 3 PROCEDURES The following guidance criteria is based on past certification policy and experience for emergency flotation systems. Demonstration of compliance to other criteria may produce acceptable results if adequately justified by rational analysis. Model tests of the appropriate emergency water landing configuration may be conducted to demonstrate satisfactory flotation and trim characteristics where satisfactory correlation between model testing and flight testing has been established. Model tests and other data from rotorcraft of similar configurations may be used to satisfy the water requirements where appropriate

# a Flotation Systems

- (1) Normally inflated The flotation systems which are <u>normally Inflated</u> and Intended for <u>emergency use only</u>, should be evaluated for
  - (ı) Structural integrity when subjected to
    - (A) Air loads throughout the approved flight envelope with floats Installed,

- (B) Water loads dunng water entry, and
- (C) Waler loads after water entry at speeds likely to be experienced after water impact
- (II) Rotorcraft handling qualities throughout the approved flight envelope with floats Installed
- (2) Normally deflated Emergency flotation systems which are normally stowed in a deflated condition and inflated either in flight or after water contact during an emergency water landing should be evaluated for

# (i) Inflation

- (A) <u>Proper Inflation</u> The inflation system **design** should **minimize** the **probability** of the floats not inflating properly or **inflating asymmetrically** This may be accomplished by use of a single inflation agent container or **multiple** container system interconnected together Redundant Inflation **activation** systems **will** also normally be required **If** the pnmary actuation system is **electrical**, a **mechanical** backup actuation system **will** usually provide the necessary **reliability** A secondary electrical actuation system may also be acceptable **if** adequate **electrical** system **independence** and **reliability** can be documented
- (B) <u>Inadvertent actuation</u> The inflation system should **be** safeguarded against spontaneous or inadvertent actuation for all **flight conditions**. It should be demonstrated that float inflation at any **flight condition** within the approved operating envelope **will** not result **in** a hazardous condition unless the safeguarding system can be shown to be reliable. Limitations to the approved envelope can be established so Inadvertent actuation does not impose a hazard at the new envelope
- (C) Float actuation The float activation means may be fully automatic or manual with a means to verify pnmary actuation system prior to each flight. If manually inflated, the float activation switch should be located on one of the primary flight controls. These activation means should be safeguarded against spontaneous or inadvertent actuation for all flight conditions.
- (D) <u>Flight Limitations</u> Maximum airspeeds for <u>intentional</u> In-flight actuation of the float system and for <u>flight</u> with the floats <u>inflated</u> should be established as <u>limitations</u> in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) unless in-flight actuation is prohibited by the RFM
- (E) <u>Inflation time</u> For floats **inflated** automatically by water contact, **inflation time** from actuation to neutral buoyancy should be short enough to prevent the rotorcraft from becoming submerged to the point where egress is impeded

- (F) <u>Pressure checking</u> A means should be **provided** for checking the pressure of the gas storage **cylinders prior** to each **flight** A table or device **showing** acceptable gas **cylinder** pressure **variation with** ambient temperature and altitude (**if applicable**) should be provided
- (G) Over <u>inflation</u> A means should be provided to <u>minimize</u> the **possibility** of over <u>inflation</u> of float bags under any reasonably probable actuation conditions
- (H) No puncture inflation The ability of the floats to inflate without puncture when subjected to actual water pressure should be substantiated A full scale rotorcraft immersion demonstration in a calm body of water is one acceptable method of substantiation. Other methods of substantiation may be acceptable depending upon the particular design of the flotation system
- (I) Flotation baa containment Float **Installations** should be evaluated to ascertain that emergency **exits** are not blocked by the inflated floats when the float bags are **Inflated** to **their** maximum **Inflation** pressure or **their** most adverse inflation pressure for emergency **exits** and the rotorcraft at its most **critical** weight and canter of gravity **configuration**
- (II) <u>Structural Integrity</u> The flotation bags should be evaluated for loads resulting from
- (A) Airloads during inflation and fully Inflated during the most critical flight conditions and water loads with fully inflated floats during water impact for the rotorcraft desiring float deployment before water entry, or
  - (B) Water loads during inflation after water entry
- (III) <u>Handling qualities</u> Rotorcraft handling qualities **should be verified** by tests or analysis to comply **with** the **applicable** regulations throughout **the** approved operating envelopes for
  - (A) **Deflated** and stowed condition,
  - (B) In-flight inflation condition
  - (C) Fully inflated condition, and
- (D) Partially **inflated condition**, assuming the most **critical** float compartment fails to inflate

# Appendix 2

- b The float system attachment hardware should be shown to be structurally adequate to mthstand **critical air** loads and water loads **during** water entry when both deflated and stowed and fully **inflated** (unless **in-flight** inflation is prohibited). The appropriate **vertical** loads and drag loads determined from water entry **conditions** (or as **limited** by **flight** manual procedures) should **be** addressed. The effects of the vertical loads and the drag loads may be considered separately for the analysis
- c <u>Flotation and Trim</u> should be investigated for a range of sea states from zero to the **maximum** selected by the applicant and should **be** satisfactory in waves having height/length **ratios** of 1 12 5 for **mult**i engine rotorcraft **with** Category A **engine** isolation and 1 10 for all other rotorcraft
  - (1) Demonstrated to be satisfactory to at least sea state 4 water conditions
- (2) Flotation tests should be Investigated at the most critical rotorcraft loading condition
- (3) Flotation time and **trim** requirements should be evaluated **with** a simulated, ruptured deflation of the most **critical** float compartment. Flotation **characteristics** should be **satisfactory in** this degraded mode to at least sea state 2 water conditions
- (4) Probable rotorcraft **door/window** open or closed configurations and probable damage to the airframe/hull ( **e** , failure of doors, **windows**, skin, etc ) should be considered when demonstrating **compliance with** the flotation and trim requirements
- d <u>Float System Reliability</u> **Reliability** should be considered in the **basic** design to ensure **approximately** equal **inflation** of **the** floats to preclude excessive yaw, roll, or **pitch in flight** or **in** the water
- (1) Maintenance procedures should not degrade the flotation system (such as **introducing** contaminants **which** could affect normal operation, etc.)
- (2) The flotation system **design** should preclude Inadvertent damage due to normal personnel traffic flow and **excessive** wear and tear Protection **covers** should be evaluated for function and reliability
- **e** Buoyancy requirements for emergency flotation systems should be a minimum of 25 percent excess buoyancy at maximum Internal gross **weight** The weight of fresh water (density 62 42 **lb/ft**<sup>3</sup>) displaced by fully submerged float or floats should be a **minimum** of 25 percent greater than the maximum **certificated** gross **weight** of the rotorcraft **Analysis** may be used for buoyancy verification
- f **Sufficient** watertight compartments should provide an acceptable margin of **positive stability with** any **single main** float compartment flooded or deflated. The

location of the floats, the most critical compartment, the rotorcraft weight, mass moment of inertia, and center of gravity location are also important considerations for stability. Analyses, tests, or a combination thereof may be used to substantiate a positive margin of stability with the most critical compartment flooded or deflated

- g The Inflatable bag type floats should be **designed** for the maximum pressure **differential** developed at the **maximum design** altitude. That is, the **resulting** pressure **difference** between **an** operational **altitude** and a takeoff site **elevation** should be **established** and **substantiated This resulting** pressure **differential** may become an operating **limitation**
- h **The** float **landing** load factors may be **determined** from the drop test of the float landing gear or the loads may be **derived** from landing gear drop test or loads may be **determined** from model or full scale water entry tests. The **vertical** loads are **distributed** over three fourths of the bags **projected** area. Sag floats are not subject to the side loads. **Rigid** floats are to be designed for **vertical**, horizontal, and **side** loads **distributed** along the length of the float.
- Design and/or support of the forward part of bag type floats should be evaluated for **maximum** design speeds to prevent collapse or **significant distortion** of the bag **while in** flight
- J Resistance to puncture and abrasion at attach/wear **points** is an Important **design consideration Girt** or attachment **design** loads should be sufficient to **withstand** the maximum imposed **design** loads
- k Occupant Egress and Survival Each practicable design measure should be taken to minimize the probability that the behavior of the rotorcraft would cause immediate Injury to the occupants or prevent evacuation of the rotorcraft after an emergency landing on water Emergency exits should be located such that they are above the waterline and will not be blocked by the inflated or partially inflated floats, impeding evacuation of the rotorcraft. The flotation time and trim of the rotorcraft should allow the occupants to evacuate the rotorcraft i e , the rotorcraft should remain sufficiently upright and in adequate trim to permit safe and orderly evacuation of all personnel. For configurations which are considered to have critical occupant egress capabilities due to float proximity, an actual demonstration of egress may be required. When a demonstration is required, it may be conducted on a full-scale rotorcraft actually Immersed in a calm body of water or using any other rig/ground test facility shown to be representative. The demonstration should show that floats do not impede a satisfactory evacuation.

Rotorcraft Flight Manual The Rotorcraft Flight Manual should contain the information pertaining to the emergency flotation system This material should include

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Appendix 2

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(1) The **information pertinent** to the **limitations** applicable to the emergency float system and operating **limitations** for **the** emergency float system,

- (2) Procedures and limitations for flotation device inflation,
- (3) Procedures for use of emergency flotation equipment, and
- (4) **Procedures** for emergency water landing occupant evacuation