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# ADVISORY CIRCULAR



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Washington, D.C.

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**Subject:** AVIATION SECURITY - CERTAIN FOREIGN AIR CARRIER OPERATORS

1. PURPOSE. To provide information and guidance for foreign air carriers concerning the requirements of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 129, Sections 129.25 through 129.27.

2. CANCELLATION. Advisory Circular 129-1, September 25, 1975.

3. BACKGROUND.

a. Public Law 93-366, dated August 5, 1974, Title II, entitled "Air Transportation Security Act of 1974," directs the Administrator of the FAA to prescribe or continue in effect reasonable regulations requiring that all passengers and all property, intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation be screened by weapon detecting procedures or facilities employed or operated by employees or agents of the foreign air carriers, prior to boarding the aircraft for such transportation. The Administrator determined, as necessary, the amendment of FAR Part 129 to include civil aviation security requirements for foreign air carriers landing or taking off large aircraft in the United States in scheduled or public charter passenger operations. Amendment No. 129-5, Foreign Air Carrier Security Program, added new Sections 129.25 (Aircraft Security) and 129.27 (Prohibition against the carriage of weapons), which became effective on October 9, 1975. Amendment No. 129-6 made certain additional security changes to these two sections and added a new Section 129.26 (Use of X-ray System), effective on August 23, 1976. Amendment No. 129-9 required charter companies to operate using a security program and security procedures like those already in use by scheduled carriers. On March 22, 1974, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted Annex 17 "Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference," which became applicable on February 27, 1975, and provided additional standards and recommended practices for the protection of civil aviation transport.

b. Subsequent to this action, terrorists attacks against international civil aviation, coupled with member state recommendations, provided the impetus for ICAO to propose adoption of three new aviation security Standards (formerly Recommended Practices). These Standards relate to the establishment of civil aviation security programs, establishment of aerodrome security committees, and measures to prohibit introduction of weapons being carried aboard aircraft by passengers or terrorists. These Standards became effective on December 30, 1976. At the same time the Council adopted a new Recommended Practice regarding prevention of carriage of explosives and incendiary devices aboard aircraft.

c. On May 21, 1974, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Executive Committee adopted procedures developed by its Security Advisory Committee and recommended that certain "minimum security procedures" be implemented at international airports. One of these procedures provides for the screening of all passengers and items entering sterile areas. Another provides for the protection of aircraft parked at ramps. During May 1975, the IATA Executive Committee noted with concern that the previously recommended security measures had not been universally implemented and that at a large number of international airports, security measures may be below safe levels. It also directed the attention of those involved in safeguarding international civil aviation to the trends toward international crimes of violence throughout the world and the fact that civil air transport is still a vulnerable target for such actions. The Executive Committee reaffirmed its recommendation for the necessity of 100 percent screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage at international airports until the threat to the security of civil aviation had been appreciably reduced. In May 1976, the Executive Committee adopted amended Minimum Security Procedures for implementation at international airports which included the recommendation that duly authorized law enforcement officers are readily available to assist in dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation.

4. DEFINITIONS. Terms used in this circular are defined as follows:

a. "Administrator" means the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), or any person to whom he has delegated his authority in the matter concerned.

b. "Foreign Air Carrier" means any person, not a citizen of the United States, who undertakes directly or indirectly, or by lease or any other arrangement, to engage in foreign air transportation.

c. "Foreign Air Transportation" means the carriage by aircraft for hire, or the carriage of mail by aircraft, in commerce between a place in the United States and any place outside of the United States, whether that commerce moves wholly by aircraft or partly by aircraft and partly by other forms of transportation.

d. "Foreign Air Carriers (FACs), covered by the FAR Part 129, Sections 129.25 through 129.27" means any foreign air carrier landing and taking off

large aircraft in the United States in scheduled or public charter passenger operations.

e. "Large Aircraft" means aircraft of more than 12,500 pounds (5670 Kg) maximum certificated takeoff weight.

f. "Carry-on Baggage" means all articles in the possession of passengers carried aboard an aircraft and accessible to them in flight.

g. "Checked or Hold Baggage" means all baggage other than carry-on.

h. "Law Enforcement Officer" means an official as defined in FAR Part 107, Airport Security, as amended December 22, 1978.

i. "Public Charters" means any charter that is not a private charter. A private charter is a charter for which the total capacity of an aircraft is engaged for the carriage only of passengers in civil or military air movements and is conducted under contract with the national government of any country or for which the passengers have been invited by the charterer who bears the entire cost.

j. "United States" means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the several territories and possessions of the United States including the territorial waters and overlying airspace thereof.

k. "Weapon or Dangerous Article." The following guidelines may be used to make an effective determination of what property in possession of a passenger should be considered a weapon or dangerous article.

(1) Firearm. Any weapon from which a shot may be fired by the force of any explosion, including starter pistols, compressed air or BB guns, and flare pistols.

(2) Knives. Sabres, swords, hunting knives, and such other cutting instruments which are considered dangerous.

(3) Bludgeons. Blackjacks, billy clubs, or similar instruments.

(4) Explosives/Ammunition. Types of explosives, ammunition, incendiaries, and fireworks whether commercially manufactured or homemade or any combination of components to produce same.

(5) Explosive/Incendiary Devices. Any combination of explosives, incendiaries, or other components of explosives, incendiaries, or other components which can result in an explosion or fire which is hazardous to the aircraft; generally spoken of as a "bomb."

(6) Gases and Chemical Agents. Tear gas, mace, and similar chemicals and gases whether in pistol, canister, or other container.

(7) Other Dangerous Articles. Ice picks, straight razors, elongated scissors, and the like, even though not commonly thought of as dangerous weapons, but which would be dangerous whenever possession supports a reasonable presumption that it could be used as a weapon. Also, any questionable device or object to include toy or dummy weapons or grenades, should be treated as a dangerous article.

1. "X-Ray System" means an electronic system used to speed up detection of carry-on baggage.

m. "Consent Search" means the search of a passenger's person/property with his agreement (and also called "consent frisk").

#### 5. ADDITIONAL COPIES.

a. Additional copies may be ordered from:

Department of Transportation  
Publication Section, M-443.1  
Washington, D.C. 20590

b. Identify the publication in your order as FAA Advisory Circular 129-2, Aviation Security, Certain Foreign Air Carrier Operators.

6. SECURITY PROGRAM SUBMISSION. Security programs of the individual FACs should be developed in conjunction with their respective governments. Although FACs are not required to submit their security programs to the Administrator for approval, they are required to submit, upon his request and in accordance with applicable law, information with respect to the security program applicable to its operations and the implementation thereof.

a. Suggested Format. FACs are not required to submit their complete security programs to FAA. However, some FACs may wish to submit their programs for FAA comment and suggestions. Others may wish to work with FAA in developing a complete and comprehensive program. A sample security program developed and used by some FACs is available upon request to FAA, Air Transportation Security Division Regional Office listed in Appendix 1 as having responsibility for the area. If the sample is not requested, the following format, with the items listed included as section

undergo the required screening process will result in denial of passage beyond the screening point. Within the U.S. such sign(s) must contain essentially the following:

(i) It is a crime to carry a concealed weapon aboard aircraft.

(ii) Federal safety rules require inspection of persons and hand-carried articles passing an inspection point.

(iii) Inspection may be refused.

(iv) Persons refusing inspection will not be permitted to pass through the inspection point.

(2) Gate Plan. Under this plan, passengers are screened as they board the aircraft, when leaving the gate for the aircraft or entering a jetway or ground transport vehicle.

(3) Hold Area Plan. Under this plan, passengers are screened as they pass into a hold area, which must be maintained as a sterile area during operational periods, and also searched if unsecured before use.

(4) Concourse Plan.

(i) The concourse (area) is established as a sterile area.

(ii) Passengers and visitors are separated to the extent possible. If visitors are to be permitted into the sterile area, they must be screened prior to entry.

(iii) Any person who exits and then reenters a sterile area must be rescreened.

(iv) Screening must consist of X-ray or physical inspection of all carry-on baggage and other items in possession of the individuals being screened except for very small or thin objects such as boarding passes or tickets. The processing of each person must be done with a detection device or consent frisk in lieu thereof. Articles of clothing such as coats draped or worn on the body need not be inspected if processed by metal detectors.

(v) All sterile areas must be properly secured against unauthorized entrance and exit.

(A) Concourse Plan Considerations. Inspection is required to reasonably ascertain that a sterile area is cleared of unauthorized personnel and dangerous objects each time it is put into operation following a period of noncontrol. At stations in the U.S. where U.S. scheduled carriers have already established concourse plan screening points and foreign air carriers jointly

use such facilities, the foreign carriers will be required to comply as a minimum to the U.S. standards of preboard screening.

(B) Intransit Passengers. When the concourse area is established as a sterile area, deplaning intransit passengers should be screened before entering or be escorted through if it can not be determined whether such passengers have been screened at their point of origin. The same procedures apply for intransit passengers entering other sterile areas.

c. Special Screening Situations. As a result of any number of considerations, foreign air carriers may have developed unique procedures for implementing the screening provisions of the FARs. FAA's concern must be that whatever procedures are developed, they are effective.

(1) Handicapped Persons. Physically handicapped individuals who cannot be subjected to normal screening procedures are required to be screened by consent frisk. Under no circumstances should a handicapped person be allowed to bypass effective screening merely because of his handicap. Arrangements consistent with the passenger screening requirements which will minimize inconvenience and prevent embarrassment to the handicapped passenger are desirable whenever they can be used. If the carrier has advance notice that a passenger is handicapped, it should, if possible, inform that passenger that individual screening is possible and make arrangements for such special screening.

(i) Persons Who Are Ambulatory. If walk-through detection devices are not appropriate, hand-held units should be utilized when available. When it is apparent that crutches, braces or other similar items are causing a detection alarm, the passenger should be permitted to board providing his carry-on items have been cleared. Should a consent frisk be necessary, every precaution must be taken to guard against injury to the handicapped individual. Private screening may also be suitable in such cases (See Paragraph 7c(6)).

(ii) Persons Confined to Wheelchairs. These individuals cannot be cleared by walk-through detection devices. Hand-held units can, in most instances, be used for this purpose as it is usually possible to determine the presence of metal on the person as opposed to the wheelchair. Consent frisks will be conducted if the individual cannot be cleared using a hand-held unit. Private screening may also be suitable in such cases. The consent frisk should include a patdown of the person and normal inspection of all carry-on items in his possession.

(2) Prosthetic Devices, Shrapnel, Etc. Some passengers are difficult to clear with a detection device because they have metal in or about their bodies because of medical or other legitimate reasons. Surgically implanted metal devices and leg braces are examples. Certain other passengers may have shrapnel or other metal in their bodies. These persons can frequently be cleared with a hand-held device or simple consent frisk. Whichever method

headings, is suggested:

- (1) Table of Contents
- (2) Predeparture Passenger Screening Procedures
- (3) Screening Plans (Types of Screening)
- (4) Screening Equipment
- (5) Aircraft Security
- (6) Baggage Security
- (7) Cargo Security
- (8) Bomb or Air Piracy Threats
- (9) Contingency Procedures
- (10) Security Training

b. Security Program Amendments. FACs may amend or modify their security programs at their own discretion, providing such amendments are not in conflict with the FARs. It is desirable that FACs review proposed amendments affecting implementation of their security programs with the FAA prior to adoption to insure effective transition from one procedure to another.

c. Reproduction and Dissemination of Security Program Information. FAC security program information submitted to the FAA in accordance with the provisions of FAR Part 129, Section 129.25(c) will not be provided to any individual or office outside the FAA without prior approval of the FAC concerned unless otherwise required by law.

d. Security Program Information. The security program information requested by the FAA Administrator should include procedures used by the air carrier in its security program that are designed to :

(1) Prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in property intended to be carried aboard in the aircraft cabin or, on or about the persons of passengers (except as provided in Section 129.27) through screening by weapon-detecting procedures or facilities.

(2) Prevent or deter unauthorized access to aircraft.

(3) Assure that baggage is accepted by a responsible agent or representative of the FAC.

(4) Prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded aboard its aircraft unless handled in accordance with the FACs' security procedures.

(5) Apply bomb threat or air piracy threat procedures in accordance with Section 129.25(d). (The FAA has recommended search procedures which can be obtained by interested carriers.)

(6) Refuse to transport any person or his property who does not consent to a search/inspection in accordance with the FACs security program.

(7) Assure that use of X-ray system in the United States is in compliance with the standards contained in Section 129.26.

(8) Prohibit the carriage of weapons in accordance with Section 129.27.

## 7. PASSENGER SCREENING.

### a. General Procedures.

(1) No passenger will be permitted to board scheduled or public charter FAC aircraft unless the passenger has been screened by a detection device/consent frisk and the carry-on items of the passenger have been inspected to prevent the carriage of weapons or dangerous articles aboard the aircraft.

(2) Weapons, explosives or dangerous articles found on persons or in carry-on baggage during the screening process should be referred to a law enforcement officer.

(3) All sterile areas should be properly secured against unauthorized entrance and exit. All persons entering the concourse or sterile area should be screened. Exceptions may be made for flight crewmembers, airline and airport tenant employees and security personnel, providing such employees are properly identified in accordance with the carrier's security program/local provisions for such entry.

(4) Provisions for such entry should include positive identification of the individual and organization by which he is employed and is limited to those who require, in the normal course of their duties, entry to the secure area. All others should submit to routine screening unless otherwise provided for under "Special Screening Situations."

b. Types of Screening Plans. Screening plans may vary according to where the screening takes place. The screening procedures described herein apply to all points in the U.S. and are adaptable for use at all foreign screening points.

(1) At each screening point, appropriate sign(s) should be conspicuously posted. Such sign(s) may advise the individual of the screening requirements and that the exercise of the individual's option to refuse to



is used, every effort should be made to prevent embarrassment to the passenger.

(3) Diplomatic Personnel. These individuals are to be screened in the normal manner except for the following considerations:

(1) Diplomatic Pouches. Diplomatic pouches are not required to be examined providing they are sealed. Persons in possession of diplomatic pouches must produce adequate identification (Diplomatic Passport). If there is any reason to question the individual's identification, he should not be permitted to board until this has been satisfactorily resolved. The individual and all carry-on items except the diplomatic pouches will be screened.

(ii) Armed Diplomatic Personnel. Diplomatic personnel who disclose that they are armed will be handled in accordance with the provisions of FAR Section 129.27, and the foreign air carrier's security program (See Paragraph 7c(4)). If they are officials of the state operating the aircraft and are authorized by that state to carry arms, they may be authorized passage aboard the aircraft with the weapons in their possession in the cabin. If they are from a state other than the state of registry of the aircraft, they must receive the authorization of the foreign air carrier to carry the weapon aboard the aircraft.

(iii) Diplomatic Immunity. Even though an individual may possess diplomatic immunity from certain police actions, a diplomat or diplomatic courier who refuses to be screened should be denied boarding. In the instance of a boarding denial in the U.S., the foreign air carrier is requested to obtain the identity of the passenger and pertinent circumstances surrounding the event. The information should then be passed to the nearest FAA Security Office (See Appendix 1).

(4) Persons Authorized to Carry Firearms. Persons authorized under the provisions of FAR Section 129.27 to carry firearms aboard foreign air carrier aircraft, may be exempted from routine screening.

(1) Record should be made by the concerned carrier of persons authorized, under the provisions of FAR Section 129.27, to carry weapons aboard its aircraft.

(ii) At U.S. stations which have joint use U.S./foreign carrier screening points, the carrier should insure that advance notification of the identity of the armed person is provided the law enforcement officer and the security personnel responsible for predeparture passenger screening, and that the armed person is escorted through the screening station by a carrier representative.

(5) Passenger Screening Provided by Another Carrier. Each foreign air carrier is responsible for insuring that passenger screening procedures are applied to each of its flights to or from the U.S. They may be provided by another carrier in which case the security procedures of either carrier

may be used.

(6) Private Screening.

(1) Private screening may be used by air carriers sparingly to accommodate persons such as dignitaries, handicapped persons, sales persons carrying high-value items, etc.

(ii) Foreign air carriers may conduct private screening. The person screened should be then escorted around the normal screening point into the secure area, or directly to the aircraft.

(iii) Private screening should not be routinely applied but may be used at the discretion of the foreign air carrier and/or upon the request of the passenger when the normal screening procedures are inappropriate.

(iv) Private screening procedures which are established should be consistent with the purpose of FAR 129.25 to screen all passengers and all property intended to be carried in the cabin of the aircraft.

(7) Persons Carrying High Value or Sensitive Items.

(1) Jewelry salesmen, and others, frequently have in their possession high value items while traveling by air. Appropriate air carrier procedures should be available so that these individuals may:

(A) Notify the foreign air carrier in advance if a private inspection of a container, briefcase, etc., is desired and appropriate.

(B) Report to the ticket counter of the affected air carrier, explain the situation to the air carrier representative, and, if appropriate, be inspected privately.

(ii) The air carrier representative should physically inspect the container(s) and escort the passenger to the appropriate screening station and authorize the container(s) to be exempted from further screening. The passenger and all other carry-on items will be screened in the normal manner.

(iii) Medical representatives and others travel regularly with very sensitive items in their possession such as medical exhibits, research materials, environmentally sterile devices, etc., which could be adversely affected by physical inspection. In these instances, the items may be boarded in their possession without opening if the items cannot be opened or processed through an X-ray system without damaging the contents. Documentation by the passenger must verify the contents and establish his identity. The passenger himself should undergo normal screening.

placed aboard their aircraft.

a. In formulating a security program to prevent or deter checked baggage from becoming a vehicle for placing a sabotage device aboard an aircraft, it should be considered that the risk of sabotage is greatly reduced if a passenger and his baggage are on the same flight. Checked baggage should only be accepted by an authorized representative or agent of the carrier and only from ticketed passengers. Access to baggage should be controlled after acceptance by the carrier to prevent tampering with or adding to baggage already checked. Baggage rooms and transfer areas should be secured. Baggage on carts and on the ramps should also be safeguarded. Baggage checks should be controlled and protected.

b. At the time of receipt, passenger identification on the checked baggage should be compared with his ticket identification. In the event of question/discrepancy additional personal identification should be requested, e.g., passport, to resolve the problem.

c. Unaccompanied baggage may require special security handling under certain conditions. Security programs, therefore, should include security procedures concerning unaccompanied baggage.

d. Personnel and vehicular identification, locked baggage carts, guards security cages, surveillance equipment and security lighting are some of the preventive measures which should be considered.

e. A passenger's checked baggage should be removed from aircraft if determined, before departure, that passenger is not aboard the aircraft.

10. CARGO SECURITY MEASURES. Air cargo must be handled in accordance with the air carriers security procedures, the purpose of which is to minimize the possibility of explosives or incendiary devices being placed in cargo.

a. The airline shall use a procedure designed to ensure cargo accepted and handled under the provisions of this program is safeguarded during loading and dispatch to prevent tampering with or adding to cargo already accepted.

b. Cargo shipments (including small package service cargo) accepted from known shippers may be dispatched on the first available or booked flight.

c. The person delivering a shipment from a known shipper shall be known to the person accepting the shipment or identify himself with a shipping document, identity card or letter issued by the shipper. If shipper cannot be identified, the cargo shall be refused, inspected or held for 24 hours prior to dispatch.

11. LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT.

a. The FAA considers law enforcement support to be an integral part of any passenger screening system. FAR Part 107, Section 107.15 requires airport operators to provide law enforcement officers in the number and in a manner

adequate to support the passenger screening system of foreign air carriers as required in Part 129 after June 29, 1979 or after the date specified by the foreign air carrier whichever date is earlier. FACs should arrange with appropriate airport officials to ensure provision of this support.

b. Passenger screening constitutes a major program in the defense against the potential hijacker. The presence of one or more law enforcement officers at or near the screening areas strengthens this defense and enhances its deterrent value. Moreover, this law enforcement support can provide an immediate and effective response capable of thwarting or otherwise dealing with hijack attempts as well as other criminal and terrorist acts. Also, in view of the potential for violent confrontation presented by the passenger screening process, the presence of law enforcement officers provides essential protection for passengers and others present in the area of screening points.

c. In May 1976, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Executive Committee adopted a recommendation of its Security Advisory Committee that "duly authorized armed LEOs are readily available to assist in dealing in the suspected or actual cases of unlawful interference with civil aviation."

12. METAL DETECTION DEVICES. Detectors are divided into two groups: the small, lightweight hand-held devices and the walk-through devices. Hand-held units permit "frisking" of a subject without any body contact and in this manner determining the location of concealed metal objects. Walk-through devices respond to the presence of metal objects as the subject passes through the device at walking speed.

a. Search Procedures for the Use of all Hand-Held Devices. The following procedures should be used in conducting a search using hand-held detection devices:

(1) Assure that the detection device is in proper working order and balance.

(2) With the device approximately two to four inches from the subject, slowly pass the device over the entire body with the detection loop parallel with the body, front and back. Then pass the device slowly over the arms and legs, front, back and sides. Particular attention should be paid to waist, groin, armpit and ankle area. With practice, a thorough search can be made in one minute. Hand-carried outer garments should be searched by hand. Bags and parcels of any size should not be searched using a hand-held weapon detection device.

(3) If the unit is alarmed a determination must be made that the cause of this alarm is not a weapon or dangerous object. This can be accomplished by a hand-held metal detector, by asking the individual to divest himself of extraneous metal on his person and repassing through the walk-thru detector, or by a consent frisk conducted by a representative of the air carrier. Persons who cannot be cleared by the air carrier using any combination of these procedures will be referred to the law enforcement officer.

**(8) Duty-Free Merchandise.**

(1) Duty-Free merchandise intended to be carried aboard an aircraft in the U.S. need not be examined in accordance with baggage/carry-on articles search requirements provided that:

(A) Delivery is made to the purchaser by a bonded, U.S. Customs licensed employee of the "Duty-Free" seller directly to the purchaser beyond the point of passenger screening or aboard the aircraft.

(B) Purchase and delivery is in accordance with U.S. Customs regulations with merchandise remaining in the custody of duty-free employees or U.S. Customs supervisor until delivered.

(ii) Duty-free merchandise purchased in another country for delivery aboard an aircraft departing for the U.S. need not be examined in accordance with carry-on baggage search procedures when local conditions and policy are such that they meet the above requirements.

(9) Screening Exemptions. Certain dignitaries, witnesses and others are regularly provided armed protective escorts by State agencies. The escort party should board either before or after the other passengers. These individuals may be exempted from routine screening provided that:

(i) The airline is made aware of the escort prior to boarding and the Federal or State official in charge presents proper identification.

(ii) The escorting agency assures the carrier verbally that the persons under escort have been screened by the agency.

(10) Inability to Screen Flight to the U.S. in Certain Countries. It is the responsibility of the foreign air carriers concerned to advise FAA where screening procedures cannot be implemented for flights to the U.S. because of local laws or policies. The carriers should describe alternative screening procedures used in such cases in the information submitted concerning their security programs. Alternate procedures should comply with the required screening procedures to the maximum extent possible.

**d. Carry-on Baggage/U.S. X-ray Inspection Procedures.**

(1) X-ray systems must be licensed by local state authority to ensure safe operation; a radiation survey must be performed every six months to assure it meets performance standards.

(2) A radiation survey is also required if X-ray unit is relocated.

(3) Signs must be conspicuously posted notifying passengers that an X-ray inspection system is used and that all X-ray and scientific film should be removed from carry-on baggage before inspection. At a passenger's request,

a physical inspection will be made of photographic equipment and film package.

(4) X-ray unit operators will receive initial and recurrent training that will cover radiation safety, efficient use, and identification of weapons.

(5) Whenever the X-ray baggage inspection system exposes any carry-on baggage or item to more than one milliroentgen during the inspection, a sign(s) shall be posted which advises passengers to: REMOVE FILM OF ALL KINDS FROM BAGGAGE.

#### 8. PREVENTION OR DETERRENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT.

a. Unattended Aircraft. Unattended aircraft present the greatest vulnerability for placement of explosive/incendiary devices on the aircraft. These include aircraft parked overnight and aircraft left unattended at maintenance areas or loading gates between flights. Whenever aircraft are parked and unattended, precautions must be taken to prevent unauthorized access. One help in achieving this is for external doors to be secured, and stairs and loading bridges removed from the aircraft. Stairs left near the aircraft should be immobilized to prevent their being used as a means of access by unauthorized persons.

(1) Because of the large number of areas which are accessible while the aircraft is on the ground, (under carriage wells, engine access panels, engine intakes, etc.), it is difficult to seal the aircraft completely. Open access areas should be inspected after an aircraft has been left unattended. Such inspections should be made by qualified personnel, e.g., flight crews and aircraft maintenance employees.

(2) Aircraft should be parked in a well-lighted area whenever possible, and security guards/police should provide frequent irregularly timed patrols of the area.

b. Attended Aircraft. Attended aircraft, while parked at the terminal, must also be protected from access by unauthorized persons. Jetway doors should be equipped with self-locking devices and kept locked while not in active use. Other access doors to the ramp should be locked unless prohibited by local regulations. Carrier personnel or representatives should be instructed to challenge unidentified individuals and restrict movement of vehicles other than those authorized in their own aircraft parking area.

c. Other Measures. In addition to the above precautions, other security safeguards should be considered as necessary, e.g., increased threat, to prevent unauthorized access.

9. BAGGAGE SECURITY MEASURES. Foreign air carrier security programs should contain security procedures designed to prevent or deter the clandestine introduction of explosives or incendiary devices into checked baggage to be

through visits, discussions and observation of security procedures. The Service also recommends corrective action(s) to remedy deficiencies and provides certain other technical security assistance. When security procedures applied by the foreign air carrier are determined not to be in accordance with its security program and, if otherwise appropriate, a letter of notification will be forwarded to the carrier informing them of the circumstances. The carrier then has the opportunity to inform the FAA how it will correct its procedures to conform with its security program and the FARs.

15. AIR CARRIER SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMS. The following guidelines are furnished concerning the training of air carrier employees in antihijacking emergency procedures.

a. Flight and Cabin Crew Security Emergency Training. It is suggested that all foreign air carriers provide emergency training on hijacking and other unusual emergency situations. Training should include but need not be limited to:

(1) Air Carrier Security Programs. Passenger screening procedures, coupled with physical barriers and air operations area access controls, provide indepth protection at airports. When flight crews are knowledgeable concerning these ground programs and their application, they can better assess a threat. Crews should have an active interest in the application of their air carrier's ground security procedures. Training content should include information on equipment, on personnel employed at screening points and an updated briefing on the results of the passenger screening program.

(2) Legal Matters. An overview of international conventions pertaining to crews and requirements placed on air carriers should be included in the training program.

(3) Aircraft Operations and Navigation.

(i) Communications: Hijacking Notification and Verification. Procedures have been established concerning hijack notification and verification techniques. Basically, these procedures, which have been adopted by ICAO, involve the use of transponder codes and other procedures to communicate pertinent covert information in the air and on the ground. Flight crews should know current procedures contained in flight manuals, Jepson, Airman Information Manual and/or the International Flight Information Manual.

(ii) Route Data. An aircraft under unlawful seizure may be forced to abandon its established flight plan and, in many cases, to operate in an area for which the flight crew does not possess necessary navigational material. Air carrier emergency plans should provide for assistance under these circumstances and procedures for furnishing the crew with the needed navigational material at the first opportunity.

b. Security Emergency Procedures Training. The ultimate objective of all antihijack, in-flight explosive tactics, procedures training is

to assure the safety of the passengers and crew. The first objective is to calm the hijacker, identify his weapon and establish communications with the outside in order to get the aircraft safely on the ground, or to keep it on the ground. This provides opportunities to deplane the passengers and crew as quickly and safely as possible. Flight and cabin crews should be adequately trained on a recurrent basis. This training should include, but need not be limited to:

(1) Hijacking Incident. In a hijack situation, the Captain and his crew must deal with a number of unstable conditions. They must assess the particular situation they are facing and make many on-the-spot evaluations and decisions. Outside technical and professional assistance is available through established communication procedures to assist the Captain in making his decisions.

(2) Defense Tactics. Knowledge of hijacker's tactics, crew responses during past hijackings and recommended procedures to safely deal with hijackers can be successfully applied by crews in their own defense.

(3) Weapons and Explosive Devices. Crews should be trained to identify the types of weapons and explosive devices which could be used in a hijacking.

(4) Bomb Threats and Incidents. The defensive measures will vary depending on whether the crew is faced with a threat of the use of an explosive device from outside the aircraft or a hijacker brandishing an explosive device or an explosive device encountered in the aircraft while in flight. Flight and cabin crew should be adequately trained on a recurring basis in subjects relating to aviation explosives security. This training should include, but need not be limited to:

(i) In-flight bomb threat response procedures including

(A) Crew/passenger relationships under the threat situation.

(B) In-flight aircraft search procedures.

(C) Post-flight safety procedures.

(D) Crew/ATC relationships.

(ii) In-flight emergency safety procedures for an explosive device encountered on board including:

(A) Crew/ATC relationships.

(B) Crew/passenger relationships under a bomb threat or incident situation.

(C) Identification of the most commonly used essential components of explosive devices.



b. Search Procedures for Walk-Through Detection Devices. The objective of the walk-through detection device is the automatic and reliable detection of any handguns carried by airline passengers. The subject of the search is only the passenger, not his hand luggage or other hand-carried items, and the passenger may or may not be asked, in advance, to remove metal objects on his person before the search. The handguns include small weapons of nonferrous (nonmagnetic) material, such as stainless steel and brass. The detection is to be done automatically at passenger walking speed with a reasonably high probability of successful detection. Other procedures concerning walk-through detection devices are as follows:

(1) Where walk-through detection devices used in the United States are common to concourse screening or are facilities belonging to the U.S. air carriers and/or are operated solely by the foreign carriers, they should assure that the devices have been subject to weapons calibration testing as required by U.S. air carriers. This testing assures that the walk-through devices are operating at an effective level. Test procedures may be obtained from any Air Transportation Security Division field office listed in Appendix 1.

(2) Where walk-through detection devices at overseas stations are operated solely by the foreign air carrier and are U.S. type detectors, it is recommended that these devices be subject to a weapons test to ensure their operation according to the manufacturer's standards.

c. Responsibility for Use of Walk-Through Detection Devices in the U.S.

(1) Where walk-through detection devices are used, each carrier is considered responsible for its ticketed passengers and for nonticketed persons accompanying or meeting its passengers who departed, boarded or intended to board one of its flights.

(2) In the case of all other persons or visitors, the carrier having overall responsibility for the operation of the screening point is responsible for the operation of the walk-through detection device.

(3) In the event no specific carrier can be identified as having overall responsibility at the screening point, each carrier utilizing the screening point is equally responsible for the operation of the walk-through detection device.

(4) It is recommended that the carriers have between them a formal agreement concerning liability with respect to the secure area and detection devices.

(5) Where more than one carrier is using detection devices in common, or has jointly contracted with a third party (noncarrier) to provide detection equipment/personnel, each carrier is held responsible for the actions stated above.

13. REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF CARRY-ON BAGGAGE X-RAY INSPECTION DEVICES IN THE U.S. X-ray inspection may be used for inspection of hand-carried items.

4/30/79

FAA approval must be obtained prior to installation and use of an X-ray system.

a. A System Manufactured Prior to April 25, 1974. It must meet either the guidelines issued by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and published in the Federal Register (38 F.R. 21442, August 8, 1973), or the performance standards for cabinet X-ray systems designed primarily for the inspection of carry-on baggage issued by the FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 F.R. 12985, April 10, 1974).

b. A System Manufactured After April 24, 1974. It must meet the standards for cabinet X-ray designed primarily for the inspection of carry-on baggage issued by the FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 F.R. 12985, April 10, 1974). In any case, X-ray systems used in air transportation in the U.S. should be operated and maintained according to the standards and procedures established by the FDA. This includes calibration testing to determine that the X-ray system is capable of distinguishing an insulated 24-gauge, insulated copper wire.

c. Training of X-ray Equipment Operators. The carrier or its agent should establish a program for initial and recurrent training of operators of the system, which includes training in radiation safety, the efficient use of the X-ray system, and the identification of weapons and other dangerous articles. An operational test system has been developed by FAA which is used for determining an operator's ability to identify weapons and other dangerous articles. This test system can be made available for foreign air carriers upon request. Procedures should be established to ensure that each operator of the system will be provided with a personal dosimeter (such as a film badge or thermo luminescent dosimeter), and that each dosimeter used is evaluated at the end of each calendar month. Records of the results of dosimeter evaluations will be maintained by the carrier.

d. Permission to Operate an X-ray System in the U.S. Each foreign air carrier desiring to operate an X-ray system is responsible to apply for permission to operate such a system to screen carry-on baggage in the U.S. When requesting permission to operate an X-ray system, the carrier must submit a letter of application to the Foreign Air Carrier Security Division, Civil Aviation Security Service, FAA, Attention: ACS-400. This application should contain all pertinent information regarding compliance with the requirements of FAR Part 129, Section 129.26, and should explain why it is in the public interest to install the X-ray system. The air carrier should have a letter or license from the state agency that regulates the use of radiation equipment, stating that the proposed installation is approved and conforms to the requirements of that state. The application must also show where the X-ray system is to be installed.

14. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES. The FAA Civil Aviation Security Service is responsible for ensuring foreign air carrier compliance with the security provisions of FAR Part 129. Compliance is determined

- (D) Evaluation of the hazards associated with these components.
- (E) Recognition and evaluation of basic types of fuzing systems.
- (F) Recommended in-flight emergency safety procedures.
- (G) Recommended least risk bomb location in the type aircraft flown.
- (H) In-flight bomb search techniques.
- (I) Post-flight safety procedures.

(5) Post-Incident Procedures. Crews need to be aware of air carrier procedures regarding the safeguarding of information related to hijack defensive tactics and for handling of media and official requests for information.

#### 16. NOTIFICATION OF FAA--BOMB/AIR PIRACY THREAT SECURITY PROCEDURES.

a. Upon receipt of a bomb threat, considered by the carrier to be against a specific aircraft or flight, a preflight or post-flight inspection shall be conducted, in accordance with FAR Part 129, Section 129.25(d). In view of varied aircraft types, search procedures should be developed by each air carrier. The FAA, also, requires immediate notice to the pilot in command when such threats against specific aircraft are received.

b. Foreign air carriers should immediately report bomb and air piracy threats against specific aircraft in the U.S. or scheduled next to land in the U.S. to the most convenient FAA air traffic control or security facility (See Appendix 1). Reports should include, as appropriate, the following information as it becomes available:

- (1) Basic information (applicable to both air piracy and bomb threats)
  - (i) Name of air carrier.
  - (ii) Flight number, nature of the incident, type of aircraft, point of origin, point of last departure, scheduled next stop, scheduled final destination.
  - (iii) Nature of incident..
  - (iv) Passenger screening details.
  - (v) Number of passengers and crew.

(2) Air Piracy Threats.

- (i) Where hijacker(s) boarded.
- (ii) Type of ticket used by the hijacker(s), where purchased, method of payment, (cash, check, etc.).
- (iii) Identification and/or description of hijacker(s).
- (iv) Description of weapons.
- (v) Demands of hijacker(s).
- (vi) Measures used/considered to terminate hijacking and regain control of aircraft.

(3) Bomb Threats.

- (i) Exact time of bomb threat.
- (ii) Whether or not pilot-in-command has been notified of the bomb threat.
- (iii) Emergency action taken.

17. INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION PROGRAM.

a. General. The Civil Aviation Security Service of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for collecting, evaluating and disseminating security information impacting on air commerce. The Civil Aviation Security Service has a continuing interest in receiving all information concerning activities directed against the security of foreign air carriers landing or taking off in the United States and which contributed to the deterrence or prevention of criminal acts against the security of civil aviation. It would be of great service if such information would be processed and evaluated by the foreign air carriers and be timely transmitted to the Civil Aviation Security Service by telegraphic message, telephone, or informal letter.

b. Areas of Information Collection Interest. Specifically included as objectives for collection is information concerning:

- (1) Any planned activity by individuals or groups which may adversely affect civil aviation security.
- (2) Any indicated threats against civil aviation security.
- (3) Suspected criminal activity directed against civil aviation security.

(4) Any movement or activities or dissident, militant or guerrilla groups or individual leaders which may pose a threat to civil aviation security.

(5) Identification and activities of groups or individuals who may be suspected of planning to:

(i) Hijack an aircraft (air piracy).

(ii) Interference with the duty performance of any of the flight crew or attendants aboard an aircraft.

(iii) Attempt to board an aircraft with an unauthorized concealed, deadly or dangerous weapon.

(iv) Place a bomb or explosive device aboard an aircraft, in an air terminal, or in a facility.

(v) Attempt to extort money or other property from an air carrier by threatening to carry out any of the above criminal acts.

(vi) Impart and convey false information concerning attempts to carry out any of the above criminal acts.

(vii) Any planned criminal disruption of civil aviation.

(6) New weapons and explosives which may be used in conjunction with threats to civil aviation.

(7) New weapons and explosives detection system/devices which may assist in the air security program.

(8) Significant publicity, adverse or laudatory, regarding civil aviation security.

(9) The details on the passenger screening methods utilized and the circumstances surrounding the ticketing and boarding of the hijackers when an aircraft is hijacked.

18. SECURITY PROGRAM INFORMATION REQUESTS. In accordance with FAR Part 129, Section 129.25(c), the Administrator may request foreign air carrier to provide information with respect to their security programs. The information may consist of a copy of the carrier's complete security program. As a minimum the information furnished should include those procedures, elements, and supplementary measures and activities adopted to implement the provisions of FAR Part 129, Section 129.25. The information should be provided in English and submitted as soon as possible following the request.

19. ADMINISTRATION. The primary focal point for the administration of foreign air carrier security programs and the requirements of Sections 129.25,

129.26 and 129.27, including the compliance and enforcement thereof, is the Director, Civil Aviation Security Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. Additional guidance and support may be received from appropriate regional offices as shown in Appendix 1.

20. FAA ORGANIZATION. The FAA regional office locations and geographical areas of responsibility as they pertain to FAR 129, Sections 129.25 through 129.27, are contained in Appendix 2.

*Richard F. Lally*

RICHARD F. LALLY  
Director, Civil Aviation Security Service

REGIONSATSFOsFAA ALASKAN REGION

Federal Aviation Administration  
 Air Transportation Security  
 Division, AAL-700  
 P.O. Box 14  
 701 "C" Street  
 Anchorage, Alaska 99513  
 Commercial: (907) 265-4477

Air Transportation Security Field  
 Office - ANC ATSFO  
 P.O. Box 6478  
 Anchorage, Alaska 99502  
 Commercial: (907) 243-4338

FAA CENTRAL REGION

Air Transportation Security  
 Division, ACE-700  
 601 East 12th Street  
 Kansas City, Missouri 64106  
 Commercial: (816) 374-3901

Air Transportation Security Field  
 Office - MCI ATSFO  
 P.O. Box 20003  
 Kansas City, Missouri 64195  
 Commercial: (816) 243-3820

Air Transportation Security Field  
 Office - STL ATSFO  
 Lambert Field  
 P.O. Box 10306  
 St. Louis, Missouri 64135  
 Commercial: (314) 425-7050

FAA EASTERN REGION

Air Transportation Security  
 Division, AEA-700  
 Federal Building #111  
 JFK International Airport  
 Jamaica, New York 11430  
 Commercial: (212) 995-9520

Air Transportation Security Field  
 Unit - BWI ATSFU  
 Pier C, Baltimore-Washington  
 International Airport  
 Baltimore, Maryland 21240  
 Commercial: (301) 962-2795

Air Transportation Security Field  
 Unit - EWR ATSFU  
 % Butler Aviation, Hangar #12  
 Newark Airport  
 Newark, New Jersey 07114  
 Commercial: (201) 645-3701

REGIONS

ATSFOs

FAA EASTERN REGION (cont'd)

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - DCA ATSFO  
Room 11, Commuter Terminal  
WNA, Washington, D.C. 20001  
Commercial: (703) 557-0265

Air Transportation Security Field  
Unit - IAD ATSFU  
Box 17174  
Dulles International Airport  
Washington, D.C. 20041  
Commercial: (703) 661-8222

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - JFK ATSFO  
Building #197  
JFK International Airport  
Jamaica, New York 11430  
Commercial: (212) 995-7080

Air Transportation Security Field  
Unit - LGA ATSFU  
United Airlines Hangar #2  
Room 322, LaGuardia Airport  
Flushing, New York 11371  
Commercial: (212) 995-2860

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - PIT ATSFO  
P.O. Box 12406  
Greater Pittsburgh International  
Airport  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15231  
Commercial: (412) 722-2845

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - PHL ATSFO  
% TWA Hangar, Room 310  
Philadelphia International Airport  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19153  
Commercial: (215) 596-1970



REGIONS

ATSFOs

FAA EUROPE, AFRICA AND MIDDLE  
EAST REGION (PROPOSED)

Federal Aviation Administration  
Tour Madou  
1, Place Madou  
1030, Brussels, Belgium  
Commercial: 513-3830

FAA SOUTHWEST REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, ASW-700  
P.O. Box 1689  
Fort Worth, Texas 76101  
Commercial: (817) 624-4911 x217

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - DFW ATSFO  
P.O. Box 61289  
DFW Airport Station  
Dallas, Texas 75261  
Commercial: (817) 283-5353

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - LAH ATSFO  
P.O. Box 60366  
Houston, Texas 77205  
Commercial: (713) 443-2390

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - SAT ATSFO  
1115 Paul Wilkins Road, Room 201  
San Antonio International Airport  
San Antonio, Texas 78216  
Commercial: (512) 824-2602

FAA NORTHWEST REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division - ANW-700  
Boeing Field, FAA Building  
Seattle, Washington 98108  
Commercial: (206) 767-2555

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - SEA ATSFO  
Room 201, Administration Building  
SEA-TAC International Airport  
Seattle, Washington 98158  
Commercial: (206) 767-2580

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - PDX ATSFO  
Lower Level Concourse L  
7000 NE Airport Way  
Portland, Oregon 97218  
Commercial: (503) 221-3050

REGIONSATSFOsFAA GREAT LAKES REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, AGL-700  
2300 East Devon Avenue  
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018  
Commercial: (312) 694-4500 x411

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - ORD ATSFO  
Room 158  
2300 East Devon Avenue  
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018  
Commercial: (312) 694-4500 x289

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - DTW ATSFO  
L.C.Smith, South Terminal Mezzanine  
Detroit Metropolitan Airport  
Detroit, Michigan 48242  
Commercial: (313) 941-1176

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - MSP ATSFO  
Room 112  
6301 - 34th Avenue, South  
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55450  
Commercial: (612) 725-3410

FAA WESTERN REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, AWE-700  
P.O. Box 92007  
Worldway Postal Center  
Los Angeles, California 90009  
Commercial: (213) 536-6325

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - LAX ATSFO  
P.O. Box 45018  
Worldway Postal Center  
Los Angeles, California 90045  
Commercial: (213) 642-5180

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - SFO ATSFO  
831 Mitten Road  
Burlingame, California 94010  
Commercial: (213) 536-6435

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - LAS ATSFO  
P.O. Box 11169  
McCarran International Airport  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89111  
Commercial: (702) 385-6390

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - SAN ATSFO  
800 Front Street, Suite 4-N-30  
San Diego, California 92188  
Commercial: (714) 293-5528

REGIONS

ATSFOs

FAA WESTERN REGION (cont'd)

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - PHX ATSFO  
Phoenix Control Tower  
3000 Sky Harbor Blvd., Suite 200  
Phoenix, Arizona 85034  
Commercial: (602) 261-6021

FAA NEW ENGLAND REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, ANE-700  
12 New England Executive Park  
Burlington, Massachusetts 01803  
Commercial: (617) 273-7354

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - BOS ATSFO  
Logan Int'l Airport, Room 218  
General Aviation Administration Bldg.  
East Boston, Massachusetts 02128  
Commercial: (617) 567-2591

FAA SOUTHERN REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, ASO-700  
P.O. Box 20636  
Atlanta, Georgia 30320  
Commercial: (404) 763-7271

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - MIA ATSFO  
P.O. Box 59-2336  
Miami, Florida 33159  
Commercial: (305) 871-5506

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - SJU ATSFO  
Second Floor, Room 200  
Puerto Rico International Airport  
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00913  
Commercial: (809) 791-3582

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - TPA ATSFO  
P.O. Box 22541  
Tampa International Airport  
Tampa, Florida 33622  
Commercial: (813) 879-3900

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - ATL ATSFO  
1568 Willingham Drive  
Suite D, Room 111  
College Park, Georgia 30337  
Commercial: (404) 763-7871

REGIONS

ATSFOs

FAA ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, ARM-700  
10455 East 25th Avenue  
Aurora, Colorado 80010  
Commercial: (303) 837-3411

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - DEN ATSFO  
10455 East 25th Avenue  
Aurora, Colorado 80010  
Commercial: (303) 837-2337

FAA PACIFIC - ASIA REGION

Air Transportation Security  
Division, APC-700  
P.O. Box 4009  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813  
Commercial: (808) 955-0460

Air Transportation Security Field  
Office - HNL ATSFO  
P.O. Box 4009  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813  
Commercial: (808) 546-8602

APPENDIX 2. REGIONAL OFFICE LOCATIONS AND  
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY a/

1. NEW ENGLAND REGION.
  - a. Regional Office. Burlington, Massachusetts.
  - b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and that portion of the Atlantic Ocean in which domestic offshore control is exercised by ATC facilities of the New England Region.
2. EASTERN REGION.
  - a. Regional Office. Jamaica, New York.
  - b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia; the District of Columbia; Canada east of 100 West longitude; and all of Canada for purposes of certification of foreign-made aircraft and components; and Greenland and Bermuda, excluding flight inspection.
3. GREAT LAKES REGION.
  - a. Regional Office. Des Plaines, Illinois.
  - b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
4. SOUTHERN REGION.
  - a. Regional Office. Atlanta, Georgia.
  - b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi, the Caribbean area, South America, Central America (excluding Mexico), Panama, the Canal Zone, and that portion of the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean in which domestic offshore control is exercised by ATC facilities of the Southern Region.
  - c. Area Offices. Balboa, Canal Zone and San Juan, Puerto Rico.
  - d. FAA Offices. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Lima, Peru.

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a/ See paragraph 251e for those flight standards functions performed by one region for another region.

## Appendix 2

### 5. SOUTHWEST REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Fort Worth, Texas.
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico; Mexico and that portion of the Gulf of Mexico covering the Oceanic Control Area and the domestic off-shore control area under control of facilities located in the Southwest Region.

### 6. CENTRAL REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Kansas City, Missouri.
- b. Geographical Area of Responsibility. States of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas.

### 7. ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Denver, Colorado.
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado.

### 8. NORTHWEST REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Seattle, Washington.
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho; the designated oceanic area within the Oakland Flight Information Region that is north of a line drawn from the intersection of the southern boundary of Oregon and the coastline to the northeast corner of the Honolulu Flight Information Region; Canada west of 100 West longitude, excluding certification of foreign-made aircraft and components within this geographic area.

### 9. WESTERN REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Los Angeles, California.
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. States of California, Nevada, and Arizona; and the designated oceanic area within the Oakland Flight Information Region, except for the area north of a line drawn from the intersection of the southern boundary of Oregon and the coastline to the northeast corner of the Honolulu Flight Information Region.

10. ALASKAN REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Anchorage, Alaska
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. State of Alaska, the oceanic area within the Anchorage Flight Information Region, including the Arctic offshore area (control 1485) and the Arctic Control Area/ Flight Information Region; flight inspection of assigned facilities in Canada.

11. PACIFIC-ASIA REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Honolulu, Hawaii.
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. Pacific Ocean area west of the continental United States (excluding the Oakland and Anchorage Flight Information Regions) and east of Bangladesh and India, including the State of Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific, the area of Micronesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Nationalist China (Taiwan), Republic of the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia, the area of Melanesia, Australia, Antarctica, New Zealand, and the dependent territories and independent nations of Polynesia including Tonga, Fiji, Tahiti and Samoa.
- c. Area Offices. Guam and American Samoa.

12. EUROPE, AFRICA, AND MIDDLE EAST REGION.

- a. Regional Office. Brussels, Belgium.
- b. Geographical Areas of Responsibility. Europe, Africa, and Middle East, including the Soviet Union and all countries that are both south of the People's Republic of China, and west of Burma; the Azores and Iceland.
- c. FAA Offices. Frankfurt, Germany; Rome, Italy; London, England; Paris, France; and Monrovia, Liberia.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
Federal Aviation Administration  
**FAA REGIONAL BOUNDARIES**

Including Locations of Regional Headquarters & Centers





FIGURE I. FAA REGIONAL BOUNDARIES

Appendix 2



# INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OF FAA REGIONS



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C. 20591

Official Business

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION

DOT 515

