


*Assessment of Community Planning for  
Mass Transit: Volume 4—Chicago Case  
Study*

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253682



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## PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Chicago, Illinois metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office of Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an overall assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary document, *AN Assessment of Community Planning /or Mass Transit*, which forms the first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment's Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.

# INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major United States metropolitan areas made its decisions about the development or modernization of rail transit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts to identify the factors that help communities, facing critical technological choices, make wise decisions that are consistent with local and national goals for transit. The study investigates the following issues:

- Are there major barriers to communication and cooperation among governmental agencies involved in transit planning and operating? Do these barriers interfere with making sound decisions ?
- . Do transit decisions reflect the combined interests of all major public groups, including citizen organizations, trade unions, the business community, and others?
- . Does the planning process provide enough information about the advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of action to provide a solid basis for making decisions ?
- Does the availability or lack of financing, or the conditions under which financing has been provided, unnecessarily limit the range of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been to cast light on those prospective changes in national transit policy and administrative programs which might improve, in different ways and to different extents, the way communities plan mass transit systems. The nine cities were selected to represent the full range of issues that arise at different stages in the overall process of planning and developing a transit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regional rail system built in decades, while Denver is planning an automated system, and voters in Seattle have twice said "no" to rail transit funding proposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of the nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an evolving social process. Consequently, the study results more closely resemble historical analysis than classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan areas and to provide the basis for comparative judgments about them. The guidelines were derived from issues identified during preliminary visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal requirements for transit planning, and an investigation via the literature into the state-of-the-art in the field,

The evaluation guidelines cover major topics which were investigated during the case assessment process. They deal with the character of the institutional arrangements and the conduct of the technical planning process.

## GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences on transit planning are exerted by the organizations responsible for conducting the planning and making the decisions. Three guidelines were used to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the nine metropolitan areas:

- Agencies responsible for various aspects of transit decisionmaking should cooperate effectively in a clearly designated "forum".
- The participants in this forum should have properly designated decisionmaking authority, and the public should have formal channels for holding decision-makers accountable for their actions.
- Citizens should participate in the transit planning process from its beginning and should have open lines of communication with decisionmakers.

## **GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT: TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS**

The technical planning process provides the information that public officials and their constituents draw upon in making plans and decisions. Four guidelines were used to assess the technical planning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

- Broad, explicit goals and objectives should guide technical planning and decision-making.
- A range of realistic alternative solutions should be developed.
- The evaluation of these alternatives should give balanced consideration to a full range of goals and objectives.
- A practical and flexible plan for financing and implementation should be developed.

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan areas, the study team interviewed the principal

representative of the transportation planning institution and other main participants in the local planning process. The visits were supplemented by interviews with UMTA officials in Washington. Pertinent documents—official plans, reports, studies, and other material—were reviewed in each case.


The information thus collected was used in compiling a history of the transit planning process in each case area, organized around key decisions such as the decision to study transit, the selection of a particular transit system, and public ratification of the decision to pay for and build the system. The main political, institutional, financial and technical characteristics affecting the conduct of the planning process were then assessed in light of the evaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each case metropolitan area was employed in making a generalized evaluation of the metropolitan experience. The results of the generalized evaluation are summarized in the report, *AH Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report*, issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in February 1976.

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# Summary and Highlights



- Chicago was the first city in the United States to systematically take advantage of expressway planning and design in order to place rail rapid transit lines in the median strips of highways.
- The joint development of the Congress Expressway and subsequently the Dan Ryan and Kennedy Expressways produced 24 miles of modern rapid transit lines and the potential for 19 additional miles of lines at relatively low cost.
- The development of the Skokie Swift service at low cost proved that greater than anticipated ridership can be attained with a service that responds to public desires—time savings through fast service and convenient origin-to-destination transfers among modes at a reasonable price.
- The major transit planning and development project in Chicago since 1968 has been the proposed replacement of the Loop transit system in the central area and the additional construction of a distributor line with extensions to serve the developing lakefront areas both north and south of the central business district.
- Acceptance of a financially viable central area plan and resolution of the long-standing controversy over the Crosstown Expressway are the major decisions facing the Chicago area. If and when these decisions are resolved, the Chicago area will have established the major components of its transit and highway capital investment program for many years.
- Commuter railroads, which historically have played an important role in access to the central business district, took a self-interested lead in the creation of suburban transit districts in order to obtain public subsidy funds for capital and operating expenses. The self-interest (to avoid absorbing large losses), however, led to the preservation and substantial improvement of an important component of the public transportation system.
- The Chicago Transit Authority, which has and deserves a reputation for being one of

the world's best transit operating organizations, has been primarily responsible for rehabilitation and replacement of transit facilities and rolling stock, and for significant operating improvements. It has not, however, been a major force in planning new or extended rail transit lines except as a technical resource organization.

- The city of Chicago, through its Department of Development and Planning and its Department of Public Works, has been the dominant force in transit planning and decision making until the last 3 or 4 years. While the Chicago area still is in a period of transition in the sense of planning and decisionmaking responsibility, the relative power of the city is diminishing.
- The creation of the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), which is still in its formative stages, is the most important institutional and financing development since the creation of CTA in 1945. The

basic RTA organization, its authority and responsibilities, its financing abilities and constraints—such as the amendment requiring that revenues raised in a county be spent in that county—inevitably force Chicago to share the decision making role with suburban county and municipal governments.

- The State of Illinois, through its Department of Transportation (I DOT), is an emerging force of some significance in transportation planning in the Chicago area. Partially as a result of its own policy initiatives and partially as a result of changes in Federal statutes and regulations, I DOT has been an obstructive force in planning and deciding whether to build the Crosstown Expressway and Busway, and a constructive force in trying to resolve the difficulties in deciding on a viable plan for the replacement of the loop transit system and the central area distributor.



# Metropolitan Setting<sup>1</sup>

## GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Since the early settlement of the Mississippi Valley, Chicago has been an important transportation center—the hub of the Midwest.

Chicago's strategic location on the Great Lakes has made it an important port for inland waterborne commerce. Chicago also is one of the most important centers in transcontinental freight service. Both regional and transcontinental trucking companies have headquarters or major freight facilities in Chicago. Its primary airport, O'Hare, is one of the busiest in the world.

Chicago, the third largest metropolitan area in the United States, is a major manufacturing, finance and service center. It is the headquarters city for several of the largest corporations in the United States and it has been long established in the production, processing, and marketing of agricultural commodities. Chicago is exceeded in population by only the New York and Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA'S. Between 1960 and 1970 the population of the Chicago SMSA increased by more than 750,000 persons to a total of 6,979,000, an increase of 12.2 percent (see Figure 2).

The city of Chicago has experienced a decline in population like many other center cities in the Nation's largest metropolitan areas. Despite the metropolitan regional growth, the city of Chicago lost more than 180,000 population, a decline of 5.1 percent in the decade from 1960 to 1970. The combination of suburban population gain and central city loss meant that, for the first time in history, the city of Chicago had less than half (48 percent) of the metropolitan population in 1970. The net migration of people to the suburban areas had the effect of moderately decreasing population density in the city and increasing the density in all other areas of the SMSA.

The city of Chicago in 1970 still accounted for more than half (52 percent) of the employment in the SMSA, but, like many of the other biggest

metropolitan areas, the central city lost jobs to the suburbs. Chicago lost more than 225,000 jobs in the decade between 1960 and 1970, while the suburban areas gained nearly one-half million jobs. The loss to the city was 15 percent of its work force. Although the metropolitan area gained employment in trade, services, and government, it lost jobs in manufacturing.

The major shifts in population and employment were accompanied by a significant change in the location of shopping areas. Although limited data are available, existing figures note that more than 65 percent of the metropolitan area's dollar volume retail sales were in Chicago in 1958; but this percentage had dropped to .51.5 percent by 1967. Although dollar volume of sales in the city increased by less than a billion dollars in this 9-year period, the dollar volume of sales outside the city increased by more than \$3 billion.

Thus the Chicago metropolitan area, like many others in the United States, has witnessed over the past two to three decades a fairly constant erosion of [the central city as the dominant place to live, work, shop, and carry on many other kinds of social and recreational activities.

The decentralization of Chicago was made possible in part by the substantial increase in the income of families throughout the metropolitan area. From 1960 to 1970, the median family income for city of Chicago residents increased by 52 percent, while families in other parts of the metropolitan area experienced a 62.5 percent increase in income.

As average income rose, so did acquisition of automobiles. The number of automobiles in the Chicago SMSA increased by more than 625,000 between 1960 and 1970. This increase represented a 37.1 percent gain for the entire SMSA, but a 66.9 percent increase for the area outside the city. Autos available increased inside the city by a smaller percentage—~4.9 percent—in spite of the fact that there were concurrent higher rates of unemployment and increases in populations unlikely to own autos, such as elderly persons and families below the poverty level. The number and percentage of


<sup>1</sup>See Figure 1, pages 18 and 19

LAND AREA (1970)

(square miles)

Center City	222.6
Suburban Ring	3,496.4
Entire SMSA	3,719

POPULATION  
Percent Change 1960-1970



POPULATION

	<u>Suburban Ring</u>	<u>Center City</u>
1960	2,670,509	3,550,404
1970	3,609,000	3,369,000

DENSITY

(population/square mile)

	<u>Suburban Ring</u>	<u>Center City</u>
1960	764	15,950
1970	1,877	15,135

**FIGURE 2: CHICAGO METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS**

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated with the central area.

households with two or more autos available increased along with the number of households with autos available.

These changes in residential and work locations, income, auto ownership, nature of jobs available, and other factors combined to significantly change patterns of work trips in the Chicago SMSA between 1960 and 1970. For example, in 1970, 39 percent of all work trips both began and ended in the city of Chicago, with an equal percentage both beginning and ending in the metropolitan area outside the city. Only 14 percent were the so-called commuter trips from suburbs to central city, and 8 percent began from the central city and ended in the suburbs (see Figure 3).

The absolute change between 1960 and 1970 involved a decrease of 35,000 work trips that both began and ended inside the city—an amount greater than the loss of jobs in the city during the same decade. Work trips from the suburbs into the city increased by 26,000; but, more importantly, the number of work trips that began in the city and ended in the suburbs increased by 118,000.

Thus, between 1960 and 1970 there was a 20 percent decrease in work trips both beginning and ending in the city, and 8 percent increase in trips from the suburbs, a 132 percent increase in work trips from the city to the suburbs, and a 61 percent increase in work trips that both began and ended in the suburbs.

The Chicago metropolitan area experienced a 46 percent increase in the use of autos for work trips between 1960 and 1970 and a decrease of 13 percent in the use of public transportation. Of all the public transportation modes in the Chicago area, only commuter rail lines reported an increase in patronage from 1960 to 1970—an increase of 6 million passengers annually. Work trips probably accounted for the overwhelming portion of this increase.

Although there was an overall decline in the use of public transit for work trips, 35 percent of city of Chicago residents continued to use transit for work trips in 1970, while only 11 percent of the workers living outside the city used transit to get to their jobs. But the combination of changes in residences and places of work and the increased availability of autos resulted in a 46 percent increase in the use of autos.

Not surprisingly, all of the factors discussed above had a marked influence not only on the way

in which people traveled to and from work, but also on the way in which they made trips for other purposes—shopping, social, health, recreation, and other purposes.

In fact, people have continued using transit for work trips to a greater extent than for all other trip purposes. When CATS made its original surveys in 1956, 32.66 percent of all trips made for work or work-related business activities used public transportation. That percentage dropped to 22.60 percent by 1970. However, the percentage of people using public transportation for other trip purposes fell off to a much greater extent. In 1956, 18.83 percent of all shopping trips used transit. By 1970, the transit accounted for only 3.65 percent of shopping trips. In 1956, 12.60 percent of all social and recreational trips used transit. By 1970, the percentage had fallen to 3.25 percent.


The general loss of ridership is a well known fact in Chicago as well as other places in the United States. However, the change in the ratio of trips during the peak hours to trips during the average nonpeak hour is not sufficiently recognized as the change in peak-to-base ratio. In other words, the number of morning and afternoon peak hour passengers has declined at a slower rate and in some cases has increased. The major losses have occurred during the remaining hours of the day and night. The transit systems, however, have to provide and therefore pay the costs of a full capacity system even though it may be fully utilized for only a short period of the day, usually less than 3 hours.

## EXISTING PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS


The continued and increasing mobility of the people in the Chicago metropolitan area has been accommodated by a significant increase since World War II in the miles of freeways, expressways, and toll highways constructed as well as by less spectacular and costly improvements to the public transport systems.

Unlike all but a handful of cities in the United States, Chicago had an extensive public transit system since the latter part of the nineteenth century. The first horse-drawn tracked trolley began operation in 1859. On the other hand, since World War II, Chicago, like most other major metropolitan areas, has experienced increased use of the automobile, accompanied by construction of highway facilities to accommodate it.

**WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION**



**WORK TRIP MODE**



**FIGURE 3: CHICAGO TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS 1960-1970**

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or cities), usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated with the central area.

Today, the Chicago metropolitan area has a large system of interconnected highway facilities as well as a public transport system consisting of subway, surface, and elevated rail rapid transit, commuter rail lines, and bus networks that serve the city as well as many of the suburban jurisdictions. The total system operates more miles of public transit routes and carries more passengers than any other multimodal system except New York's.

The Chicago metropolitan area has a radial system of freeways concentrating on the central business district; which is bounded on the north and west by the Chicago River, on the south by Congress Street, and on the east by Lake Michigan. The radial system includes the Kennedy and Edens Expressways (I-94 North), serving the north and northwest areas; the Eisenhower Expressway (I-90), serving the western portion of the metropolitan area; the Stevenson Expressway (I-55), serving the southwest, and the Dan Ryan Expressway (I-90 and 94 South), serving the southern portion of the area. In addition, the Chicago Skyway (I-90) serves the southern portion of the metropolitan area and the northwestern part of Indiana, which is also a part of the Chicago region.<sup>2</sup>

The Tri-State Tollway (I-294) forms a partially circumferential highway approximately parallel to the lakefront at a distance of from 8 to 16 miles to the west. In addition, the Chicago area is served by numerous other limited or partially controlled access highway facilities including its boulevard system.

Eight privately owned and operated commuter railroads provide service from outlying areas to downtown in 12 corridors. The railroads operate passenger service over 1,160 miles of track and accommodate nearly 68 million passenger trips annually. About 62 percent of the passenger trips either originate or terminate in the central business district. The commuter railroads serve a more extensive area and transport more passengers than any other commuter railroad network in the Nation except those serving New York City, where most of the service is provided by the publicly owned Long Island Railroad.

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<sup>2</sup> However, the Census Bureau definitions for the Standard Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes only the Illinois portions of the region.

The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) is the primary public transportation carrier in the region and the only operator of rail mass transit service. The rapid transit network consists of 243 miles of track on 10 routes, 8 of which serve the Loop area of the city. CTA operates approximately 1,200 rapid transit cars. The CTA also is the largest bus operator in the metropolitan area with about 2,700 buses in operation over 131 routes throughout the city and extends into 30 suburbs in Cook County. More than 98 percent of the city's population lives within three-eighths of a mile of either CTA rapid transit or bus service.

The metropolitan area is also served by 32 bus companies which are publicly owned or privately owned and publicly assisted. These companies operate almost exclusively in the suburban areas. Fourteen are new, public intracommunity bus systems, financed by local revenue funds, providing feeder bus or dial-a-bus service. Of the remainder, 13 are privately owned and 5 are municipally owned and operated bus companies offering regularly scheduled service.


The combined public transportation system in the Chicago area has experienced a relatively constant erosion of patronage since World War II. However, the number of passengers carried by CTA, particularly on its rapid transit network, increased moderately during the mid-1960's until significant fare increases were put into effect in 1967. CTA served some 510.5 million originating passengers in 1967, but by 1973 patronage was down to 368 million. The CTA system, like most transit systems in the Nation, experienced a moderate upturn in ridership during the oil embargo in early 1974 and during the subsequent increases in the price of gasoline (see Figure 4). This temporary increase in patronage, however, has started to slip during 1975.

## TRANSPORTATION PLANNING INSTITUTIONS

The Chicago metropolitan area has a complex institutional structure for transportation planning composed of a large number of agencies and organizations with overlapping and competing authority and responsibility. The institutional structure results in part because of the complexity of the large metropolitan bi-State area. It also results from various Federal requirements for regional planning, and from the competition among


VEHICLE MILES OPERATED  
(millions of miles)

Peak Year = 1966 (157.8 million miles)  
Low Year = 1974 (136.9 million miles)




REVENUE PASSENGERS  
(millions of passengers)

Peak Year = 1960 (534.8 million miles)  
Low Year = 1974 (381.7 million miles)



NET OPERATING REVENUE  
(millions of dollars)

Peak Year = 1962 (\$11.7)  
Low Year = 1974 (-\$78.2)



**FIGURE 4 CHICAGO TRANSIT OPERATIONS**

Source: American Public Transit Association records for the Chicago Transit Authority.  
I Data was not reported in 1970.

units of government for control of the planning and decisionmaking process.

**TABLE I.—Federally Recognized Regional Agencies**

<u>Designation Agency</u>	
A-95	Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission
MPO	Chicago Area Transportation Study (recognized by the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration); and Regional Transportation Planning Board (recognized by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration).

### **Regional Transportation Authority (RTA)**

The Regional Transportation Authority was approved by the Illinois State legislature in 1973, subject to a referendum in the six-county area it was to serve. Voters in the RTA region approved the institution and its authority in March 1974. Organization of the new authority continued throughout 1974 and into 1975 before it was ready to fully assume its responsibilities. RTA is empowered to contract for transit services throughout its service area and to determine fares, routes, schedules, and other operating characteristics.

RTA commands an array of funding mechanisms, including the power to levy a motor fuel sales tax up to 5 percent and to tax parking lot revenues. A portion of the State sales tax collected in the RTA area and \$14 from each auto license fee for cars registered in the area is allocated to RTA. It also has the authority to issue up to \$500 million in bonds, and it possesses the power of eminent domain.

### **Chicago Transit Authority (CTA)**

The Chicago Transit Authority has been in operation since 1947, 2 years after it was authorized by the Illinois State legislature and approved by referendum. It acquired and since has operated the rail rapid transit system in the metropolitan area and most of the transit bus service in the city. It is controlled by a seven-member board, in which four of the members are appointed by the Mayor of Chicago with approval of the Governor, and three are appointed by the Governor with the approval of the Mayor.

A significant feature of CTA'S basic authority is that it has no taxing capability and must rely on revenues, primarily transit fares, for its income. It can and does receive grants.

### **Local Mass Transit Districts**

Eight local mass transit districts have been formed in the Chicago region along corridors of existing rail or bus service. The districts are established under Illinois statute and have the status of municipal corporations, the right of eminent domain, and the power to levy a tax on property in the district at a rate not to exceed .05 percent of assessed value, provided a majority of registered voters approve in a referendum. The mass transit districts in the Chicago area are the North Suburban, West Suburban, Chicago South Suburban, Joliet, Chicago Urban, Greater Lake County, and Greater McHenry County districts.

### **Chicago Urban Transit District (CUTD)**

The Chicago Urban Transit District is one of the eight local mass transit districts described in the preceding paragraph. CUTD, which encompasses the Chicago central business district, was established in 1970 as the agency responsible for planning, designing, and building the proposed Loop subway and distribution system,

### **Regional Transportation Planning Board (RTPB)**

The Regional Transportation Planning Board was formed in July 1971 by the four major planning agencies within the eight-county Chicago-Gary region for the purpose of developing a comprehensive and coordinated transportation planning program. The participating agencies are the city of Chicago (through its Department of Development and Planning and its Department of Public Works), the Chicago Area Transportation Study, the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission, and the Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning Commission. The State of Illinois Department of Transportation is a nonvoting member of the RTPB.

RTPB was created to coordinate member agencies undertaking a regional transportation planning program. RTPB administers UMTA planning grants and both develops and monitors the

progress of an interagency work program. The products of this work program are the plans and programs of the member agencies. RTPB does not have the power to adopt these plans or the Comprehensive Regional Transportation Plan into which they are assembled. The policy committees, commissions, councils, and advisory committees of the autonomous member agencies retain responsibility and authority for adopting plans and actions.

### **Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) and CATS Policy Committee**

In 1955, the Chicago Area Transportation Study was created as an ad hoc agency through a memorandum of agreement between the Illinois Division of Highways, the Cook County Highway Department, the city of Chicago Department of Public Works, and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. CATS became a permanent department of the State Division of Highways in 1957. Over the years the CATS policy committee, comprised of heads of the member agencies, has been expanded to include all six counties in the Chicago SMSA, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, as well as one representative each from the suburban railroads, the regional Council of Mayors, the mass transit districts, and the suburban bus companies. Efforts are underway by CATS to add a Regional Transit Authority (RTA) representative to the committee.

The policy committee is chaired by the State Secretary of Transportation. CATS has a work program committee headed by a designee of the Secretary. The Transit Carriers Coordinating Committee, organizationally separate from CATS, includes representatives of the 24 carriers in the region and meets monthly to discuss common problems. A representative of this committee is a member of the CATS technical committee.

CATS is supported primarily by Federal highway funds channeled through the Illinois Department of Transportation. In addition, most of the policy committee members, including the Department of Transportation, contribute to CATS operations.

The temporary designation of CATS as the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) expired on June 30, 1975. However, the Governor of Illinois has not yet designated another agency to take over MPO functions. CATS continues to be the metropolitan planning agency recognized by

the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration, and RTPB is recognized by UMTA.<sup>3</sup>

### **Council of Mayors**

In order to provide local input to the regional planning process, CATS has organized a Council of Mayors representing the 258 municipalities in the region. The Council is subdivided into 11 regional councils. These regional councils are active and have set priorities for improvements in their regions. The Council chairman sits on the CATS policy committee.

### **Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC)**

The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission was created in 1957 and is authorized to develop and adopt a comprehensive plan for the Metropolitan Counties Area, which includes the counties of Cook, Lake, Will, DuPage, Kane, and McHenry. The Commission is the designated A-954 review agency. Members are appointed by the Mayor of Chicago, the Governor, and the presiding officer of each of the six counties.

### **The Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning Commission (NIRPC)**

The Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning Commission is the counterpart to NIPC in the Gary, Indiana, region.

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<sup>3</sup> The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the Federal Highway Administration require Governors to designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), in each area to carry out the "continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process . . . carried out cooperatively . . ." (the "3-C" process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974. According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published in September 1975, MPO's must prepare or endorse (1) a long-range general transportation plan, including a separate plan for improvements in management of the existing transportation system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the transportation improvement program (TIP), to implement portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work programs.

<sup>4</sup> Office of Management and Budget Circular A-9.5 requires one agency in each region to be empowered to review all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region. Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which has created to implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301).



### **Illinois-Indiana Bi-State Commission**

The Illinois-Indiana Bi-State Commission was created in 1974 by joint action of the legislatures and the Governors of Illinois and Indiana. It consists of six members from each State.

The Commission was created to act as a single body in coordinating planning and development in the northwestern Indiana-northeastern Illinois area. The area is comprised of the Indiana counties of Lake and Porter and the Illinois counties of Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will. It is empowered to establish project priorities for bi-State capital improvement programs and to adopt public plans, policies, programs, and activities of bi-regional significance. The Commission also may consider project reviews under Circular A-9.5 of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for projects of bi-regional significance, but such reviews only supplement, and do not replace, the A-9.5 reviews undertaken by NIPC and NIRPC.

Funding for the Commission is provided by earmarking a portion of Federal funds otherwise available to area agencies, with any necessary non-Federal share being provided in facilities and services.

In late May 1975 the Governor of Indiana designated the Commission as the region's MPO, but no similar action has been taken by the Governor of Illinois.

### **Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)**

The Illinois Department of Transportation participates in Chicago regional transportation planning through several channels. The Secretary of Transportation is chairman of the CATS policy committee. Technically, CATS is part of IDOT'S Division of Highways.

In addition, the director of IDOT'S Office of Mass Transportation (OMT) is an ex officio member of RTPB board. OMT is located in Chicago and is responsible for providing technical assistance to units of local government and for managing the State's capital grant and operating assistance programs. The office originally was responsible to

the Governor but was incorporated into IDOT in 1971.

### **Illinois Transportation Study Commission**

The Illinois Transportation Study Commission was created in 1969. The 16-member commission includes members of both houses of the Illinois legislature and representatives from the general public. The Commission is responsible for making a continuing study of the needs, finances, and other problems relating to the transportation service needs of the State, including those in the Chicago area.

### **City of Chicago**

The city of Chicago has been and continues to be one of the primary institutional actors in Chicago area transit planning and decision making. Two departments of the city, the Department of Development and Planning (DDP) and the Department of Public Works (DPW) have been intimately involved in essentially all of the major capital facilities improvements to the CTA rail transit system during the past 20 years. The Department of Development and Planning has wide ranging authority in the city for planning and community facilities development, including a major role in transportation planning. The Department of Public Works, which shares responsibility with DDP for transit planning, also is responsible for all highway planning, design, and construction as well as other public works activities.

### **Metropolitan Area Transportation Council**

The 26-member Metropolitan Area Transportation Council was established in December 1974 by the Illinois State Legislature to advise the Regional Transportation Authority. It was granted the authority to hold public hearings, adopt resolutions, and otherwise counsel and advise RTA on transit service, fare structure, and other matters of policy. The Council members are appointed by locally elected officials from Chicago area jurisdictions.

# Critical History of Rapid Transit Planning and Decisionmaking

Transit planning and decisionmaking in the Chicago area has been significantly influenced by factors dating back to shortly after the turn of the century. Three events are noteworthy because they shape the context in which Chicago's transit planning activities were conducted.

In 1913 four rapid transit companies, one of which dated back to the World's Columbian Exposition in 1893, began coordinated service with a unified scheduling of trains and a single fare over the elevated Union Loop track. (The four rapid transit companies were consolidated into the Chicago Rapid Transit Company in 1924.)

The city of Chicago stimulated the coordination of all surface transit lines in 1914 by enacting an ordinance which provided for single management and coordinated service of the many surface line transit companies.

Finally, bus transit service, which started in 1917 and expanded significantly during the 1920's, was consolidated into a single institutional structure, the Chicago Motor Coach Company, in 1922. It continued as the principal bus transit system within the city until it was acquired by CTA in 1952. Even earlier, in 1935, intercompany transfers permitting continuous trips were started.

Thus, Chicago had a long history of unified and coordinated transit service when the Chicago Transit Authority took over the rail rapid transit system and surface streetcar and trolley bus lines in 1947 and the bus transit system in 1952.

This narrative discusses several specific transit planning and decisionmaking activities whose conduct and outcome carry lessons for other metropolitan areas:

- Planning and construction of the State Street Subway, the Milwaukee-Dearborn-Congress Subway, and the Elevated Lake Street Transit Line prior to 1962;
- The several early examples of joint transit-expressway planning, particularly the Congress Expressway;

- Planning of the Skokie Swift;
- The Central Area Transit Project;
- The Crosstown Expressway; and
- The 1995 Transportation Plan,

The following discussion is organized under headings corresponding to these planning activities.

## EARLY TRANSIT PLANNING IN CHICAGO

The Chicago transit system is unique in that significant capital improvements in both facilities and rolling stock were made periodically prior to the availability of Federal capital grants resulting from the Mass Transportation Act of 1964. Some of these improvements are specifically mentioned because they clearly demonstrate the involvement of the city of Chicago in transit planning and improvement programs prior to the period of public ownership, operation, and responsibility.

One such example is the planning and construction of the State Street Subway in the late years of the Depression and immediately prior to World War II. As the first of Chicago's subways, 4.9 miles in length, it was planned and constructed by the city even though the rapid transit system was privately owned and operated. The operator, the Chicago Rapid Transit Company, assisted in the planning, design, and implementation.

The State Street Subway was built at a cost of \$34 million. It was financed by the city of Chicago largely through its Traction and Transit Fund, with significant contribution from the Federal Government through a combination of grants resulting from Depression-oriented economic stimulation and development programs. The subway was completed and went into operation in October 1943.

One significant feature of the State Street Subway project was that the Chicago Rapid Transit

Company had to assume the responsibility of repaying the city for the fixed transportation equipment investments built into the subway. These investments totaled \$4,349,231. The liability subsequently was transferred to CTA as a part of the purchase of the private transit company.

The second Chicago subway, the Milwaukee-Dearborn-Congress Subway, was completed in a similar manner after CTA took over ownership and operation responsibilities from the private company. Notwithstanding ownership of the system by a public authority, the second subway project was carried forward by the city and the planning, design, and construction was the city's responsibility with CTA participation. The 3.99-mile Milwaukee-Dearborn-Congress Subway was completed at a cost of \$40 million and went into operation in February 1951. The CTA, like its private predecessor, had to assume the responsibility of repaying the city for fixed transportation facility investments, which in this case totaled \$4,874,811.

A third capital facilities project, along Lake Street, also is worthy of note because it involved a wider range of public institutions in the planning, design, and construction of a transit facility.

The project involved removal of surface, street-level transit tracks and loading platforms and their relocation to an adjacent elevated structure for <sup>2-1/2</sup> miles. The primary purpose of the project was to eliminate severe congestion and conflicts in operation between the transit line and the street system. A total of 22 grade crossings were eliminated, thus reducing the conflict between transit trains and motor vehicles as well as pedestrians.

The \$4 million project was financed with \$600,000 from the city of Chicago, \$800,000 from the Village of Oak Park, \$1 million from Cook County, \$1 million from the State of Illinois, and \$600,000 from CTA. The project was completed and placed in operation in October 1962.

Construction of the Lake Street Transit Line elevated section was noteworthy because it involved close cooperation and coordination with the Chicago and North Western Railway. The new elevated line utilized rights-of-way owned by the private railroad through realignment of two of the railroad's tracks and construction of a short section of new track and elevated station platforms. The railroad, while paying the capital costs for the improvements to its trackage, receives an annual

rental fee from CTA for the use of its rights-of-way and facilities common to both systems.

## JOINT TRANSIT-EXPRESSWAY PLANNING

Although overlapping in time and related to other improvements, a new era of transit planning and development began in Chicago in the early 1950's that extends to the present.


Chicago, unlike any other city in the United States, saw the opportunity of utilizing the burgeoning highway construction program as a mechanism to improve its rail rapid transit system. As a result, Chicago has completed and put into operation nearly 24 miles of rapid transit service in the medians of expressways. Space is available for an additional 19 miles of transit service should transit demand increase and funds become available.

The utilization of publicly owned rights-of-way, particularly streets, for fixed guideway transit is a concept as old as transit service itself. Almost without exception, early transit service provided by horse-drawn carriages and tracks and subsequently by streetcars utilized streets for right-of-way.

With the growing need for more transit capacity, faster service, greater safety—and to increase the capacity of the streets to carry automobile traffic—rail transit was either elevated or depressed. To obtain the grade-separated rights-of-way, transit service was placed in subways, particularly in the most congested and expensive central business districts, or only elevated sections wherever it was feasible and acceptable.

The design concept of building grade-separated transit lines into open-cut depressed and closed subway sections or elevated sections on structure dates back into the last century. But the concept continues to be utilized in the most modern of systems such as BART in San Francisco and the new systems being constructed in Washington and Atlanta. Chicago is the only U.S. city which has deviated from the traditional design concept and has systematically exploited the highway planning and development program as a mechanism to expand and improve its rail transit system at relatively low cost.

The first example of joint highway-transit use in Chicago was the planning development of the



Chicago is the only U.S. metropolitan area to systematically build transit lines and expressways jointly.

Congress Street Expressway in the early 1950's prior to the start of the interstate highway program. The Congress Street Expressway subsequently has been renamed the Eisenhower Expressway and has been incorporated into the interstate highway system as I-90. Most of its cost was paid without 90 percent Federal interstate program funds because the expressway was planned, designed, and partially constructed before the interstate highway program was enacted in 1956.

The Congress Rapid Transit Line connects with the Milwaukee-Dearborn-Congress Subway near the west bank of the Chicago River. It extends westward for about 9 miles, about two-thirds of the distance in the median of the highway and about one-third along the south edge of the highway right-of-way. Space next to the transit tracks also is utilized by a double track freight line railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad.

The Congress Transit Line replaced the old Garfield elevated route, which for most of its length used a right-of-way and structure built in 1895 for the West Side Elevated Railroad. The right-of-way for the old elevated transit line, ranging up to 75 feet wide, was far from wide enough to accommodate the 550-foot highway right-of-way, but it was continuous for the entire distance of the highway and therefore was the single most important parcel of property along the highway route.

In the planning and design of the highway, alternatives were considered for replacing the old elevated Garfield transit line. The design concept that was selected called for joint use of the right-of-way, with transit partially alongside and partially in the median, thus giving birth to the modern concept of joint transit-expressway service in the same corridor.

There are other examples of joint or combined use of rights-of-way in the United States. But none are as complete or systematically planned and designed as those in Chicago. One example was the relocation of a portion of an old Pacific Electric Railway route in the Hollywood Freeway in Los Angeles, but service on that route was abandoned long ago. Another transit median route had been planned as a part of the Interstate 66 in Northern Virginia. This route, part of the Washington Metro System, now is in doubt because of a Federal Government decision not to build the freeway.

One of the significant results of the Congress planning and design studies was the conclusion that rail rapid transit lines could be built in the medians of freeways much less expensively than on independent rights-of-way. The approximate division of cost between the highway and the transit line in the Congress corridor was about 80 percent highway and 20 percent transit. The transit facility occupied a relatively small portion of the rights-of-way—about 43 feet out of a total average width of more than 500 feet. It also is important to note that modern freeways, even without transit in the median, are designed with as much separation of the opposing traffic lanes as can be economically justified. The length and width of structures on such expressways constitutes a significant portion of the total cost. In many instances, the median width of urban expressways is 36 feet. Thus, if transit utilizes rights-of-way which would be provided anyway, at least in part, the provision of transit does not significantly increase the cost of structures which carry the expressway over or under intersecting roadways.

The new Congress Rapid Transit Line was completed in stages between 1958 and 1960, with the first service starting on June 22, 1958.

The Congress Line was constructed before there was any authority to utilize highway funds for transit costs. Thus, there was a careful accounting of full costs and a strict division of costs allocated to the transit improvement, which totaled about \$27 million, including the cost of the fixed transit facilities and equipment. The improvement was paid for with \$25 million raised by the city of Chicago, through the sale of general obligation bonds and about \$2 million from the sale of revenue bonds. CTA, as with the improvements mentioned previously had to assume the responsibility of repaying the costs of the fixed transit equipment and facilities, which totaled about \$11.7 million.

The relatively low cost of the expressway median transit line is best demonstrated by the per-mile cost of about \$4 million, including the cost of stations, signalization, and other fixed facilities as well as the incremental cost of rolling stock. Even though costs have rapidly escalated since 1956-58, it is unlikely that any rapid transit surface line could be built on its own grade-separated right-of-way in a major metropolitan area for a similar amount, even discounted to 1958 prices.

The success of combining highway and transit planning, design and construction in the Congress corridor led the city of Chicago to the policy decision that all future expressway and freeway construction would include similar facilities or provide for future development of rail transit lines in the medians of all new expressways.

There followed in succession the development of rail transit lines in the Dan Ryan and Kennedy Expressways and the reservation of space for future development of transit lines in the Stevenson and Calumet Expressways.

The Kennedy Expressway, connecting the central business district with O'Hare Airport and the northwestern suburbs, opened in 1961. The Dan Ryan Expressway, connecting the central business district with the southern suburbs, opened to traffic in 1962. Both were built as part of the interstate highway system with 90 percent Federal funding.

No funds were available for developing transit lines in the median strips of the Kennedy and Dan Ryan Expressways as these highways were constructed, but space was reserved for future transit use. The subsequent availability of Federal transit funds through the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 made possible the construction of both lines.

The new Dan Ryan Transit Line was combined with the old Lake Line to form the present west-south route, which extends service from the Loop to Forest Park, a distance of about 9 miles. The line began service in 1969, 7 years after the highway was opened to traffic. The Dan Ryan Line was built by the city of Chicago at a total cost of \$40 million, with two-thirds of the money coming from Federal capital grants.

The 5-mile extension of CTA'S West-Northwest route from Logan Square to Jefferson Park, utilizing the median of the Kennedy Expressway,

was completed in 1970. The total cost was \$48 million, with two-thirds of the funds provided by Federal capital grants.

In each of the examples of combined expressway and rapid transit planning, design, and construction, several institutions were involved. Federal funds, either 50 percent or 90 percent, were invested in the highway facilities and administered by the old Bureau of Public Roads, subsequently incorporated into the Federal Highway Administration. Thus, all planning, design, and construction activities had to meet the stringent tests of acceptable Federal design standards. The Federal-Aid highway program was administered in Illinois by the former Illinois Highway Department, now an integral part of the Illinois Department of Transportation.

In most States, the State highway agency is directly responsible for the planning, design, and construction of all interstate and U.S.-signed highways, and this nominally is true in Illinois. Yet, the city of Chicago, primarily through its Department of Public Works, actually took the leadership and dominated the process that resulted in the combined expressway and transit facilities. The Chicago Area Transportation Study played an

important technical support role through its assigned responsibility of analyzing and forecasting traffic usage of the facilities.


CTA, of course, was deeply involved in the planning and design of the transit facilities that occupied the median strips of the expressways. CTA did not initiate or guide the planning, however, and its role essentially was one of technical support.


## THE SKOKIE SWIFT

Another example of transit planning and decisionmaking in Chicago is the development of an express-type suburban rail transit service popularly known as the Skokie Swift. It is cited not only because it involves an important link in the Chicago area transit service, but also because of the way in which it was brought about.

Transit service from the Howard Street station in Chicago to the Dempster Avenue station in suburban Skokie, a distance of about 5 miles, began in 1925. The route was operated by the Chicago Rapid Transit Company, the predecessor of CTA. Seven intermediate stations were intended to serve








**FIGURE 1: CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA**

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or cities), usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated with the central area.





the booming land development in the late 1920's. The Depression intervened, and the rapid transit line, serving a maximum of about 700,000 passengers annually, never was successful. The Chicago North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad utilized the same tracks starting in 1926 to provide commuter service through the Skokie Valley to Milwaukee. The North Shore Company owned the tracks and right-of-way.

CTA ceased its rapid transit service to Skokie in 1948 and substituted bus service to the connecting rapid transit lines in Chicago. Patronage on the CTA line had fallen off to about 1,700 riders per day at the time service was abandoned. The North Shore Railroad continued its commuter railroad service until 1963, after 5 years of attempting to abandon the line. One of the factors influencing the decision to abandon it was the completion of the parallel Edens Expressway. Ridership on the commuter trains had fallen to about 1,500 riders per day by the time service was discontinued over the strong objections of the Village of Skokie and other communities served.

With the cessation of both rapid transit and commuter rail service to Skokie, the village began a campaign for restored service. CATS also suggested restoration of transit service to Skokie as part of its study and analysis of transportation system plans. In addition, CTA had a direct interest in these planning and promotional activities. CTA still had to lease facilities and operating rights from the North Shore Railroad in order to operate trains from the Howard Street connection over a portion of the Skokie Line tracks to CTA'S yards and service facilities near Skokie. The halt to transit service meant CTA would have to take on the extra responsibility of operating and servicing the electrified lines.

The abandonment of all transit service in 1963, the campaign of the Village of Skokie for renewed service, and CTA'S need to maintain and operate part of the line led to the development of the Skokie Swift demonstration project in 1964.

The project also was made possible, in part, by the fact that Congress, as a part of the National Housing Act of 1961, authorized a program of loans and demonstration grants for mass transit purposes. This modest program, aimed primarily at preserving failing rail transit and commuter rail services in the Northeast, was the forerunner of the Mass Transportation Act of 1964. It was administered by the Housing and Home Finance

Administration, which subsequently became the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The Skokie Swift project originally was budgeted at a net project cost of \$524,000, a very modest amount for the resulting service. The low figure did not include any of the costs of right-of-way acquisition or construction of buildings since the Federal program at that time did not allow Federal participation in these capital costs. CTA picked up the entire cost of these items, as well as certain other facilities and equipment that would have been required anyway in order to continue the link to its yards and maintenance and repair shops.

Disregarding these expenditures, the net cost of the Skokie Swift project during its 2-year demonstration period was only \$483,000, even though capital outlays were higher than anticipated. Unexpectedly high patronage and fare income were the major factors in bringing the project 8 percent under the original budget. The net project costs were shared two-thirds by the Federal Government, 26.23 percent by CTA, and 7.10 percent by Skokie.

The Skokie Swift project, therefore, was an overwhelming success. The project originally was planned to provide service from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. weekdays with 10-minute headways during the peak period and 30-minute headways during the off peak. Two single cars were to make 50 trips in order to accommodate the expected 1,000 passengers per day.

Instead, nearly 4,000 passengers used the service the first day. Five cars were put in operation instead of two. Headways were cut from 10 minutes to 5 minutes in the peak period and from 30 minutes to 15 minutes in the offpeak. Operations were increased from 50 trips to 75 trips the first day, to 94 trips the next week, and ultimately to 115 trips per day. Evening service was extended an hour to 11 p.m. Saturday service was initiated, and special trips were added on Sundays for special occasions, including football games.

A significant feature of the project was the provision of nonstop shuttle service between Skokie and the Howard Street station of the CTA system. The 5-mile trip was scheduled for 6?4 minutes of running time. Patrons were charged 45 cents for the trip with free access, at no additional charge, to the full CTA system at the Howard Street station.

The Village of Skokie, as a participant in the project, built a 385-space parking lot at the station which soon had to be expanded to its present capacity of 555 spaces. All other project planning, design, and construction activities were the responsibility of CTA.

The success of the project was measured by the high initial passenger response, and continued growth in patronage has been widely reported. An important aspect of this success was the ability of the CTA engineering department and its shops to modernize and adapt older PCC transit cars for the Skokie Swift service. Initially, four single cars were equipped with higher performance electric motors and drive systems and adapted to operate both with "third rail" and overhead trolley electric pickup, a necessity on the Skokie line. Subsequently, as demand for equipment rapidly increased, four other PCC cars were adapted. It soon became apparent, however, that passenger demand would exceed the system capacity with single car service, so CTA converted its 3-unit, 94-passenger articulated PCC cars to the Skokie service. The higher-capacity trains accommodated more patrons, particularly during the peak period, without compromising running time and train frequency.

Subsequent analysis demonstrated clearly that relative travel-time savings were the most important factor behind the unexpectedly high patronage on the Skokie Swift demonstration. Nonstop shuttle service over the 5-mile distance was scheduled to take only 6-1/2 minutes. The 45-cent fare was found to have been relatively less significant. It is important to note that high patronage resulted even though the service used an old existing right-of-way and renovated operating equipment originally built for a different type of service.

## **THE CENTRAL AREA TRANSIT PROJECT**

Whereas the Skokie Swift was one of the most modest projects undertaken in the Chicago area, measured in financial terms, the proposed development of the Chicago Central Area Transit Project is the most ambitious.

The central area project envisions the replacement of the elevated Loop with a Loop subway, the addition of a downtown transit distributor, and the

extension of the subway system to the west, northeast, and southeast of the business district. Most recent unofficial cost estimates for the project range up to \$1.642 billion. While the estimate is subject to further change, it is clear that the project now would cost more than triple the originally estimated \$478 million.

Proposals to replace the elevated Loop, from which Chicago gets the name for its central business district, date back to 1927. Earlier plans proposed or conceptualized varying amounts of new rapid transit subways, but a specific proposal to replace the elevated Loop with a subway was not made until that year. From then until 1968, however, no plan repeated the Loop replacement proposal; they either proposed only partial replacement or ignored the Loop system altogether.

It is interesting to note that essentially all transportation plans for the Chicago central area through 1939 proposed major and fairly extensive construction of streetcar subways. In some instances, plan proposals emphasized streetcar subways instead of extensions or replacements for the heavy rail transit system.

In 1958, CTA, on behalf of the Chicago Plan Commission, published a plan called *New Horizons for Metropolitan Chicago*, which contained the city's first proposal for a bus subway to extend under Washington Street from the Illinois Central Railroad station east of Michigan Avenue westward to Chicago and Northwestern Railroad station west of the Chicago River. The 1958 plan, the most comprehensive attempt by CTA to develop a metropolitan-scale plan for the city, also proposed the elimination of several miles of elevated transit lines, including the lines that form the Loop. The CTA plan, however, would not have replaced the Loop, but instead would have constructed a new north-south subway route through the central area along Wells Street and a new east-west route, in addition to the bus subway along Jackson Street, extending from near the University of Illinois Circle Campus to east of the railroad yards near the lake front.

The CTA plan, the first comprehensive transit plan in the post World War 11 era, also contained a number of other proposed improvements, many of which have been subsequently carried out. These include the transit line in the Congress Expressway and extensive improvements to stations, train control, signalization, and other operating and equipment improvements.

The publication of the CATS plan in 1962 was a milestone in Chicago area transportation planning for both highways and transit. The CATS effort was the most innovative planning study ever undertaken up to that time and many of the techniques, methodologies, and analyses have been incorporated in urban area transportation planning throughout the world.

The comments in this case study, however, are limited to those portions of the CATS study that relate directly to mass transportation and specifically to the central area.

The CATS 1962 report began its discussion of its public transportation plan with these words:

Any realist can see that planning for future mass transportation facilities—buses, subway and elevated lines, and suburban railroads—is a particularly difficult task. Historical trends continue to show passenger losses. Risk capital is scarce. The increasing dispersion of riders and the harsh economic fact of serving a more dilute market area cannot be ignored.

Yet the need for mass transportation and the problems created by increasing use of the automobile cannot be ignored. Many people in the Chicago area are completely dependent upon public transit for transportation. The economic well being of large parts of the central city—particularly the core area—is at stake. Any accelerating decline in the availability of public transportation would be reflected in lower property values and increased congestion.

Strong efforts are needed to maintain and improve public transportation services. This is the policy of the plan presented here—a policy concurred in by most public officials of this area. This policy must be effectuated, however, in full view of the difficulties, and with a realistic appraisal of problems and opportunities.

The CATS study evaluated the then existing commuter rail and rail transit system, the CTA plan, a modification of the CTA plan, and one proposed by CATS,

The proposed plan, which ultimately was recommended in the 1962 report, differed in some respects from all previous reports, including the CTA plan. However, the major difference was in the central area. The CATS plan proposed

operating all rail transit service through the existing Lake and Dearborn subways and, instead of adding any new central area subway segments, it proposed development of an extensive system of grade-separated moving pedestrian walkways. The moving sidewalks would connect to the commuter railroad stations as well as the transit stations. It consisted of one central north-south segment and two east-west segments.

The CATS report contained many cautionary statements that its plan and analysis were preliminary in nature and subject to much more refined and detailed planning, design, and analysis as well as other nontransportation considerations. Notwithstanding, it indicated that the plan would achieve an order-of-magnitude saving of more than \$1 million per year in total costs compared with continued operation of the existing system through 1980. The proposed CTA plan, on the other hand, would have cost an annual total of about \$3.7 million above the cost of operating the existing system.

The proposed bus subway from the earlier CTA plan and the moving pedestrian walkways from the CATS plan never received further serious consideration in central area transportation planning.

The Central Area Transit Project, as it is known today? dates from 1968 when the city of Chicago, with cooperation from Federal, State, and local agencies, produced the *Transit Planning Study, Chicago Central Area*. The study was financed largely with funds from the Community Facilities Administration of HUD rather than its Office of Mass Transportation, which was a constituent HUD agency at that time.

The city of Chicago dominated leadership of the study. It was conducted by the city's Department of Development and Planning (DDP), the Department of Public Works (DPW), and CTA. The chairman of the coordinating committee for the study was the Commissioner of DDP, and the study director was the Deputy Commissioner of DDP. The Commissioner of Public Works was responsible for the engineering work program, and other city agencies and CTA were responsible for all other aspects of the project except one. The lone exception was that CATS was responsible for patronage and revenue projects. (CATS was limited to this type of technical support role until about 1973.)

The 1968 Central Area Study reviewed all of the comprehensive transportation plans for or affecting the central area dating from 1909, when the Burnham Plan was produced. In several of the subsequent plans, in 1916, 1923, 1927, 1930, 1937, 1939, 1958, and 1962, components of the plans which specifically proposed replacement of the elevated Loop or made it possible are specifically noted. The 1962 plan, produced by CATS, deserves special note.

The Central Area Study report, in commenting on the CATS plan, notes:

The recommended plan proposes a network of highways and transit extensions for the Chicago metropolitan area in a broad and general manner, leaving detailed solutions to future studies. . . . The purpose of the report was to propose the nature, arrangement and location of future transportation facilities, in a very general form, to provide projected capacity needs with consideration of safety and operating and construction costs based on projected land developments. Generally, the report recommends a plan of transportation for 1980.

Further, the Central Area Study report comments:

The possibilities of removal of existing elevated Loop structures are treated relatively lightly. No evidence was presented that alternatives were studied for central area transit improvements, which would eliminate or improve problems inherent in the proposals made in the report.

The Central Area Study review of the 1958 CTA Plan simply ignores the proposed bus subway along Washington Street.

The dominant factor in the Central Area Study was the importance of allowing continued development and redevelopment of the central business area by providing adequate transportation support services. The study report states:

The transit plan for the central area proposed herein embodies four principles aimed toward reinforcing the vitality of Chicago's core area as the center for employment, education, and culture.

1. Adequate distribution of passengers with all weather connections to commuter

railroad stations and other traffic generators.

2. Expansion of transit service to present and planned centers of activity such as the University of Illinois—Chicago Circle Campus, the Gateway area, railroad stations, Illinois Central Air Right's Development, Wolf Point, the near North Side, the cultural and recreational area to the south along the lakeshore, and the McCormick Place complex.
3. Reduction of the volume of vehicular traffic in the central area not only by promoting greater use of transit, but also by encouraging the use of fringe parking facilities for those who continue to drive.
4. Removal of the existing Loop elevated structure.

The study developed 14 sketch plans, from which 5 were selected for further analysis and evaluation. In light of the four principles listed above, plus nine additional functional or engineering criteria, all plans were found wanting in some respects.

The recommended plan assembled components of the five rejected plans into subway and distributor extensions from the Loop area to serve McCormick Place and Walton Place to the north and south and Circle Campus. It also proposed an extensive system of subway pedestrian connections.

The recommended plan was significantly more extensive than any of the five earlier plans—and more expensive. It was estimated to cost \$478 million. The study report conceded that "a public works project such as this should provide an economic gain to justify its cost."

The economic analysis conducted as a part of the project concluded that the project was justified, but presented no detailed analysis that showed the recommended alternative to be a public investment in which the benefits would outweigh the costs. Neither did the economic analysis compare the costs and benefits of the alternative plans.

The summary report of the project instead referenced the economic and social impacts, the cultural and recreational potential, the esthetic considerations, expanded employment opportunities, and other factors.

The economic analysis concluded that the Central Area Transit Project might generate an increase in assessed value of property in the central business district of as much as \$1.8 billion "The gross tax revenues from this increase in property values alone will be an amount equivalent to the total cost of the project improvement in a period of 10 years," the report concluded.

The economic analysis did not indicate the relative increase in property value associated with each alternative, including leaving the Loop system intact, but it did note that keeping the 70-year-old elevated Loop in operation would cost in excess of \$20 million or about 4 percent of the cost of the recommended plan.

The Central Area Study reported that the development of a specific and detailed financing plan had been beyond the scope of the study. Notwithstanding, it reported on four alternative financing schemes including the potential of creating a special transit district which would be supported by property taxes on the property within the district. Although the study did not make a recommendation, the special transit district was authorized by the Illinois Legislature in its 1970 session and subsequently was approved by referendum. The special district, Chicago Urban Transit District (CUTD), was challenged in the courts as unconstitutional and eventually was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the act was valid in 1972.

The CUTD applied for an UMTA capital grant for the Loop and distributor subways in 1971 in the amount of \$500.4 million, the proposed Federal share of the cost. Technically, the application is still pending before UMTA, but the CUTD has received additional study and planning grants in the subsequent years. The original 1968 study was updated in 1971 with identical findings.

The recommended project has been highly controversial, not only because of its high cost and the fact that the local share of costs would be obtained through property taxes on central area owners, but also because of charges and counter charges of who would benefit and whether the project was being used to delineate an area of the city that would receive development and redevelopment benefits to the detriment of adjoining areas.

During the initial planning of the project and up until quite recently, there was no attempt to carry out a structured citizen participation program in

the ordinarily accepted meaning of the term. Instead, there were many meetings with business and civic leaders primarily interested in the growth and development of the central business district. Most recently, there has been a modest effort to get more citizen input into the project through surveys and similar activities.

Primarily in response to pressure from the Federal Government the CUTD started a new study in 1973 in which 12 alternative plans were considered and evaluated. Four were selected for detailed analysis. The study concluded that the original 1968 plan was the best alternative.

UMTA, however, did not fully accept the results of the restudies and submitted a list of questions to be answered separately by the city of Chicago, CUTD, CTA, and the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). Instead, all four wrote a joint letter of response in which they said the project should go forward with Federal funding and that remaining problems could be resolved during detailed planning.

For the remainder of 1974 and the first half of 1975, little progress was made in resolving disagreements and no additional funds were provided by UMTA. In June 1975, CUTD organized an interagency task force to review the controversial portions of the plan and try to agree on a solution.

The task force, which was headed by CUTD, was supposed to conclude its work in time to report to the CUTD board July 28, 1975. The work was to be undertaken by staff of the participating agencies. The staff met on a semiweekly basis. The agencies represented were DDP, DPW, CTA, and IDOT. The newly created RTA was invited to participate, but it deferred and reported that CTA would represent its interests.

The task force developed five alternatives for the Monroe distributor portion of the plan and four for the Franklin portion of the plan. These were presented to the senior task force of agency heads on July 25, 1975, but no agreement was reached.

There were numerous meetings in the following month, and, unofficially, alternate plans were worked out in which portions of the central area plan could be carried out at a significantly reduced cost without abandoning the entire concept. But even reduced plans, as unofficially reported, are substantially beyond the capability of presently identified sources of funding. However, later in

August, the CUTD board met and issued a statement indicating that it would continue planning for the Loop-distributor subway and for a north-south subway running generally along Franklin Street. At this writing, the outstanding problems still remain unresolved.

## **THE CROSSTOWN EXPRESSWAY**

The Crosstown Expressway project illuminates other important aspects of the institutional structure of transportation and transit planning in the Chicago area as well as questions pertaining to the future implementation of Chicago area transportation plans.

The proposed Crosstown Expressway is the last unconstructed segment of the Chicago area's interstate system routes. The proposed Crosstown, now estimated to cost more than \$1 billion, would connect with the Dan Ryan south and southwest of the central area, extend westward to the vicinity of Cicero Avenue, and then go directly north about 5 miles west of the central area to a connection with the Kennedy Expressway in the northwestern portion of the city.

The expressway project has been controversial for many years, but the controversy reached a new height when present Illinois Governor, Daniel Walker, made opposition to the expressway project one of his prominent campaign issues in 1972 in opposition to the policies of Chicago Mayor, Richard Daley. While the State and city have been at odds on a number of issues, differences over the Crosstown Expressway have been the foremost issues in the transportation sector of public policy.

The transit planning activities in the Chicago metropolitan area have not included any concerted effort to develop a citizen participation program either at the overall regional systems level or in individual projects. Ironically, the greatest citizen participation in the Chicago area in recent years involved the planning for the Crosstown Expressway, and the program was devised largely to overcome significant citizen and other opposition to the project.

The Crosstown Expressway, through the development of a second generation plan, now contains a transit component in the form of an exclusive busway. The transit component, however, is not the focus of the disagreement. Rather,

the controversy consists of an open and protracted disagreement over the expressway itself. The State takes the position that the expressway should not be built, whereas the city advocates the project.


The outcome of the dispute is important to the area transit program. The State's opposition is based on its desire to take advantage of the provisions of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, in which interstate system highway funds can be transferred to transit projects. The State sees the transfer of funds as the only realistic source of sufficient funds for building some form of the Central Area Project as well as for making other improvements in the area's transit system.

The stalemate over the Cross town Expressway is reflected in the 1995 Transportation System Plan for the Chicago area, as adopted by CATS and NIRPC. The corridor that contains the proposed Crosstown Expressway has been designated as a "high accessibility corridor" without any definition of what the term means or what kind of facilities eventually would be provided. A second controversial proposed highway corridor, the North Avenue Corridor from First Avenue in the western portion of Cook County to Fox River in DuPage County, also has been designed as a "highway accessibility corridor." While not as directly or deeply involved in the Chicago rapid transit planning dispute, the North Avenue corridor is opposed by IDOT in part because it would cause disruption and in part because it would be a radial freeway providing additional highway capacity into Cook County and Chicago. IDOT fears the highway facility would compete with and therefore cause some diversion from the Chicagoan Northwestern commuter rail service.

## **THE 1995 TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM PLAN**

The 1995 Plan is the first plan that addresses the eight-county metropolitan area of northeastern Illinois and northwestern Indiana. It was developed in cooperation with the Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning Commission. The report is intended to replace the interim plan adopted in 1971 that was a composite of official public transportation plans for the eight-county bi-State metropolitan area.

A formal attempt at citizen participation was made in connection with the announcement of the



**FIGURE 5 : ADOPTED 1995 TRANSIT PLAN**

Source: 1995 Transportation System Plan, Northern Illinois Regional Planning Commission and Chicago Area Transportation Study, September 1974.



1995 Transportation System Plan for the region. The plan was presented to the public in a television program with the opportunity for the public to either telephone questions during the presentation or submit questions or comments in writing following the program. No significant involvement resulted and no changes were made in the plan. NIPC, however, reported that it made 30 changes in the text as a result of citizen comments.

The 1995 Plan is the first plan in the Chicago area that covers all transportation modes, including public transit, highways, aviation, and freight. The plan proposes a fairly extensive network of new freeway construction, but almost all of the proposed new routes are in the most outlying areas of the metropolitan region. No new freeways are proposed in the city of Chicago. The plan does propose a very short, controlled-access connector along Franklin Street in the downtown lakefront area of new development, a project which is largely noncontroversial and on which some work has already been accomplished. A significant feature of the 1995 freeway plan is that almost all routes are beltway or circumferential highways in character and service.


The public transportation plan, however, is essentially the opposite. It proposes extensions of three commuter rail lines further into the outlying areas of the region. It also proposes an extensive

expansion of rail rapid transit routes, including the plan to replace the Loop and construct the Archer Avenue distributor with extensions as put forth in the CUTD plan. Other parts of the proposed network expansion include extension of the Kennedy Line to O'Hare Airport, extensions of the service in the Congress (now Eisenhower), the Dan Ryan, and Calumet Expressways and an extension to Midway Airport that would utilize part of the median of the Stevenson Expressway. In addition, the 1995 Plan proposes the development of a new subway along Archer Avenue from Harlem Avenue to the Franklin Street connector, a corridor that now has the most densely utilized bus service of any bus route into the CBD.

The 1995 Plan also proposes two new transit lines: one from the Skokie Swift Terminal in Skokie to the Jefferson Park Station on the Kennedy Expressway Line; and the second servicing the Chicago Loop by way of Lawrence Avenue, connecting to the east-west leg of the present Ravenswood Line to the Howard Line at Wilson, and then south along Sheridan Road and Lake Shore Drive to a new connection in the Loop.

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<sup>5</sup>Some transit lines in expressway medians bear a different name from the expressway whose right-of-way they share. In this discussion, the names of the expressways are used uniformly.





# Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1858	Chicago's first "horse subways" were authorized.		transit extension and improvement program.
1892	The first elevated line, steam operated, began service.		In June, the rapid rail line extension in the Eisenhower Expressway median opened.
1897	Construction of the Loop elevated was completed.		
1914	All street railway properties in Chicago were unified under one management (Chicago Surface Lines, CSL).	1962	The Chicago Area Transportation Study published its final report, including <i>Volume 111: Transportation Plan</i> , which recommended a general plan of transportation for 1980.
1917	Chicago Motor Bus Company (CMB), a luxury bus line, began operations on the boulevards. (CMB later became the Chicago Motor Coach Company.)	1964	The Skokie Swift, a 2-year demonstration program funded by an UMTA demonstration grant, started 5 miles of commuter rail service between the village of Skokie and Chicago's Howard Street. Since 1966 CTA has operated the line as part of its regular service. It was popular beyond expectations and now serves 12,000 riders daily.
1927	<i>A Plan for a Unified Transportation System for The City of Chicago.</i> The plan proposed a comprehensive system of transit subway and contained the first proposal to remove the elevated transit main lines and Union Loop within the central area.		
1939	In October, the Committee on Local Transportation, Department of Subways and Traction, published <i>A Comprehensive Plan for the Extension of the Subway System of the City of Chicago</i> . It proposed new and extended subways, suggested a combination of rail rapid transit and expressway facilities within common rights-of-way, and provided for new subways to be utilized for long-haul traffic, coordinated with surface street feeder and distributor routes within the central area.	1966	Voters approved a bond issue to provide the local share of funds for transit extensions in the Dan Ryan and Kennedy Expressway medians (10 and 5 miles, respectively).
1945	State legislation was passed creating the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA); a local referendum endorsed its funding.	1968	In April, the city published the <i>Chicago Central Area Transit Planning Study</i> , proposing a new subway Loop distributor subway system and removal of the elevated Loop. (It is referred to as the Chicago Central Area Transit Project, or CCATP.)
1947	CTA began operations and purchased the Chicago Rapid Transit Company and the Chicago Surface Lines.	1969	In May, extension of CTA'S North-South Rapid Transit Line to a new terminal in Englewood was completed with UMTA capital assistance. In September, also with UMTA money, extension of CTA'S west-south route in the median of the Dan Ryan Expressway was completed.
1952	CTA bought the Chicago Motor Coach Company.	1970	Service began on the extension of CTA'S West-Northwest Rapid Transit Line in the median of the Kennedy Expressway to Jefferson Park.
1958	In April, CTA published <i>New Horizons for Chicago</i> , recommending a 20-year rapid		

- The Chicago Urban Transit District (CUTD) was formed as a separate municipal corporation with tax levying powers, encompassing the Chicago CBD.
- 1971 In January, CLJTD applied for a \$500.4 million UMTA capital grant to build the Loop and distributor subways. The application is still pending.
- In January, for the first time, CTA received grants from the City of Chicago and Cook County (\$3.5 million) for operating losses and from the State (\$6.3 million) for debt service.
- With a \$53 million capital grant from UMTA, CTA began a major facility renewal program. An additional \$40 million was added to the project in 1972.
- 1971 /72 Several bills to establish a regional transportation authority were introduced into the State legislature but died in the committee.
- 1971 In July, the State established a transit capital grant program to be financed through a \$200 million statewide bond issue.
- 1972 *O'Hare Express: An Employment Access Demonstration Project* was published by the Mayor's Committee on Economic and Cultural Development. The project provided express bus service from the Jefferson Park rapid transit terminal on the Kennedy Expressway to O'Hare International Airport.
- 1972 The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear appeals from lower courts on the validity of financing mechanisms proposed for the Loop and distributor subway system.
- In August, CUTD received a \$5.8 million grant to start the distributor subway portion of the CCATP.
- RTPB received a technical studies grant (amended in August 1973 to make a total of \$3,259,000) for preparation of a regional 5-year transit development plan. A priority ranking of the proposed projects was to be undertaken in order
- 1973 for Chicago to qualify for additional capital grants.
- In January, the Governor's Transportation Task Force published *Crisis and Solution: Public Transportation in Northeastern Illinois*, which was designed to provide a framework for legislative action to establish a regional transportation authority. The Task Force Report examined the public transportation problems in northeastern Illinois and recommended concepts related to the purpose, responsibility, legal form, organizational structure, and governing structure of a Regional Transportation Agency.
- Early in the year, CTA was threatened with bankruptcy and its board approved a 50¢ fare and a massive program of service cuts. The State legislature approved a \$12.6 million subsidy, matched by a \$6.3 million city-county subsidy to last through June 30, 1973. Operating subsidies also were provided for commuter rail and bus operators.
- On June 30, CTA'S subsidy funding ran out and a large program of service cuts was proposed. In early July, the city of Chicago raised \$6.5 million, Cook County approved a \$2 million subsidy, and the State added \$12 million to help keep the system in operation at least until late 1973.
- [In September, the *Chicago 21 Plan* was published by the Central Area Committee. Recommendations for mass transportation included construction of the Loop and distributor subways and initiation of a supplemental, grade-separated transit system utilizing a personal rapid transit type of technology.
- In December, the legislature passed an act creating the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), subject to a favorable vote in a referendum in the region.
- 1974 In March, the public approved creation of RTA and endowed it with authority to issue up to \$500 million in general

obligation bonds and to levy various other taxes.

In March, in response to gasoline shortages, CTA instituted a Sunday 25¢ fare (10¢ for children and senior citizens). The special rates continued through June 30, 1974.

The Indiana-Illinois Bi-State Planning

Commission was created by joint action of the two State legislatures and Governors.

In September, televised public hearings were conducted for the 1995 Transportation System Plan

Later in the fall, NIPC adopted the 1995 Plan.

# Assessment of the Planning and Decisionmaking Process

## INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The institutions and the process of public transportation planning and decisionmaking in the Chicago Metropolitan Area are extremely complex. Some of the complexity is brought about by external pressures and requirements. Some of the complexity is deliberate in order to control the process and decisionmaking.

The Chicago area involves two States, eight counties, the city of Chicago, hundreds of municipalities, public and privately owned transportation companies, and a number of multi-jurisdictional regional agencies. Bringing together these institutions into one cohesive planning and decisionmaking institution would be extremely difficult under the most optimal set of circumstances and perhaps is impossible as a practical matter, given the wide-ranging diversity of interests as well as authorities and responsibilities.

An understanding of the institutional aspects of transit planning and operations in the Chicago area requires tracing the changes in the institutional mechanisms over time. Modern transportation planning in Chicago has been much more of an evolutionary process than has been true in most of the other metropolitan areas assessed during this study, where new transit institutions were developed to build new systems as well as to purchase and operate existing systems. The following discussions take an evolutionary approach to the discussion of the assessment topics.

### Forum for Decisionmaking

The institutional relationships among a variety of agencies with direct or indirect responsibilities for transit planning in the Chicago area have been chaotic. In the past this condition allowed the city of Chicago to play the primary role in making decisions on transit planning and development. In 1973 the search for more stable financing led to creation of the Regional Transit Authority, which

has diminished the dominance of the city and elevated the importance of the State.

Although the RTA appears to provide an improved forum for regional transit decisionmaking, it does not resolve some of the region's fundamental decisionmaking problems. Neither it nor any other regional organization has the authority and power to make decisions on future joint development of transit and highway facilities. Nor can they effectively coordinate transportation and land use programs.

### Forum for Decisionmaking: the City of Chicago

The city of Chicago, through its Department of Public Works and later through shared responsibility of DPW and the Department of Planning and Development, historically has been the dominant force in the institutional aspects of transit planning and decisionmaking in the Chicago area. Although the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) has taken an important part in Chicago transit planning and regional organizations have come to the fore in recent years, the shape of Chicago's transit system owes its greatest debt to the city.

The city was the initiator, planner, designer, and builder of the central area's two subways long before there was any serious thought of Federal programs, regional planning requirements, and many of the other institutional requirements or necessities that have emerged through the 1960's and 1970's. The first subway was built when the rail transit system was still privately owned and operated. The second was built after CTA was formed and had the ownership and operating responsibility for the transit system. In neither case, however, could the transit owner have possibly put together the capital required to build the two subways with any hope of repaying principal and interest out of income. Thus, the city assumed and vigorously played the leading role in these early capital project developments, a role which it has carefully guarded until most recent years when economic necessity forced the city to

loosen its grip on transportation decisionmaking in order for the public transportation system to obtain a broader base for its revenue from other than passenger fares.

In contrast, two facts stand out about CTA'S role. First, CTA was regarded as a city institution, notwithstanding its legally independent status and the fact that the Mayor and the Governor had appointive authority with cross-veto rights for members of the CTA board. Second, CTA, while having complete authority and responsibility for transit operations and capital improvements to fixed transportation equipment and rolling stock, played only a technical support role in the planning of new or reconstructed transit lines with but few exceptions.

The dominant role of the city vis-a-vis CTA and other transportation organizations in the region is well illustrated by the evolution of the decision to build a transit line in the median of the Congress Expressway. Except for one of the two central area subways mentioned, the Congress Line was the first major transit development project after World War II.

The decision to build the Congress Transit Line in the 1950's was both accidental and fortuitous. The line did not originate as a transit project but grew out of interest in constructing a new radial expressway into the central area of Chicago to serve the auto-oriented suburban expansion to the west.

The best available corridor in which to build the new expressway at the lowest cost was occupied by the old Garfield Elevated Transit Line. CTA, as the owner and operator of the transit line, wanted to continue service in the corridor but did not give the Garfield Line high priority for redevelopment or reconstruction. The transit planners and those charged with operations, while desiring to continue transit service in the corridor, also were skeptical, and in some cases opposed, to a rail transit line in the median of a high speed, heavily-traveled highway because of the difficulty of operations and maintenance as well as the fact that station access would be difficult and require more time for transit patrons walking to stations.

The highway planners, clearly interested in building a new radial expressway, were not

interested in developing or remodeling the old and largely dilapidated Garfield transit line. b

Notwithstanding these opposing and conflicting views, the Congress Expressway and transit line was designed, constructed, and became a model for future transit development which is continuing in the Chicago area.

The city of Chicago, through its Department of Public Works and its director, George DeMent, was faced with the problem of developing a new expressway and preserving transit service in a narrow corridor with limited resources. The Illinois Highway Division, which largely deferred to the city on highway matters within its jurisdiction, reluctantly went along with Chicago's decision and helped the city persuade the Federal Bureau of Public Roads to provide part of the funds for the highway portion of the joint use corridor. The BPR, responding to this reluctance and aided by highway laws that allowed highway use revenues to be spent only for highway purposes, required a strict accounting of costs between those elements of the construction plans necessary for highway purposes and those attributable to the joint transit development.

The city of Chicago paid for the right-of-way and structural elements of the joint corridor that were attributable to transit with its own general purpose funds, and CTA was charged with the cost of fixed transit equipment and rolling stock.

Thus, the dominant role played by the city department and its director resulted in the joint use project that subsequently has been extolled as an outstanding example of combined highway and transit planning and development. Ironically, the Congress corridor has been displayed frequently and prominently by highway officials to demonstrate their longtime interest in comprehen-

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o In fact, during this period and extending well into the interstate program, highway officials developed and implemented very stringent policies which largely prevented the use of controlled access highway right-of-way for any use other than highways. The exclusive-use-of -right-of-way policy was aimed largely at preventing utilities from using shared space, but the policy extended to any use which interfered with the safety features of high-speed, median-divided, grade-separated expressway operation. Thus, most highway planners and designers were skeptical if not outright opposed to deliberately planning a rail transit facility and operation within the narrow confines of the space separating the opposing lanes of the expressway.

sive surface transportation in urban areas without regard to mode or technology.

Rail transit lines subsequently were built into the Kennedy and Dan Ryan Expressways, but the fundamental decision that resulted in Chicago's unique system of expressway median transit lines dates from the middle 1950's and was a decision made largely by the city of Chicago with acquiescence by the other parties to the development.

#### **Forum for Decisionmaking: Toward a Regional Transit Agency**

A major development in the institutional process was the creation of the Chicago Area Transportation Study in 1955. CATS, the first major metropolitan area transportation study program, paved the way for a whole new concept of technically oriented and rigorous transportation planning and evaluation. Most of the basic concepts developed and made operational as a part of the CATS study are in worldwide use today.

CATS, however, has never achieved a role significantly greater than technical support for the policy makers in the areas of transit planning and development. It should be noted that CATS was the creation of the Illinois Highway Division with complete cooperation of Chicago, Cook County, and the other suburban counties. But its policy control was vested in the highway officials of the participating jurisdictions. Notwithstanding, the CATS study and its resulting 1962 plan seriously examined the potential role of transit in the future and developed alternative plans which systematically examined costs and revenue, including the costs of operation and the cost of money over time.

Almost all of the major plans which have been developed in recent years in the Chicago area, including the CATS plan, have some elements which either have been built or continue to be contained in current plans. It is obvious, however, that neither the CATS plan nor the CTA "New Horizons" plan of 1958 were fully acceptable to the dominant decisionmaking force, the city of Chicago. (The CATS plan for highways, however, was fully accepted and has been carried out to a large extent except for the controversial Crosstown Freeway.)

The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC) was formed in 1957, during the years of the development of the CTA and CATS plans. NIPC,

while having broad planning authority including transportation, nevertheless was not a major factor in the decisionmaking process during these years, either for highway or transit programs. Its force as a regional planning body grew incrementally and was substantially enhanced by its designation as the A-95 review agency for the metropolitan area in 1969.

Chicago, unlike any other of the case assessment cities with the possible exception of Boston, has not faced many of the problems of other metropolitan areas with new transit systems in planning or construction. Chicago area decisions have focused on revitalizing the existing transit system and extending it into new service areas. These concerns are manifested in the series of proposals to build the Central Area Plan by replacing the elevated Loop and building the distributor transit line.

Revitalization of the existing system was left largely to the decisionmaking authority of CTA leadership and management. Although CTA had made major strides in renovating its system with self-generated debt funds and money either contributed or advanced by the city, CTA still faced major capital expenditures for fixed facilities and rolling stock at the time Federal funds became available for capital investment following the Mass Transportation Act of 1964. Thus, major portions of the funds allocated to the Chicago area in the subsequent years have been used to replace old and antiquated rolling stock, both rail vehicles and buses. New maintenance and operations facilities have been constructed; stations remodeled; and power, signal, and control facilities replaced or modernized. All of these investments were critically important for preserving and improving service but did not result directly in significant expansion of service to new areas. The investments did, however, improve service on existing transit and bus routes and, consequently, they increased patronage through the 1960's until overall costs required large fare increases starting in 1967.

The other major products of Federal transit capital assistance in Chicago are the new transit lines in the medians of the Dan Ryan and Kennedy Expressways and the Skokie Swift. But the extension of new service into the Kennedy and Dan Ryan corridors did not represent new decisions. Rather, the projects grew out of decisions made in the 1950's when Chicago, as a matter of policy, decided to reserve the medians of all future expressways and freeways for transit service.



Although the Central Area Transit Project continues to dominate the issue of transit improvements in the Chicago area, extensions of service in the Kennedy, Dan Ryan, and Calumet Expressway corridors remain relatively high on the list of priority projects to be undertaken.

Meanwhile, during these same years following the Mass Transportation Act of 1964, the suburban transit districts were formed in order to have access to Federal funds for improvements and additions to commuter railroad rolling stock suburban stations, and park-and-ride lots. The suburban districts subsequently were expanded to provide an institutional mechanism and taxing power for public and private suburban bus operators as well as the commuter railroads.

These several developments during the 1960's created a condition in which several different institutions were making separate and uncoordinated applications for funds to UMTA with no significant indication from any single institutional source as to regional priorities. Routinely, UMTA was faced with annual applications for capital grant funds far in excess of what it could reasonably

allocate to the Chicago area, with no expressed set of priorities for UMTA guidance in deciding what projects it would fund and what projects it would defer.

UMTA started exerting pressure on regional institutions to designate or create a body which could coordinate transit capital grant applications and specifically to present annual applications by order of priority. UMTA even threatened to cut off Federal funds for the region unless a coordinating mechanism was developed, although the threat was never taken seriously. Responding to UMTA pressure, the city of Chicago exercised its leadership by creating the Regional Transportation Planning Board with membership consisting of the city of Chicago (through its DPW and DDP), CATS, NICP, and the Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning Commission. The State of Illinois was represented on the board as an ex officio member.

The RTPB was a paper organization that actually operated out of the offices of the city's DDP and DPW. Its staff support came from the same agencies that supported transit decisions prior to

RTPB's formation. Thus, the RTPB changed decisionmaking in the Chicago area in form but not in substance.

Internal memoranda of UMTA personnel as late as 1974 demonstrate UMTA'S frustration at the inadequacy of its attempts to create a truly regional representative institution to guide Federal participation by setting priorities among area plans for transit developments. It is important to note that this fundamental problem in regional decision-making was not altered until financial conditions internal to the Chicago area forced changes starting in 1971 and extending to the present.

#### **Forum for Decisionmaking: Creation of the Regional Transit Authority**

The CTA first experienced a net operating deficit in 1971 of \$13.2 million (exclusive of depreciation). This operating deficit in effect forced the city of Chicago, Cook County, and the State of Illinois to make grants to CTA to keep it out of the red and to avoid even greater fare increases and service reductions.<sup>7</sup> It was apparent that financial conditions would become more severe in subsequent years, and this realization started the agonizing process of developing a different financing system for transit in the region.

Legislation for various kinds of regional organizations and financing mechanisms was introduced and considered in the 1972 session of the Illinois legislature. But no plan could win sufficient support for enactment. The worsening financial condition of CTA and a very real threat of significant fare increases and service cutbacks led to a crisis, and the legislature finally took action in 1973. The result was the creation of the Regional Transportation Authority. While still in its formative stages, the RTA clearly is becoming the dominant decisionmaking forum for transit development and operations in the entire Chicago metropolitan region.

The factors that led to creation of RTA are critical to an assessment of the present and future decisionmaking process. The State of Illinois, which had taken only a peripheral interest in Chicago area transit in previous years, became an important actor when it started in 1971 to make significant financial contributions to transit systems in the

area. The city of Chicago, with perhaps the largest stake in the outcome of a new institutional and financial plan, attempted to exercise as much leadership as possible in the outcome of the legislative considerations. But Chicago also recognized the growing political strength of the suburban jurisdictions in the legislature as well as the absolute necessity of broadening the tax revenue base for transit support. The suburban jurisdictions banded together and exercised their political power through the Speaker of the House, who represented a suburban constituency. He reactivated the dormant, legislatively created Transportation Study Commission as the mechanism for legislative control.

While there were many important issues to be resolved, primary consideration boiled down to how the resulting institution would be controlled and how taxes would be estimated and apportioned.

Governor Richard B. Ogilvie had created a Governor's transportation task force during 1972, and its January 1973 report became the foundation for subsequent action. The report, *Crisis and Solution: Public Transportation in Northeastern Illinois*, recommended in broad outline an institutional mechanism and financing plan similar to that which was eventually incorporated in the RTA legislation. The report gave elaborate detail on how a regional agency should be created, organized, and controlled. The report, however, was much less explicit on how the regional agency should be financed and instead suggested a number of taxes that should be considered.

As the final critical process started in January 1973, Governor Ogilvie was replaced by Governor Daniel Walker. However, it is clear that the leadership within the legislature came through the Transportation Study Commission and not from the incoming administration of Governor Walker. The new administration took little active part in the legislative negotiations until the final stages, and even then was concerned primarily with the taxing issues vis-a-vis other State tax programs as distinct from the organization and control of the regional transit agency.

The inevitable compromise that resulted from the legislative process created the RTA, subject to voter approval, which was to be controlled by a 9-member board with eight of the members equally divided between Chicago and the suburban jurisdictions. It is important to note that the Governor was given no appointive or veto authori-

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<sup>7</sup> Commuter railroads also were operating at deficits, but their losses were absorbed in total railroad revenue.



ty such as Governors have had in connection with CTA from its inception. The eight board members had the responsibility of choosing the ninth member, who also would be chairman of the board.

The taxing authority, which will be discussed in detail later in this section, also was the product of compromise.

The RTA plan was submitted to voters on March 19, 1974. It was approved by the slim margin of only about 15,000 votes out of 1.3 million cast. It won by an overwhelming margin in the city but lost in all other jurisdictions, including Cook County. The margin of loss was almost 10 to 1 in suburban McHenry County.

The very significant opposition to RTA in the suburban jurisdictions led to legislative reconsideration of whether the authorizing legislation should be amended to such an extent that the practical result would be a regional agency without the authority to carry out its responsibilities. The legislative fight resulted in several changes to the legislation, including the creation of a metropolitan area transportation council whose authority and responsibility is essentially that of oversight by locally elected officials. The RTA also was constrained in several other ways, but its basic authority was left intact.

Thus, RTA was created through the decision-making forum of the State legislature. The principal actors were the city of Chicago, the suburban jurisdictions, and the State of Illinois. Regional agencies such as CATS and NIPC were called on for technical support services, and transit operators, including CTA and the commuter railroads, were lobbying forces. But the decision was made in the political arena of the State legislature with city, suburban, and State elected officials playing the decisive roles.

#### **Forum for Decisionmaking: the Outlook for RTA**

RTA has gone through and is still experiencing many of the difficulties of organizing and operating a new public institution. It is still too early to assess

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<sup>8</sup> During 1975, the Governor has twice vetoed Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's nomination of a board member and chairman-designate of the CTA. These are the only vetoes that have been exercised by either the Mayor or the Governor since the formation of CTA.

its effectiveness, but some comments can be made on factors that are clearly evident.

The first and foremost issue involving RTA, aside from legislative and legal challenges that presumably have been settled, was the selection of the chairman and its full-time executive leadership. Immediately after the city and the suburban jurisdictions named their respective sets of four board members, the city members proposed the selection of Milton Pikarsky as the chairman of RTA. Pikarsky at the time was chairman of CTA and previously had been Commissioner of the Department of Public Works. He had long been regarded as a strong, articulate, and effective leader of city positions in regional, State, and national transportation forums.

The strong advocacy of Pikarsky by the city RTA board members delayed RTA for many months while the suburban members either opposed his selection or insisted on a wide-ranging recruitment and interview program. In the end, Pikarsky was selected and RTA is in the process of organizing and initiating its program.

The city's long and aggressive campaign for Pikarsky's selection as RTA chairman indicates that it intends to exercise as strong a role as possible in the new agency's future policies and operations. It is evident, however, that the city's power over regional transit policy has been diminished significantly. The balanced composition of the RTA board plus specific legislative requirements designed to protect suburban jurisdictions ensure that transit policy and operations in the region will be shared by many jurisdictions. On the other hand, RTA's broad authority and funding resources may eventually make it a semi-independent force of considerable strength in the region.

The creation of RTA does not settle some of the region's fundamental decisionmaking problems. One such problem is that because authority and responsibility for highways and streets remain under the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois and local cities and counties, RTA does not qualify under U.S. Department of Transportation guidelines for designation as the Metropolitan Planning Organization. The Chicago region, therefore, still faces the problem of selecting or creating an institution that meets Federal guidelines. Previously, the Governor made an interim designation of CATS, but that designation expired June 30, 1975, and no subsequent designation has been made. UMTA, on the other hand, still

recognizes the RTPB as the regional coordinating agency for transit funds and programs.

Theoretically, the new Bi-State Transportation Commission, described earlier in this report, could become the designated MPO for both transit and highway programs. But it also is destined to be largely a paper organization because it has only loosely defined authorities and responsibilities. More importantly, it has no designated source of funds and suffers the ignominy of being specifically prevented from having any staff other than an executive director, administrative support staff, and two planners. The institutions that continue to control highway funds as well as the new RTA with its sources of transit funding, are unlikely to willingly turn over authority for developing programs, setting priorities, and allocating funds to any agency in the absence of a specific statutory directive.

More importantly, the creation of RTA does not directly tackle the two biggest unresolved transportation planning and development issues in the Chicago region—namely, whether to implement the entire Central Area Plan and whether to build the Crosstown Expressway. The new agency represents a major step forward by providing the mechanism and the financing, at least for the immediate future, for the Chicago region to provide stable and reasonably high quality regional transit service on the existing system. However, RTA does not resolve the problems of how decisions will be made for the future development of transit and highway facilities and services.

### **Accountability of Decisionmakers**

In past years, most of the major decisions on planning and developing new or extended transit lines have been made by the city of Chicago through its Department of Development and Planning and Department of Public Works. Both departments are headed by commissioners appointed by the Mayor. To the extent that CTA was involved in technical support of the planning and decisionmaking activities, its interests were represented by the CTA chairman, who is appointed by the Mayor with the concurrence of the Governor. But both in reality and in public perception, the key transit decisionmaker in the city of Chicago was its Mayor, who can be held accountable by the public through the electoral process.

Starting in 1971, other institutions have taken significant decision making roles, and the planning and decisionmaking process has become progressively complex. The State of Illinois, through the legislature, has been deeply involved in Chicago transit activities, primarily through its decisions to provide State financial assistance for both capital investments and operating subsidies. The State legislature also was the forum in which myriad parties and institutions negotiated the legislation creating RTA. The State, through its Department of Transportation, has exercised policy leadership and dominance of CATS planning activities. As more organizations became involved and the forum grew increasingly fragmented, public accountability was significantly reduced.

The advent of RTA may restore direct and well-defined accountability, although the channels are different from those of the past. The RTA board, which has very broad and decisive authority over the full spectrum of metropolitan area public transportation, is made up of nine members. Four are appointed by the Mayor of Chicago. Two are appointed by elected members of the Cook County Board outside Chicago, and two are appointed by the chairmen of the county boards of the remaining counties in the metropolitan area. The ninth member (the chairman) is chosen by a majority of the eight.

Thus, the board members of RTA, and particularly the chairman, are in highly visible positions and are directly accountable to elected public officials. More importantly, because RTA has broad authority and responsibility with a secure independent source of revenue, it is likely to become the forum for much of the region's transit decisionmaking and thus once again focus public attention on the decisionmakers who should be held accountable.

### **Public Involvement**

Public involvement and participation in transit planning in the Chicago area has not been a significant factor in the investment decisions that have been made in the recent past. Until recently, the transit planning institutions neither sought nor made any systematic provision for interacting with the public except through the long-established practice of working with business and civic improvement organizations.

The first preliminary steps toward organized and systematic public involvement were made through

the television airing of the metropolitan area's 1995 Transportation System Plan with the opportunity for the general public to telephone comments or questions or follow up in writing. Central Area Project planners also have made some efforts to meet with broader and more diverse groups than the CBD business interests, whom they consulted regularly during the planning activities.

Amendments to the legislation creating RTA call for a broadly based metropolitan area transportation council to advise and counsel the RTA board and its chairman. The 26-member council, which is to be made up of persons appointed by locally elected officials, has the authority to hold public hearings. Whether this will develop into a mechanism for public participation in the planning and decisionmaking activities of RTA is yet to be established.

## TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The Chicago area has a long history of highly competent and sophisticated transportation planning.


The area relies heavily on CATS for transportation analysis at the regional and systems level. Transit operational planning and development is

the domain of CTA and is accomplished largely through its own planning and engineering staff. Major new capital construction projects, however, almost always are accomplished through the use of consultants under the tight management of the city's DDP and DPW.

Two major factors have influenced or are in the process of influencing the technical planning process in the Chicago area. The first is the emergence of the State of Illinois, through its Department of Transportation, as a major participant in the planning process. The second is the creation of RTA,

IDOT, starting in 1973, has assumed control and direction of CATS and its technical work program. Subsequently, CATS has become much more active in the transit portion of transportation planning and has added significant new studies and other activities to its work program. CATS' new responsibilities brought additional sophistication and competence to Chicago transit planning; the results are reflected in the 1995 Transportation Plan (developed and adopted in 1974), and the 5-year transit development program.

RTA's role in the technical planning process is yet to be defined. The new agency of necessity will be a major factor because it is the primary funding source for all transit operators in the region, not



only for operating subsidies but also for most capital improvements.

### **Goals and Objectives**

The Chicago area for the first time developed an explicit set of goals and objectives as part of its effort to produce its 5-year mass transit development program as required by UMTA. The 5-year program, prepared by the Regional Transportation Planning Board (RTPB) in October 1974, set out in two and one-half pages its set of goals and objectives. The goals and objectives represent an explicit statement of the factors that had been guiding planning and decisionmaking in the past.

RTPB started with three broad and general goals: economic growth; an attractive, healthful, and convenient environment; and optimum use of natural resources. Using these goals as a foundation, RTPB established five broad, functional goals that led to four statements of objectives postulating that the transportation system should meet regional needs for moving people and goods, be functionally viable, contain desirable amenities, and promote positive environmental effects and desirable regional growth.

Within this still general framework, RTPB developed six investment policies with the explanation that consideration was divided into categories of maintaining the existing system, improving the system, and constructing new transit lines. RTPB's report states that some investment should be made in each category consistent with the long-range plan and some benefits from the program should be received in every geographic region of the area.

The investment policies become moderately specific only insofar as to give highest priority to maintenance of the existing system. There also is an implication that improving the existing system is given second priority. The investment policies also assigned high, medium, and low priorities for each of the categories.

### **Development and Evaluation of Alternatives**

The Chicago area, with its long history of established commuter railroads, conventional rail rapid transit, and bus service, has never undertaken a full-scale evaluation of alternatives at an areawide level, although planners have studied alternatives for new lines or major capital projects. The primary technical planning, analysis, and evaluation is concentrated on maintaining and improving the existing system.

Although this assessment has focused on new transit lines and extensions, some of the most significant improvements in Chicago's transit system are due to CTA'S competence in operations management. Their success indicates that CTA'S widespread reputation as an efficient transit operations manager is well deserved.

CTA has successfully carried out two major programs of rolling stock replacement for rail and bus transit, and it expects within the next 2 or 3 years to replace the remaining stock of old or rebuilt transit cars and buses. When that is accomplished, and assuming a reasonably stable flow of funds, CTA will be able to maintain a regular cycle of equipment replacement.

CTA still has a large backlog of remodeling, refurbishing, and other kinds of projects to improve its fixed transportation facilities and equipment, including rights-of-way and stations. However, the completed projects already have resulted in faster and more efficient operations. For example, institution of skip-stop service on lines with low passenger volumes led to major gains in system speed and reduced passenger travel time. Although lacking a four-track system, CTA produced semiexpress service by scheduling certain trains to stop at all stations while other trains bypass light passenger stations, thus producing faster travel speed for patrons.

CTA also has successfully rebuilt and modernized older transit rolling stock, in some instances using components from phased-out streetcars in order to obtain the highest operating efficiency at relatively low cost. The rolling stock for the Skokie Swift is an excellent example of CTA'S abilities to modernize and adapt equipment for new and changed uses.

The commuter railroads also have carried out large equipment replacement programs, primarily through Federal capital grant assistance to local transit districts.

In fact, more than half the capital funds invested in the Chicago area in recent years have been expended for maintaining and improving the existing system as distinct from building new or extended lines. The region's present 5-year development program continues to place high priority on existing system maintenance and improvement. Plans for the development of new or extended transit lines, however, will dominate the amount of capital funds needed in future years,

particularly if the Central Area Plan is carried out as recommended.

The 5-year program gives the Central Area Project and the extension of the Kennedy Line to O'Hare Airport top priority among new or extended lines.

The O'Hare extension, which as a practical matter is likely to be started before any other major new project, was the subject of a technical study by a consultant under the direction and supervision of the DPW in 1973. The consultant made a preliminary evaluation of a busway to connect the Jefferson Park Station (the present outer terminus of the Kennedy Line) with O'Hare and rejected further consideration because of the lack of adequate highway space. The consultant also rejected, after preliminary analysis, consideration of a dual-mode highway-rail system because of technological problems. All other alternatives studied involved variations in Chicago's standard rail transit system. The fact that the O'Hare extension would utilize the median of the Kennedy Expressway up to the edge of the airport property meant that all alternatives to the project provided service connections into the Loop and the CBD.

The study made extensive use of travel and demand data from previous studies, including much of the travel forecasting and analysis done by CATS. The study made a basic assumption, based on an earlier airport study, that O'Hare would experience about a 100 percent increase in airline passengers from 1969 to 1985. This figure represented about a 50 percent increase over passenger levels at the time of the study, in 1973.

All the alternatives carried fully through the study process were systematically analyzed and evaluated against a specified and documented list of both quantitative and qualitative criteria. The study did not include extensive preliminary engineering although some sketch planning and engineering evaluation was necessary in order to develop preliminary cost estimates. The recommended alternative, while clearly not providing the highest level of service, had the highest benefit-cost ratio.

An analysis of the consultant's report indicates that the study was carried out systematically, all relevant factors were fully and fairly analyzed, and each alternative was evaluated against a documented set of criteria. The recommended alternative not only had the highest benefit-cost

ratio but also was the least costly of the alternatives considered.

The Central Area Plan, while clearly much more complex than the relatively simple airport extension study, was conducted in a very different way. The study examined alternatives and then officially reanalyzed the plan in two succeeding study efforts plus some additional less intensive reexaminations.

Both the original planning study and the studies that reaffirmed the original decision were based upon Chicago's goal of eliminating the elevated transit loop and maximizing the opportunity for continued growth and development of the central business district, including lakefront development to the north and south. As a result, the Loop replacement, the Monroe Street distributor, the extension to the Circle Campus, and the extensions north and south to serve the growing lakefront areas were designed to enhance economic growth.

Whether the plan is justified on the basis of measurable criteria has never been demonstrated. It appears likely that the selection of projects for the plan grew out of judgmental assessments about how best to hold and increase central business district investment, jobs, and economic activity.

The same or similar criteria used in the O'Hare extension study would not have justified the more than \$1.6 billion cost of the Central Area Plan.

From the standpoint of pure transportation economics, the plan is exceedingly expensive. But taken in the context of the city's goals for central business district development and redevelopment, the plan obviously is desirable. The application now pending before UMTA for the first allocation of capital construction funds for the project obviously will be a major test of what UMTA means by its new policy of cost-effectiveness evaluation.

### Financing and Implementation

TABLE 2.—Federal Assistance to Chicago Transit Programs From F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975

Type of assistance	Federal share	Total costs
Capital Grants . . . . .	\$351,660,000	\$612,237,000
Capital Loans . . . . .	7,500,000	7,500,000
Technical Studies . . . . .	11,663,000	16,992,000
<b>TOTAL . . . . .</b>	<b>370,823,000</b>	<b>636,729,000</b>

Source: Urban Mass Transportation Administration.

The 5-year transit improvement program recommended by RTPB not only is completely dependent upon Federal funds, but is dependent on Chicago's receiving more than twice the present annual average level of funding from Federal sources. " Thus, the recommended 5-year plan can be used to justify requests to Congress for substantial increases in Federal funds for transit improvement and development.

The recommended 5-year development program for all categories totals \$2,297,674,000; this is far more money than can be supplied from existing and presently projected sources of operating and capital revenues. The program contains all high priority maintenance and improvement projects and contains some projects from the medium priority lists for both maintenance and improvement. The largest share of the funds, \$1,431,300,000 would be allocated to new transit lines, with \$1,255,800,000 for the Central Area Project, \$174,300,000 to build the O'Hare Airport extension, and \$1,200,000 for the Archer Avenue Subway.

The 5-year plan makes it clear that the Chicago metropolitan area does not expect any difficulty in raising the local share of funds from a variety of sources, but the plan assumes that revenues from the State or metropolitan area will be needed only to pay 20 percent of the total costs; the remainder is to be paid by Federal funds.

Depending upon the level of funding necessary to subsidize transit operations, it is clear that RTA, from its own revenue sources as well as additional funds from other identifiable sources, can match all presently projected Federal funds as well as very large increases in the Federal program. RTA could not, however, take over the responsibility of financing a large share of the recommended program with 100 percent local funds. Thus, the Chicago area financial plan rests squarely upon the

continued availability of Federal funds in significantly increasing amounts.

The 5-year development program also identifies a "low funding alternative" that is within reasonable limits of the total the Chicago area can expect to receive under the existing Federal transit program. However, the program states that the low funding level would result in such a condition "... that RTA and other agencies will not—cannot—fulfill many of the obligations to modify and improve the region's public transit system. " Under this alternative, the 5-year plan says it would concentrate its resources on meeting all high and medium priority projects for maintenance and improvements, leaving a total of only \$296 million for new lines. Obviously, the Chicago area could not make much of a start on its high priority Central Area Project within the next 5 years given such a level of funding.

Thus, in the final analysis, the success or failure of the Central Area Plan as recommended will rest on the availability of Federal funds.

This financial condition places increased emphasis on the controversy over the Crosstown Expressway because of the interstate transfer provision of the Highway Act of 1973, as discussed briefly earlier in this report. The Crosstown highway project is estimated to cost well over \$1 billion. The provision of the Highway Act, which permits elimination of a highway project and the substitution of transit projects, has created a serious policy dilemma for the city of Chicago. At this time, the city chooses to build both the Crosstown Expressway and the Central Area Plan, notwithstanding the State's open campaign to kill the highway project and use the funds for transit. The State takes the position that the Crosstown Expressway should not be built under any circumstances and has pledged to prevent its construction.

Meanwhile, the estimated cost of the Central Area Project has jumped from less than \$500 million in 1968 to more than \$1.6 billion at the present. It is apparent that unless Congress authorizes a significant increase in UMTA'S budget, it is highly unlikely that Chicago will obtain sufficient UMTA capital grants to carry out the project.

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<sup>9</sup>In fiscal year 1975 Chicago received about \$115 million, which is not much more than the projected annual average for the area under current total Federal funds levels. Table 2 shows Federal transit grants to Chicago area transit programs from 1962 through spring 1975.

# Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize the transit planning and decisionmaking process in the Chicago region in light of the guidelines listed in the Introduction to the case assessments. The summary, therefore, is divided into **two** parts: (1) Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2) Assessment of the Technical Planning Process.

## 1. Assessment Of The Institutional Context

- **Forum for Decisionmaking.**—The city of Chicago dominated transit planning and decisionmaking until the need to broaden the base for tax revenue for metropolitan transit led to creation of the Regional Transit Authority. RTA, because it has independent t sources of tax revenue, is likely to become a strong regional institution. However, the creation of RTA does not resolve the problem of selecting or creating a metropolitan organization with responsibility for both highway and transit planning.
- **Accountability of Decisionmakers.**—Accountability to the public for transit planning and decisionmaking has become increasingly diffused in the past 5 years as more agencies became involved in making decisions. The creation of RTA, with board members appointed by local elected offi-

cial, may restore accountability by focusing public attention on the decisionmakers that should be held accountable.

- **Public Involvement.**—Public participation in the planning and decision process was not systematically undertaken in the past, and whether RTA will develop a structured program of citizen interaction remains to be seen.

## 2. ASSESSMENT OF THE TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

- **Goals and Objectives.**—The 5-year transit development program published by the Regional Transportation Planning Board in 1974 developed a set of goals and objectives that permitted setting priorities among area transit projects.
- **Development and Evaluation of Alternatives.**—The Chicago area has never undertaken a full-scale evaluation of alternatives at an areawide level, and primary technical planning, analysis, and evaluation is concentrated on maintainin<sub>g</sub> and improving the existing system.
- **Financing and Implementation.**—The Chicago area's plans for transit development are heavily dependent on obtainin<sub>g</sub> Federal funding in amounts significantly above the level of the present program.