

Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 3, System Requirements Specification (SyRS) - Tampa (THEA)

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Final Report — January 2021
FHWA-JPO-16-315



U.S. Department of Transportation

Produced by Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 3
Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA)
U.S. Department of Transportation
Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office

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Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No. FHWA-JPO-16-315	2. Government Accession No.	3. Recipient's Catalog No.	
4. Title and Subtitle Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 3, System Requirements Specification (SyRS) – Tampa (THEA)		5. Report Date January 2021	
		6. Performing Organization Code	
7. Author(s) Stephen Novosad, HNTB; Steve Johnson, HNTB; Victor Blue, HNTB; Sisinnio Concas, CUTR; David Miller, Siemens; Joe Waggoner, THEA; Bob Frey, THEA		8. Performing Organization Report No.	
9. Performing Organization Name And Address Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority 1104 East Twiggs Street, Suite 300 Tampa, Florida 33602		10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)	
		11. Contract or Grant No. DTFH6115R00003	
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address U.S. Department of Transportation ITS Joint Program Office 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590		13. Type of Report and Period Covered Final Report	
		14. Sponsoring Agency Code	
15. Supplementary Notes COR: Govind Vadakpat, CO: Sarah Khan,			
16. Abstract This document describes the System Requirements Specification (SyRS) for the Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) Connected Vehicle (CV) Pilot Deployment. This SyRS was updated to reflect the requirements implemented in Phase 3 and describes the current system requirements derived from the user needs, Concept of Operations, Security Management Operating Concept, Safety Management Plan, and the Performance Measurement and Evaluation Support Plan. The requirements describe what the system does; not how it will be done. This document will be used as the basis for the high level design. The requirements have traceability back to the Concept of Operations and user needs and forward to the high level design. A separate traceability matrix documents this process.			
17. Key Words Intelligent Transportation Systems, Intelligent Vehicles, Crash Warning Systems, Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment, Collision Avoidance, V2V, V2I, Vehicle Communication, SyRS		18. Distribution Statement No restrictions	
19. Security Classif. (of this report) Unclassified	20. Security Classif. (of this page) Unclassified	21. No. of Pages 49	22. Price

Version History

#	Date	Author (s)	Summary of Changes
Draft	3/21/16	THEA	Initial draft release for USDOT review and comment
Final	5/2/2016	THEA	Updated UC requirements after USDOT comment and walkthrough and added UC definitions from walkthrough.
Final	5/23/2016	THEA	Updated the system requirements to reflect the changes from the walkthrough.
Final	6/3/2016	THEA	Reorganized some of the system requirements (security, safety) to reference the appropriate documents rather than repeat requirements from the documents to ensure consistent documentation
Final	8/22/16	THEA	Address USDOT comments; added verification method column to requirements tables.
Final	8/31/16	THEA	Addressed remaining USDOT comments
Final	12/16/20	THEA	Update for Phase 2 and Phase 3
Final	1/14/21	THEA	Updated to respond to USDOT comments
Final	2/15/21	THEA	508 compliance

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1 Introduction

1.1 System Purpose

The Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) Connected Vehicle (CV) Pilot aims to meet the purposes set forth in the United States Department of Transportation's (USDOT's) Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) to advance and enable safe, interoperable, networked wireless communications among vehicles, and the infrastructure and to make surface transportation safer, smarter, and greener. The THEA CV Pilot aims to demonstrate the kinds of improvements that can be made in an urban environment, with Tampa's Central Business District (CBD) as the example site. THEA is deploying site-tailored collections of applications that address specific local needs while laying a foundation for additional local/regional deployment, and providing transferable lessons learned for other prospective deployers across the nation.

1.2 System Scope

The THEA CV Pilot Deployment (herein referred to as the "Pilot") in downtown Tampa aims to create a connected urban environment to measure the effect and impact of CVs in Tampa's vibrant downtown. To the vision of a connected downtown, the proposed Pilot offers several CV applications that can be deployed in Tampa's CBD and environs. This environment has a rich variety of traffic, mobility and safety situations that are amenable to Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), solutions. The deployment area is within a busy downtown and offers a tolled expressway with street-level interface, bus and street car service, high pedestrian densities, special event trip generators and high dynamic traffic demand over the course of a typical day. These diverse environments in one concentrated deployment area collectively encompass many traffic situations that allow for deployment and performance testing of CV applications.

The scope of the Pilot will comprise THEA/City of Tampa (CoT) Combined Traffic Management Center (TMC) Operations, Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART) Bus Operations, CoT signal Operations and Maintenance (O&M), CV Pilot System Development, CV Pilot Design, Deployment and O&M, Key Agency Partners, Stakeholders and System Users, and Sustainability Models/Partners.

1.3 Definitions and Acronyms

The following table defines selected project specific terms used throughout this System Requirements document.

Table 1.1: Acronym List

Acronym/Abbreviation	Definition
BAA	Broad Agency Announcement
BSM	Basic Safety Message
CA	Certificate Authority
CAMP	Crash Avoidance Metric Partnership
CBD	Central Business District

Acronym/Abbreviation	Definition
CC	Common Criteria
ConOps	Concept of Operations
CoT	City of Tampa
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CV	Connected Vehicle
CVRIA	Connected Vehicle Reference Implementation Architecture
DSRC	Dedicated Short Range Communications
EE	End Entity
EEBL	Emergency Electronic Brake Light
FCW	Forward Collision Warning
HART	Hillsborough Area Regional Transit
HSM	Hardware Security Module
I-SIG	Intelligent Traffic Signal System
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IMA	Intersection Movement Assist
IP	Internet Protocol
IRB	Institutional Review Board
ITS	Intelligent Transportation System
MAFB	MacDill Air Force Base
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OBU	Onboard Unit
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturers
OS	Operating System
PII	Personal Identifiable Information
POC	Proof of Concept
PSM	Personal Safety Message
REL	Reversible Express Lane
RLVW	Red Light Violation Warning
RSU	Roadside Unit
SCMS	Security Credential Management System
SE	System Engineering
SET-IT	System Engineering Tool for Intelligent Transportation

Acronym/Abbreviation	Definition
SMOC	Security Management Operating Concept
SPaT	Signal Phase and Timing
SRM	Signal Request Message
SSM	Signal Status Message
THEA	Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority
TIM	Traveler Information Message
TMC	Traffic Management Center
TSP	Transit Signal Priority
USDOT	United States Department of Transportation
V2I	Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V	Vehicle to Vehicle
V2X	Vehicle to Device
VIN	Vehicle Identification Number
VM	Verification Method
VTRFTV	Vehicle Turning Right in Front of Transit Vehicle
WAVE	Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment
WSA	WAVE Service Advertisement

Table 1.2: Glossary of Terms

Term	Definition
Automobile	A light vehicle (e.g., car or pickup truck), motorcycle, moped, or other powered wheel vehicle that is legal to operate on streets.
App	Software application
Authentication	Agency vehicles append a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) to BSM, creating a Signal Request Message (SRM) that is compared to a data base of authorized vehicles. Authenticated SRMs are used for emergency vehicle preemption and bus priority. SRM can also be used in applications where participants agree to reveal their identities for research purposes, such as comparing the end to end travel time of an authorized vehicle broadcasting SRM to the incremental travel times of private vehicles broadcasting BSM.
Buffer Time	This is the time from when the pedestrian countdown ends and the opposing signals turns green
Center/Agency (TMC)	Stakeholders of the systems located in the TMC, i.e. owners/operators
Center/Agency (MAFB):	Stakeholders of the systems located at MacDill Air Force Base (MAFB), i.e. owners/operators
Center/Agencies (HART Operations Center):	Stakeholders of the systems located at HART, i.e. owners/operators

Term	Definition
Center Connected V2I Management	Roadside Unit (RSU) Management software system located within the TMC that manage a wide area Network of RSUs, and not part of the TMC Regional Traffic Management
Classification	<p>Researchers need to determine the effect of the applied technology without violating participant privacy. Participant BSM use the vehicle size classification field to classify the BSMs into groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control Group: Equipped, but not enabled • Treated Group: Equipped and enabled • Proxy Group: Unequipped <p>Each group is sufficiently large to correlate data without identifying participants.</p>
Emergency Electronic Brake Light (EEBL)	An application where the driver is alerted to hard braking in upstream traffic. This provides downstream drivers with additional time to look for, and assess situations developing ahead.
End of Ramp Deceleration Warning (ERDW)	An application where speed advice is presented to drivers based on the length of the queue from the end of the REL.
Forward Collision Warning (FCW)	An application where alerts are presented to the driver to help avoid or mitigate the severity of crashes into the rear end of other vehicles on the road. Forward crash warning responds to a direct and imminent threat ahead of the host vehicle.
Intersection Movement Assist (IMA)	An application that warns the driver when it is not safe to enter an intersection—for example, when something is blocking the driver’s view of opposing or crossing traffic.
Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG)	An overarching system optimization application accommodating signal priority, preemption and pedestrian movements.
Probe-enabled Data Monitoring (PeDM)	An application that utilizes communication technology to transmit real time traffic data between vehicles and roadside equipment.
Proxy App	Proxy App is used to create PSMs for pedestrians. Traditional pedestrian detectors issue an occupancy call to the Proxy Application running in an RSU when a pedestrian is detected. The Proxy App broadcasts a Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) PSMs as if the pedestrian were broadcasting the PSM.
PSM	Personal Safety Message with the same information as a BSM RSUs within range of OnBoard Units (OBUs) are used to broadcast PSMs via DSRC.
Roadway Signal Control	The traffic signal control software application installed in traffic signal controllers
Tampa Intersection Devices	The physical roadside equipment excluding the THEA RSUs
TERL	Traffic Engineering Research Laboratory (TERL), a joint Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) and Florida State University partnership for traffic equipment standards and testing development research
THEA RSU	DSRC roadside radios conforming to USDOT requirements
TMC	The physical TMC room and communications infrastructure; excluding the existing TMC software system.
TMC Intersection Safety	Intersection Safety software system located within the TMC that manages and collects intersection safety data, not the safety application running at the roadside and not part of the TMC Regional Traffic Management

Term	Definition
TMC Regional Traffic Management	Traffic Management software system located within the TMC that manages the wide area network of signal controllers, not part of the Center Connected V2I Management
Transit Signal Priority (TSP)	An application that provide signal priority (green) to transit at intersections and along arterial corridors.
Vehicle Turning Right in Front of Transit Vehicle (VTRFTV)	An application that warns transit vehicle operators of the presence of vehicles attempting to go around the transit vehicle to make a right turn in front of the transit vehicle. The driver of the vehicle making a right turn is also warned.

1.4 Referenced Documents

The following table lists the references used to develop the concepts in this document.

Table 1.3: References

#	Document (Title, source, version, date, location)
1	FHWA, USDOT Guidance Summary for Connected Vehicle Deployments – Concept of Operations and the CVRIA/SET-IT Tool, Final Report: FHWA-JPO-16-337, July 2016 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31555 .
2	FHWA, USDOT, Broad Agency Announcement No. DTFH6115R00003, January 30, 2015.
3	FHWA, USDOT, Systems Engineering for Intelligent Transportation Systems , An Introduction for Transportation Professionals, http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/seitsguide/seguide.pdf , January 2007.
4	THEA, Final Needs Summary, November 23, 2015.
5	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 3, – Tampa (THEA) Concept of Operations (ConOps) – Final December 2020
6	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 1, Performance Measurement and Evaluation Support Plan – Tampa (THEA)
7	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 1, Safety Management Plan – Tampa (THEA)
8	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 Security Management Operational Concept – Tampa (THEA) December 2018 42690
9	THEA CV Pilot Project Stakeholder SyRS Review Panel Roster, March 23, 2016.
10	THEA, The Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program, Phase 1, March 26, 2015. (THEA CV Pilot Proposal.)
11	CVRIA website, http://iteris.com/cvria/ , accessed November 30, 2015.
12	SET-IT Download Page, http://www.iteris.com/cvria/html/resources/tools.html , accessed November 30, 2015.
13	IEEE Guide for Developing System Requirements Specifications , IEEE Std 1233, 1998 Edition (R2002)
14	USDOT Guidance Summary for Connected Vehicle Site Deployers – System Requirements and the CVRIA/SET-IT Tool – Draft Report, September 2015

#	Document (Title, source, version, date, location)
15	1609.2 - IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments Security Services for Applications and Management Messages, March 1, 2016.
16	SAE J2945/1 V5- On-Board System Requirements for V2V Safety Communications
17	THEA CV Pilot lesson learned see the Roadside Unit (RSU) Lessons Learned and Best Practices https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/50749
18	Driving Towards Deployment: Lessons Learned from the Design/Build/Test Phase https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/37681
18	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 Data Management Plan – Tampa (THEA) October 2017 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/32763
19	Application Deployment Plan – Tampa (THEA) September 2016 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31374
20	Human Use Approval summary – Tampa (THEA) August 2016 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31394
21	Participant Training and Education Plan – Tampa (THEA) August 2016 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31394
22	Partnership Status Summary – Tampa (THEA) February 2019 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31719
23	Comprehensive Pilot Deployment Plan – Tampa (THEA) August 2016 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31720
24	Deployment Readiness Summary – Tampa (THEA) September 2016 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/31721
25	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 System Architecture Document – Tampa (THEA) November 2018 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/42557
26	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 System Design Document (SDD) – Tampa (THEA) February 2019 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/50746
27	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase II Data Privacy Plan Tampa (THEA) February 2017 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/32034
28	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 Comprehensive Installation Plan – Tampa (THEA) May 2018 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36240
29	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 Operational Readiness Plan (ORP) – Tampa (THEA) June 2019 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/50547
30	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 Comprehensive Maintenance and Operations Plan – Tampa (THEA) May 2018 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36237
31	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program System Performance Report – Tampa (THEA) June 2019 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/42436
32	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 2 Outreach Plan – Tampa (THEA) December 2018 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/38682
33	Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 3 Contribution to Standards Development – Tampa (THEA) Draft Report – November 2020
34	Phase 1 CV Pilot Documentation https://www.its.dot.gov/pilots/phase1_technical.htm
35	Phase 2 CV Pilot Documentation https://www.its.dot.gov/pilots/phase2_technical.htm

1.5 System Overview

The System Overview can be found in the Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase 1, Concept of Operations (ConOps) – Tampa (THEA) Chapter 7.

1.6 System Requirements Lessons Learned

During the course of the CV Pilot project, THEA had challenges implementing the requirements. The majority of the requirements that were not implemented were focused on pedestrian applications. It was found that smartphones had several issues including:

- accurately maintain GPS location
- missing phone features such as heading
- inability to connect to wifi because of public wifi access spots.

One of the lessons learned with regard to smartphones is there are many different models and not all models have the same hardware features. Another lesson learned is when a smartphone has connected to a public wifi network previously, it will try and autoconnect to that network causing the smartphone to not connect to the wifi needed to communicate with the RSU.

For more detailed information of THEA CV Pilot lesson learned see the Roadside Unit (RSU) Lessons Learned and Best Practices and the Driving Towards Deployment: Lessons Learned from the Design/Build/Test Phase.

2 General System Description

2.1 System Context

The Pilot area is contained within the Tampa CBD. In order to bound each Use Case, they are defined to a specific location(s). Each Use Case is composed of at least two applications which when implemented will work together to address the issues/needs of the Use Case. In some instances, these Use Case locations overlap or intersect; making it possible for Use Case/applications to interact with one another.

2.2 User Characteristics

User Characteristics identify the user types who interact with the system. For each user type, their role, where they participate, and devices they use or interact with are discussed. Within the Pilot, the following user types are defined:

- Drivers
- Bus operators
- Streetcar operators
- Pedestrians (Pedestrians interact with they CV Pilot system when crossing the mid block crosswalk at the court house)
- TMC Operators

2.2.1 Drivers

Drivers are defined as any person who operates a vehicle with an OBU installed. These vehicles are defined as passenger vehicles including pickup trucks, Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs), etc. (also known as light vehicles). Drivers will operate their vehicles as they normally do. For those OBU equipped vehicles; drivers will receive warnings/alerts. The estimated number of OBU equipped vehicles is 1,000. These warnings/alerts will be audible and visible. Drivers participating in the Pilot are primarily commuters who travel thru downtown to work.

2.2.2 Bus Operators

Bus operators are defined as people who operate the HART buses in which OBUs are installed. These buses operate on fixed routes. Bus operators will not receive audible or visual alerts if they are granted priority. These buses traverse routes that may start and/or end outside the deployment area, but during some portion of the route, the bus travels through the deployment area including Marion Street and East Kennedy Boulevard and Jackson Street. The estimated number of buses equipped is 10.

2.2.3 Streetcar Operators

Streetcar operators are defined as people who operate Tampa Electric Company (TECO) streetcars in which OBUs are installed. The streetcars operate on a fixed route using rail. Streetcar operators shall receive audible or visual messages from OBUs indicating a vehicle is turning in front of the streetcar as it approaches an intersection. The streetcar's route is primarily within the deployment area. The estimated number of equipped street cars is 9.

2.2.4 Pedestrians

Pedestrians are defined as people who are on foot. Florida law classifies a bicyclist riding on a sidewalk as a pedestrian. Pedestrians will be located on Twiggs Street near the courthouse, who use the unmarked crosswalk.

2.2.5 TMC Operators

TMC Operators staff the THEA TMC where they manage and operate the reversing of the REL and the signal system in downtown. The TMC is located within THEA's administration building and staffed by the CoT. The operators work within the TMC at workstations and have a video wall showing the expressway and the signal systems.

2.3 System Modes and States

As the system is composed of multiple devices; potentially hosting several applications, the system mode is viewed on a more micro level. With devices deployed across the deployment area and outside the deployment area (i.e., vehicles), viewing the Pilot as a single system is not considered. The mode will be composed of the status of a device, its ability to communicate, and the operational status of the installed applications.

There are three modes:

- Normal mode.
- Degradation mode
- Error mode

Normal mode is defined by a device and its applications operating as required. Degradation mode is defined as something unexpected occurring and part of the device may not be functioning as required. Error Mode is defined as a complete failure of the device including communication failure.

Each device (Roadside Unit [RSU] and Onboard Unit [OBU]) is considered to be in normal mode when the device is operating as designed and the applications are functioning as designed.

A device enters degradation mode when there is failure of one or more of the applications or a portion of the hardware fails. When an application fails, data is not being received, processed and transmitted for those application(s). The other applications continue to function as designed receiving, processing and transmitting data. When a portion of the device hardware fails, the application may or may not be able to perform its functions.

Error mode is entered when a device completely fails or loses the ability to communicate.

OBUs' mode cannot be determined in real time. Mode changes by these devices will be discovered when the vehicle's data is downloaded. If there is a complete failure of the device, then it will be readily apparent that the device is nonoperational. If the device is operating, but one of the applications has failed, this will be determined after the data has been downloaded and analyzed. OBU failures may be determined more efficiently as drivers may notice the OBU is not functioning properly and bring the vehicle in for OBU maintenance.

When determining the system state, the focus will be on the RSUs. These devices can provide a heartbeat to the TMC which can be monitored. The OBUs are not considered as there is no reliable means to know if these devices are always operating as required. The RSU device states are:

- Operational
- Partial Failure
- Failed

When the device is operational, an RSU is known to be up and operating and communications with the TMC. Partial failure of an RSU indicates that the RSU is not operating as required. An RSU is considered nonoperational when the communications with the RSU is down (interrupted) or the RSU itself

has some failure preventing it from operating normally. The RSU is considered to be in a failed state when an RSU is inoperative.

2.4 Major System Capabilities

The system requirements for the six Use Cases are defined in this chapter. Each Use Case and the user needs associated with the Use Case were reviewed as well as discussions with the stakeholders to derive the system requirements. For each of the selected Connected Vehicle Reference Implementation Architecture (CVRIA) applications, the system requirements defined and approved within the CVRIA SET-IT tool are included by reference.

The nomenclature for the requirement identifiers is defined as follows:

- THEA-xxx-zzz

Table 2.1 Requirement Nomenclature

Identifier Position	Definition
THEA	Identifies the CV Pilot
xxx	The first three characters identify the requirement type the requirement is associated with. (e.g., UC1 – Use Case 1; SEC – Security; etc.)
Zzz	Sequential number starting at 001 and is incremented by one for the next requirement. The numbering resets to 001 for each new requirement type.

Note the column labeled VM standards for the Verification Method to be used in testing. The following methods will be used:

- A – Analysis
- D - Demonstrate
- I – Inspection
- T – Test

2.4.1 Use Case 1 - Morning Peak Hour Queues Requirements

The requirements for this Use Case are identified in the table below

Table 2.2 Use Case 1 Morning Peak Hour Queues System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC1-001	The Queue Length Measurement application shall provide the southbound queue data to the ERDW.	Provide commute reliability	T
THEA-UC1-002	The drivers shall receive speed advice from the ERDW application on the vehicles		T
THEA-UC1-003	I-SIG application at Twiggs and Nebraska shall transmit westbound queue length data to the CSW application on the REL per lane.	REMOVED: The requirement was removed as the queue length is now calculated based on the furthest equipped vehicles from the end of the REL	T
THEA-UC1-004	The Electronic Emergency Brake Light warning (EEBL) application on the braking vehicle shall broadcast an		T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
	EEBL warning when the vehicle deceleration exceeds predetermined value.		
THEA-UC1-005	The EEBL application on the receiving vehicle shall receive an EEBL warning from the braking vehicle.		T
THEA-UC1-006	The EEBL application on the receiving vehicle shall process an EEBL warning from forward vehicles.		T
THEA-UC1-007	The EEBL application shall warn the driver on the REL of vehicles exceeding the preset deceleration downstream to Twiggs Street.		T
THEA-UC1-008	Vehicles equipped with OBUs shall receive BSMS from other vehicles equipped with OBUs within DSRC range.		T
THEA-UC1-009	The FCW in-vehicle application shall identify crash trajectories with other vehicles.		T
THEA-UC1-010	The FCW application shall warn the driver of crash trajectories.	Assumes the lead vehicle is also equipped with an OBU.	T
THEA-UC1-011	The FCW application shall warn the driver no more than once when multiple warnings are received within a configurable timeframe.		T
THEA-UC1-012	The Queue Length Measurement application for Twiggs and Meridian shall receive BSMS from vehicles equipped with OBUs.		T
THEA-UC1-013	The Queue Length Measurement application for Twiggs and Meridian shall process BSMS to determine the queue length on the southbound approach from the REL.		T
THEA-UC1-014	I-SIG application at Twiggs and Nebraska shall process BSMS to determine the queue length.	REMOVED: The requirement was removed as the queue length is now calculated based on the furthest equipped vehicles from the end or the REL	T
THEA-UC1-015	Queue Length Measurement application for Twiggs and Meridian shall transmit the queue lengths to the THEA master server.		T
THEA-UC1-016	I-SIG application at Twiggs and Nebraska shall transmit the queue lengths to the THEA master server.	REMOVED: The requirement was removed as the queue length is now calculated based on the furthest equipped vehicles from the end or the REL	T
THEA-UC1-017	The Master Server shall receive and analyze the queue lengths from I-SIG application to the master server at Twiggs and Nebraska.	REMOVED: The requirement was removed as the queue length is now calculated based on the furthest equipped vehicles from the end or the REL	T
THEA-UC1-018	The Master Server shall receive the queue lengths from the Queue Length Measurement application for Twiggs and Meridian.		T
THEA-UC1-019	The combination of signal controller and the Queue Length application shall modify the signal phase timing when the queue length exceeds a configurable threshold at Twiggs and Meridian.		T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC1-020	The combination of signal controller and the I-SIG application shall modify the signal phase timing when the queue length exceeds a configurable threshold at Twiggs at Nebraska.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the RSU implemented NTCIP1202 v2 to communicate with the signal controller.	T
THEA-UC1-021	I-SIG application shall prioritize queues that limit safe stopping distance as Priority as defined in the I-SIG requirements.	REMOVED: The requirement was deleted as 3 speed zones (20, 30, and 40 miles per hours) were implemented that contracted and expanded based on the length of the queue.	T
THEA-UC1-022	The RSU ERDW application shall broadcast a recommended speed advice.		T
THEA-UC1-023	The vehicle ERDW application shall receive the recommended speed advice from the RSU ERDW application.		T
THEA-UC1-024	The vehicle ERDW application shall receive the recommended speed advice from the RSU ERDW application.		T
THEA-UC1-025	The vehicle CSW application shall convert the recommended standard speed to an appropriate speed based on the vehicle type.	REMOVED: The requirement was deleted as 3 speed zones (20, 30, and 40 miles per hours) were implemented that contracted and expanded based on the length of the queue. When the driver enters one of these zones they received the speed advice for that zone.	T
THEA-UC1-026	The RSU ERDW application shall transmit the recommended speed advice to the THEA Master Server.		T
THEA-UC1-027	TMC operators shall be able to access standard curve speed.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as TMC operators do not interact with the CV Pilot system.	T
THEA-UC1-028	A traditional vehicle detector shall issue a call to the proxy app when a vehicle occupies the detection zone.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as this created ghost BSMs causing the potential for OBUs to misinterpret where the vehicle actually was.	T
THEA-UC1-029	The proxy app shall transmit a BSM when the traditional detector issues a call.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as this created ghost BSMs causing the potential for OBUs to misinterpret where the vehicle actually was.	T
THEA-UC1-030	Vehicles equipped with OBUs shall broadcast BSMs.		T
THEA-UC1-031	The Master Server shall analyze the queue lengths from the Queue Length Measurement application for Twiggs and Meridian.		T

2.4.2 Use Case 2 - Wrong Way Entries Requirements

The requirements for this Use Case are identified in the table below.

Table 2.3 Use Case 2 Wrong Way Entries System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC2-001	Vehicle traveling in the legal direction shall receive the BSM of vehicles traveling opposite the legal direction.	10 times per second as long as both vehicles are equipped	T
THEA-UC2-002	Vehicles traveling in the legal direction shall identify crash trajectory of vehicles traveling opposite the legal direction.	This requirement was deleted as vehicles driving in the legal direction received a TIM warning of a wrong way driver.	T
THEA-UC2-003	Vehicles traveling in the legal direction shall identify crash trajectory of cross street vehicles	Calculates crash threat based on the location, heading, speed and elevation of both vehicles (Intersection Movement Assist)	T
THEA-UC2-004	RSU at REL entrance shall host the existing 2-phase traffic signal control application.	This requirement was deleted as the original WWE design was to modified the Red Light Violation Warning (RLVW) application on the RSU. The J2735 specification was updated to include a revocable bit in the SPaT message; allowing the RSU to use this bit to indicate which lanes are wrong way.	T
THEA-UC2-005	Signal control application Phase 1 at REL entrance shall be RED inbound and GREEN outbound during outbound times of day,	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the original WWE design was to modified the Red Light Violation Warning (RLVW) application on the RSU. The J2735 specification was updated to include a revocable bit in the SPaT message; allowing the RSU to use this bit to indicate which lanes are wrong way.	T
THEA-UC2-006	Signal control application Phase 2 at REL entrance shall be GREEN inbound and RED outbound during inbound times of day.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the original WWE design was to modified the Red Light Violation Warning (RLVW) application on the RSU. The J2735 specification was updated to include a revocable bit in the SPaT message; allowing the RSU to use this bit to indicate which lanes are wrong way.	T
THEA-UC2-007	RSU WWE application at REL entrance shall transmit the latest published standard SPaT message per J2735 current version.	Compatible with the message payload and security of OEM Class 1 OBU	T
THEA-UC2-008	RSU WWE application at REL entrance shall transmit the REL entrance lane geometry MAP message per J2735 current version.	Compatible with the message payload and security of OEM Class 1 OBU	T
THEA-UC2-009	Participating vehicles shall host the Red Light Violation application.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the original WWE	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
		design was to modified the Red Light Violation Warning (RLVW) application on the RSU. The J2735 specification was updated to include a revocable bit in the SPaT message; allowing the RSU to use this bit to indicate which lanes are wrong way.	
THEA-UC2-010	OBU WWE application shall receive the RSU signal control application SPaT message.		T
THEA-UC2-011	OBU WWE application shall receive the RSU signal control application MAP message.		T
THEA-UC2-012	OBU WWE application at the REL entrance shall warn drivers intending to enter the REL the wrong way, using the MAP and SPaT received from the RSU signal control application.	OBUs use the RSU SPaT and MAP to predict the vehicle is on a wrong-way trajectory	T
THEA-UC2-012a	The OBU WWE application shall warn drivers who have entered the REL, they are going the wrong way, using the MAP and SPaT received from the RSU signal control application.		T
THEA-UC2-012b	A roadside vehicle detector shall detect wrong way vehicles on the REL near the REL entrance,		T
THEA-UC2-012c	The RSU WWE application shall receive a notification from the roadside vehicle detector of a wrong way vehicle.		T
THEA-UC2-012d	The RSU WWE application shall issue a Traveler Information Message (TIM) warning of a wrong way driver.		T
THEA-UC2-012e	Equipped vehicles with the OBU WWE application, approaching the REL exit, shall receive notification of a wrong way vehicle		T
THEA-UC2-012f	The OBU WWE app shall warn the driver of a wrong way driver.		T
THEA-UC2-013	A roadside vehicle detector shall issue a call to the proxy app when a vehicle approaches the REL entrance.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as this created ghost BSMS causing the potential for OBUs to misinterpret where the vehicle actually was.	T
THEA-UC2-014	A roadside vehicle detector shall issue a call to the proxy app when a vehicle enters the REL entrance.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as this created ghost BSMS causing the potential for OBUs to misinterpret where the vehicle actually was.	T
THEA-UC2-015	Proxy app shall create a proxy RLVW when the advance detector call is asserted and followed by the local detection call is asserted during red phase.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as this created ghost BSMS causing the potential for OBUs to misinterpret where the vehicle actually was.	T
THEA-UC2-016	RLVW application of violator shall issue a wrong-way alert to the wrong-way driver when the RLVW application leaves the REL MAP geometry during RED phase.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the OBU used the SPaT revocable bit to determine wrong way.	T
THEA-UC2-017	RLVW application of violator shall issue wrong-way alert to the RSU when the RLVW application checks out of the REL MAP geometry during RED phase.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the OBU used the	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC2-018	Wrong-way alert from the RSU shall be received at the master server.	SPaT revocable bit to determine wrong way. Wrong-way alerts received from violators at the THEA master server.	T
THEA-UC2-019	Wrong-way alert from the RSU shall be stored at the master server.	Wrong-way alerts received from violators at the THEA master server.	T
THEA-UC2-020	Wrong-way alert from master server shall be received by law enforcement dispatch.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as Law Enforcement Agencies were unwilling to receive these alerts over concerns of false alerts.	T

2.4.3 Use Case 3 - Pedestrian Safety Requirements

The requirements for this Use Case are identified in the table below.

Table 2.4 Use Case 3 Pedestrian Safety System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC3-001	The OBU shall receive Personal Safety Messages (PSM).		T
THEA-UC3-002	The OBU shall determine if there is a potential conflict with a pedestrian.		T
THEA-UC3-003	The OBU shall warn the driver upon determination of a potential conflict with a pedestrian.		T
THEA-UC3-004	The OBU shall receive data from the RSU of a pedestrian entering the crosswalk.		T
THEA-UC3-005	The PID shall warn the pedestrian in the crosswalk when a vehicle is approaching the crosswalk.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-006	The PID shall warn the pedestrian approaching the crosswalk when a vehicle is entering the crosswalk.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC3-007	The PID shall warn the pedestrian in a non-crosswalk area on the street when there is an impending vehicle conflict.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-008	The PID shall transmit PSM to the RSU.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-009	The RSU shall receive PID PSM.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-010	The RSU shall convert the PSM into a BSM..	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize. The final implementation was for the RSU to broadcast PSMs over DSRC received from pedestrian detection equipment.	T
THEA-UC3-011	The RSU shall send a PSM over DSRC.		T
THEA-UC3-012	The RSU shall receive vehicle BSMs.		T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC3-013	The RSU shall send a not in crosswalk message to PIDs who are outside the crosswalk.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-014	The RSU shall convert vehicle BSMs into PSMs	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-015	The RSU shall send a converted PSM from a vehicle BSMs over Wi-Fi	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-016	The PID shall receive PSMs.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC3-017	The PID application, Mobile Accessible Pedestrian Signal (PED-SIG), shall inform the pedestrian, they are not in the crosswalk.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
		was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	
THEA-UC3-018	The RSU shall receive pedestrian movements from detection devices	e.g., cameras and lidar	T
THEA-UC3-019	The RSU shall convert pedestrian movements into PSMs.		T

2.4.4 Use Case 4 – Bus Rapid Transit Signal Priority Optimization, Trip Times and Safety Requirements

The requirements for this Use Case are identified in the table below.

Table 2.5 Use Case 4 Bus Rapid Transit Signal Priority Optimization, Trip Times and Safety System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC4-001	Transit vehicle shall send Signal Request Message (SRM) to RSU when vehicle matches the location of the intersection approach.	A signal green is requested at approach to the intersection by the transit vehicle, or the current green is requested to be extended.	T
THEA-UC4-002	SRM from transit vehicles shall be forwarded by the RSU to the transit central	A green request is received by RSU and sent on to transit central.	T
THEA-UC4-003	Transit central shall compare bus VIN, location and time to bus schedule.	Transit central authenticates the VIN and other information.	T
THEA-UC4-004	If bus is behind schedule, the transit central shall return the SRM to the originating RSU.	Transit central grants priority, if the bus is behind schedule	T
THEA-UC4-005	The TSP shall request signal priority of the controller when SRM is received from transit central.		T
THEA-UC4-005a	The TSP application shall utilize NTCIP 1211 to communicate a priority request to the Controller Unit (CU).		T
THEA-UC4-006	TSP shall receive priority status from the CU.	This ensures the intersection is going to Priority for that phase.	T
THEA-UC4-007	TSP shall send Signal Status Message (SSM) to bus.	Priority status is sent to bus	T
THEA-UC4-008	Bus shall receive SSM from TSP.	SSM has priority information for that bus.	T
THEA-UC4-009	SSM shall be displayed as a bus driver notification.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted over safety concerns of distracting the driver.	T
THEA-UC4-010	Signal controllers shall prevent vehicles from blocking bus stop entrance when the bus is behind schedule.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the street TSP was deployed on is a transit only street.	T
THEA-UC4-011	TSP shall issue an alert to participant pedestrians that a bus is approaching intersection where a bus is about to be given priority.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC4-012	Pedestrian Safety app on RSU shall issue an alert to pedestrians that bus is about to proceed.	smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize. REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC4-013	Transit signal priority shall be implemented to control signals at streets crossing the bus route.	TSP provides green times to maintain schedule.	T

2.4.5 Use Case 5 - TECO Line Streetcar Street Car Conflicts Requirements

The requirements for this Use Case are identified in the table below.

Table 2.6 Use Case 5 TECO Line Streetcar Conflicts System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC5-001	Streetcar OBUs shall receive vehicle BSMS within DSRC range.		T
THEA-UC5-002	Street car OBUs shall determine the position of received participant PSMs within WiFi range.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-003	Streetcar OBUs shall broadcast BSMS.		T
THEA-UC5-004	RSUs adjacent to street car line shall receive PSMs of in WiFi range pedestrians.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-005	RSUs adjacent to street car line shall inform in range PIDs that the street car will be crossing the intersection.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC5-006	PID receiving information of street car crossing the intersection shall warn the pedestrian carrying the PID.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-007	Streetcar OBUs shall determine if a vehicle's right turn indicator is activated.		T
THEA-UC5-008	Streetcar OBUs shall produce a warning of a vehicle turning in front of the streetcar to street car operator, if right turn indicator is activated.		T
THEA-UC5-008a	Vehicle shall produce a warning to the driver they are attempting a right turn in front of a streetcar.		T
THEA-UC5-009	RSUs adjacent to the street car line shall send right turning vehicle warning to the Master Server.		T
THEA-UC5-010	Street car OBUs shall analyze its current position in relation to pedestrians in intersection crossings.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-011	Street car OBUs shall produce a warning to the street car operator that equipped pedestrians are in conflict to the street car within a configurable threshold defaulted to 100 feet.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-012	RSUs adjacent to the street car line shall send pedestrian conflicts warnings to the Master Server.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-013	Street car OBUs shall store the warning message that a pedestrian is crossing the intersection.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-014	Vehicle OBUs shall receive PSMs from the RSUs adjacent to the street car line.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC5-015	Vehicle OBUs shall store the pedestrian crossing warning messages.	such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize. REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-016	Vehicle OBUs shall download pedestrians crossing warning messages to the master server	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-017	RSUs adjacent to the street car line shall receive information about location and movement of the streetcar.		T
THEA-UC5-018	PIDs shall receive a street car collision warning from the RSUs adjacent to the street car line.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-019	PIDs shall provide street car collision warning messages to the pedestrian.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC5-020	PIDs shall provide vehicle collision warning messages to the pedestrian.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T

2.4.6 Use Case 6 - Enhanced Signal Coordination and Traffic Progression Requirements

The requirements for this Use Case are identified in the table below.

Table 2.7 Use Case 6 Enhanced Signal Coordination and Traffic Progression System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-UC6-001	The master server application shall send Travel Times to vehicles and nomadic devices.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as there was no data available from adjacent routes available.	T
THEA-UC6-002	The master server application shall send MAFB gate queues to vehicles and nomadic devices.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the application that was supposed to be deployed was never deployed. This application was outside the CV Pilot project.	T
THEA-UC6-003	The master server application shall send incident locations to vehicles and nomadic devices.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as there was no data available from the Selmon, REL, or adjacent routes available.	T
THEA-UC6-004	PIDs shall transmit PSMs	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-UC6-005	Vehicle OBUs shall broadcast BSMs.		T
THEA-UC6-006	I-SIG application shall receive vehicles' BSMs.		T
THEA-UC6-007	I-SIG application shall measure intersection delay time		T
THEA-UC6-008	I-SIG shall archive Multi-Modal Intelligent Traffic Signal Systems (MMITSS)-measured intersection delay time at the TMC Master Server.		T
THEA-UC6-009	The Master Server shall present delay times for inclusion in the dataset as performance measurement data.		T
THEA-UC6-010	The Master Server shall present delay times to the TMC Operator.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the data was not available.	T
THEA-UC6-011	Travel times along Meridian Avenue shall be determined in a configurable time threshold (starting at 15 seconds).	Based on consolidating BSM speeds and directions from multiple OBUs along the route.	T
THEA-UC6-012	Travel times along Meridian Avenue shall be based on length of corridor and detection points.	Based on consolidating BSM speeds and directions from multiple OBUs along the route.	T
THEA-UC6-013	Travel times along Channelside Drive shall be determined with the most current data.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as there was no travel time data available on Channelside Drive.	T
THEA-UC6-014	Travel times along Selmon Expressway shall be determined with the most current data.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as there was no travel time data available on the Selmon Expressway.	T

2.5 Major System Conditions

The system conditions requirements will focus on safety and performance measures. Safety requirements identify the state that must exist in order for the system to improve safety. Performance measurement requirements identify the data that is created to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The tables below describe the safety and performance requirements.

2.5.1 Safety Requirements

Table 2.8 Safety Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SAF-001	Equipment, software, processes, and interfaces shall comply with IEEE and SAE standards as prescribed by one of the USDOT approved certification entities.		I
THEA-SAF-002	Equipment, software, processes, and interfaces shall be tested for interoperability before deployment to ensure they meet those standards for interoperability.		T
THEA-SAF-003	During operations the installation technicians and performance measurement team shall performs checks on the equipment, software, interfaces, and processes.		D
THEA-SAF-004	THEA shall maintain the RSUs installed along the roadside.		D
THEA-SAF-005	OBU/Application failure shall not affect the normal operation of the vehicle.		T
THEA-SAF-006	RSU/Application failure shall not affect the safe operation of the signal controller.		T
THEA-SAF-007	PID application failure shall not affect the normal operation of the PID.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	T
THEA-SAF-008	OBUs shall be installed properly in vehicles, buses, and streetcars.		I
THEA-SAF-009	RSUs shall be installed such that they receive GPS and DSRC signals.		T
THEA-SAF-010	RSUs shall be installed near signal cabinets such that the RSU and signal controller can be connected.		I
THEA-SAF-011	Participants shall be inspected within 14 days when the vehicle is involved in a crash.	This is to ensure the equipment is working properly after the vehicle has been repaired.	D
THEA-SAF-012	The in-vehicle applications shall present information to drivers using a device that drivers are familiar with and limit interaction.		D
THEA-SAF-013	CV device suppliers shall provide and follow an approved quality management process in designing, constructing and producing their devices.		I

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SAF-014	The proposed user interface(s) shall be reviewed and approved by THEA and stakeholders.	User interface definition will happen during the development of each application.	I
THEA-SAF-015	Safety checks for OBU's and RSU's shall include the equipment reset functions upon power loss and restoration.		T
THEA-SAF-016	Safety checks for OBUs and RSUs shall include the redundancy actions upon power loss and restoration.		T
THEA-SAF-017	Safety checks for OBUs and RSUs shall include the security actions upon power loss and restoration.		T
THEA-SAF-018	Safety checks for OBUs and RSUs shall include the equipment reset functions, redundancy, security, and actions upon power loss and restoration.		T
THEA-SAF-019	Uninterruptible power supply units with sufficient holdup time (2 hours) to implement the response plans shall be installed at all signal controller cabinets as part of the pilot.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as all signal controllers that were part of the CV Pilot were upgraded by the City of Tampa.	A
THEA-SAF-020	Device installers shall be approved by the invehicle integrator to install devices in vehicles, buses, streetcars.	The purpose of this requirement is to minimize safety concerns over improper installed equipment and what affect it could have on participants.	I
THEA-SAF-021	Device installers shall be approved by the infrastructure integrator to install devices in signal cabinets and along the roadside.	The purpose of this requirement is to minimize safety concerns over improper installed equipment and what affect it could have on participants.	I
THEA-SAF-022	Devices installed for the pilot shall have a fail safe mode.	This mode causes the devices to respond in a manner that does not cause harm to the system, devices, participants or other users.	T

2.5.2 Performance Measures System Requirements

Table 2.9 Performance Measures System Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-PFM-001	The Master Server shall collect historical or "before CV treatment" performance measurement data for each CV App used in each Use Case if available.		T
THEA-PFM-002	The Master Server shall store historical or "before CV treatment" performance measurement data for each CV App used in each Use Case if available.		T
THEA-PFM-003	The Master Server shall collect performance measurement data for each CV App used during each Use Case		T
THEA-PFM-004	The Master Server shall store performance measurement data for each CV App used during each Use Case		T
THEA-PFM-005	The Master Server farm shall enable the analysis or compare historical or "before CV treatment" performance measurement data for each CV App used in each Use Case to "after CV treatment" performance metrics for each CV App used in each Use Case.		T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-PFM-006	The Master Server farm shall automate routine performance reports.		T
THEA-PFM-007	The Master Server farm shall automate on demand performance reports.		T
THEA-PFM-008	The Master Server farm shall automate daily performance reports.		T
THEA-PFM-009	The Master Server farm shall automate weekly performance reports.		T
THEA-PFM-010	The Master Server farm shall automate monthly performance reports.		T
THEA-PFM-011	The Master Server farm shall transmit reports to USDOT.		T
THEA-PFM-012	<p>The system shall collect:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delay time • queue length • crashes, conflicts, or near misses • approaching speed on REL • travel time reliability indices • travel times • percent arrival on green • percent red light running/violation • travel time delay on REL • travel time delay on adjacent arterial • approaching speed on Twiggs Street toward the REL • vehicle delay time at the crosswalk • pedestrian delay time at the crosswalk • vehicle's speed approaching the crosswalk • bus travel time through the deployment region • bus percent arrival on schedule • bus percent arrival on green • bus percent red light violation/running • number of times priority is requested and granted • number of time priority is requested and denied • number of times priority is requested, granted, and then denied due to a higher priority • travel times along Meridian Avenue • delay time along Meridian Avenue • percent arrival on green along Meridian Avenue • percent red light violation/running along Meridian Avenue • approach speed at intersections along Meridian Avenue 	<p>The following data was REMOVED due to lack of data from various sources including the signal controller software and the lack of supporting data ot calculate other data.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delay time • queue length • approaching speed on REL • travel time reliability indices • travel times • percent arrival on green • percent red light running/violation • travel time delay on REL • travel time delay on adjacent arterial • approaching speed on Twiggs Street toward the REL • vehicle delay time at the crosswalk • pedestrian delay time at the crosswalk • vehicle's speed approaching the crosswalk • bus percent arrival on schedule • bus percent arrival on green • bus percent red light violation/running • travel times along Meridian Avenue 	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-PFM-013	<p>The system shall store:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delay time • queue length • crashes, conflicts, or near misses • approaching speed on REL • travel time reliability indices • travel times • percent arrival on green • percent red light running/violation • travel time delay on REL • travel time delay on adjacent arterial • approaching speed on Twiggs Street toward the REL • vehicle delay time at the crosswalk • pedestrian delay time at the crosswalk • vehicle's speed approaching the crosswalk • bus travel time through the deployment region • bus percent arrival on schedule • bus percent arrival on green • bus percent red light violation/running • number of times priority is requested and granted • number of time priority is requested and denied • number of times priority is requested, granted, and then denied due to a higher priority • travel times along Meridian Avenue • delay time along Meridian Avenue • percent arrival on green along Meridian Avenue • percent red light violation/running along Meridian Avenue • approach speed at intersections along Meridian Avenue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delay time along Meridian Avenue • percent arrival on green along Meridian Avenue • percent red light violation/running along Meridian Avenue • approach speed at intersections along Meridian Avenue <p>The following data was REMOVED due to lack of data from various sources including the signal controller software and the lack of supporting data to calculate other data.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delay time • queue length • approaching speed on REL • travel time reliability indices • travel times • percent arrival on green • percent red light running/violation • travel time delay on REL • travel time delay on adjacent arterial • approaching speed on Twiggs Street toward the REL • vehicle delay time at the crosswalk • pedestrian delay time at the crosswalk • vehicle's speed approaching the crosswalk • bus percent arrival on schedule • bus percent arrival on green • bus percent red light violation/running • travel times along Meridian Avenue 	T

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • delay time along Meridian Avenue • percent arrival on green along Meridian Avenue • percent red light violation/running along Meridian Avenue • approach speed at intersections along Meridian Avenue 	

2.6 Major System Constraints

System constraints are those items that limit or restrict the system. For the Pilot, system constraints include system wide constraints and individual Use Case/application constraints. The table below identifies these constraints.

Table 2.10 System Wide and Use Case/Application Constraints

Identifier	Constraint	Comment
System	The system is limited by the geographical boundaries set forth that contain the Tampa CBD.	
System	The range of the communications for RSUs and OBUs	
UC1	The actual number of OBU equipped vehicles using the REL exit during rush hour.	
UC1	The alert to the driver cannot be distracting.	
UC2	The actual number of OBU equipped vehicles on the REL during a wrong way incident.	
UC2	The actual number of vehicles attempting to enter the REL going the wrong way at the Twiggs/Meridian intersection.	
UC2	The alert to the driver cannot be distracting.	
UC3	The actual number of OBU equipped vehicles traveling on Twiggs Street at the Courthouse.	
UC3	The alert to the driver cannot be distracting.	
UC3	The actual number of PID equipped pedestrians walking from the parking garage to the courthouse or vice versa.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.
UC4	The actual number of buses outfitted with an OBU using the TSP routes.	Buses are not permanently assigned to a route and are moved around periodically.
UC4	The alert to the bus driver cannot be distracting.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as alerts are not displayed to the bus driver

Identifier	Constraint	Comment
UC4	Buses adhering to their schedule.	
UC5	The actual number of PID equipped pedestrians walking at the intersection where opportunities for conflicts with street cars and vehicles exist.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.
UC6	The actual number of OBU equipped vehicles traveling on Meridian Avenue.	
UC6	The actual number of signal controllers connected to an RSU along Meridian Avenue.	

2.7 Assumptions and Dependencies

The table below lists the known assumptions for the Pilot.

Table 2.11 Pilot Assumptions

Number	Assumption
1	The SCMS will be available when needed by the Pilot
2	CV application source will be available from the ITS CodeHub
3	There will be at least two CV device manufacturers that are certified to be interoperable.
4	RSUs can communicate using DSRC based on SAE J2945/1 V5- On-Board System Requirements for V2V Safety Communications.
5	Should CAMP provide vehicles, these vehicles will have a data storage device from which the Pilot can obtain BSMs, alert messages, and other data that CAMP vehicles can provide. REMOVED: This assumption was deleted as CAMP declined to participate.
6	Signal controllers provide an interface to RSUs from which SpaT is retrieved.
7	There is a communications network from the RSU to the Master Server in the TMC.
8	Flushing the queue at intersections near a bus stop will allow a bus to enter/exit the bus stop. REMOVED: (Note: this assumption was removed as the Bus Route runs along Marion which is a transit way only.)
9	The CV manufacturers' devices can download and execute custom applications.
10	Signal controllers output SPaT in a format that the RSU can directly translate to the SAE J2735 SPaT format

This table below lists the known risks for the Pilot.

Table 2.12 Pilot Risks

Risk Number	Risk Identification
1	Differing Manufacturers' CV devices are not interoperable and do not meet the standards required for the Pilot
2	There are not adequate participants for the Pilot.
3	Unknown system/device compatibility issues
4	Loss of Key Staff
5	Public Opposition / Privacy or safety concerns
6	Extended road closures – Planned private development
7	Conflicting construction projects – Managed Lanes 2018
8	Conflicting construction projects – CoT planned signal upgrades in pilot area
9	Accident in pilot area with litigation.
10	The fully functional SCMS is not available in time for Pilot testing and development, including all extensions associated with V2I Components
11	The full suite of SCMS design documents is not made available in a timely fashion to the pilot sites and technology developers and vendors to allow them to begin the process of incorporating the full SCMS design
12	The inability to create a CRL and to automatically remove devices from the pilot. REMOVED: (Note: This risk was deleted because this functionality was removed due to the SMCS POC delays and move to a private SCMS vendor).
13	Current certification plan only covers RSUs and not OBUs. Security compliance and interoperability with SCMS will need to be self-certified
14	There are 3 formal pilots plus others (AACVTE, USDOT Test bed, etc.) plus the official SCMS being deployed to support GM. Assuming one SCMS Root, who is the ultimate decision maker on distributing credentials? Risk associated with having no control over security material being distributed.
15	POC SCMS Testing is currently software only. Pilots will require a full end-to-end test that includes requesting and downloading certificates over the air at RSUs. This has not been tested. Risk is that the distribution of security materials fails and after bootstrap, devices never get renewed credentials.
16	RSU cannot support signing of messages
17	OBU cannot support signing or confirmation of signed messages
18	OBU's not available that support CRL functionality
19	OBU does not support download of security credentials "on the fly"
20	OBU cannot support encryption of messages (i.e., BSMS)
21	RSU cannot support encryption of messages.

2.8 Operational Scenarios

The Operational Scenarios can be found in the Con Ops in Chapter 10.

3 System Capabilities, Conditions, and Constraints

The system requirements are defined in this chapter. System requirements are those requirements not directly associated with one or more user needs, but are needed in order for the system to operate and be maintained. System requirements are defined herein are or referenced from an existing document.

3.1 Physical

3.1.1 Construction

The Pilot will not require major construction efforts to deploy CV devices. RSUs will be installed in signal cabinets and along the roadside. OBUs will be installed in vehicles, buses, and streetcars. The Master Server will be installed in the THEA TMC network room.

RSUs deployed in the signal cabinets shall be installed in the signal cabinet using available power and network communications. The DSRC antenna shall be mounted outside the cabinet in a location providing clear path to the directions from which it is anticipated most CV device communications shall take place. GPS antenna shall be positioned to have a clear view of the sky. If necessary, these RSUs shall be installed on a pole to accommodate potential antennae issues. RSUs deployed along the roadway will be mounted on a pole or other structure where power and network communications is available. The DSRC antenna shall be mounted in a location providing a clear path to the directions from which it is anticipated most CV device communications will take place. GPS antenna shall be positioned to have a clear view of the sky.

OBUs are installed into vehicles, buses and streetcars. These devices shall be installed in a manner that the device is not visible, wiring for the device is not visible or minimized visibility and no holes or modifications to the vehicle are required. The user interface for the OBU shall be visible to the driver minimizing potential distraction. The installations shall be performed in a professional manner by technicians trained in the installation of CV equipment.

3.1.2 Durability

The CV devices shall meet the requirements set forth by the certification entities working for USDOT for withstanding wear and tear, operating time, and damage. These requirements are well known to the entities (OmniAir, 7layers and Danlaw).

3.1.3 Adaptability

Adaptability is defined as the ability for a system to grow without having to make a major overhaul to the system. The system for the Pilot shall have the ability to grow in terms of

- Geography
- Number of RSUs
- Number of OBUs

THEA plans to operate and maintain the system beyond the Pilot and continue deployment of the Pilot technologies to increase coverage, penetration, and acceptance. As the coverage area grows, the

number of RSUs deployed grows and the potential to interact with more equipped vehicles increases creating more data. Similarly as the number of equipped vehicles grows (penetration), the amount of data generated increases. This increase in data and communication will grow at an accelerated rate proportional to the number of devices. As the public's trust and acceptance of the technology improves, the number of participants will increase. Again, this creates the opportunity for accelerated data growth.

During the Pilot, analysis shall be performed to determine the potential data growth rate and the impact on the network and storage. Decisions will have to be made to determine if data can be archived in a more compact manner, whether all data has value, and how long the data is archived.

3.1.4 Environmental Conditions

The Tampa area climate is generally warm year around. During the summer temperatures can reach the high 90s with a higher heat index. As Tampa is a coastal city on the Gulf of Mexico, it is susceptible to regular rain storms including severe lightening. It is not uncommon for Tampa to have tropical storms and/or hurricanes throughout hurricane season. Because of these conditions, lightening, flooding and overheating occurs potentially threatening CV devices' health.

For RSUs installed in signal cabinets, it is assumed that the signal cabinet will have the appropriate protection from lightening, flooding, and overheating as it already houses many electronic components susceptible to these events. RSUs installed along the roadside shall be mounted high enough to ensure they are above the potential flood line for that area. Adequate lightening protection shall be installed for RSUs installed along the roadside. With regards to overheating, the RSU shall meet the requirements of the latest RSU specification.

OBUs are installed inside vehicles and as such are not normally prone to lightning strikes or flooding. However, it is possible for a driver to enter a flooded area and flood the inside of their vehicle which would cause the OBU to likely fail. This possibility is not covered by the requirements; rather the vehicle owner will assume responsibility for the act by acknowledging this potential when they sign up for the Pilot. Overheating is a concern for vehicles with a user interface; especially if the user interface is tablet based. Before OBUs are procured, careful analysis of the heat requirements for an OBU user interface shall be performed and those requirements flowed down to the OBU manufacturer.

3.2 System Performance Characteristics

Through the standards work that has been performed to date, CV devices have an established set of performance characteristics they must meet. For RSUs, the current version of the DSRC Roadside Units Specification Document is used by the certification entities as the basis for certifying manufacturers' RSUs. The Pilot will use the devices that either have been certified or can demonstrate through self-certification they meet the standards.

OBUs adhere to the same set of DSRC standards. The Pilot will use these standards as the base and include requirements similar to automotive grade standards for existing in-vehicle devices. In-vehicle standards include vibration, heat, connections, etc.

For FCW, EEBL, and Vehicle Turning Right in Front of Transit Vehicle (VTRFTV) (V2V applications), the OBUs must be able to receive, process and determine whether there is a potential conflict in real time and warn the driver if necessary. BSMs are received by these applications 10 times a second and are used to calculate surrounding vehicles trajectories and speed. These applications were developed for the Safety Pilot Model Deployment and been improved over the last several years. The Collision Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) has developed a suite of V2V applications including the ones mentioned

above and have tested them across OEM boundaries. The Pilot will take advantage of this research to implement its V2V applications and meet the performance criteria.

CV equipment is expected to operate over the life of the Pilot and beyond. While it is understood that equipment manufacturers continue to refine their equipment designs all manufacturers should be working toward meeting the standards with regards to mean time between failure. Ultimately, CV equipment should have the same life span as other traffic control and ITS devices.

3.3 System Security Requirements

System security is of the utmost importance from both a personally identifiable information perspective as well as a system intrusion (hacking) perspective. Security requirements are included here referenced from the Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program Phase I Security Management Operational Concept – Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) (published).

Table 3.1 Security Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SEC-001	All Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) devices (i.e., OBU, RSU) shall comply with IEEE 1609.2: Standard for WAVE – Security Services for Applications and Management Messages		I
THEA-SEC-002	Devices shall sign and/or encrypt data exchanged over non-DSRC IP communications interfaces with IEEE 1609.2 certificates.		T
THEA-SEC-003	THEA CV Pilot devices shall support requirements identified in the SCMS POC Implementation End Entity (EE) Requirements and Specifications Supporting SCMS Software Release 1.0 Appendix A and B to complete processes and use cases.		T
THEA-SEC-004	Datasets shall be required to have Personally Identifiable Information (PII) information removed prior to being made publicly available.		T
THEA-SEC-005	Monitoring systems shall be enabled and used to perform intrusion detection		T
THEA-SEC-006	Monitoring systems shall be enabled and used to detect abnormal unauthorized activity on an IP connection.		T
THEA-SEC-007	OBUs shall meet FIPS-140-2 Level 2 or equivalent.	If OBUs cannot meet this requirement, alternate requirements will need to be developed.	I
THEA-SEC-008	PIDs shall meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or equivalent.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	↓

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SEC-009	RSUs shall meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or equivalent.	If RSUs cannot meet this requirement, alternate requirements will need to be developed.	I
THEA-SEC-010	ITS Roadway Equipment communications shall be developed meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or equivalent.	If an ITS RSU cannot be identified that meets this requirement, alternate requirements will need to be developed (e.g. sensors).	I
THEA-SEC-011	New field cabinets shall include tamper alerts.	REMOVED: This requirement was not implemented as THEA does not own nor is responsible for field cabinets.	⊘
THEA-SEC-012	New field cabinet tamper alerts shall be sent to the TMC when the tamper seal is broken.	REMOVED: This requirement was not implemented as THEA does not own nor is responsible for field cabinets.	⊘
THEA-SEC-013	All participant data, as defined in the Security Management Operating Concept (SMOC), shall be encrypted with minimum standards, password protected, and maintained separate from the application and performance measurement data (Separate systems, separate login and user access at a minimum).		T
THEA-SEC-014	There shall be an established list of personnel that have access to participant data, but shall not have access to CV data generated by the participants.		I
THEA-SEC-015	The definition of how applications are authorized to communicate shall be using valid certificates.		T
THEA-SEC-016	No person shall transfer PII information in an unencrypted state.		T
THEA-SEC-017	The participant's location information shall not be provided unless it is part of an application and no correlation to the participants personal information.		T
THEA-SEC-018	PII shall not be used as a unique identifier except for buses.		T
THEA-SEC-019	For broadcast and transactional unicast transmissions by OBUs, temporary and one-time identifiers shall be used to protect against inadvertently providing PII.		T
THEA-SEC-020	The user shall consent to providing data in an agreement that spells out how the data is used and by whom (including re-distribution to third parties).	Related to Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Informed consent form.	I
THEA-SEC-021	RSUs and ITS Roadside Equipment (RE) devices shall support remote authenticated access.		T
THEA-SEC-022	OBU's shall not support remote access of the connected vehicle applications.		T
THEA-SEC-023	OBUs and RSUs shall support physical access to support bootstrapping activities.	See THEA-SEC-004	I
THEA-SEC-024	OBUs and RSUs shall support role-based authentication to enable physical access.	See THEA-SEC-004	I

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SEC-025	The host processor and its operating software shall be delivered in an operational state.	Operational state is defined in the Security Management Operating Concept document. Required protections are defined in THEA-SEC-034 to THEA-SEC-051.	T
THEA-SEC-026	The host processor and its operating software shall be delivered such that required protections are implemented.	Operational state is defined in the Security Management Operating Concept document. Required protections are defined in THEA-SEC-034 to THEA-SEC-051.	T
THEA-SEC-027	If the host processor is initialized in a manufacturing state, the required protections shall not be required.	Manufacturing state is defined in the Security Management Operating Concept document.	T
THEA-SEC-028	Any devices designed so they can return from the operating state to the manufacturing state shall wipe all privileged applications from the processor and all keys as part of the transition once the devices are returned to THEA.		T
THEA-SEC-029	The device shall allow a user to perform a reset to a manufacturing state without any authentication if the reset mechanism guarantees the physical presence of the user.		T
THEA-SEC-030	The host processor shall perform integrity checks on boot to ensure that it is in a known good software state.		T
THEA-SEC-031	If the host processor determines it is not in a known good software state on boot up, it shall not continue and will log an error.		T
THEA-SEC-032	The host processor integrity checks shall require the use of a hardware-protected value.		T
THEA-SEC-033	The host processor shall not allow any privileged application to request signing until the integrity checks have passed.		T
THEA-SEC-034	If the host processor fails the integrity checks it shall not grant access for any process to private keys.		T
THEA-SEC-035	If the host processor fails the integrity checks it shall not allow any privileged application to operate.		T
THEA-SEC-036	The host processor integrity check shall carry out a check that stored root CA certificates have not been modified since they were last accessed.		T
THEA-SEC-037	If the integrity check fails, the device shall reject all incoming signed messages that chain back to those root CA certificates as invalid.		T
THEA-SEC-038	Each privileged application shall map to a role as defined in the SMOC.		I
THEA-SEC-039	The discretionary access control mechanisms of the host processor Operating System (OS) shall be configured to specify the set of roles that has execute permissions on each private key stored within the Hardware Security Module (HSM).	It is permissible for the host to require that all keys are generated on the device and that keys cannot be entered directly	D

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SEC-040	The discretionary access control mechanisms of the host processor operating system shall be configured to: specify the set of roles that can modify (i.e., write, replace, and delete) the following programs and plaintext data stored within the host processor boundary	It is permissible for the host to require that all keys are generated on the device and that keys cannot be entered directly	D
THEA-SEC-041	The discretionary access control mechanisms of the host processor operating system shall be configured to specify the set of roles that can read data stored within the host processor boundary and which data can be read by those roles	It is permissible for the host to require that all keys are generated on the device and that keys cannot be entered directly	D
THEA-SEC-042	The discretionary access control mechanisms of the host processor operating system shall be configured to specify the set of roles that can enter cryptographic keys.	It is permissible for the host to require that all keys are generated on the device and that keys cannot be entered directly	D
THEA-SEC-043	The host processor OS shall allow processes that correspond to privileged applications to operate without explicit authentication by a user,		T
THEA-SEC-044	The host processor OS shall allow processes that update private key material within the HSM to operate without explicit authentication by a user.		T
THEA-SEC-045	The host processor OS shall allow processes to install new software or firmware if that software or firmware is signed by the original developer/manufacturer.	Depending on their implementation and the developer, these roles may operate without explicit authentication or they may require authentication.	T
THEA-SEC-046	The host processor OS shall allow processes to write private key material to the HSM.	Depending on their implementation and the developer, these roles may operate without explicit authentication or they may require authentication.	T
THEA-SEC-047	The host processor OS shall require explicit authentication for processes that modify or inspect executing processes.	Explicit authentication is defined by a username/password at a minimum.	T
THEA-SEC-048	The OS shall not allow processes that read private cryptographic key material from the HSM.		T
THEA-SEC-049	The host processor shall require that all software installed is signed	i.e., when requested to install software, the host processor OS ensures that the software is signed by an authority with appropriate permissions before proceeding with the installation and rejects the installation if the signature or any of the validity checks on the software or its signing certificate fail.	T
THEA-SEC-050	The integrity of the verification key shall be protected by local hardware.	Either by directly storing the key in local hardware, or by creating a chain of trust from the key to a hardware-protected key	I
THEA-SEC-051	The hardware protection shall be equivalent to FIPS 140-2 at the level appropriate to the device as a whole.	i.e., when requested to install software, the host processor OS ensures that the software is signed by an authority with appropriate permissions before proceeding with the installation and rejects the installation if the	I

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
		signature or any of the validity checks on the software or its signing certificate fail.	
THEA-SEC-052	The host processor shall require that software be installed only by an authenticated user.		T
THEA-SEC-053	The update mechanism for the host processor shall include mechanisms to prevent updates from being rolled back.		T
THEA-SEC-054	If an update fails, the host processor shall notify the update mechanism of the failure.		T
THEA-SEC-055	If the update mechanism receives an update failure, it shall publish a notification of the failure and request authorization to instruct the host processor to roll back.		T
THEA-SEC-056	All cryptographic software and firmware shall be developed and installed in a form that protects the software and firmware source and executable code from unauthorized disclosure and modification		T
THEA-SEC-057	The HSM shall be certified by one of the approved certification entities or if they are not available the HSM shall be self-certified by the vendor at a minimum.	e.g., an approved message authentication code or digital signature algorithm	I
THEA-SEC-058	A cryptographic mechanism using an approved integrity technique shall be applied to all cryptographic software and firmware components within the HSM.	e.g., an approved message authentication code or digital signature algorithm	T
THEA-SEC-059	If the HSM itself calculates the Message Authentication Code when the software is installed using a secret key known only to the HSM, and uses this secret key to verify the software on boot or if the software provider has a unique shared key with each distinct device and uses this to authenticate the software, the message authentication code shall be us.		T
THEA-SEC-060	A Message Authentication Code shall not be used to protect the software unless the Message Authentication Code key is unique to the HSM.		T
THEA-SEC-061	Cryptographic software and firmware, cryptographic keys, and control and status information shall be under the control of an operating system that meets the functional requirements specified in the Protection Profiles listed in FIPS 140-2 Annex B and is capable of evaluation at the CC evaluation assurance level EAL2, or an equivalent trusted operating system.		A
THEA-SEC-062	To protect plaintext data, cryptographic software and firmware, cryptographic keys, and authentication data, the discretionary access control mechanisms of the operating system shall be configured to specify	e.g., cryptographic keys, audit data, and plaintext data.	A

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
	the set of roles that can execute stored cryptographic software and firmware.		
THEA-SEC-063	To protect plaintext data, cryptographic software and firmware, cryptographic keys, and authentication data, the discretionary access control mechanisms of the operating system shall be configured to specify the set of roles that can modify (i.e., write, replace, and delete) the following cryptographic module software or firmware components stored within the cryptographic boundary: cryptographic programs, cryptographic data .	e.g., cryptographic keys, audit data, and plaintext data.	A
THEA-SEC-064	To protect plaintext data, cryptographic software and firmware, cryptographic keys, and authentication data, the discretionary access control mechanisms of the operating system shall be configured to specify the set of roles that can read the following cryptographic software components stored within the cryptographic boundary: cryptographic data.	e.g., cryptographic keys, audit data, and plaintext data.	A
THEA-SEC-065	To protect plaintext data, cryptographic software and firmware, cryptographic keys, and authentication data, the discretionary access control mechanisms of the operating system shall be configured to: Specify the set of roles that can execute stored cryptographic software and firmware.	e.g., cryptographic keys, audit data, and plaintext data.	A
THEA-SEC-066	The operating system shall prevent all operators without the appropriate permissions (i.e., system admin) and executing processes from modifying executing cryptographic processes (i.e., loaded and executing cryptographic program images).	In this case, executing processes refer to all non-operating system processes (i.e., operator-initiated), cryptographic or not.	A
THEA-SEC-067	The operating system shall prevent operators without the appropriate permissions (i.e., system admin) and executing processes from reading cryptographic software stored within the cryptographic boundary.		A
THEA-SEC-068	The HSM shall maintain two roles, User which can execute software and firmware, write and delete cryptographic keys, and install signed software and firmware, and Security Officer which can install unsigned software and firmware in the event that specialized new software and/or firmware is being tested and troubleshot.		A
THEA-SEC-069	Activities carried out by the user role shall not be explicitly authenticated, once the user role has successfully logged in.		A
THEA-SEC-070	In a networked architecture which includes the host processor, other processors, and the HSM, the host processor shall authenticate itself to the HSM with an authentication mechanism based in hardware with the same physical security as the HSM.		A

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SEC-071	OBU devices shall support security requirements identified in SAE J2945/1 V5, such as the BSM transmission and reception security profile.		T
THEA-SEC-072	All unused media ports shall be sealed with a removable tamper evident seal at a minimum.		I
THEA-SEC-073	OBU devices shall support the ability to reset default user names and passwords by users with Administrative functions (ENG, MRG, and DYNACAdmin).		T
THEA-SEC-074	RSU devices shall meet the WAVE Service Advertisement (WSA) security profile covered in IEEE 1609.3 (2016)		T
THEA-SEC-075	RSU devices shall meet the SPaT, MAP and Traveler Information Messae (TIM) security profiles covered in the COC system Functional and Performance Specification Version 0.4.0.		T
THEA-SEC-076	RSU devices shall support security requirements identified in SAE J2945/1 V5, such as the BSM transmission and reception security profile		T
THEA-SEC-077	RSU devices shall support the ability to reset default user names and passwords by users with Administrative functions (ENG, MRG, and DYNACAdmin).		T

3.4 Information Management Requirements

Information management defines the system requirements for managing the data within the system. The Pilot shall manage participants' personal data and system generated data.

Personal data requirements are derived from the Human Use Approval plan, the Informed Consent Document, and the interaction with the Institutional Review Board. The table below lists the requirements.

Table 3.2 Personal Data Information Management Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-INM-001	The system shall protect participants' personal information including name, address, vehicle make/model, driver's license number at a minimum.		T
THEA-INM-002	Personal information collected when registering participants shall be electronically stored separately from connected vehicle data (i.e., BSMS, alerts).		T
THEA-INM-003	Personal data access shall require a login with password protection.		T
THEA-INM-004	Data shall be removed of PII before being released to the ITS DataHub.		T

System generated data is data that is created by the applications as part of their functionality. This data may be used by other applications to perform calculations and analysis such that the applications can perform their intended functionality. System generated data is created by all devices (i.e., RSU, OBU).

Table 3.3 System Generated Data Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SGD-001	Data (i.e., BSMs) generated and received by vehicles (i.e., OBUs) shall be stored on a storage device connected locally to the vehicle.		T
THEA-SGD-002	Messages (i.e., alerts) transmitted and received by RSUs shall be stored on a storage device connected locally to the RSU		T
THEA-SGD-003	Data locally stored on OBUs shall be transmitted wirelessly to RSUs through a secure communications connection.		T
THEA-SGD-004	Data locally stored on RSUs shall be transmitted to the Master Server through a secure communications connection.		T
THEA-SGD-005	The frequency at which data locally stored on OBUs is transmitted to the Master Server shall be determined by the ability of those devices to wirelessly transmit the data.		T
THEA-SGD-006	The frequency at which data locally stored on RSUs is transmitted to the Master Server shall be determined based on the RSUs' storage capacity.		T
THEA-SGD-007	The Master Server shall securely archive the system generated data to protect against a single point of failure.	See THEA-SEC-002, THEA-SEC-004, and THEA-SEC-016.	T
THEA-SGD-008	Access to the Master Server shall require a login and password.		T
THEA-SGD-009	Access to the Master Server shall be limited to authorized personnel as defined in the published version of the SMOC.		T

3.5 System Operations

3.5.1 System Human Factors

The Human Use Approval and Informed Consent will outline the interaction between participants and the CV devices. Participants will not be required to react to alerts or warnings from devices they are presented with. However, participants may take action because of the alert they received (e.g., applying the brake, turning around). These actions are outside the control of the Pilot. Participants will be trained on what alerts mean and possible responses. It is up to the participant to evaluate the overall situation and determine their best course of action based on their knowledge and experience.

3.5.2 System Maintainability Requirements

System maintainability describes the requirements necessary to perform planned maintenance and emergency maintenance during the operation of the Pilot in a timely and efficient manner. The table below describes these requirements.

Table 3.4 Maintainability Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-MNT-001	RSU communication failures shall be responded to within one business day in accordance with the City of Tampa response time for signal controllers.		D
THEA-MNT-002	RSU communication shall be restored in accordance with the City of Tampa response time for signal controllers.		D
THEA-MNT-003	RSU hardware failures shall be addressed in accordance with the City of Tampa response time for signal controllers.	Physically replace the RSU with a spare and diagnose the hardware failure offline.	D
THEA-MNT-004	RSU application issues shall be responded in accordance with the City of Tampa response time for signal controllers.	Responding to an application issue may be to temporarily restart the application until the issue is diagnosed and fixed.	D
THEA-MNT-005	Planned RSU maintenance shall be schedule in accordance with the City of Tampa response time for signal controllers.		D
THEA-MNT-006	Planned RSU maintenance shall be performed during off peak hours of the Pilot's operation.	Off peak hours as defined between 8:00 pm and 4 a.m.	D
THEA-MNT-007	OBU failures shall be logged at the time they are reported.		D
THEA-MNT-008	OBUs shall alert the participant, if possible, of a failure.		D
THEA-MNT-009	In order to diagnose OBU failures, an appointment to bring the vehicle into the support facility shall be made at the participant's convenience.		D
THEA-MNT-010	When a participant brings in their vehicle because of an OBU failure, the unit shall be exchanged in order to minimize the time the participant is in the facility or if feasible, the device is replaced at the participant's choice of location.	Every effort should be made to replace the OBU while the vehicle is in the shop. Offer the option to replace the OBU at another location (e.g., participants residence), if the participant is willing to do that.	D
THEA-MNT-011	When a PID issue is identified, the participant shall follow the instructions for attempting to address the issue before contacting support.	REMOVED: This requirement was deleted as the it was found smartphones have differing features such as some smartphones do not have the ability to calculate its heading. Smartphone GPS was found to be too inaccurate to utilize.	D
THEA-MNT-012	Support staff shall be trained to troubleshoot and diagnose RSU and OBU issues.		D
THEA-MNT-013	A set of support, diagnostic and troubleshooting procedures shall be developed to guide the support staff.		D

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-MNT-014	The CoT shall maintain the RSUs installed in signal cabinets.	REMOVED: This requirement is on hold as the CV Pilot has continued into Phase 4. At the conclusion of Phase 4, this requirement will be revisited.	D

3.5.3 System Reliability Requirements

System reliability requirements should be expressed in quantitative terms, and should define the conditions under which the reliability requirements are to be met. The Pilot divides system reliability into RSU, OBU and data. The table below defines the requirements.

Table 3.5 Reliability Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA-SRL-001	RSUs, and OBUs shall meet the latest published specification as of September 2016 at a minimum.		I
THEA-SRL-002	RSUs and OBUs shall store their data and not delete or rollover the data until it has confirmed the data has been successfully transmitted to the Master Server and properly stored.		T

3.6 Policy and Regulation Requirements

Organizational policies, external regulatory policies, and normal business practices are discussed to describe how these policies and practices affect system operation and/or performance. These requirements are described in the table below.

Table 3.6 Policy and Regulation Requirements

Identifier	Requirement	Comment	VM
THEA- PAR-001	Proper licensing to broadcast using DSRC shall be obtained.	This is both a federal and state requirement. The Florida Department of Transportation requires all licensing to go through the Traffic Engineering Research Laboratory.	I

3.7 System Lifecycle Sustainment

System lifecycle sustainment describes the quality activities, such as review, and measurement collection and analysis, to help realize a quality system. During the initial stages of the System Engineering (SE) process, the produced documents such as Concept of Operations, System Requirements, Safety Management Plan, Security Management Operating Concept, Performance Measurement Management Plan to name a few, are reviewed by stakeholders, partners, and other interested parties. Comments on these documents are addressed to form a complete picture of the system. These reviews ensure the system is based on quality concepts. As the project progresses, the continued review of System Engineering documentation and peer review of application development products promote the successful implementation of the requirements which traces back to the user needs. In the testing phase of System Engineering, the system is tested on several levels sometimes defined as unit testing, module/subsystem testing, integration testing, and acceptance testing.

Once the system is deployed and initial data is archived, the performance measurement evaluation process begins. Performance measures determine if and how much the system is improving the issues/situations that exist. Using the same data, the system quality and reliability can be assessed. If the data shows the appropriate data is being sent and received by devices and the appropriate alerts are being broadcast, the system is seen as functioning properly within its parameters. Error logs are monitored to determine if some part of the system may be experiencing problems.

As the data is analyzed and experience is gained using the system, new ideas and enhancements will be realized. These ideas and enhancements will be analyzed to determine the impact they could have on improving the system and fed back into the SE process.

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