

**In re Investigation of an accident which occurred
on the Ogden, Logan & Idaho Railway near
Slide, Utah, September 19, 1917.**

October 17, 1917

In September 19, 1917, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on the Ogden, Logan & Idaho Railway near Slide, Utah, resulting in the injury of 40 passengers and 1 employee. After investigation of this accident the Chief of the Division of Safety reports as follows:

The Ogden, Logan & Idaho Railway is a single-track electric railway extending between Ogden, Utah, and Preston, Idaho, a distance of 94.7 miles. Train movements are governed by time-table and train orders, which are transmitted by telephone from the dispatcher direct to conductors of trains, who write them down and deliver copies to the motorman.

The trains involved in this collision were northbound regular passenger train No. 3 and southbound passenger extra 500. Train No. 3 consisted of two motor cars and two trailers, of all-steel construction, and was in charge of Conductor Hansen and Motorman Tallman. This train is scheduled to leave Slide, 19.2 miles north of Ogden, at 4:14 p.m.; it left that place practically on time, without any train orders, and about 4:17 p.m. collided with extra 500 at a point 3/4 mile north of Slide. Train No. 3 had been brought almost to a stop when the collision occurred.

Southbound extra 500 consisted of two motor cars and one trailer, of all-steel construction, in charge of Conductor Fowler and Motorman Newton. At Brigham, Utah, the starting point of extra 500, about 1-1/4 miles north of the place where the accident occurred, the crew received train order No. 39 reading as follows:

"Motor 3 & run extra Ogden to Brigham;
next ex. 500 south at Hot Springs.
Order No. 3 is annulled. Motor 500
run extra Brigham to Ogden."

Extra 500 was run to carry passengers returning from a beach day celebration at Brigham. It left Brigham at 1:10 p.m., and was traveling at a speed of between 12 and 15 miles an hour when it collided with train No. 3.

The collision occurred about 200 feet from the southern end of a 2-degree curve 1,300 feet long. Beginning approximately 500 feet north of the point of accident there is an orchard, about 250 feet in length, on the inside of the curve, which limited the view of the motorman on the opposing train to about 750 feet. Approaching the curve from the north and south the

track is tangent for a considerable distance. At the point of accident there is a 2 percent grade descending southward.

None of the cars in either train was derailed, nor were they sufficiently damaged to prevent them from being operated. The weather at the time of accident was clear.

Motorman Tollman, of train No. 9, stated that a stop was made at a crossing with a branch of the Oregon Short Line Railway, 1,320 feet south of the point of accident; that after the train left there and the speed had increased to about 13 miles an hour he saw extra 500 coming around the curve; that he sounded the whistle, applied the brakes in emergency, reversed the car and had the brakes practically fully released, and jumped, before the collision occurred. He said that when he first saw extra 500 approaching down the grade its speed was about 35 miles an hour, but that it was reduced to 12 or 13 miles an hour before the trains collided. Motorman Tollman stated that at the time of the accident he held no train orders.

Conductor Hansen stated that he estimated the speed of extra 500 at about 13 miles an hour when he first saw it, about 150 feet distant, and that his own train was moving very slowly, about 3 miles an hour, when the trains collided.

Conductor Fowler, of extra 500, stated that he received train order No. 32 over the telephone, handed a copy of it to the motorman and read it to him, but because of the crowding of the passengers in boarding his train he did not get an opportunity to show the order to his flagman, and overlooked the schedule of train No. 9. He stated that the speed of his train was 10 or 12 miles an hour when the collision occurred.

Brakeman Jones, of extra 500, stated that when the train left Brigham he closed the trap-door on the first two cars, went to the head end of the train and said to the motorman: "Where are we going to meet No. 9?" and the motorman asked: "What time are they due at Olney?" He stated that he then looked at his timetable and said: "4:14"; and that the motorman asked: "What time is it now?" and he replied "4:17." Brakeman Jones stated that they began to look out for train No. 9, the motorman shutting off power just as that train appeared, while he was yet talking about that train. He said the speed was then about 20 miles an hour, but was reduced to about 8 miles an hour before the collision occurred, which was less than a minute after he spoke to the motorman about train No. 9.

Motorman Newton, of extra 500, stated that he had been in the service of this company about two weeks. He stated that at Brigham the conductor read the running order to him; that he did not think about train No. 9 until he saw it; that the speed of his train was at least 20 miles an hour; and that he applied the

brakes, used sand, and reversed the car, and had reduced the speed to about 10 miles an hour when the trains collided. Motorman Newton further stated that he did not remember having any conversation whatever about train No. 9 with the brakeman, who was riding on the front end of the train with him just before the collision occurred.

Rule 176, of the operating rules of this railway, provides that:

" train of inferior class must in all cases keep out of the way of trains of superior class, and must clear the line of each train five minutes unless a meeting or passing order has been given.

" train failing to clear the main track by the time required by rule, must be protected as prescribed by Rule 206."

This accident was caused by extra 603 occupying the main track on the time of train No. 9, for which Conductor Fowler and Motorman Newton are responsible, they having overlooked the schedule of train No. 9, and failed to comply with the requirements of rule 176 above quoted.

Conductor Fowler entered the service of the Oregon, Logan & Idaho Railway on July 8, 1915, and Motorman Newton had been in its service about two weeks. At the time of accident the crew of train No. 9 had been on duty 7 hours 32 minutes, and the crew of extra 603 had been on duty 7 hours 47 minutes.

H. T. B.