

**In re Investigation of an accident which occurred
on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, near
Glasgow Junction, Ky., on July 7, 1917.**

August 16, 1917.

On July 7, 1917, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad near Glasgow Junction, Ky., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of nine employees. After the investigation of this accident the Chief of the Division of Safety reports as follows:

This accident occurred on the first division of the main line of this railroad. Southward from Louisville, Ky., the line is double track to Lebanon Junction, a distance of 29.7 miles, and is then single track to Bowling Green, Ky., a distance of 33.9 miles. On this single track at the point of accident no block signal system is in use, train movements being governed by time-table and train orders.

Northbound freight train 2d No. 74 consisted of 26 loaded cars, 2 empty cars and a caboose, hauled by locomotive 1170, was in charge of Conductor Bousman and Enginemen Baulch, left Nashville, Tenn., at 10.30 p. m., July 6th, left Bowling Green at 3.20 a. m., July 7th, and at about 3.02 a. m., while traveling at a speed of 8 or 10 miles an hour, collided with train No. 15 at a point 215 feet north of mile post 39, about 1.8 miles north of Glasgow Junction, and 24.8 miles north of Bowling Green.

Southbound freight train No. 15, consisting of 30 loaded cars, 3 empty cars and a caboose at the time of accident, hauled by locomotive 1046, was in charge of Conductor Riney and Enginemen Larkin, left "FX" Tower, 3.7 miles south of Louisville station, at 11.10 p. m., July 6th, and while running at a speed estimated at between 30 and 35 miles an hour it collided with train 2d No. 74.

The collision occurred near the summit of a grade of 0.62 per cent. ascending for northbound trains, on the spiral approach to the southern end of a 2-degree 5-minute curve, at a point 59 feet from the point of tangent. This curve, including the spiral approaches at both ends, is 1,065 feet in length. Northward from the curve the track is tangent for 1,800 feet, and southward therefrom there are 2,500 feet of tangent track. The point of collision was at the southern end of a cut, about 650 feet in length, with a maximum depth of 20 feet. The curve mentioned extends through this cut. The weather at the time of accident was clear.

Both engines were quite badly damaged but remained upright on the roadbed. The five head cars in train No. 15 were derailed and one car near the center of the train turned over, and several cars in train 2d No. 74 were derailed. A student fireman, who was riding on the fireman's side of the locomotive on train No. 15, was killed in the accident.

Conductor Bousman, of train 2d No. 74, stated that his train left Nashville at 10.30 p. m., July 6th. When it reached Bowling Green he checked the train register against his time-card, in which checking he included train No. 15, but he said that afterwards he never thought of that train until the accident occurred. He stated that his train went on the siding at Glasgow Junction, 22.9 miles north of Bowling Green, in order to clear train No. 3, a southbound passenger train, and while there he was in the caboose making out a report of the consist of the train, to be delivered at Cave City, the next station, 6 miles north. His train left Glasgow Junction at 4.52 a. m.; and when the collision occurred the speed of the train was about 8 miles an hour. Conductor Bousman attributed to a lapse of memory the fact that he overlooked train No. 15, which was due at Glasgow Junction at 5.03 a. m. He said that he was familiar with this division and with the time-table, and could offer no reason for the lapse of memory on his part.

Engineman Beulah, of train 2d No. 74, stated that he had been a fireman in passenger service for six months on this division, and that he had made only a few trips on it as engineman, but that he was familiar with it. He stated that at Bowling Green orders were received, one of them establishing meeting points with several trains. He checked the train register there against his time-card, and knew that he would have to look out for train No. 15. When his train was on the siding at Glasgow Junction, to let train No. 3 pass, he had an idea that he had to meet only passenger trains and those covered by the train orders he held. He also said that after leaving Glasgow Junction he consulted his time-card, but did not notice the schedule of train No. 15, or realize that he had to meet that train. When he looked up from the time-card he saw train No. 15 only about two car lengths away, coming out of the cut. Engineman Beulah stated further that on this trip he had a fireman who was making his first trip over this division; and the trouble experienced with steam and water, due to the fireman's lack of experience, took his thoughts from his own duties to a certain extent, and caused him to overlook train No. 15.

Head Brakeman Taylor, of train 2d No. 74, stated that his train headed in on the west siding at Glasgow Junction, to let southbound passenger train No. 3 pass. He said he knew

that there were no orders against train No. 15, but other than that he thought nothing about that train. He also stated that the fireman of his train was making his first trip and was having considerable trouble in keeping up steam, and that he helped the fireman by firing between Smith's Grove and Glasgow Junction, a distance of 9.2 miles. Brakeman Taylor estimated the speed of his train as having been 10 miles an hour at the time of collision.

Flagman Buchanan, of train 2d No. 74, stated that this was his fourth or fifth trip over this division; that while he was an extra conductor and had worked on this division 5 or 6 years prior to the accident, he had only recently returned after an absence of 3 years; and that he was familiar with the division. He stated that the crew received orders at Bowling Green, Smith's Grove and Glasgow Junction; that he was under the impression that the orders covered everything; and that he was satisfied to entrust everything to the conductor.

Engineman Larkin, of train No. 15, stated that on this trip he had been making practically schedule time. He stated that train No. 3 passed at Cave City and his train left there about ten minutes afterwards. He said that approaching the point of accident the speed was between 30 and 35 miles per hour. Engineman Larkin stated that, on account of being on the outside of the curve, and because he received no warning, he knew nothing of the approach of train 2d No. 74 until the collision occurred, and therefore had no opportunity to apply the brakes.

Fireman Stewart, of train No. 15, stated that the head brakeman, middle brakeman and a student fireman were riding on the fireman's side of the engine. He stated that he had been working on the fire, as the student fireman had gotten it into bad condition; and that he first saw train 2d No. 74 when it was about 4 telegraph poles distant. Without calling to the engineman, he got down on the steps and jumped.

Conductor Riney, of train No. 15, stated that he was sitting in the cupola of his caboose when the collision occurred, at 5.02 a. m. This statement was corroborated by Rear Brakeman Thompson, as to the time when the accident occurred.

Train No. 15 is scheduled to leave Cave City at 4.39 a. m., and Glasgow Junction, 6.1 miles south thereof, at 5.03 a. m. It reached Cave City at 4.28 a. m., where it was passed by train No. 3 at 4.44 a. m.; it left there at 4.54 a. m. The time-table in effect on this division contains the following rule:

"Regular southbound trains are superior to trains of the same class moving in the opposite direction when running in accordance with General Rule No. 73."

Train No. 15, a southbound train, therefore had the right of track in this instance, as against northbound train 2d No. 74.

This accident was caused by train 2d No. 74 occupying the main track on the time of train No. 15, a train superior by direction, for which Conductor Bouseman and Engineman Saulch are responsible. Had they been paying the necessary amount of attention to the safe operation of their train they would have noticed by their time-cards that they should remain on the siding at Glasgow Junction until train No. 15 had passed. Not only the engineman and conductor, but the entire crew of train 2d No. 74 overlooked train No. 15. The engineman claimed that his thoughts were diverted by the trouble that was being experienced with steam and water, due to the fact that his fireman was an inexperienced employee. The conductor, on the other hand, could offer no reason for overlooking train No. 15. It is difficult to understand how every member of a train crew, all experienced men except one, could be so unmindful of the safety of their train as to fail to know or discover that their train was occupying the main track on the time of another train.

Conductor Bouseman entered the service of this railroad as a brakeman May 25, 1898, and was promoted to conductor April 17, 1906. Engineman Saulch was employed as fireman October 10, 1906; made his first trip as engineman on the Second Division of the Main Line on October 25, 1913. From February 10, 1916, to September 29, 1916, he fired on passenger trains on the First Division, and then returned to the Second Division to fire and be extra engineman.

At the time of the collision, the crew of train 2d No. 74 had been on duty 7 hours 14 minutes, and the crew of train No. 15 had been on duty 6 hours 32 minutes.