## INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUPEAU OF SAFETY IN RE IN-VESTICATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE FORT WAYNE-LITA RAILROAD NEAR MIDDLEPOINT, OHIO, ON AUGUST 21, 1923.

December 5, 1929.

To the Commission:

On August 21, 1929, there was a head-end collision between two freight trains on the Fort Wayne-Lina Railroad, operated by the Indiana Service Corporation, near Middle-point, Onio, which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of five employees.

Location and rethod of operation

This railroad is an electric line which extends between Fort Wayne, Ind., and Lina, Ohio, a distance of 64.7 miles, and is a sin-le-track line over which trains are operated by the e-table and train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident occurred at a point about half way between France Siding and Gamble Siding, which are located 1 mile and 2.7 miles, respectively, test of Middlepoint. Approaching the point of accident from the east the track is tangent for a distance of 3,260.8 feet, followed by a 60 8' curve to the right 400 feet in length, the accident occurring on this curve at a point 134 feet from its western end, approaching from the west there is a 00 15' curve to the left 393.4 feet in learth, tangent track for a distance of 806.1 feet, and then the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade for westbound trains is generally ascending for a distance of 3,000 feet, readding a maximum of 0.48 per cert as the point of accident and extending for a distance of 150 feet beyond; it is then generally descending for a distance-of 2,400 feet, the maximum descending grade being .46 per cent.

The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 4.28 a.m.

## Description

Westbound freight train extra 763 consisted of seven cars, hauled by motor 763, and was in charge of Conductor Brown and hotogram Mitchell. At Lina this train received train order No. 10, directing it to run extra from Grand Avenue to Fort Wayne, and to report to the dispatcher at France Siding. This train departed from Lina, 31.4 miles east of France Siding, at 3.39 a.m., passed France Siding without stopping, and collided with extra 853 while traveling at a speed variously estimated to have been from 25 to 40 miles per hour.

Eastwound ireitht trun extra 850 consisted of four a mty side-dump cars, of 'll-steel construction, wuled by motor 85%, and was in observe of Conductor Johnson and Lator on DeWitt. This train described from Fort Name at 2.55 a. n. and at Convoy, 2.1 wiles from Fort Warme, recaived an order to meet extra 733 at Gamole Siding, which is On arrivine et located 12.5 inles borond that boint. Cabble Siding, the crew received train order No. 15 providing for a neet with extra 763 west at France Siding instead of Gample Siding, which order was rade complete at 4.26 a.m. Extra 253 started for France Siding, an additional distance of 1.7 miles, and although the reflection of the headlight of extra 765 was visible for a distance of about 2 inles, yet the location of extra 763 was not definitely decided as being rest of France Siding until the two trains were book 1,000 feet apart. Extra 853 was prought to a stop before the collision occurred.

Both motor cars were devolushed and the ook cars in extra 765 were considerably durined. The employee milled was the motorian of extra 763, mails those injured were the conductor and brake an of extra 763 and the motorian, conquetor and brake an of extra 853.

## Surnary of evidence

Conductor Brown, of artra 763, stated inst when he recaived train order No. 10, requiring his train to report at France Siding, he repeased it to the disputcher and then gave it to the notorman, no read it loud to him. then informed the or teman of its contents. Conductor Brown was thoroughly familiar with the location of the telephone, about 500 feat east of the east switch at France Sidia, which was a ficing-point statch for his area, but on Eporosching this siding no was dozing and did not atticen intil just on instant before the collision occurred. He was riding in the front end of the motor and when he looked up and saw the approaching train he called to the poterran, but he did not know whether or not the motorman was also asleep. A brake test had been made at Lima and the brakes worked properly en route, but they were not applied prior to the collision. Conductor Brown further stated that he was in good physical condition and did not feel tired when he went on duty at 10.30 p.m. on August 20.

Brakeman Court, of extre 763, stated that at the time of the accident ne was sitting in the motor car, examining oills and reports for the purpose of learning the work for a conductor's position, and while he is fairly well acquainted with the sidings and telephone booths on that division, he was not paving any attention as to the loc iion of his train. The conductor had said something to nime about reporting at France or Cave, the latter station osing west of Camble, but he was not sure which place was meant and did

not concern himself about the atter, and it also appeared that while he usually reads the orders numbelf, yet in this instance he ade no effort to obtain information as to the contents of the orders. He stated that there as considerable noise in the car, which ade it difficult to hear any conversation between the rotorman and conductor, although he heard then at these, but he did not hear any sounds of conversation after they passed Middlepoint. Brake an Court estileted the speed of their train at the tile of one accident to have been between 25 and 30 miles per hour.

Notorian DeWitt, of extra 853, stated the cafter lorving Gamble Similar, where he received an order providing a pact with extra 773 at France Siding, his train attained a speed between 20 and 25 miles per hour, and then he discovered that extra 763 had passed France Siding, he shut off the controller and applied the air brakes, the train being brought to a stop before the collision occurred. He estimated the speed of the opposing train to have been between 35 and 40 miles per hour.

Conductor Johnson, of extra 853, thought that the arc light of extra 763 was visible for a distance of about 2 miles, and he said that as soon as the motorman realized that the opposing extra had passed France Siding, he commanced to reduce speed, Conductor Johnson estimating the distance between the two trains at that time to have been 1,000 feet. The conductor also stated that he turned off the headlight on his own car just before are accident occurred, at this latter time his own train hid about come to a stop, thile at estimated the speed of the opposing train to have been about 40 miles per hour. The statements of Brakeman Harrison brought out nothing additional of importance, except that it had been the custom of the conductor to advise him of the orders they received, and in this case he had been informed by Conductor Johnson relative to the orders foverning their movement and theroughly understood them.

Train Dispatcher Young, located at Fort Wayne, stated that when extra trains leave their terminals they are given the order to run extra over the whole division, and if impossible to issue positive meet orders, he issues a positive order to report from certain sidings ha ed in the order, which he did in this instance, and he said that this system is thoroughly understood by all concerned. Such an order restricts a movement beyond the designated point just as much as if a meet order had been issued.

Trainmaster Lentz stated that motor 763 was geared for a speed of  $37\frac{1}{2}$  miles per hour, and his examination of the car after the accident showed the controller in full multiple position and the brake valve in full release, and there was no evidence of 'sand having been used prior to the collision.

## Conclusions.

This accident was caused by the failure of Motorman Mitchell and Conductor Brown, of extra 765, to stop their train at a siding specified by train order, and obtain further orders before proceeding beyond that point.

The investigation disclosed that the crew of extra 763 received train order No. 10, directing them to run as an extra train, and to report at France Siding, orders of this type being used on this line as a latter of practice. It appeared, however, that on approaching France Siding, Conductor Brown was asleep and that he did not awaken until just before the collision occurred. The reason for the failure of Motorman Mitchell to bring his train to a stop at France Siding is unknown, as no was killed as a result of the accident, but it would appear that he also was asleep or no would have seen the headlight on the approaching train. An examination of the car after the occurrence of the accident showed that the brakes had not been applied, nor had the senders been used.

The evidence also disclosed that fulls Conductor Brown had told Brakeman Court of the contents of the order, the brakeman was unable to state whather they were to report to the dispatcher at France or at Cave. Had he obtained the correct information relative to this order, and had he not been so occupied in learning the clarical duties of a conductor that he failed to pay attention to the operation of his train, he would have been in a position to check up with the motorman and conductor when he saw that the train was not going to stop at France Siding.

All of the employees involved were experienced den with the exception of Brakeman Court, who entered the service of this railroad on July 11, 1929, and Brakeman Harrison, who entered the service on August 12, 1929, and none of them had been on duty in violation of any of the provisions of the hours of service law, Notor an Nitchell, of extra 763, had been on duty 7 hours at the tipe of the accident, after naving been off duty 15 hours, and Conductor Brown and been on duty 6 nours, after having been off duty 15 hours.

Respectfully submitted, W. P. BORLAND, Director.