

CIRCULATED *2/19/19*

IN AN INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE
BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD NEAR MAYNARD, OHIO,
JANUARY 11, 1919.

February 19, 1919.

On January 11, 1919, there was a head-end collision between two extra freight trains on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad near Maynard, Ohio, which resulted in the death of 1 employee and injury of 7 employees. After investigation, the Chief of the Bureau of Safety reports as follows:

The C. L. & W. sub-division on which this accident occurred extends between Bridgeport and Holloway, Ohio, a distance of 30.9 miles. From Bridgeport to BN Tower, a distance of 8.8 miles, it is a double-track line. From BN Tower to Fairpoint, a distance of 8.1 miles, it is a single-track line. From Fairpoint to PI Tower, a distance of 10.6 miles, it is a double-track line. From PI Tower to Holloway, a distance of 2.5 miles, it is a single-track line. This accident occurred on the single-track portion between BN Tower and Fairpoint. Trains are operated by time table and train orders, supplemented by a manual block signal system.

The trains involved in this accident were east-bound extra 2563 and westbound extra 2612.

Extra 2563, consisting of engine 2563, 16 loaded freight cars and a caboose, with helper engine 4135 coupled ahead, in charge of Conductor Adrian and Enginemen Hayes and Reid, left Fairpoint at 7.37 a.m., with train order No.

409 reading as follows:

Extra 2563 East take siding and meet Extra 2612 west at Maynard. Eng. 2563 run Extra Fairpoint to Bridgeport. After Extra 2698 East arrives at BN Tower Eng. 2612 run Extra BN Tower to HO Tower.

and at 7.55 a.m., while running at a speed of about 18 miles an hour, collided with extra 2612 about 1 mile west of Maynard.

Extra 2612, consisting of engine 2612 and a caboose, in charge of Conductor Johnson and Engineman Dobbs, left Bridgeport at 5.20 a.m. At Barton near BN Tower this train picked up 18 cars of coal. At BN Tower Conductor Johnson received both his own and the engineman's copy of Form 19 train order No. 409. He read the orders and put them in his coat pocket, went down and handed his own copy of the block card Form A and a message he had received at Bridgeport to Fireman Samuels, thinking he was delivering the engineman's copy of train order No. 409. Extra 2612 did some additional station work, waited for the arrival of a passenger train, and at 7.33 a.m. departed without the engineman having received a copy of train order 409. It passed Maynard and, while running at a speed of about 18 or 20 miles an hour, collided with extra 2563.

Engineman Reid on helper engine 4135, the lead engine in train extra 2563, was killed. All three engines and tenders remained upright, parallel with the track and only partly derailed. The front end of each was crushed in, the front part of each frame was broken and engine trucks

knocked off. The front end of the tender of each engine was shoved against the boiler head. The second engine of extra 2563 mounted the frame of the first tender of that train and crushed the rear end of the cistern for a distance of about 8 feet. The rear end of the second tender was crushed and the first car behind it demolished. The rear end of the tender of extra 2612 was also crushed in and the first two cars demolished.

Approaching the scene of the accident from the east and beginning at Maynard station there is a 3000-foot compound curve to the left, the curvature of which is at its eastern end 6 degrees then is 1 degree 15 minutes and at its western end is 4 degrees. Then there is a tangent about 1550 feet long leading to a 1550-foot compound curve to the right, the curvature of which is 7 degrees, then 6 degrees and at its western end is 8 degrees. The collision occurred about 575 feet from the west end of this latter curve.

Approaching the scene of the accident from the west there is a 4-degree curve to the left about 1000 feet in length followed by a tangent approximately 1000 feet long leading to the compound curve upon which the accident occurred. Just west of the scene of the collision on the inside of the curve there is a high steep bank and just east of the point of collision on the same side of the track there is a house. Owing to the bank and the house the view of approaching trains at that point is limited to a distance of

about 500 feet. The weather at the time was clear.

Fireman Gans of engine 4135, the lead engine of extra 2563, stated that he read the order requiring his train to meet extra 2612 at Maynard, and as his train was coming around the curve he saw extra 2612 approaching. At first he thought that train was on the mine track. He looked a second time, discovered that it was on the main track, called to Engineman Reid and then jumped off the engine. The engineman did not succeed in getting off and was killed.

Engineman Hayes of extra 2563 stated that his train left Fairpoint about 7.37 a.m. with orders to meet extra 2612 at Maynard. When about one mile west of this point his fireman called to him warning of an approaching train. They both ran to the gangway and started to jump. The collision occurred just as he was getting off. The speed of his train at that time was between 15 and 20 miles an hour. He further stated that he had received the orders from the conductor at the east end of Fairpoint and had shown them to his fireman.

Fireman Hollingsworth of extra 2563 stated that his train left Fairpoint with running order, Form A caution block card and meet order with extra 2612 at Maynard, and a message to Engineman Reid to deliver engine 4135 to Engineman Hawley who was deadheading on extra 2612. He said that when the train came around the curve west of Maynard he looked through the window and discovered an approaching engine on the main track. He called to the engineman to get off and they both

ran to the gangway. Just as they swung off the collision occurred.

Conductor Adrian of extra 2563 stated that at Fairpoint he received train order No. 409 and block card Form A from the operator and delivered copies of it to both enginemen. He stated that before leaving Fairpoint he personally got the block from the telegraph office. He said that at the time of the collision he was riding in the cupola of the caboose, and on account of the curve he could not see the approaching train.

Brakeman Hupp of extra 2563 stated that his train left Fairpoint with instructions to take siding and meet extra 2612 at Maynard, but collided with that train west of that point. After the accident he immediately went back to protect the rear of his train. He said that he had read the orders held by his train and they were in correct form and accompanied by block card Form A.

Brakeman Gillham of extra 2563 stated that he had read the order requiring his train to meet extra 2612 at Maynard. Approaching Maynard he was riding on engine 4135. He stated that the first he knew of the impending collision was when Fireman Jams called to them to jump. Extra 2612 was then about three car lengths distant.

Engineman Dobbs of extra 2612 stated that as he was pulling out of the storage track at Barton Conductor Johnson handed the fireman a block card form a and a message. The message gave instructions for his train to get a helper at

Barton or Fairpoint. The block card showed the engine number plainly but the rest of it had been smeared by the fireman's dirty gloves. The engineman said he did not have a running order out of Barton. He stated that he was familiar with the rule requiring a westbound extra to have a running order as well as a clearance card before passing BN Tower, but had simply overlooked the fact that he had no such order. He also knew that only the conductor or engineman is permitted to secure the block from the operator, but was busy and, knowing the brakeman was an experienced man, he sent him to get it. When the brakeman returned the engineman understood him to say the block was clear.

Fireman Samuels of extra 2612 stated that while his train was doing station work at Barton the conductor handed him a block card form A and a message. He handed them to the engineman. There was more station work done and the train proceeded. The fireman stated that the block card was dated January 11 and addressed to extra 2612 but he did not know what else was on it. The message had instructions to get the 4135 as a helper either at Barton or Fairpoint. He did not know whether his train got a block card at Bridgeport, and said that it is claimed that it is necessary for a train to have a card to leave Bridgeport but that he has left many times without one. The first intimation he had of anything wrong was when the engineman called a warning of the approaching train.

Brakeman Hodgkinson of extra 2612 stated that at the time of the collision he was riding on the left side of the cab of engine 2612. The first intimation he had of danger was when the engineman called a warning and he immediately jumped. He said that he did not see the orders his train had leaving Barton and did not ask to see them. He stated that at the request of the engineman he got the block at the west end of the westbound siding at Barton.

Engineman Hawley, who was deadheading in the caboose of extra 2612, stated that at Barton the operator gave him instructions to get engine 4135 at Fairpoint. Conductor Johnson was in the office at the time. Leaving Barton, Conductor Johnson, Brakeman Jones and Fireman Burns were also in the caboose, but the conductor did not show any orders and Engineman Hawley stated that he did not hear anyone talking about orders nor did he ask to see them. His fireman asked Conductor Johnson where they were to get engine 4135 and as well as he can remember the conductor told the fireman Fairpoint.

Fireman Burns stated that he was deadheading on extra 2612 with instructions to get engine 4135 at Fairpoint, at the time of the collision he was in the caboose, but had not seen the orders extra 2612 had and had not asked Conductor Johnson anything about them.

Brakeman Johns of extra 2612 stated that he was familiar with the rule requiring the conductor to show his

train orders to his brakeman, but that on this occasion the conductor did not show his orders and the brakeman did not ask to see them. He, the conductor, and a deadheading engineman and fireman were in the caboose at the time of the collision. He stated that as soon as the collision occurred the conductor put his hand in his pocket and exclaimed that they had run a meet order.

Conductor Johnson of extra 2612 stated that at Barton he got orders from the operator, read them, folded them up and put them in his pocket. He said he then went down and called to the fireman who looked out from the engine. Conductor Johnson handed up what he thought was the engineman's copy of the order he had just received but what was in fact his own copy of the block card and message he had received at Bridgeport. Extra 2612 finished its station work and pulled out. The conductor ate his lunch and engaged in conversation with the deadheading crew in the caboose and forgot about his orders. He had not shown them to any one. He had told Engineman Hawley who was deadheading on his caboose, that the dispatcher had said engine 4155 would be at Fairpoint but had said nothing further concerning the orders he had received.

Train Dispatcher Chadlock stated that there was nothing irregular about the orders held by any of the train crews involved, and said that he had personally informed Conductor Johnson over the telephone where he would get the helper engine, but had given him no written message to con-

firm these verbal instructions.

Operator ratt at Barton stated that he delivered train order No. 409 and block card Form A properly filled out to Conductor Johnson, and that later one of the members of the crew of extra 2612 called him on the telephone and asked for the block. He stated that he told this man "Form A, part b, meet a man at Maynard" but that he did not find out the name of the man to whom he gave the block. He said that in order for a westbound train to move out of Barton it should have a running order and a block card Form A.

Rules 97, 109-a, 211 and 211-a of the Operating Department of this railroad read in part as follows:

97. Single track -

Extra trains will not be run without train orders.

109-a. When trains are released from sidings by telephone the conductor or engineman only is authorized to receive Form A and will give train and engine number, and his name. The operator responding will give his name and will file his copy of Form A bearing the name of conductor or engineman.

211. When a "19" train order has been transmitted * * * the operator * * * will * * * personally deliver a copy to each person addressed without taking his signature. But when delivery to engineman will take the operator from the immediate vicinity of his office, the engineman's copy will be delivered by the conductor, personally.

211-a. * * * conductors of freight trains will show train orders to flagmen, and enginemen to firemen, and when practicable to the front trainmen, all of whom are required to bear them in mind and should occasion require will call attention of conductors and enginemen to them.

This accident was caused by the failure of extra 2612 to wait at Maynard as required by train order No. 409.

for which failure Conductor Johnson and Engineman Dobbs are responsible.

Conductor Johnson was negligent in not delivering the engineman's copy of train order No. 409 to him personally as required by Rule 211. He also failed to show his orders to his flagman as required by Rule 211-A.

Engineman Dobbs violated Rule 97 by entering upon the single-track main line west of BN Tower without running orders. He also violated Rule 109-A in that he allowed his brakeman to secure the block for his train. Had he insisted upon having a running order before moving his train beyond BN Tower he would have learned that he was to meet extra 2563 at Maynard, or had he gone personally to the telephone to secure the block, as under the rules he was required to do, he might have found out about the meet at Maynard.

Brakeman Johns failed to comply with Rule 211-A in that he did not request the conductor to show him the train orders. Had he insisted upon seeing Conductor Johnson's orders, it is probable that the fact that the conductor was still in possession of the engineman's copy would have been discovered.

Fireman Daniels is guilty of violation of Rule 211-A and of extreme negligence. When he held in his hand what he supposed were the orders of his train he did not examine them beyond seeing that the date and engine number were correct, nor did he later request the engineman to show them to him.

brakeman Hodgkinson also is responsible for violating rule 211-A in that he did not request the engineer to show him the train orders. He also violated Rule 109-A in accepting instructions from the engineman to secure Form A by telephone from the operator, which under the rule could only be secured by the engineman or conductor.

The entire crew was negligent and showed lamentable lack of regard for the safety of their train. This accident again calls attention to the absolute necessity for strict compliance with every rule promulgated for safety.

All of the employees involved were experienced men. At the time of the accident the crew of extra 2612 had been on duty 3 hours and 25 minutes after periods off duty varying from 11 hours and 10 minutes to 27 hours. The crew of extra 2563 had been on duty 9 hours and 55 minutes after off duty periods of from 10 hours and 25 minutes to 21 hours and 20 minutes. Operator Pratt had been on duty 7 hours and 55 minutes after 16 hours off duty.

A.H.C.