

December 4, 1912.

In re investigation of accident on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, at Chicago Junction, Ohio, October 10, 1912.

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On October 10, 1912, there was a rear end collision between a freight train and a passenger train on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Chicago Junction, Ohio, resulting in the death of two employees and the injury of twenty-one passengers, 2 employees and one postal employee.

After investigation, I beg to submit the following report:

The trains involved in this collision were freight train No. 88 and passenger train No. 14. The accident occurred on the east-bound main track of a double track line, at a point about 170 feet west of the west switch leading into the receiving yard, or 2.3 miles west of the passenger station, at Chicago Junction. The track from the west is straight for a distance of about five miles and the grade is practically level at the point where the accident occurred.

Freight train No. 88, consisting of an engine, 80 loaded cars and a caboose, with conductor Miller and engineer Baker in charge, left Garrett, Ind., at 3:05 p.m., October 9, bound for Chicago Junction. This train was delayed on account of failure of the engine to steam properly and it did not reach the Chicago Junction yard until 4:05 a.m., October 10th. When this train approached the yard and whistled

for the switch, the switch tender, believing that it was a stock train, lined up the switches for the main track and headed this train down the old west-bound main or Q.D. track which is reserved for the stock trains and trains going to the ice house. As soon as the switch tender saw that this was not a stock train he signaled it to stop and told conductor Miller that his train was on the wrong track and it would have to back out and head down into the yard. The conductor told the switch tender that his engine did not have sufficient steam to back out, and as this train was on the time of an express train the switch tender directed that it proceed on this track.

When this train came to a stop at the east end of . . . track, the train crew was directed not to uncouple the engine from the train as the train would have to be backed out and headed down into the yard. Conductor Miller, head brakeman Stewart and yard brakeman all sent to the yard office for instructions.

The statements of the employees regarding the further circumstances which led up to the collision are conflicting and somewhat confusing. Brakeman Stewart apparently through a misunderstanding returned to the train and told engine-man Honer that yardmaster Lewis had directed that he back his train out. Brakeman Stewart then went towards the rear end of the train and engine-man Honer started to back out. The train was backed up a distance of 80 or 90 car lengths, running through and splitting the lead switch, and the rear end of the train passed out on the east-bound main track about

170 feet west of the main track switch which was opened by the switch tender when he heard the train approaching him. At this time brakeman Steward was standing on the rear platform of the caboose. The switch tender signaled this train to stop and then started west to flag No. 14. He had proceeded but a short distance when No. 14 passed him. The brakeman had applied the brakes and train No. 86 had come to a stop before the collision occurred.

Train No. 14 consisted of an engine, a mail car, 2 baggage cars, 2 coaches, a Pullman sleeper, a coach, and a Pullman sleeper. The mail car and the Pullman cars had steel underframe with wooden superstructure, the coaches were of all-steel construction, and the baggage cars were of wooden construction. This train left Chicago at 9:30 p.m., October 9, bound for New York, and at the time of the accident it was in charge of conductor Porter and engineer Kenneman. It passed Action, a station, 7 1/2 miles west of the point where the accident occurred, at 11:10 p.m., 19 minutes late, and covered this distance of 7 1/2 miles in five minutes, the collision occurring at 11:15 p.m. The speed recorder on this train showed that the train was running 61 miles an hour at the time of the accident. In this collision the engine of the passenger train was badly damaged and the mail car and one baggage car were completely destroyed and damaged. The caboose and four cars in the rear of the train were damaged.

There were no markers on the rear platform of the caboose at the time of the accident but the markers were burn-

ing. Before train No. 88 reached Chicago Junction yard it was on the time of No. 46, a first-class train, and flagman Deeser took the red light from the rear platform of the caboose and flagged No. 46. When this train stopped for him, he got on the engine and rode to the yard; seeing that his train was in to clear, he remained on the engine No. 46 and rode to Chicago Junction passenger station.

Conductor Miller stated that he understood from his conversation with yardmaster Lewis that his train would have to be backed out and that his engine would have to wait there until another engine could be secured to assist in backing the train. He then instructed brakeman Steward to go and tell the engineman to remain where he was until the switch engine came to help him back out. Under the rules of the company trainmen and enginemen are subject to the orders of the yardmaster while in the yard. When yardmaster Lewis told conductor Miller that his engine would have to wait until they could get an engine to assist in handling the train he directed brakeman Steward to notify the engineman of the orders of the yardmaster; having read the red and delivered his bills, and his train being in the clear, he considered himself off duty and went to his boarding place.

Brakeman Steward stated that he heard yardmaster Lewis say that they would have to back out and the conductor also told him to notify the engineman to back his train. He then went from the yard office to the engine and he stated that he told the engineman that the yardmaster had said he

would have to back out, he stated engineman Shoner then told him to go back and look for signals. Brakeman Stewart stated that he started back along the train and after going a few car lengths he climbed up on top of the train and walked back. He stated that he did not give any signals to the engineman, but the engineman sounded the back-up signal five or six times and the train started to back up. He stated that he reached the rear end of the train by the time it reached the switch leading to the eastbound main track. He then got down and tried to get into the caboose to secure a red light but the doors were locked. He stated that just then the switch tender ran up and said that No. 14 was coming; he applied the air brakes and started toward the engine to signal the engineman to go ahead, and the switch tender started west to flag the approaching train.

Engineman Shoner stated that brakeman Stewart told him that the yardmaster said he would have to back out and that it was all right. The engineman stated that he would tell the yardmaster his direction to the switch tender at the west end to line up the switches for the west-bound main track. He told the brakeman to go back and get on the caboose, saying that he would give him all night time to go back and that if the signals were not clear to apply the air from the rear end. There was a fence for some distance could be seen but a short distance. The engineman stated that he waited about 20 minutes and then sounded the back-up whistle signal five times and started back slowly, this back-up movement being made without

a signal from anyone.

Yardmaster Lewis when advised by the switch tender at the west end of the yard that train No. 88 had been headed in on the wrong track told the switch tender that the train would have to be backed out and told him to line up the switches for the west-bound main track. These instructions were later changed by yardmaster Lewis, when, according to his statement, yard brakeman Doll came to the office a second time and notified him that the engine of No. 88 had been out off an. aa. gone to the roundhouse.

Yard brakeman Doll states that he went over to train No. 88 only once. He notified the brakeman not to cut the engine off and notified the conductor of the yardmaster's instructions. He then returned to the office, accompanied by conductor Miller and brakeman Steward, and in their presence notified the yardmaster that the steam was low in the engine of train No. 88. He stated that he had no further conversation with or orders from yardmaster Lewis in regard to that train and he did not again go to that engine.

The entrance of trains to the west end of this yard is regulated by a switch tender. More than a year before this accident occurred an interlocking tower was built at the entrance to this yard but the plant had not been completed and connected up. There was no distant signal working in connection with the switch at the entrance to this yard.

This accident was caused by the engineman backing his train out on to the main track without receiving signals of any kind from any one in charge of the train or in authority in the yard. This was a violation of rule No. 88 of the operating rules of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company providing that a train must not start until the proper signal is given. The conductor is also at fault for delegating brakeman Stewart to communicate to the engineman verbal orders from the yardmaster directing a yard movement. Brakeman Stewart had been employed on August 18, 1912, and had had no previous railroad experience. He had made only four trips between Garrett and Chicago Junction. Conductor Miller did not have other duties requiring his immediate attention and he should have personally communicated these orders to the engineman.

This yard is so arranged that train No. 88 could have been moved from . . . track to the hump yard without coming into contact with . . . in track at all, by moving the train into the . . . yard and then backing it through a crossover into the hump yard. It is therefore believed that the yardmaster is also at fault for directing an unnecessary yard movement.

This accident probably could have been averted had a distant signal and interlocking plant been in service at this point.