

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2903
THE UNION TERMINAL COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT DALLAS, TEX., ON
JUNE 21, 1945

SUMMARY

Railroad: The Union Terminal Company
Date: June 21, 1945
Location: Dallas, Tex.
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision
Trains involved: M.K.T.T. yard : St.L.S.F.& T.
engine and cars : freight train
Train numbers: : Extra 1039 South
Engine numbers: 18 : 1039
Consist: 6 cars : 5 cars, caboose
Estimated speed: Standing : 8 m. p. h.
Operation: Signal indications
Track: Double; 5⁰54' curve; 0.33 percent
descending grade southward
Weather: Clear
Time: 6:03 p. m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 3 injured
Cause: Failure properly to control speed
of following train in accordance
with signal indication

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2903

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE UNION TERMINAL COMPANY

August 8, 1945.


Accident at Dallas, Tex., on June 21, 1945, caused by
failure properly to control the speed of the fol-
lowing train in accordance with signal indication.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On June 21, 1945, there was a rear-end collision between cars being pulled by a Missouri, Kansas, Texas Railroad Company of Texas yard engine and a St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway freight train on the line of the Union Terminal Company at Dallas, Tex., which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of three employees.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Inv. No. 2903
Union Terminal Company
Dallas, Tex.
June 21, 1945

South Tower,
Dallas

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the railroad extending southward from North Tower to South Tower, Dallas, 0.57 mile, a double-track line over which trains are operated in either direction by signal indications. The tracks are designated as freight tracks, and are hereinafter referred to, from east to west, as track No. 1 and track No. 2. Yard engines of the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company of Texas and freight trains of the St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway Company are regularly operated over these tracks. The accident occurred on track No. 2 at a point 0.45 mile south of North Tower. From the north there are, in succession, a 7°30' curve to the left 437 feet in length, a tangent 404 feet, a 7°36' curve to the right 214 feet, a tangent 925 feet and a 5°54' curve to the left 414 feet to the point of accident and 377 feet southward. Throughout a distance of 2,389 feet immediately north of the point of accident, the grade varies between 0.04 percent and 0.54 percent descending southward, and is 0.33 percent at the point of accident.

Signals R-52 and R-24, governing south-bound movements on track No. 2, are, respectively, 2,495 feet north and 412 feet south of the point of accident. These signals are of the one-arm, upper-quadrant, semaphore type, and are continuously lighted. The involved day aspects and corresponding indications of these signals are as follows:

<u>Signal</u>	<u>Aspect</u>	<u>Indication</u>
R-52	45 degrees	Caution
R-24	Horizontal	Stop

Signal R-52 is controlled by the leverman at North Tower, and signal R-24 is controlled by the leverman at South Tower. The controlling circuit of signal R-52 is so arranged that, when a south-bound train or engine is occupying track No. 2 within a distance of 200 feet immediately south of the signal, this signal will display stop. When a south-bound movement is south of the 200-foot section but north of signal R-24, signal R-52 can be operated by the leverman to display a 45-degree aspect to permit a following south-bound movement to proceed on track No. 2. Flag protection against following movements between North Tower and South Tower is not required.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

- 5. * * * Speed of trains between North Tower and South Tower must not exceed eight (8) miles per hour. * * * Look out carefully for trains occupying tracks, and be prepared to stop in distance seen to be clear.

51. * * * Train finding signal at "Caution" may proceed under control to the next signal.

Description of Accident

Yard engine 18, an M.K.T.T. engine, headed southward and pulling 6 cars, stopped about 6 p. m. on track No. 2 at signal R-24, which displayed stop. About 3 minutes later the rear car was struck by Extra 1039 South.

Extra 1039 South, a south-bound St.L.S.F.& T. freight train, consisting of engine 1039, 5 cars and a caboose, passed signal R-52, which displayed caution, and while moving at an estimated speed of 8 miles per hour it struck the rear car of the cut of cars coupled to yard engine 18.

The force of the impact moved yard engine 18 and the cut of cars southward about 20 feet. The tender of engine 18 and 5 cars of the cut of 6 cars were slightly damaged.

The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6:03 p. m.

The employee killed was a car inspector, who was on the tender of yard engine 18. The foreman, the engineer and a switchman of yard engine 18 were injured.

Discussion

The rules governing operation in this territory provide that movements in either direction on tracks No. 1 and No. 2 may be made at a speed not exceeding 8 miles per hour when authorized by proper signal indication. Flag protection against following movements is not required. Trains or engines moving under authority of a caution indication must be prepared to stop within a distance the track is seen to be clear.

About 3 minutes after yard engine 18 stopped in compliance with a stop indication displayed by signal R-24, the rear car of the cut of 6 cars coupled to the rear of the engine was struck by Extra 1039 South.

When the accident occurred the members of the crew of yard engine 18 were in the vicinity of their engine, and they were not aware that Extra 1039 was approaching until immediately prior to the collision.

Extra 1039 was proceeding under authority of a caution indication displayed by signal R-52. The members of the crew understood that the indication displayed by signal R-52 required the speed of their train to be so controlled that it could be stopped within the distance the track could be seen to

be clear. As the train was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 8 miles per hour. The front brakeman, who was on the tender of the engine, and the enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead. Because of the sharp curve to the left, the view had by the engineer of the track ahead was restricted to a distance of about 90 feet. The point where the accident occurred could be seen from the left side of a south-bound engine a distance of approximately 700 feet. The fireman and the front brakeman said they saw some cars a few hundred feet distant, but they thought the cars were on an auxiliary track located to the west of track No. 2. The front brakeman, who was the first to be aware that the yard movement was on track No. 2, called a warning to the engineer, but the warning was not heard. The enginemen were not aware that the yard engine and cars were on track No. 2 until their engine was about 90 feet north of the rear car. Then the engineer moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the collision occurred before the train could be stopped.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train in accordance with signal indication.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this eighth day of August, 1945.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.