

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

REPORT NO. 3365
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
IN RE ACCIDENT
AT GREEN RIVER, WYO., ON
SEPTEMBER 11, 1950

SUMMARY

Date: September 11, 1950

Railroad: Union Pacific

Location: Green River, Wyo.

Kind of accident: Side collision

Equipment involved: Yard engine with : Passenger train
passenger-equip-
ment cars and
yard engine

Train number: : 38

Engine numbers: Diesel-electric : 826
unit 1152

Consists: 13 cars, Diesel- : 14 cars
electric unit
1119

Speeds: Standing : 30 m. p. h.

Operation: Timetable, train orders and automatic
block-signal system

Tracks: Double; 4°41' curve; level

Weather: Cloudy

Time: 11:22 p. m.

Casualties: 61 injured

Cause: Switching movement fouling main
track immediately in front of
approaching train

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

REPORT NO. 3366

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

November 14, 1950


Accident at Green River, Wyo., on September 11, 1950,
caused by a switching movement fouling the main
track immediately in front of an approaching train.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On September 11, 1950, there was a side collision between a switching movement and a passenger train on the Union Pacific Railroad at Green River, Wyo., which resulted in the injury of 43 passengers, 6 dining-car employees, 2 chair-car attendants, 3 employees off duty, and 7 train-service employees.

¹
Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Report No. 3365
Union Pacific Railroad
Green River, Wyo.
September 11, 1950

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Wyoming Division extending between Ogden, Utah, and Green River, Wyo., 175.6 miles. This is a double-track line, over which trains moving with the current of traffic are operated by timetable, train orders and an automatic block-signal system. The main tracks from north to south are designated as westward and eastward. At Green River three station tracks parallel the eastward main track on the south. These tracks are designated from north to south, consecutively, as station tracks Nos. 3, 4 and 5. At a point 2,933 feet west of the station an auxiliary track diverges from the eastward main track. Station tracks Nos. 3 and 4 converge and join the east end of the auxiliary track at a point approximately 1,636 feet west of the station. The accident occurred within yard limits on the turnout of the auxiliary track at a point 95.8 feet east of the point-of-switch and 75.9 feet west of the clearance point. From the west on the eastward main track there is a tangent 1,177 feet in length, and then a compound curve to the right, having a maximum curvature of $5^{\circ}15'$, 61 feet to the point of accident and 1,142 feet eastward. At the point of accident the specified curvature is $4^{\circ}41'$. The grade for east-bound trains is level 1,066 feet to the point of accident.

Automatic signal 8182, governing east-bound movements on the eastward main track, is located 3,636 feet west of the point of accident. The signal is of the color-light type, and displays three aspects. The aspect applicable to this investigation and the corresponding indication and name are as follows:

<u>Aspect</u>	<u>Indication</u>	<u>Name</u>
Green.	Proceed.	Clear signal.

The shunt fouling circuit of the auxiliary track extends 171.7 feet east of the point-of-switch. The controlling circuits of signal 8182 are so arranged that, when any portion of the shunt fouling circuit of the auxiliary track is occupied, signal 8182 indicates Stop.

This carrier's operating rules read in part as follows:

ENGINE WHISTLE SIGNALS

14.

* * *

The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds; "—" for longer sounds. * * *

* * *

SOUND	INDICATION
* * *	
(h) o o o	When standing, back. * * *
* * *	

93. Within yard limits the main track may be used, protecting against first-class trains.

* * *

99. When a train stops, except when clear of the main track, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals, a sufficient distance to insure full protection. * * *

* * *

99(A). In moving to main track from siding or other track, a trainman must be at rear of train, and where conditions require, protection must be provided as prescribed by Rule 99.

* * *

In the vicinity of the point of accident the speed for the passenger train involved was restricted to 40 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

Diesel-electric yard engine 1152, headed west, pulled a cut of cars from station track No. 3 westward to the auxiliary track. The cut of cars consisted of four sleeping cars, one lounge car, one dining car, four coaches, two storage mail cars and one mail car, in the order named. All cars were of all-steel construction. The movement stopped about 11:21 p. m., on the turnout of the auxiliary track, with the front end of the engine fouling the main track. Immediately after the movement stopped, Diesel-electric yard engine 1119 moved from station track No. 4 and it was coupled to the most easterly car of the cut of cars. Immediately afterward, about 11:22 p. m., engine 1152 was struck by No. 38.

No. 38, an east-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of engine 826, four baggage cars, two coaches, one dining car, one lounge car and six sleeping cars, in the order named. All cars were of all-steel construction. This train departed from Ogden at 7:30 p. m., 20 minutes late, passed Granger, the last open office, at 10:51 p. m., 30 minutes late, passed signal 8182, which indicated Proceed, and while moving at a speed of 30 miles per hour it struck engine 1152.

Engine 1152 was moved eastward a distance of 128 feet. The cab of the engine and the west vestibule of the first car were demolished. The east truck of the fourth car, the west truck of the fifth car and the east truck of the seventh car were derailed. Engine 1152 and the first car were considerably damaged. The second to the eighth cars, inclusive, were somewhat damaged. No. 38 stopped with the front end of the engine 128 feet east of the point of accident. The engine, the tender and the front truck of the first car were derailed and stopped approximately in line with the eastward main track. All of the equipment remained upright. Engine 826 was badly damaged. The first to the fifth cars, inclusive, and the seventh to the fourteenth cars, inclusive, were somewhat damaged.

The engineer, the fireman and a brakeman of engine 1152, and the engineer, the fireman and both brakemen of No. 38 were injured.

The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 11:22 p. m.

Discussion

As Diesel-electric yard engine 1152 with a cut of 13 cars approached the turnout of the auxiliary track, the engineer was looking toward the rear for signals from a brakeman. The fireman was maintaining a lookout ahead. The clearance point of the auxiliary track was not marked. The fireman warned the engineer that the engine was closely approaching the main track. The engineer immediately initiated an application of the brakes, and the movement stopped with the front of the engine 76 feet west of the clearance point of the turnout. At that time one yard brakeman was on the last car, the yard conductor was standing north of the ninth car and the other yard brakeman was standing north of the fourth car. When the movement stopped, the last car was west of the switch at the entrance to track No. 3. Diesel-electric yard engine 1119 then moved from station track No. 4 and was coupled to the most easterly car of the cut of cars. It was intended to switch the last four cars to another station

track. The fireman of engine 1152 warned the engineer that No. 38 was approaching. The engineer sounded the back-up signal on the pneumatic horn and attempted to back the engine clear of the main track. However, the angle cock on the west end of the ninth car was closed immediately after the movement stopped, and the brakes of the rear four cars could not be released.

As No. 38 approached the point where the accident occurred the enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead from their respective positions in the cab of the engine, and the members of the train crew were in various locations throughout the cars of the train. The brakes of this train had been tested and had functioned properly when used en route. The headlight was lighted brightly. Signal 8182 indicated Proceed, and the indication was called by the engineer and repeated by the fireman. The engineer initiated a service application of the brakes, and released the application when the speed of the train was reduced to 30 miles per hour. The engineer said the headlight of engine 1152 was dimmed, and he thought that this engine was clear of the main track. He was not aware before the collision occurred that engine 1152 was fouling the main track.

The distance between the clearance point of the auxiliary track and the switch at the entrance to station track No. 3 is 1,100 feet. The overall length of Diesel-electric engine 1152 and the cut of 15 cars was 1,000 feet. None of the members of the crew of engine 1152 except the engineer and the fireman was aware that engine 1152 was fouling the main track when the movement stopped. Apparently, No. 38 passed signal 8182, which indicated Proceed, before engine 1152 occupied the point fouling section of the auxiliary track.

All members of the crew of engine 1152 understood that whenever engine 1152 fouled the main track the rules required that protection be provided against overdue first-class trains in accordance with Rules 93 and 99.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by a switching movement fouling the main track immediately in front of an approaching train.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this fourteenth day of November, 1950.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.