

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2906
ST. LOUIS, SAN FRANCISCO AND TEXAS
RAILWAY COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT SHERMAN, TEX., ON
JUNE 30, 1945

SUMMARY

Railroad: St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas
Date: June 30, 1945
Location: Sherman, Tex.
Kind of accident: Head-end collision
Trains involved: Freight : Yard engine
Train number: Extra 1024-1039 :
North
Engine numbers: 1024-1039 : 3747
Consist: 37 cars, 2 : 3 cars
caboose
Estimated speed: 5 m. p. h. : 5 m. p. h.
Operation: Timetable and train orders;
yard limits
Track: Single; tangent; 0.7 percent
ascending grade northward
Weather: Clear
Time: 7:20 p. m.
Casualties: 1 injured
Cause: Failure properly to control
speed of both movements
within yard limits

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2906

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

ST. LOUIS, SAN FRANCISCO AND TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY

August 13, 1945.

Accident at Sherman, Tex., on June 30, 1945, caused by
failure properly to control the speed of both move-
ments within yard limits.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:


On June 30, 1945, there was a head-end collision be-
tween a freight train and a yard engine with cars on the
St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway at Sherman, Tex.,
which resulted in the injury of one employee.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and
disposition.

← To Irving

To Sherman →

X Sherman, Tex.
(Point of accident)
54.3 mi.
Carrollton
10.2 mi.
Irving, Tex.



Inv. No. 2906
St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Railway
Sherman, Tex.
June 30, 1945

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Fort Worth Sub-Division extending northward from Irving to Sherman, Tex., 65 miles, a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. The accident occurred within yard limits on the main track at Sherman, at a point 0.8 mile south of the station and 1.44 miles north of the south yard-limit sign. From the south there is a 2° curve to the right 1,120 feet in length, which is followed by a tangent 393 feet to the point of accident and 2,122 feet northward. The grade is 0.7 percent ascending northward.

The south switch of an auxiliary track, located on the west side of the main track and hereinafter referred to as track No. 1, is 287 feet north of the point of accident and is trailing-point for south-bound movements.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

14. ENGINE WHISTLE SIGNALS

NOTE: The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds * * *

SOUND	INDICATION
(a) o	Apply brakes. Stop.
* * *	

93. Yard limits will be indicated by "yard limit" boards. Within yard limits the main track or tracks may be used, protecting against first-class trains. Second and inferior class and extra trains must move within yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear.

Description of Accident

Extra 1024-1039 North, a north-bound freight train, consisting of engines 1024 and 1039, 37 cars and 2 cabooses, in the order named, passed Carrollton, 54.8 miles south of Sherman and the last open office, at 5:55 p. m., passed the south yard-limit sign at Sherman, and while moving at an estimated speed of 5 miles per hour it collided with yard engine 3747 at a point 1.44 miles north of the south yard-limit sign.

Yard engine 3747, headed southward and pulling a cut of 3 cars, entered the main track in the vicinity of the station

and was en route southward to enter track No. 1 at the south switch. While moving at an estimated speed of 5 miles per hour it collided with Extra 1024-1039 North at a point 287 feet south of the south switch of track No. 1.

The force of the impact moved yard engine 3747 and the cut of cars northward about 50 feet. The engine-truck wheels and the No. 1 pair of driving wheels of engine 1024 were derailed. The front ends of engines 3747 and 1024 were badly damaged.

It was clear and daylight at the time of the accident, which occurred about 7:20 p. m.

The engineer of yard engine 3747 was injured.

Discussion

Extra 1024-1039 North and yard engine 3747 were moving within yard limits when the collision occurred. Under the rules, each movement was required to be controlled in such manner that it could be stopped short of a train or an obstruction.

As yard engine 3747 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 8 miles per hour. The engineer and the fireman were maintaining a lookout ahead. The engine foreman and a switchman were on the front foot-board of the engine, and another switchman was on top of one of the cars. The foreman and the switchman who was on the car alighted at a point about 200 feet north of the south switch of track No. 1; and the switchman who was on the front foot-board alighted at the switch. When the engine was a short distance north of the switch the fireman saw the approaching train about 700 feet distant, and called a warning to the engineer. The fireman said that the engineer opened the throttle and increased the speed of the movement in an unsuccessful attempt to pull by the switch and back into clear on track No. 1. When the engine reached a point about 100 feet south of the switch the fireman jumped from the engine, and the collision occurred almost immediately afterward. The foreman and the switchmen first saw the approaching train after their engine had passed the south switch of track No. 1. The engineer was so seriously injured that he could not be questioned during the investigation, and it could not be determined when he first became aware that Extra 1024-1039 was approaching. The brake system of the yard engine and the cut of cars was properly charged and had operated properly prior to the accident.

As Extra 1024-1039 North was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 12 miles per hour, the throttle of each engine was closed and the enginemen of

each engine were maintaining a lookout ahead. The front brakeman was in the brakeman's booth on the tender of the first engine, and the conductor and the flagmen were in the caboose. The train-brake system was in the charge of the engineer of the first engine. The brakes of this train had been tested and functioned properly en route. Because of the curve south of the point where the accident occurred and buildings adjacent to the track, the view had by the enginemen of the track ahead was materially restricted. When the first engine was about 700 feet south of the point where the accident occurred the engineer saw the yard engine in the vicinity of the south switch of track No. 1, and made a service brake-pipe reduction. Then the enginemen of both engines of Extra 1024-1039 observed that the speed of the yard engine had increased, and they heard a stop signal sounded on the whistle of the yard engine. Then the engineer of engine 1024 moved the brake valve to emergency position and sounded a stop signal on the whistle of his engine. The speed of Extra 1024-1039 was about 5 miles per hour when the collision occurred.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of both movements within yard limits.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirteenth day of August, 1945.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.