

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON

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INVESTIGATION NO. 3057  
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY  
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT  
AT FORT WAYNE, IND., ON  
JANUARY 2, 1947

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SUMMARY

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Railroad: Pennsylvania  
Date: January 2, 1947  
Location: Fort Wayne, Ind.  
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision  
Trains involved: Freight : Engine  
Train numbers: Extra 7343 West : Extra 1064 West  
Engine numbers: 7343 : 1964  
Consist: 46 cars, caboose :  
Estimated speeds: Standing : 10 m. p. h.  
Operation: Operating rules  
Track: Secondary track: 4° curve; 0.18  
percent descending grade westward  
Weather: Snow and sleet  
Time: 4 a. m.  
Casualties: 2 injured  
Cause: Failure properly to control speed  
of following train in accordance  
with rules governing movement on  
secondary track

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

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INVESTIGATION NO. 3057

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS  
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY

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February 11, 1947

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Accident at Fort Wayne, Ind., on January 2, 1947, caused  
by failure properly to control the speed of the  
following train in accordance with the rules  
governing movement on a secondary track.

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
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On January 2, 1947, there was a rear-end collision between  
a freight train and an engine on the Pennsylvania Railroad at  
Fort Wayne, Ind., which resulted in the injury of two employees.

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<sup>1</sup>Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-  
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the  
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and  
disposition.



Inv. No. 3057  
 Pennsylvania Railroad  
 Fort Wayne, Ind.  
 January 2, 1947

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Fort Wayne Division extending between Division Post, near Crestline, Ohio, and Fort Wayne, Ind., 133.4 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a double-track line over which trains moving with the current of traffic are operated by signal indications. The main tracks from south to north are designated as No. 1, eastward, and No. 2, westward. In the vicinity of Fort Wayne an auxiliary track 2.7 miles long and designated as secondary track No. 3 parallels track No. 2 on the north. Movements on track No. 3 are authorized in accordance with operating rules applicable to secondary tracks, and time-table special instructions. There is no block system in use on this track. The east switch of a lead track, which connects track No. 3 and the tracks of an engine-house yard, is 1.57 miles east of the station. The east switch of a facing-point crossover, which connects tracks Nos. 2 and 3 and hereinafter referred to as crossover 1, is 1.15 miles east of the station. The accident occurred on track No. 3 at a point 521 feet east of the station. From the east on track No. 3 there is a tangent 470 feet in length, which is followed by a 4° curve to the right 453 feet to the point of accident and 7 feet westward. The grade is 0.10 percent descending westward.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

DEFINITIONS

\* \* \*

Reduced Speed--Prepared to stop short of train or obstruction.

\* \* \*

Secondary Track--A designated track upon which trains and engines may be operated without time-table authority, train orders or block signals.

105a. Unless otherwise provided, trains and engines using a secondary track must proceed at reduced speed unless the track upon which the movement is to be made is seen or known to be clear and switches properly lined.

\* \* \*

105b. Unless otherwise provided, trains and engines using a secondary track or a siding will not protect against following movements on such tracks.

The maximum authorized speed for all trains moving on track No. 3 is 30 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

Extra 7343 West, a west-bound freight train, consisting of engine 7343, 46 cars and a caboose, moving on track No. 2, proceeded through crossover 1 to track No. 3 and stopped about 3:55 a. m., with the rear end standing 681 feet east of the station at Fort Wayne. About 5 minutes later the rear end of Extra 7343 West was struck by Extra 1964 West.

Extra 1964 West, a west-bound engine en route from the engine-house to the passenger station at Fort Wayne, entered track No. 3 at the east lead-track switch about 3:50 a. m., and while moving at an estimated speed of 10 miles per hour it struck Extra 7343 West.

The caboose and the rear car of Extra 7343 West and the front end of the engine of Extra 1964 West were damaged.

The conductor and the flagman of Extra 7343 West were injured.

A mixture of snow and sleet was falling at the time of the accident, which occurred about 4 a. m.

Discussion

Extra 7343 West stopped on secondary track No. 3 about 3:55 a. m., in compliance with stop signals given by a switch-tender. About 5 minutes later the rear end of this train was struck by Extra 1964 West. The conductor and the flagman of Extra 7343 West were in the caboose, and they were not aware of anything being wrong until the collision occurred. Under the carrier's rules applicable to operation on secondary tracks, the crew of Extra 7343 West was not required to provide flag protection against following movements, and the speed of the following train was required to be so controlled that it could be stopped short of a preceding train or an obstruction.

Extra 1964 West consisted of the engine only, and the crew consisted of an engineer and a fireman. As this train was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 10 miles per hour. The headlight was lighted

No authority to proceed on Extra 7343 West

brightly, and the enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead. The engineer said he thought the speed of his engine was being controlled so that it could be stopped short of a preceding train. When he first observed the lighted red marker lamps of the preceding train about 350 feet distant, he thought that the train was on track No. 2. Soon afterward he realized that the preceding train was on track No. 3, and he then moved the independent brake valve to application position, but this action was not taken soon enough to stop Extra 1964 West short of the preceding train. ~~After the accident there was no condition found that would prevent the proper application of the brakes of engine 1964.~~

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train in accordance with the rules governing movement on a secondary track.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this eleventh day of February, 1947.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

J. P. BARTEL,  
Secretary.