

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON

---

INVESTIGATION NO. 2633  
THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY  
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT  
NEAR MARCY, OHIO, ON  
OCTOBER 11, 1942

---

SUMMARY

---

Railroad: New York Central  
Date: October 11, 1942  
Location: Marcy, Ohio  
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision  
Trains involved: Freight : Freight  
Train numbers: Extra 2180 West : Extra 2809 West  
Engine numbers 2190-2144 : 2809  
Consist: 93 cars, caboose : 90 cars, caboose  
Speed: Standing : 25 m. p. h.  
Operation: Yard  
Track: Double; 1°30' left curve; 0.325  
percent descending (grade westward)  
Weather: Dense fog  
Time: 5:25 a. m.  
Casualties: 1 killed  
Cause: Accident caused by failure to  
provide flag protection for  
preceding train and by failure  
properly to control speed of  
following train moving within  
yard limits and in conformity  
with signal indication

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

---

INVESTIGATION NO. 2633

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS  
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

---

December 7, 1942.

---

Accident near Marcy, Ohio, on October 11, 1942, caused by failure to provide flag protection for proceeding train and by failure properly to control speed of following train moving within yard limits and in conformity with signal indication.

---

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>


PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On October 11, 1942, there was a rear-end collision between two freight trains on the New York Central Railroad near Marcy, Ohio, which resulted in the death of one employee. This accident was investigated in conjunction with representatives of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.

---

<sup>1</sup>Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.

- Brady Lake, Ohio  
13.53 mi.
- Brandywine  
12.51 mi.
- Warner  
0.88 mi.
- X Point of accident  
0.84 mi.
- Marcy, Ohio



Inv-2633  
 New York Central Railroad  
 Marcy, Ohio  
 October 11, 1942

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Cleveland Division designated as the Lake Erie and Pittsburgh Branch and extending between Brady Lake and Marcy, Ohio, a distance of 27.76 miles. Between Warner, 1.72 miles east of Marcy, and Marcy this is a double-track line within yard limits over which trains are operated by operating rules without the use of train orders. There are no schedules in effect. The accident occurred on the westward main track at a point 4,883 feet west of the east yard-limit sign and 4,400 feet east of the tower at Marcy. Approaching from the east there are, in succession, a tangent 3,595 feet in length, a 0°20' curve to the left 856 feet, a tangent 3,079 feet and a compound curve to the left 2,972 feet, the maximum curvature of which is 4°. The accident occurred on the latter-mentioned curve at a point 269 feet west of its eastern end where the curvature is 1°30'. The grade for west-bound trains averages 0.28 percent descending a distance of 14.23 miles to Marcy and is 0.325 percent at the point of accident.

Semiautomatic signal Bl.1 and home signal 19, which govern west-bound movements through Marcy interlocking on the westward main track, are located, respectively, 240 feet east and 3,760 feet west of the point of accident. Signal Bl.1 is of the two-arm, three-indication, upper-quadrant, semaphore type, and is continuously lighted. Signal 19 has three arms. The top arm is fixed, the middle arm operates in three positions and the bottom arm in two positions. The involved night aspects and corresponding indications of these signals are as follows:

Signal Bl.1

<u>Aspect</u>	<u>Indication</u>
Red-over-red, staggered.	Stop, then proceed at restricted speed

Home Signal 19

Red-over-red-over-red.	Stop.
------------------------	-------

Operating rules read in part as follows:

SIGNAL DEFINITIONS.

Restricted Speed.--A speed not exceeding that which will enable a train to stop short of train ahead, obstruction, or switch not properly lined, look out for broken rail, and not exceeding slow speed.

Slow Speed.--A speed not exceeding fifteen miles per hour.

35. The following signals will be used by flagmen:

\* \* \*

Night signals--A red light,  
A white light,  
Torpedoes,  
Fusees.

93. Within yard limits the main track may be used, protecting against first class trains.

All other trains and engines must move within yard limits prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear.

Note.--Yard limits will be indicated by yard limit boards.

99. When a train stops under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying lighted fusees.

\* \* \*

The maximum authorized speed for freight trains is 40 miles per hour.

#### Description of Accident

Extra 2180 West, a west-bound freight train, consisted of engines 2180 and 2144, coupled, 92 loaded cars, 1 empty car and a caboose. This train departed from Brady Lake, 27.76 miles east of Marcy, at 12:10 a. m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains, departed from Brandywine, 14.23 miles east of Marcy and the last open office, at 4:15 a. m., stopped at signal Bl.1, then proceeded and stopped at home signal 19 at 5:02 a. m. with the rear end standing 240 feet west of signal Bl.1 and 4,883 feet west of the east yard-limit sign. About 21 minutes later the rear end was struck by Extra 2809 West.

Extra 2809 West, a west-bound freight train, consisted of engine 2809, 58 loaded and 32 empty cars and a caboose. This train departed from Brady Lake at 2:10 a. m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains, departed from

Brandywine at 4:55 a. m., passed the east yard-limit sign at Warner, passed signal B1.1, which displayed stop-and-proceed, and while moving at a speed of 25 miles per hour, as indicated by the tape of the speed recorder with which engine 2809 was equipped, it struck the rear end of Extra 2180 West.

The brakes of Extra 2809 had functioned properly at all points where used en route. There was no condition of the engine that obscured the vision or distracted the attention of the employees on the engine.

The caboose and the rear four cars of Extra 2180 West were derailed and stopped across the tracks. The caboose and the second car from the rear were destroyed and the remainder were considerably damaged. One truck of the fifth car from the rear was derailed. Engine 2809 was derailed to the right and stopped, badly damaged, practically upright and parallel to the track. The front end of the engine and the cab were destroyed. The tender stopped diagonally across the tracks at the rear of the engine. The first six cars were derailed and badly damaged. The front truck of the seventh car was derailed.

A dense fog prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred about 5:25 a. m.

The employee killed was the engineer of Extra 2809 West.

#### Discussion

The rules governing operation within yard limits in the territory involved provide that trains must move prepared to stop unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. According to the interpretation placed upon the flagging rule by operating officers of this railroad, when a train stops within yard limits under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection. All surviving members of the crews involved understood these requirements.

About 21 minutes after Extra 2180 West had stopped at Marcy, its rear end was struck by Extra 2809 West at a point 240 feet west of signal B1.1, which displayed stop-and-proceed, and 4,833 feet west of the east yard-limit sign. Extra 2180 was required to provide flag protection and Extra 2809 was required to stop short of any obstruction within yard limits.

When Extra 2180 stopped at Marcy, the conductor and the flagman were in the caboose. Soon afterward the flagman went back to provide flag protection. He said he reached a point

about 500 feet east of the caboose and remained there until he heard a train approaching from the east. He made no effort to provide flag protection, but ran toward his caboose and called a warning to the conductor. The conductor said that he remained in the caboose until the flagman warned him of the approaching train just before the collision occurred. These employees gave no reason why flag protection for their train was not provided. If adequate flag protection had been provided for Extra 2180 undoubtedly this accident would have been averted.

As Extra 2809 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was 28 miles per hour. The engineer and the front brakeman were maintaining a lookout ahead. Because of fog, visibility was restricted to a distance of about 100 feet. Just before the engine passed signal Bl.1, the fireman observed simultaneously the stop-and-proceed indication displayed by that signal and the red markers on the caboose of the train ahead. He called a warning to the engineer, who moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the distance was not sufficient for Extra 2809 to stop short of Extra 2180. If the speed of Extra 2809 had been controlled in accordance with the yard-limit rule, or if the indication displayed by signal Bl.1 had been obeyed, this accident would not have occurred.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure to provide flag protection for the preceding train and by failure properly to control the speed of the following train moving within yard limits and in conformity with signal indication.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this seventh day of December, 1942.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,  
Secretary.