

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2862
THE NEW YORK & LONG BRANCH RAILROAD COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT RED BANK, N. J., ON
JANUARY 18, 1945

SUMMARY

Railroad: New York & Long Branch
Date: January 18, 1945
Location: Red Bank, N. J.
Kind of accident: Side collision
Trains involved: Freight : Passenger
Train numbers: C. N. J. Extra : C. N. J. 3330
863 East
Engine numbers: 863 : 754
Consist: 55 cars, caboose : 5 cars
Estimated speed: Standing : 35 m. p. h.
Operation: Timetable, train orders and an
automatic block-signal and a
cab-signal system
Track: Double; 1°50' curve; 0.456 percent
ascending grade eastward
Weather: Clear
Time: 9:25 p. m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 28 injured
Cause: Derailed cars obstructing adjacent
main track immediately in front
of approaching passenger train

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2862

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE NEW YORK & LONG BRANCH RAILROAD COMPANY

March 9, 1945.


Accident at Red Bank, N. J., on January 18, 1945, caused
by derailed cars obstructing adjacent main track
immediately in front of an approaching passenger
train.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On January 18, 1945, there was a side collision between a passenger train and derailed cars of a freight train of the Central Railroad of New Jersey on the line of the New York & Long Branch Railroad at Red Bank, N. J., which resulted in the death of 1 employee, and the injury of 27 passengers and 1 employee off duty. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



To South Amboy →

To Bay Head Jct. ↓

- | | | |
|---|----------------------|-----------|
| ○ | South Amboy, N. J. | 15.07 mi. |
| ○ | Red Bank | 0.75 mi. |
| X | Point of accident | 5.18 mi. |
| ○ | Long Branch | 15.64 mi. |
| ○ | Bay Head Jct., N. J. | |

Inv. No. 2862
 New York & Long Branch Railroad
 Red Bank, N. J.
 January 18, 1945

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the New York & Long Branch Railroad extending eastward, according to timetable directions, from Bay Head Jct. to South Amboy, N. J., 36.64 miles. This was a double-track line over which trains moving with the current of traffic were operated by timetable, train orders, and an automatic block-signal and a cab-signal system. Trains of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, hereinafter referred to as the C. N. J., were regularly operated over this line. At Red Bank, 21.57 miles east of Bay Head Jct., a spur track 5,062 feet in length paralleled the eastward main track on the south. The switch was 822 feet west of the station, and was trailing-point for east-bound movements. The distance between the track centers of the eastward main track and the spur track was 13 feet 4 inches. The derailment of the freight cars occurred on the spur track at a point 3,854 feet west of the station, where the spur track and the main tracks were crossed at grade by a private road crossing, and the side collision between the derailed cars and the passenger train occurred 3,945 feet west of the station. From the west on the eastward main track there was a tangent about 5 miles in length, which was followed by a 1°50' curve to the right 629 feet to the point of accident and 536 feet eastward. The grade was 0.456 percent ascending eastward.

The private road crossed the tracks at practically right angles. The road and the crossing were 14 feet wide, and were surfaced with a mixture of crushed stone and earth. Flangeway guards were not provided.

Automatic signal L-174, governing east-bound movements on the eastward main track, was 2,228 feet west of the point of collision.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

102. * * *

* * *

When a train is disabled so it may obstruct the opposite track, trains on that track must be stopped.

The maximum authorized speed for the passenger train was 60 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

Extra 863 East, an east-bound C. N. J. freight train, consisted of engine 863, 55 cars and a caboose. About 9:24 p. m., while this train was moving westward on the spur track at an estimated speed of about 3 miles per hour the forty-eighth to the fiftieth cars, inclusive, were derailed, and fouled the eastward main track.

No. 3330, an east-bound C. N. J. passenger train, consisted of engine 754 and five coaches. All cars were of steel construction. This train departed from Long Branch, 5.93 miles west of Red Bank, at 9:17 p. m., 1 minute late, and while moving at an estimated speed of 35 miles per hour it struck the derailed cars of Extra 863 East.

No. 3330 was not derailed, but the right side of the engine was considerably damaged and the right side of each car was slightly damaged.

It was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 9:25 p. m.

The engineer of No. 3330 was killed.

Discussion

When Extra 863 East was moving westward on the spur track the flagman was on the rear platform of the caboose and the other members of the train crew were on the south side of the spur track in the vicinity of the front end of the train. The flagman said that he did not observe any abnormal movement of the caboose when it passed over the private road crossing. There was no emergency application of the air brakes of Extra 863 immediately prior to the collision, and no member of the crew was aware that any part of the train was derailed until after the collision occurred.

As No. 3330 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 35 miles per hour. The headlight was lighted brightly. The air brakes had functioned properly at all points where used en route. The engineer was on the right side of the cab, which was located midway of the boiler, and the fireman was in the fireman's shelter at the rear of the back-head of the firebox. From this location the fireman was unable to maintain a lookout ahead because storm curtains covered the gangway at each end. The fireman and the members of the train crew said that there was no application of the air brakes immediately prior to the collision, and they were not aware of anything being wrong until the accident occurred. The air brakes became applied in emergency after the collision as a

result of a broken air pipe on the right side of the cab.

During a period of several days immediately prior to the accident a considerable amount of sleet and snow had fallen in this vicinity. The division engineer said that sufficient ice had formed on the rails of the spur track and in the flangeways at the crossing to cause the wheels of the cars of Extra 863 which passed over the crossing to rise high enough for the flanges to cross over the top surface of the head of the rails. He was of the opinion that the caboose and the fifty-first to the fifty-fifth cars, inclusive, remained in line with the track as these cars moved over the crossing, but the forty-eighth to the fiftieth cars, inclusive, followed a tangential line and became derailed at the crossing because of the ice formation. The derailed cars did not become uncoupled from the other cars, and the brake-pipe hose were not separated. The track foreman said that because his force was engaged in removing snow and ice from the flangeways of numerous public grade crossings in this vicinity during the storm no inspection was made of the condition of the private-road crossing immediately prior to the accident.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by derailed cars obstructing an adjacent main track immediately in front of an approaching passenger train.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this ninth day of March, 1945.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.