

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON

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INVESTIGATION NO. 2798  
THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY  
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT  
AT MARQUAND, MO., ON  
MAY 10, 1944

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SUMMARY

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Railroad: Missouri Pacific  
Date: May 10, 1944  
Location: Marquand, Mo.  
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision  
Trains involved: Freight : Freight  
Train numbers: Extra 153 North : Extra 18 North  
Engine numbers: 153-9 : 18-4  
Consist: 45 cars, cabooses : 39 cars, 2 cabooses  
Estimated speed: Standing : 15 m. p. h.  
Operation: Timetable and train orders;  
yard limits  
Track: Single; tangent; 0.20 percent  
ascending grade northward  
Weather: Clear  
Time: 3:44 p. m.  
Casualties: 1 killed; 4 injured  
Cause: Failure properly to control  
speed of following train  
moving within yard limits

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

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INVESTIGATION NO. 2798

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS  
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

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June 7, 1944.

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Accident at Marquand, Mo., on May 10, 1944, caused by  
failure properly to control the speed of the fol-  
lowing train moving within yard limits.

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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>


PATTERSON, Chairman:

On May 10, 1944, there was a rear-end collision be-  
tween two freight trains on the Missouri Pacific Railroad  
at Marquand, Mo., which resulted in the death of one  
employee and the injury of four employees.

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<sup>1</sup>Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-  
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the  
Commission to Chairman Patterson for consideration and dis-  
position.

o	Bismarck, Mo.
	42.67 mi.
X	Marquand (P. of A.)
	60.26 mi.
o	Charleston, Mo.



Inv. No. 2798  
 Missouri Pacific Railroad  
 Marquand, Mo.  
 May 10, 1944

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Missouri Division designated as the Belmont Subdivision and extending northward from Charleston to Bismarck, Mo., 102.93 miles. This was a single-track line over which trains were operated by timetable and train orders. There was no block system in use. The accident occurred within yard limits on the main track at Marquand, 60.26 miles north of Charleston, at a point 2,045 feet south of the station and 241 feet north of the south yard-limit sign. From the south there were, in succession, a tangent 1,107 feet in length, a  $2^{\circ}27'$  curve to the left 320 feet, a tangent 544 feet, a  $3^{\circ}$  curve to the right 645 feet and a tangent 605 feet to the point of accident and a considerable distance beyond. The grade for north-bound trains varied between 1.50 percent and 0.11 percent descending 3,000 feet, then it was, successively, 0.15 percent ascending 500 feet, 0.20 percent descending 300 feet, 0.60 percent ascending 700 feet, 0.30 percent ascending 500 feet, 0.40 percent ascending 400 feet and 0.20 percent ascending 165 feet to the point of accident and a considerable distance beyond.

DEFINITIONS.

\* \* \*

Restricted Speed.--Proceed prepared to stop short of train, obstruction, or anything that may require the speed of a train or engine to be reduced.

\* \* \*

Operating rules read in part as follows:

93. \* \* \*

Within yard limits the main track may be used without protecting against second and inferior class, extra trains and engines.

Second and inferior class, extra trains and engines must move within yard limits at restricted speed.

The maximum authorized speed for freight trains was 30 miles per hour.

### Description of Accident

Extra 153 North, a north-bound freight train, consisted of engines 153 and 9, 45 cars and a cabooses, in the order named. This train stopped on the main track at Marquand at 3:13 p. m., with the rear end standing 241 feet north of the south yard-limit sign. About 31 minutes later the rear end was struck by Extra 18 North.

Extra 18 North, a north-bound freight train, consisted of engines 18 and 4, 39 cars and 2 cabooses, in the order named. While this train was moving at an estimated speed of 15 miles per hour it struck the rear end of Extra 153 North.

The cabooses and the rear car of Extra 153 North were demolished. The engines and seven cars of Extra 18 North were derailed and damaged.

From the right side of a north-bound engine the view of the point where the accident occurred was materially restricted, because of an embankment and vegetation adjacent to the track and track curvature.

It was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 3:44 p. m.

The fireman of the second engine of Extra 18 North was killed. The engineer and the fireman of the first engine, the engineer of the second engine, and the front brakeman of Extra 18 North were injured.

### Discussion

The rules of this carrier governing operation within yard limits provide that all trains except first-class trains must be operated prepared to stop short of a train or an obstruction, and all the surviving employees concerned so understood.

About 31 minutes after Extra 153 North stopped at Marquand the rear end was struck by Extra 18 North, about 240 feet north of the south yard-limit sign.

As Extra 18 North was approaching Marquand the speed was about 30 miles per hour. The train air-brake system was in the charge of the engineer of the first engine. The brakes had been tested and functioned properly en route. The front brakeman, who was on the first engine, and the enginemen of each engine were maintaining a lookout ahead. When the first engine was about 4,000 feet south of the south yard-limit sign,

the engineer made a 7-pound brake-pipe reduction. From this point northward the view of the track ahead was materially restricted because of embankments and vegetation adjacent to the track and track curvature. When the first engine was in the vicinity of the south yard-limit sign the speed was about 25 miles per hour, and the engineer made an additional 7-pound brake-pipe reduction. Immediately afterward the employees on each engine saw the caboose of the preceding train. The engineer of the first engine immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position. The speed of Extra 18 North was about 15 miles per hour when the collision occurred.

The engineer of the first engine of Extra 18 operated engine 18 as the second engine of a south-bound train over this territory on the day the accident occurred. Prior to that trip, he had not operated an engine over this territory during the previous 12 years. He said that prior to making the trip involved he informed the trainmaster he was not familiar with the territory, but the trainmaster instructed him to proceed. However, the engineer knew the locations of yard limits on this subdivision.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train moving within yard limits.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this seventh day of June, 1944.

By the Commission, Chairman Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,  
Secretary.