

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON

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INVESTIGATION NO. 3027  
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY  
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT  
AT KANSAS CITY, MO., ON  
SEPTEMBER 28, 1946

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SUMMARY

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Railroad: Missouri Pacific  
Date: September 28, 1946  
Location: Kansas City, Mo.  
Kind of accident: Side collision  
Equipment involved: Engine and cars : Engine  
Engine numbers: 9449 : 1513  
Consist: 9 cars :  
Estimated speeds: 2 m. p. h. : 2 m. p. h.  
Operation: Operating rules  
Tracks: Yard tracks; tangent; level  
Weather: Cloudy  
Time: 7:10 p. m.  
Casualties: 1 killed; 1 injured  
Cause: Crossover switch being improperly lined for intended movement of engine

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

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INVESTIGATION NO. 3027

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS  
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

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November 12, 1946

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Accident at East Yard, Kansas City, Mo., on September 28,  
1946, caused by a crossover switch being improperly  
lined for the intended movement of an engine.

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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>


PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On September 28, 1946, there was a side collision  
between two engines on the Missouri Pacific Railroad at  
East Yard, Kansas City, Mo. which resulted in the death  
of one employee, and the injury of one employee.

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<sup>1</sup>Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-  
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the  
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and  
disposition.

Lead track No. 1 - 6,953 ft.  
Lead track No. 2 - 3,315 ft.



Inv. No. 3027  
Missouri Pacific Railroad  
Kansas City, Mo.  
September 28, 1946

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Kansas City Terminal Division designated as East Yard. In the vicinity of the point of accident two lead tracks, which parallel one another, connect a classification yard on the east and a car-repair yard and engine-house yard-tracks on the west. The lead tracks are designated from south to north as tracks Nos. 1 and 2, which are, respectively, 6,953 feet and 3,315 feet long. The east switch of a crossover, 205 feet long and designated as crossover 50, which connects tracks Nos. 1 and 2, is about 2,950 feet west of the east end of track No. 1. Crossover 50 is facing-point for east-bound movements from track No. 1 to track No. 2. Movement of engines on tracks Nos. 1 and 2 are governed by operating rules. The accident occurred at the fouling point of track No. 2 and crossover 50. From the east track No. 2 is tangent throughout a distance of 1,934 feet to the east switch of crossover 50 and some distance westward. From the west on track No. 1 there are, in succession, a 10° curve to the left 215 feet in length, a tangent 275 feet, a 6° curve to the left 80 feet and a tangent 351 feet to the west switch of crossover 50. The grade is practically level.

The switchstand of the west switch of crossover No. 50 is of the hand-throw low-stand type. Neither a target nor a switch lamp or other illuminating device is provided on the switchstand.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

DEFINITIONS.

\* \* \*

Restricted Speed.--Proceed prepared to stop short of train, obstruction, or anything that may require the speed of a train or engine to be reduced.

\* \* \*

105. Trains or engines using a siding or yard track must proceed at restricted speed.

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### Description of Accident

Engine 9449, headed eastward and pushing 9 cars westward, was moving on track No. 2 at an estimated speed of 2 miles per hour when the engine was struck by engine 1513 at the fouling point of crossover 50.

Engine 1513, headed eastward, was moving eastward on track No. 1 at an estimated speed of 2 miles per hour when it entered crossover 50 at the west switch and struck engine 9449.

None of the equipment was derailed. The cab of engine 9449 was demolished, and the front end of engine 1513 was considerably damaged.

The weather was cloudy and it was dark at the time of the accident, which occurred about 7:10 p. m.

The engineer of engine 9449 was killed, and the fireman of this engine was injured.

### Discussion

A few minutes before the accident occurred, engine 9449, headed eastward, had shoved a cut of cars westward from track No. 2 through crossover 50 to track No. 1 thence to the tracks of a car-repair yard. After this movement was completed the engine foreman lined both switches of the crossover to normal position. Just before the accident occurred one of the switchmen of engine 9449 was in the vicinity of the west switch of the crossover as his engine was pushing a cut of 9 cars westward on track No. 2. He saw engine 1513 approaching from the west on track No. 1, and, because he did not see his engine foreman line the west crossover-switch to normal position, he thought the switch was lined for entry to the crossover. This switch is not provided with a target nor a switch lamp or other illuminating device. The switchman did not examine the switch points to determine the position of the switch, and he erroneously lined the switch for entry to the crossover. The other surviving members of the crew of engine 9449 were not aware of the action taken by this switchman until after the collision occurred. The engineer of engine 9449 was killed.

Engine 1513, headed eastward, was en route eastward from the engine house to the freight classification yard. The crew of this engine consisted of the engineer and the fireman. This engine stopped on track No. 1 a short distance west of the west switch of crossover 50 and waited several

minutes until engine 9449 had completed switching movements through the crossover. The fireman of engine 1513 examined the points of the west switch of crossover 50 a short time before the switchman of engine 9449 changed its position, and soon afterward he signaled his engineer to proceed and then boarded his engine. The engineers of engine 1513 did not see the switchman operate the west crossover-switch, and they were not aware that it was not properly lined for the intended movement of their engine until the engine entered the crossover. Then the engineer closed the throttle lever and moved the independent brake valve to application position, but the collision occurred before the engine could be stopped. The brakes of this engine had been tested and functioned properly.

If the switchstand of the west crossover-switch had been provided with a lamp or other illuminating device, it would have indicated to the employees involved that the switch was not properly lined for the intended movement of engine 1513, and this accident could have been averted.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by a crossover switch being improperly lined for the intended movement of an engine.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this twelfth day of November, 1946.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,  
Secretary.