

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2535

THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY

REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
NEAR MORGANTOWN, IND., ON
OCTOBER 9, 1941

SUMMARY

Railroad: Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago
& St. Louis

Date: October 9, 1941

Location: Morgantown, Ind.

Kind of accident: Head-end collision

Trains involved: Mixed : Freight

Train numbers: 354 : Extra 1489 West

Engine numbers: 1526 : 1489

Consist: 2 cars : 2 cars and caboose

Estimated speed: Standing : 12-17 m. p. h.

Operation: Timetable and train orders

Track: Single; tangent; 0.248 percent
descending grade westward

Weather: Rain

Time: 1:53 p. m.

Casualties: 3 injured

Cause: Accident caused by train order being
accepted at a station after train
to which it was addressed had passed
that station

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2535

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY

December 17, 1941.

Accident near Morgantown, Ind., on October 9, 1941, caused by
a train order being accepted at a station after train to
which it was addressed had passed that station.

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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

PATTERSON, Commissioner:


On October 9, 1941, there was a head-end collision between
a mixed train and a freight train on the Cleveland, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Railway near Morgantown, Ind., which re-
sulted in the injury of six employees. This accident was inves-
tigated in conjunction with a representative of the Public Ser-
vice Commission of Indiana.

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Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce
Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission
to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



- o Fairland, Ind. 12.5 mi.
- o Franklin 7.2 mi.
- o Trafalgar 5.11 mi.
- X Point of accident 1.59 mi.
- o Morgantown 11.6 mi.
- o Martinsville, Ind.



Inv-2535
 C. C. C. & St. L. Ry.
 Morgantown, Ind.
 October 9, 1941.

To Martinsville

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Indiana Division which extends between Martinsville and Fairland, Ind., a distance of 38 miles. This is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders; there is no block system in use. The accident occurred at a point 1.59 miles east of the station at Morgantown. As the point of accident is approached from the west there are, in succession, a tangent 215 feet in length, a 2°11'36" curve to the right 1,360 feet and a tangent 66 feet to the point of accident. As the point of accident is approached from the east there is a 0°55' curve to the right 1,862 feet in length, which is followed by a tangent 1,303 feet to the point of accident. The grade for east-bound trains varies from 0.248 percent to 0.689 percent ascending a distance of 3,126 feet to the point of accident and is 0.248 percent ascending at the point of accident. The grade for west-bound trains varies from 0.248 percent to 1.018 percent descending a distance of 7,274 feet to the point of accident.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

S-208b. On portions of the road where no form of block system is in use, a train order must not be sent to a superior train at the last open train-order office (except at a station where the superior train is required to receive Clearance Form A) directing it to meet or wait for an opposing train at a station where no operator is on duty, if it can be avoided. When the movement of a passenger train is affected, the order to the inferior train must not be made "complete" until the superior train has been brought to a stop and a copy of the order delivered to the conductor or engineman.

219. An operator must not repeat or give the "X" response to a train order for a train which has been cleared or of which the engine has passed his train-order signal until he has obtained the signatures of the conductor and engineman to the order.

221 (A). Unless otherwise provided, a fixed signal must be used at each train-order office, which shall indicate "stop" when there is an operator on duty, except when changed to "proceed" to allow a train to pass after getting train orders or for which there are no orders. The signal must be returned to "stop" as soon as a train has passed.

* * *

If the fixed signal should fail to work properly, Clearance Form A must be used. * * *

222. Operators must promptly record and report to the train dispatcher the time of arrival and departure of all trains and the direction of extra trains.

There are no train-order signals on the territory involved in this accident.

The maximum authorized speed for the trains involved is 30 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

No. 354, an east-bound first-class mixed train, consisted of engine 1526, one box car and one coach, in the order named; the coach was of steel construction. At Martinsville, 11.6 miles west of Morgantown, the crew received copies of train order No. 44, Form 19, which read as follows:

Eng 1489 run Extra Fairland to
Martinsville and meet No. 354 at
Morgantown

No. 354 departed from Martinsville at 1:15 p. m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains, 6 hours 5 minutes late, and at 1:42 p. m. arrived at Morgantown where the crew received copies of train order No. 49, Form 19, which read as follows:

Extra 1489 West meet No 354 at
Trafalgar instead of Morgantown

This order was made complete at 1:40 p. m. No. 354 departed from Morgantown at 1:45 p. m., 5 hours 55 minutes late, and at a point 1.59 miles east of Morgantown it stopped on the main track and immediately afterward was struck by Extra 1489 West.

Extra 1489 West, a west-bound freight train, consisted of engine 1489, one loaded car, one empty car and a caboose. At Fairland, 24.81 miles east of the point of accident, the crew received copies of train order No. 44, Form 19, previously quoted. This train departed from Fairland at 12:29 p. m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains, stopped at Franklin, 12.31 miles east of the point where the accident occurred, and performed switching service east of the station. This train then stopped at the station where a brakeman delivered company mail and waybills to a clerk during the absence of the operator. Extra 1489 departed from Franklin at 1:15 p. m., according to the statement of the conductor, passed the blind

siding at Trafalgar, 5.11 miles east of the point where the accident occurred, where it should have entered the siding to clear for No. 354 if the crew had received copies of order No. 49, and while it was moving at an estimated speed of 12 to 17 miles per hour it collided with No. 354.

Because of track curvature and trees adjacent to the track, the view of the point of accident from the right side of an east-bound engine is restricted to 580 feet; however, when an east-bound engine is 369 feet west of the point of accident the view is unrestricted throughout a distance of 1,640 feet. The point where the accident occurred could be seen from the right side of a west-bound engine a distance of 1,640 feet and from the left side, 1,303 feet.

The pilot of engine 1489 was torn off, the left cylinder was cracked, the front deck-casting was broken, the engine truck was demolished and driven under the cylinders, and the front driving wheels were raised off the rails. The front deck-casting of engine 1526 was bent and the engine truck was damaged.

A light rain was falling at the time of the accident, which occurred about 1:53 p. m.

The employees injured were the conductor, the front brakeman, the middle brakeman and the flagman of No. 354, and the conductor and the front brakeman of Extra 1489.

Data

During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident the average movement over the territory involved was 2 trains daily except Sunday. There was no train operated on Sundays.

On October 16, Bulletin Order No. 35 reading as follows was issued:

SUBJECT - Rule 83D - Clearing of trains:

All concerned:

At Morgantown and Franklin eastward and westward trains must not leave without Clearance Form A except during hours train order stations are closed.

Discussion

The rules governing operation on the line involved provide that an operator must not accept a train order for delivery to a train at his station after that train has passed the station. In addition, a fixed signal must be used at each train-order station;

however, there was no form of train-order signal in use on the line involved.

The crews of both trains held copies of train order No. 44, which established a meeting point at Morgantown between No. 354, an east-bound first-class mixed train, and Extra 1489 West. When No. 354 arrived at Morgantown Extra 1489 had not been reported as having departed from Franklin, 13.9 miles east of Morgantown. In order to avoid delay to No. 354, the train dispatcher called the operators at Franklin and Morgantown to copy an order to change the meeting point of these trains from Morgantown to Trafalgar, 6.7 miles east of Morgantown, but the operator at Franklin was at lunch. Upon his return a clerk in the station informed him that the dispatcher had called on the telephone concerning the issuance of an order to be delivered to Extra 1489. The operator inquired if Extra 1489 had passed the train-order station and was informed by the clerk that it was performing switching service east of the station. Although a member of the train crew had been in the office to deliver waybills some time prior, the clerk failed to observe that Extra 1489 had departed westward about 1:15 p. m. On the information received from the clerk, the operator called the dispatcher and informed him that Extra 1489 had not passed beyond his train-order station. The dispatcher then transmitted train order No. 49 simultaneously to the operators at Franklin and Morgantown. This order superseded train order No. 44 and established the meeting point at Trafalgar instead of Morgantown. The operator at Franklin repeated the order first, then the operator at Morgantown repeated it, and the dispatcher made it complete to both at 1:40 p. m. The operator at Morgantown delivered copies of this order, together with copies of clearance Form A, to the crew of No. 354 and this train departed at 1:45 p. m. Soon afterward the agent at Trafalgar reported to the operator at Franklin that Extra 1489 was passing his station. This was the first knowledge the operator at Franklin had that Extra 1489 had passed his train-order station.

Under train order No. 44 the crew of Extra 1489 was authorized to use the main track as far as the east siding-switch at Morgantown and under train order No. 49 the crew of No. 354 was authorized to use the main track as far as the east siding-switch at Trafalgar; therefore, both trains were authorized to use the main track between the east siding-switch at Morgantown and the east siding-switch at Trafalgar, and as a result of this lap of authority these trains collided between Morgantown and Trafalgar.

The operator at Franklin had an unrestricted view to the east of 2,500 feet. If he had determined for himself that he did not have control of Extra 1489 before he accepted an order affecting the movement of that train, this accident could have been averted.

For a considerable period prior to the current year, a mixed train had been scheduled for tri-weekly service on the line involved. This resulted in only one train being operated daily except Sunday. On August 1, 1941, because of increased business, service was increased to one train in each direction, daily except Sunday. Within the memory of most of the employees involved and the supervisory officials, there had been no train-order signals in use on this line; however, the dispatcher was not aware of this fact. On October 16, a bulletin order was issued, addressed to all concerned, requiring that all east-bound and all west-bound trains must not depart from either Franklin or Morgantown without a clearance Form A. If this order had been in effect on the day of the accident, Extra 1489 would not have been permitted to leave Franklin until the crew received clearance Form A, and the accident would not have occurred.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by a train order being accepted at a station after train to which it was addressed had passed that station.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this seventeenth day of December, 1941.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

W. P. BARTEL,

Secretary,

(SEAL)