

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2933
THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC
RAILWAY COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
NEAR GASCONDY, MO., ON
SEPTEMBER 22, 1945

SUMMARY

Railroad: Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Date: September 22, 1945
Location: Gascondy, Mo.
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision
Trains involved: Freight : Freight
Train numbers: 92 : Extra 25⁰¹ East
Engine numbers: ~~2057~~ : 2591
Consist: ~~32 cars~~, caboose : caboose
Estimated speed: Standing : 15 m. p. h.
Operation: Timetable and train orders
Track: Single; 6⁰ curve; 0.76 percent ascending grade eastward
Weather: Raining
Time: 7:20 a. m.
Casualties: 1 killed
Cause: Failure to provide adequate protection for preceding train

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2933

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

October 25, 1945.

Accident near Gascondy, Mo., on September 22, 1945, caused
by failure to provide adequate protection for the
preceding train.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:


On September 22, 1945, there was a rear-end collision
between two freight trains on the Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Railway near Gascondy, Mo., which resulted in the
death of one employee.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and
disposition.

To Lackland →

← To Elden

○	Lackland, Mo.
	100.44 mi.
X	Point of accident
	1.06 mi.
	Gascondy
○	Elden, Mo.
	45.60 mi.



Inv. No. 2933
 Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
 Gascondy, Mo.
 September 22, 1945

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Missouri-Kansas Division which extends between Eldon and Lackland, Mo., 147.1 miles, a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. The accident occurred on the main track 46.66 miles east of Eldon, at a point 1.06 miles east of the station at Gascondy. From the west there are, in succession, a tangent 1,265 feet in length, a 6° curve to the left 270 feet, a tangent 626 feet and a 6° curve to the right 472 feet to the point of accident and 188 feet eastward. Throughout a distance of more than 1 mile immediately west of the point of accident the grade varies between 0.76 and 1.0 percent ascending eastward, and is 0.76 percent at the point of accident.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

14. Engine Whistle Signals.

NOTE.--The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds; "___" for longer sounds.
* * *

Sound.	Indication.
* * *	
(c) ___ o o o	Flagman protect rear of train.
* * *	

35. The following signals will be used by flagmen:

- Day signals (A red flag,
(Torpedoes and
(Fusees.
- Night signals (A red light,
(Torpedoes and
(Fusees.

91. Unless some form of block signal is used:

Trains in the same direction must keep not less than five minutes apart, except in closing up at stations.

* * *

99. When a train stops under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full protection, placing two torpedoes, and when necessary, in addition, displaying lighted fusees.

* * *

When a train is moving under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must take such action as may be necessary to insure full protection. By night, or by day when the view is obscured, lighted fuses must be thrown off at proper intervals.

When day signals cannot be plainly seen, owing to weather or other conditions, night signals must also be used. Conductors and enginemen are responsible for the protection of their trains.

The maximum authorized speed for freight trains is 45 miles per hour on tangents and 35 miles per hour on curves.

Description of Accident

No. 92, an east-bound second-class freight train, consisting of engine 2667, 32 cars and a caboose, departed from Eldon, the last open office, 45.6 miles west of Gascondy, at 4:35 a. m., 2 hours 25 minutes late, and passed Gascondy about 7:12 a. m., 2 hours 57 minutes late. Because of moisture on the rails and an obstruction in the sand pipes of the engine, the train stalled on the ascending grade, and it stopped about 7:17 a. m., with the rear end standing about 1.06 miles east of the station at Gascondy. About 3 minutes later the rear end was struck by Extra 2591 East.

Extra 2591 East, an east-bound freight train, consisting of engine 2591 and a caboose, departed from Eldon at 5:30 a. m., passed Gascondy about 7:18 a. m., and while moving at an estimated speed of 15 miles per hour it struck No. 92.

The caboose of No. 92 was demolished. The rear car of No. 92 and the front end of the engine of Extra 2591 East were considerably damaged.

It was raining at the time of the accident, which occurred about 7:20 a. m.

The conductor of No. 92 was killed.

During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident, the average daily movement in the vicinity of the point of accident was 10.9 trains.

Discussion

Because of moisture on the rails on a 0.76 percent ascending grade and an obstruction in the sand pipes of the engine which prevented sand from being deposited upon the rails, the engine of No. 92 stalled and the train stopped on the main track about 1 mile east of Gascondy about 7:17 a. m., with the rear end standing 472 feet east of the west end of a 6° curve to the right. About 3 minutes later the rear end was struck by Extra 2591 East.

As Extra 2591 East was approaching the point where the accident occurred, the speed was about 25 miles per hour. The brakes had functioned properly at all points where used en route. The enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead. No train order restricting the authority of Extra 2591 to proceed at the maximum authorized speed had been issued, and no warning signal was seen or heard by the members of the crew immediately prior to the accident. In this vicinity the view had by the enginemen of the track ahead was materially restricted because of embankments and vegetation adjacent to the track, and track curvature. The first these employees were aware of anything being wrong was when the engineer saw the caboose of the preceding train about 280 feet distant. Then he moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the collision occurred before the train could be stopped.

Throughout a distance of approximately 1 mile immediately west of the point where No. 92 stopped, the maximum speed attained by this train on the ascending grade was about 20 miles per hour. The engineer said that when he became aware that the engine was going to stall he sounded the whistle signal for the flagman to provide protection. When the train stopped, the conductor and the flagman were in the caboose. The conductor was killed in the accident. The flagman understood that he was required to drop lighted fusees at frequent intervals during the time his train was moving at less than normal speed. However, no fusee was dropped at any point in this territory. The flagman said that he remained in the caboose until he heard a train approaching from the west. Then he made an attempt to provide flag protection, but the collision occurred immediately after he alighted from the caboose.

In this territory trains are operated by timetable and train orders only. If an adequate block system had been in use on this line, the crew of the following train would have received definite information that the preceding train was occupying the main track in the same block, and this accident could have been prevented.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure to provide adequate protection for the preceding train.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this twenty-fourth day of October, 1945.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.