

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2737
THE CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT RED WING, MINN., ON
NOVEMBER 2, 1943

SUMMARY

Railroad: Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
and Pacific

Date: November 2, 1943

Location: Red Wing, Minn.

Kind of accident: Rear-end collision

Trains involved: Freight : Freight

Train numbers: Extra 618 West : 83

Engine numbers: 618 : 203-341

Consist: 83 cars, caboose : 84 cars, caboose

Speed: Standing : 6 m. p. h.

Operation: Timetable, train orders and auto-
matic block and cab-signal system

Track: Double; 2°40' curve; 0.31 percent
descending grade westward

Weather: Hazy

Time: 6:50 a. m.

Casualties: 1 killed

Cause: Failure properly to control speed
of following train moving on siding

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2737

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY

November 29, 1943.

Accident at Red Wing, Minn., on November 2, 1943, caused
by failure properly to control the speed of the fol-
lowing train moving on siding.


REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On November 2, 1943, there was a rear-end collision
between two freight trains on the Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul and Pacific Railroad at Red Wing, Minn., which
resulted in the death of one employee.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and
disposition.

- | | | |
|---|------------------------|----------|
| o | La Crosse, Wis. | 59.7 mi. |
| o | Wabasha, Minn. | 29.4 mi. |
| X | Red Wing (P. of A.) | 21.6 mi. |
| o | St. Croix Tower, Minn. | |



Inv. No. 2737
 C. M. St. P. & F. R. R.
 Red Wing, Minn.
 November 2, 1943

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the La Crosse and River Division designated as the First Subdivision and extending between La Crosse, Wis., and St. Croix Tower, Minn., 110.7 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a double-track line over which trains were operated by timetable, train orders and an automatic block and cab-signal system. At Red Wing, Minn., a siding 4,896 feet in length paralleled the westward main track on the north. The east switch of this siding was 5,691 feet east of the station. The accident occurred on the siding 1,022 feet west of the east siding-switch. From the east there were, in succession, a 3°30' curve to the right 1,119 feet in length, a tangent 388 feet and a 2°40' curve to the left 1,062 feet to this point and 1,186 feet beyond. The grade for west-bound trains was 0.31 percent descending.

DEFINITIONS.

* * *

Restricted Speed.- Proceed prepared to stop short of train, obstruction, or anything that may require the speed of a train to be reduced.

* * *

Operating rules read in part as follows:

105. Unless otherwise provided, trains using a siding must proceed at restricted speed.

* * *

Description of Accident

Extra 618 West, a west-bound freight train consisting of engine 618, 83 cars and a caboose, stopped into clear on the siding at Red Wing about 5:45 a. m., with the rear end standing 1,022 feet west of the east siding-switch. About 1 hour 5 minutes later the rear end was struck by No. 83.

No. 83, a west-bound second-class freight train, consisting of engines 203 and 341, 84 cars and a caboose, in the order named, passed Wabasha, 29.4 miles east of Red Wing and the last open office east of Red Wing, at 5:07 a. m., 4 hours 27 minutes late, entered the east siding-switch at Red Wing and while moving on the siding at an estimated speed of 6 miles per hour it collided with the rear end of Extra 618 West.

The caboose and the rear four cars of Extra 618 were derailed and considerably damaged. The first engine of No. 83 was derailed to the north and stopped, considerably damaged, upright and in line with the siding, with its front end 210 feet west of the point of collision.

It was nazy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6:50 a. m.

The flagman of Extra 618 West was killed.

Discussion

The rules governing operation on this line provide that a train moving on a siding must be operated at restricted speed and be prepared to stop short of a train or an obstruction.

Extra 618 West stopped into clear on the siding at Red Wing about 5:45 a. m., with the caboose standing 1,022 feet west of the east siding-switch. About 1 hour 5 minutes later, when No. 83 was entering the siding at the east switch to clear for No. 1, a west-bound first-class train, it struck the rear end of Extra 618 West. Under the rules, the speed of No. 83 was required to be so controlled that it could be stopped short of a train or an obstruction.

The first the conductor, the front brakeman and the engine-men of Extra 618 knew of anything being wrong was when the accident occurred. The conductor said the marker lamps on the caboose were lighted when he last examined them about 2 hours prior to the accident. It could not be determined when the flagman first became aware of anything being wrong, as he was killed in the accident.

Just before No. 83 started to enter the siding the engineer of the first engine warned his fireman that the siding might be occupied by cars. The members of the crew said that after their train entered the siding the speed was not in excess of 6 miles per hour. The engineer of each engine, and the conductor, who was in the right side of the cab of the first engine, were unable to see the track ahead because the track curvature was to the left. The fireman of the first engine and the front brakeman, who was seated behind the fireman on the left side of the engine, said they were maintaining a lookout ahead part of the time, but did not see Extra 618 at any time prior to the collision. There was no condition about the first engine that obscured visibility ahead. The fireman of the second engine said that his view of the track ahead was obscured by smoke. The engineer of the first engine moved the brake valve to emergency position immediately after the collision occurred. The railroad experience of the firemen and the front brakeman of the following train ranged only from 4 months to 15 days.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train moving on siding.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this twenty-ninth day of November, 1943.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,

Secretary.