

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2743
THE CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
NEAR CORY, ILL., ON
NOVEMBER 16, 1943

SUMMARY

Railroad: Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Date: November 16, 1943
Location: Cory, Ill.
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision
Trains involved: Freight : Engines
Train numbers: 54 : Extra 1009-1016
North
Engine numbers: 1956 : 1009-1016, coupled
Consist: 62 cars, cabooses :
Estimated speed: Standing : 8 m. p. h.
Operation: Timetable, train orders and
automatic block-signal
system; yard limits
Track: Double; tangent; practically level
Weather: Hazy
Time: About 3:04 a. m.
Casualties: 1 killed
Cause: Failure properly to control
speed of following train
moving within yard limits

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO 2743

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY

December 8, 1943.

Accident near Cory, Ill., on November 16, 1943, caused by
failure properly to control the speed of the following
train moving within yard limits.


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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On November 16, 1943, there was a rear-end collision
between a freight train and two engines, coupled, on the
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad near Cory, Ill., which
resulted in the death of one employee.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the
Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and
disposition.

- o Yard Center, Ill. 105.20 mi.
- o Danville 0.20 mi.
- o Cory 0.61 mi.
- X Point of accident 0.79 mi.
- o Oaklawn 1.70 mi.
- o Brewer, Ill.



Inv. No. 2743
 Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R.
 Cory, Ill.
 November 16, 1910

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the railroad designated as the Danville District and extending between Brewer and Yard Center, Ill., 108.5 miles. Between Oaklawn and Cory, respectively, 1.7 miles and 3.1 miles north of Brewer, this was a double-track line, within yard limits, over which trains were operated by timetable, train orders and an automatic block system. The accident occurred within yard limits on the northward main track 0.61 mile south of the tower at Cory. From the south the main tracks were tangent throughout a distance of 1.33 miles to this point and a considerable distance northward. The grade was practically level.

Between Oaklawn and Cory, an auxiliary track paralleled the southward main track on the west. At Oaklawn, an engine-house track was connected to the auxiliary track, and its switch was trailing-point for movements from this track to the auxiliary track. The south switch of a crossover 191 feet long, hereinafter referred to as crossover No. 1, which connected the auxiliary track and the southward main track, was 13 feet north of the enginehouse-track switch, and was facing-point for movements from the auxiliary track to the southward main track. The south switch of a crossover 193 feet long, hereinafter referred to as crossover No. 2, which connected the southward and the northward main tracks, was 41 feet north of the north switch of crossover No. 1, and was facing-point for movements from the southward to the northward main track.

Time-table instructions read in part as follows:

22. CHANGES IN BOOK OF RULES:

* * *

k-Rule 93--* * *Third class and extra trains, road engines, yard engines and motors must move on either main track within yard limits under such control as will prevent accident and must not exceed five (5) miles per hour unless the main track is seen or known to be clear, * * *

Description of Accident

No. 54, a north-bound second-class freight train, consisting of engine 1956, 62 cars and a caboose, stopped at Cory at 3:01 a. m., at the northward home signal, which was displaying stop. About 3 minutes later the rear end, which was standing 3,199 feet south of the tower at Cory, was struck by Extra 1009-1016 North.

Extra 1009-1016 North, a north-bound train, consisting of engines 1009 and 1016, headed southward, in the order named, was en route from the enginehouse at Oaklawn to the passenger station at Danville, 1.6 miles north of Oaklawn. The headlight on the rear end of the first engine was lighted. This train moved from the enginehouse track to the auxiliary track, through crossover No. 1 to the southward main track and through crossover No. 2 to the northward main track. It entered the northward main track 353 feet north of signal 124-4, the approach signal to the northward home signal at Cory, and while moving at an estimated speed of 8 miles per hour it struck the rear end of No. 54.

The caboose of No. 54 was demolished. The rear two cars were derailed and considerably damaged. The tender of engine 1009 was badly damaged.

It was hazy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 3:04 a. m.

The conductor of No. 54 was killed.

Discussion

The rules of this carrier governing operation within yard limits provide that third-class and extra trains and engines must be operated under such control as will prevent an accident, and must not exceed a speed of 5 miles per hour unless the main track is seen or known to be clear.

About 3 minutes after No. 54 stopped within yard limits, its rear end was struck by Extra 1009-1016 North. Under the rules the speed of Extra 1009-1016 was required to be so controlled that it could be stopped short of a train or an obstruction.

When No. 54 stopped, the flagman and the conductor were in the caboose. The flagman said that the marker lamps on the caboose were lighted when he last examined them about 30 minutes prior to the accident. The flagman saw the reflection of the headlight of the first engine of the approaching train, and he jumped off just before the collision occurred. He called a warning to the conductor, but the collision occurred before the conductor could leave the caboose.

The crew of Extra 1009-1016 consisted of an engineer and a fireman on each engine, and the engines were moving in backward motion. Immediately after No. 54 passed crossover No. 2

at Oaklawn, Extra 1009-1016 entered the northward main track and had proceeded northward a distance of 2,016 feet at a speed of about 8 miles per hour when it struck No. 54. A switchtender, who was at crossover No. 2 when No. 54 passed, said that he observed lighted red marker-lamps displayed at the rear end of No. 54. The engineer of engine 1016 said he saw a lighted red marker-lamp on the west side of the caboosc, but the other members of the crew of Extra 1009-1016 said they did not observe the rear end of No. 54 when it passed crossover No. 2. Each member of the crew said he was maintaining a lookout ahead, but none of them saw No. 54 from the time their train entered the northward main track to the time of the collision. The enginemen of the first engine said that coal dust blowing from the tender of the engine restricted their view of the track ahead to some extent. The enginemen of the second engine said that their view of the track ahead was obscured by smoke. The engineer of the first engine moved the brake valve to emergency position immediately after the collision occurred.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following train moving within yard limits.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this eighth
day of December, 1943.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.