

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2791
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT PRESQUE ISLE YARD, TOLEDO, OHIO, ON
APRIL 11, 1944

SUMMARY

Railroad: Chesapeake and Ohio
Date: April 11, 1944
Location: Presque Isle Yard, Toledo, Ohio
Kind of accident: Side collision
Equipment involved: Yard engine : Cut of cars
Engine number: 1295 :
Consist: : 6 cars
Speed: 4 m. p. h. : 8 m. p. h.
Operation: Yard
Track: Yard track; tangent; level
Weather: Hazy
Time: 12:20 a. m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 2 injured
Cause: Crossover switch not being
lined for intended movement
of cut of cars

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2791

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY

May 8, 1944.

Accident at Presque Isle Yard, Toledo, Ohio, on April 11,
1944, caused by a crossover switch not being lined
for the intended movement of a cut of cars.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹


PATTERSON, Chairman:

On April 11, 1944, there was a side collision between
an engine and a cut of cars on the Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway at Presque Isle Yard, Toledo, Ohio, which resulted
in the death of one employee, and the injury of two employees.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the
Commission to Chairman Patterson for consideration and dis-
position.

- Track No. 1 - 572 ft. long
- Track No. 2 - 752 ft. long
- Track No. 3 - 788 ft. long

- Crossover No. 1 - 193 ft. long
- Crossover No. 2 - 190 ft. long



Inv-2791
 Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
 Presque Isle Yard, Toledo, Ohio
 April 11, 1944

Engine 1295

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Toledo Terminal designated as Presque Isle Yard. In the vicinity of the point of accident three lead tracks, practically paralleling one another, connected a classification yard on the south and a dock yard on the north. These tracks, numbered consecutively from east to west, are hereinafter referred to as tracks No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3. They were, respectively, 572 feet, 752 feet and 788 feet long. The north switch of a crossover, 193 feet long and hereinafter referred to as crossover No. 1, which connected tracks No. 1 and No. 2, was 347 feet south of the north end of track No. 1. The north switch of a crossover, 190 feet long and hereinafter referred to as crossover No. 2, which connected tracks No. 2 and No. 3, was 286 feet south of the north switch of crossover No. 1. Crossover No. 1 was facing-point for southward movements from track No. 2 to track No. 1, and crossover No. 2 was facing-point for southward movements from track No. 2 to track No. 3. The accident occurred at the fouling point of track No. 3 and crossover No. 2. The yard engine was moving northward on track No. 3 and the cut of cars was moving southward on crossover No. 2. From the north on track No. 2 there were, in succession, a tangent 456 feet in length, a compound curve to the right 297 feet, the maximum curvature of which was 30°, and a tangent 9 feet to the north switch of crossover No. 2. Track No. 3 was tangent throughout a short distance immediately south of the south switch of crossover No. 2. The grade was practically level.

The switch-stand for the north switch of crossover No. 1 was on the west side of track No. 2, and was of the hand-throw intermediate-stand type. The switch-stand was provided with an oil lamp. When the switch was lined for movement on track No. 2, a green light was displayed, and when lined for movement through crossover No. 1, a yellow light was displayed.

Description of Accident

Yard engine 1295, headed southward, was moving northward on track No. 3 at an estimated speed of 4 miles per hour when it was struck by the first car of a cut of 6 cars at the fouling point of crossover No. 2.

During switching operations, a cut of 6 cars was detached from yard engine 1275 on track No. 2. These cars passed the north switch of crossover No. 1, moved southward on track No. 2, entered crossover No. 2 at the north switch, and while moving at an estimated speed of 8 miles per hour the first car struck engine 1295.

None of the equipment was derailed. The cab of engine 1295 was demolished. The front end of the first car was slightly damaged.

It was hazy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 12:20 a. m.

The employee killed was the fireman of engine 1295. The employees injured were the conductor and the engineer of engine 1295.

Discussion

The investigation disclosed that officials had issued oral instructions that members of yard crews must expect to find switches lined for movement to any track or crossover for which the switches provide entry. The surviving members of the crews involved understood these instructions, and understood also that switching movements were frequently made on the tracks in the vicinity of the point where the accident occurred.

Engine 1275 was pushing a cut of 6 cars southward on track No. 2, and the crew thought the north switch of crossover No. 1 was lined for the cut of cars to move through crossover No. 1 and thence on track No. 1. However, after the cut of cars was detached from the engine and had passed the north switch of crossover No. 1, the conductor observed that the north switch of crossover No. 1 was not lined for the intended movement, and that the north switch of crossover No. 2 was lined for the cars to enter crossover No. 2. No employee had been instructed to accompany the cut of cars, and the collision occurred before action could be taken to stop the movement. The conductor of engine 1295, who was on the engine, and the engineer were not aware of anything being wrong until the accident occurred. It could not be determined when the fireman first became aware of anything being wrong, as he was killed in the accident. If proper attention had been given to the position of the switch involved before the cut of cars was permitted to move through this switch, this accident would not have occurred.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by a crossover switch not being lined for the intended movement of a cut of cars.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this eighth day of May, 1944.

By the Commission, Chairman Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.