INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2745

THE BALTIMORE AND CHIC RAILROAD COMPANY

REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT

AT NEWTON FALLS, CHIC, ON

NOVEMBER 24, 1943

SUMM ARY

Railroad: Baltimore and Onio

November 24, 1943 Date:

Location: Newton Falls, Onio

Kind of accident: Rear-end collision and wreckage struck

by train moving on adjacent track

Trains involved: B. & O. : P. R. R. : B. & O. freight freight passenger

Train numbers: : Extra 4496 : 20 Extra 4424-

> 4452 East East

Engine numbers: 4424-4452 : 4496 : Diesel-electric

57

: 74 cars. : 12 cars Consist: 58 cars,

caboose caboose

: About 10 : About 55 Speed: Standing

m. p. h. m. p. h.

Operation: Interlocking

Track: Double: tangent; level

Weathér: Hazy

Time: About 11:10 p. m.

Casualties: 2 killed; 78 injured

Failure properly to control speed of fol-Cause:

lowing freight train moving on siding

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2745 .

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE PALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY

December 27, 1943.


Accident at Newton Falls, Onio, on November 24, 1943, caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following freight train moving on a siding.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On November 24, 1945, there was a rear-end collision between a Baltimore and Ohio Railroad freight train and a Pennsylvania Railroad freight train, and the wreckage was struck by a Baltimore and Ohio Railroad passenger train on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Newton Falls, Ohio, which resulted in the death of 2 train-service employees, and the injury of 64 passengers, 1 porter, 5 dining-car employees, 3 train-service employees off duty and 5 train-service employees on duty. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Inv. No. 2745
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Newton Falls, Ohio
November 24, 19-3

2745

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

- 5 -

This accident occurred on that part of the Akron-Chicago Division extending between Ravenna and Niles Junction, Onio, 22.7 miles. Trains of the Pennsylvania Railroad were regularly operated over this portion of the reilroad. This was a double-track line over which trains moving with the current of traffic were operated by an automatic block-signal system, the indications of which superseded time-table superiority. At Newton Falls the eastward siding, 1.33 miles in length, paralleled the eastward main track on the south. The west switch of this siding was 2,137 feet east of the tower. The freight trains involved were on the eastward siding, and the passenger train involved was moving on the eastward main track. The accident occurred within interlocking limits, 1.21 miles east of the tower. From the west the main tracks were tangent 1.9 miles to this point and a considerable distance beyond. At this point the grade was level.

The eastward home signal of the interlocking, which governed movements on the eastward main track and movements from the eastward main track to the eastward siding, was 1,743 feet west of the west siding-switch.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

102. When a train is disabled or stopped suddenly by an emergency application of the air brakes or other causes, adjacent tracks as well as tracks of other railroads that are liable to be obstructed must at once be protected until it is ascertained they are safe and clear for the movement of trains.

105. Trains using a siding must proceed, expecting to find it occupied.

* * *

Time-table special instructions read in part as follows:

5. SPEED RESTRICTIONS

* * *

Trains * * * using siding * * * will not exceed a speed of 10 miles per hour.

The maximum authorized speed for the passenger train was 70 miles per nour.

27.15

Description of Accident

Extra 4424-4452 East, an east-bound B. & O. freight train, consisting of engines 4424 and 4452, 58 cars and a caboose, in the order named, stopped into clear on the eastward siding at Newton Falls about 9:55 p. m., with the rear end standing 4,290 feet east of the west siding-switch. About 1 hour 15 minutes later the rear end was struck by Extra 4496 East.

Extra 4496 East, an east-bound P. R. R. freight train, consisting of engine 4496, 74 cars and a caboose, passed the tower at Newton Falls at 11:07 p. m., entered the eastward siding at the west switch, and while moving at an estimated speed of 10 miles per nour it collided with the rear end of Extra 4424-4452 East. Engine 4496 and its tender were derailed to the north, stopped on their left sides and fouled the eastward main track.

No. 20, an east-bound first-class B. & O. passenger train, consisted of Diesel-electric engine 57, of the two-unit type, I passenger-baggage car, 4 coaches, I dining car, I club car and 5 Pullman sleeping cars, in the order named. The cars were of steel construction. This train, moving on the eastward main track, passed the tower at Newton Falls at II:09 p. m., 6 minutes late, passed the eastward nome signal, which displayed proceed, and while moving at a speed of about 55 miles per hour it struck engine 4496. Both units of engine 57 and the first four cars were derailed.

The caboose of Extra 4424-4452 was demolished, and the rear two cars were considerably damaged. Engine 4496 was badly damaged, and the first and seventh cars of Extra 4496 were slightly damaged. Engine 57 and the first four cars of No. 20 were badly damaged.

It was nazy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 11:10 p. m.

The engineer and the fireman of Extra 4496 were killed. The flagman of Extra 4424-4452, and the conductor, the engineer, the fireman and the baggageman of No. 20 were injured.

Discussion

Extra 4424-4452 East had stopped into clear on the eastward siding at Newton Falls, with the caboose standing 4,290 feet east of the west siding-switch. Later, Extra 4496 East entered the siding at the west switch, and while moving eastward in the siding it struck the rear end of Extra 4424-4452 East. About 1 minute later, the wreckage, which fouled the eastward main track, was struck by No. 20. Under the rules, the speed of Extra 4496 was required to be so controlled that it could be stopped short of a train or an obstruction.

The conductor, the front brakeman and the enginemen of Extra 4424-4452 were in the vicinity of the front end of their train when Extra 4496 struck the caboose. The flagman of Extra 4424-4452 said that the marker lamps on the caboose were lighted when his train stopped on the siding. The first he knew of anything being wrong was when he saw the engine of Extra 4495 just before it struck the caboose. He was unable to provide protection on the adjacent tracks, as he was struck by debris and rendered unconscious.

The front brakeman of Extra 4496 was in the booth on the tender and the first he knew of anything being wrong was when the collision occurred. He immediately proceeded toward No. 20 and was giving stop signals with a lighted white lantern when the engine of No. 20 bassed him about 200 feet west of the wreckage. The conductor and the flagman of Extra 4496 were in the caboose when it passed the west siding-switch. They said their train was moving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour when No. 20 bassed the caboose about 300 feet east of the west siding-switch. The first they knew of anything being wrong was when the brakes became amplied in emergency just before the collision occurred. It could not be determined when the enginemen of Extra 4496 first became aware of anything being wrong, as they were killed in the accident.

As No. 20 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was about 55 miles per hour, and the enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead. The first the engineer knew of anything being wrong was when he observed stop signals being given with a lighted white lantern about 100 feet distant. He immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the engine struck the wreckage before the brakes became effective.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of the following freight train moving on a siding.

Dated at Wesnington, D. C., this twenty-seventh day of December, 1943.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

M. P. BARTEL,

(SEAL)

Secretary.