INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 3187

UNION DEPOT COMPANY

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY AND THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY

REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT

AT COLUMBUS, OHIO, ON

JUNE 7, 1948

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SUMMARY

Railroads: Union Depot : Baltimore and Ohio. Company and Pennsylvania Date: June 7, 1948 Location: Columbus. Onio Kind of accident: Derailment and collision Trains involved: P.R.R. passenger : P.R.R. passenger Train numbers: 30 : 155 Diesel-electric : 5348 Engine numbers: units 5754A-5752A Consists: 16 cars : 9 cars Estimated speed: 10 m. p. h. : Standing Operation: Hand signals : Automatic-block and ceb-signal systems Five; tangent; Tracks: : Four; tangent; 0.875 percent 0.88 percent ascending grade ascending grade eastward eastward Weather: Clear Time: About 9:34 p. m. Casualties: 6 injured Cause: Double-slip movable-center-point crossing improperly lined for movement intended That the Union Depot Company, the Recommendation: Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company install an interlocking in the territory where this accident occurred



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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

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IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

> UNION DEPOT COMPANY THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY AND THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY

> > AUGUST 3, 1948

Accident at Columbus, Chio, on June 7, 1948, caused by a double-slip movable-conter-point crossing being improperly lined for the movement intended.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION


PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On June 7, 1948, there was a derailment of a Pennsylvania Railroad passenger train on the line of the Union Depot Company at Columbus, Ohio, and a collision between a derailed car of that train and a Pennsylvania Railroad passenger train standing on an adjacent main track operated jointly by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad. The collision resulted in the injury of five passengers and one Pullman employee. This accident was investigated in conjunction with representatives of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.



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Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Location of Accident and Method of Operation

The derailment of the passenger-train car occurred on that part of the line of the Union Depot Company, Columbus, Ohio, extending castward from the centerline of the station to the east limits, 1,390 feet, and the collision between the derailed passenger-train car and a passenger train standing on an adjacent track occurred on that part of the Columbus and Newark Division, which is jointly operated by the Ealtimore and Ohio Realroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad, and which extends between Fourth Street, Columbus, and fourk, Ohio, 32.93 miles. Trains are operated over the tracks of the Union Depot by flag and lentern signals. P.R.R. trains moving with the current of traffic are operated over the C. & M. Division by sutomatic-block and cab-signal indications, and B. & O. R. R. trains are operated by automatic block-signal indications. The station tracks are designated from south to north as tracks Nos. 1 to 8, inclusive. They converge at the east end of the station into five tracks, which extend eastward 711 fest, and are designated from south to north as tracks los. 1 to 5, inclusive. These five tracks in turn converge with four tracks of the C. $\hat{\alpha}$ N. Division designated from south to north as B. & O. track No. 4, eastward freight; B. & O. track No. 2, castward passenger; B. & O. track No. 1, Westward passenger; and B. & O. track No. 3, westward freight. The distance between the centerlines of these tracks is 13 feet. Between points 487 and 1,537 feet east of the conterline of the station, a single ladder track, designated as lidder 1 and extending from northwest to southeast, crossts the previously mentioned tracks at the point of convergence between the U. D. and the B. & O. tracks. Doubleslip movable-point crossings are provided. Crossing 3, located 1,266 fect east of the centerline of the station, connects U. D. track No. 3 and B. & O. track No. 2 for through movement, but the crossing can be lined for a diverging movement from U. D. trock No. 3 to B. & O. track No. 4 via ladder 1. Botwoon points 1,547 and 2,039 feet east of the centerline of the station, a double-track ladder, designated as ladders 2 and 3, extends from the southwest to the northcast and crosses the B. & O. tracks on double-slip movable-point crossings. Ladder tracks 2 and 3 cross B. & O. track No. 1 at crossings 8 and 10, and 2. & 0, track No. 2 at crossings 7 and 9. The derailment occurred at crossing 3 and the collision occurred on B. & O. track No. 1 at a point 914 feet east of crossing 3 and 264 feet east of crossing 10. U. D. track No. 3 and B. & O. track No. 2 are tangent throughout a distance of 741 feet immediately west of crossing 3 and 1,707 feet eastward. The grade for east-bound trains is 0.875 percent ascending at the point of dernilment and 0.80 percent according at the point of collision.

At the noint of derailment the structure of U. D. track No. 5 consists of 130-pound cropped rail varying from 29 to 38 fect in length, relaid in its present location during 1930 on an average of 17 treated ties per 50-foot length. It is fully tieplated, spiked with 3 spikes per ticplate, and provided with 6-hole joint bars. It is ballasted with gravel to a depth of 12 inches below the ties. At the point of derailment the gage was 4 feet 9 inches, the south rail was 1/4-inch lower than the north rail, and the alinement was tangent.

Crossing 3 is a No. 9 double-slip crossing having opposed pairs of movable center-points, and is laid on 32 treated switch ties, and can be lined for four routes. Its diagonal length along the axis between the points of the outer rigidtype frogs is 76 feet 3 inches. The angle of each frog is 7009'10" and they are protected by one-piece guard rails having integral and-blocks. The structure of the crossing consists of 131-pound rail sections, four switch rails operating in unison at each end, and two opposed pairs of movable-center points in the center of the crossing. The switch rails are 13 feet long. The center-point rails are 10 feet 4-1/2 inches long, and are chamfered to fit the angle of their respective knuckle rails. The north and the south inner stock-rails of the crossing are knuckle rails 21 feet 7 inches long having knuckle angles of 7009'10", and are reinforced on the outside of the knuckle angle by easer rails 5 fort 8 inches long. The north and the south outer slip rails are curved and braced. The switchpoints and the center-points are erranged for a throw of 4-1/2 inches, and each set of these points is maintained in proper relation by two switch rods at each location, except the west switch rails, which have one switch rod only. The operating mechanism consists of two vertical ground-throw levers having veisited ends and handholds, mounted side-by-side on a common trunnion-type base, and are located 2 feet north of the north stock rail and 5 feet west of the west center-points. The operating levers are pipe-connected to the operating switch rods. The inside lever operates the east switch rails and both pairs of center-points, and the outside lever operates the vest switch rails. These levers operate independently of each other. Positive latches are not provided.

A spindle bearing a switch lamp having four flared disc targets is located 4 feet south of the vest switch points, and the centers of the lenses and the targets are 4 inches above the level of the tops of the rails. A similar switch lamp is located 6.6 feet east of the operating levers and 3.3 feet north of the east center-points. Then the crossing is lined normally for movement from U. D. track No. 3 to B. & O. track No. 2, the inside switch lever is lined to the west, the outside lever is lined to the east, and each switch lamp displays a green light and a white target.

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The Union Depot Company has no book of operating rules. Trains of each tenant line are operated under time-table special instructions of the respective line.

Operating rules of the Pennsylvania Railroad read in part as follows:

104. * * *

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"hen practicable, the angine an must see that the switches nearest the angine are properly lined.

A train or engine must not foul a track until switches connected with the movement are properly lined. * * *

* * *

104a. Trains and engines must approach switches where switch tenders are stationed prepared to stop clear of any switch or route unless signal to proceed is received from the switch tender.

A switch tender must not set a switch to divert an approaching train until he is assured of its identity and that its speed does not exceed 15 miles per hour.

Time-table special instructions of the Columbus Division, Pennsylvania Railroad, read in part as follows:

HAND, FLAG AND LAMP SIGMALS

1402. Switchtenders at Fourth Street, Columbus Union Depot * * * use a green flag by day and a green light by night to govern eastward movements; a yellow flag by day and a yellow light by night to govern westward movements.

2407. Switchtenders, other than P.R.R. employes, are stationed at and have charge of hand operated switches as indicated:

Location	Switches
Fourth Street	Crossovers
Columbus Union Depot, east end	All Switches
* * *	* * *

NOTE--Trains and engines must approach switches at Fourth Street and not cost and west hids of Columbus Union Depot prepared to step and must stop clear of switches or routes unless signal to proceed is received from switchtender as prescribed by Special Instruction 1402.

The time-table special instructions of the Columbus and Newerk Division read in part as follows:

The movement of enstward and westward trains between Veilsten and Union Station will be governed by the prescribed hand signals gived by switchtender, and trains will not exceed 10 miles per hour.

The maximum authorized speed for any movement through crossings and switches in this territory is 10 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

No. 155, a P.F.R. west-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of steam engine 5548, four baggage cars, one mail car, two coaches, one sleeping car and one box-express car, in the order named. All cars were of steel construction. This train, moving on F. & O. track No. 1, stopped about 9:31 p. m., at a point 264 feet east of crossing 10. About 5 minutes later this train received a proceed signal given with a lighted yellow lantern by the switchtender located at that point, noved several feet westward and then stopped. Immediately afterward the engine was struck by the fiftcenth car of No. 50.

No. 30, an east-bound P. R. R. first-class passanger train, consisted of Diesel-electric units 2754A and 5752A, coupled in multiple-unit control, one presenger-baggage car, six slopping cars, one dining car, three cleeping cors, one dining car, three sleeping cars and one sleeping-lounge-observation car, in the order named. The sixth to eighth cars, inclusive, the tenth car, and the fifteenth and sixteenth cars were of lightweight high-tensile-steel construction, and the remainder of the cars were of conventional all-steel construction. After a terminal air-brake test was completed this train departed from the passenger station on U. D. track No. 3 at 9:32 p. M., 7 minutes late, passed the switchtender in charge of crossing 3, and entered crossing 3, there the rear truck of the fifteent car was derailed. The front portion of the train made a diverging movement at crossing 3, entered F. & O. track Ho. 4 at crossing 4, prosed the switchtender stationed at the vest end of ladder tracks 2 and 3, entered ladder 2 at switch 5, was diverted to E. 2 O. track No. 2 at crossing 7, and the engine stopped about 1,700 feet east of crossing 10 when the brokes became applied in emergency. The rear two cars remained

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coupled to the front portion of the train and the rear truck of the fifteenth car dragged between B. & O. tracks Nos. 4 and 2 and the sixteenth car continued on B. & O. track No. 2 from crossing 3 to crossing 7, on ladder 2 to crossing 8, thence to B. & O. track No. 1, and the rear end of the fifteenth car was diverted northward and fouled B. & O. track No. 1. While No. 30 was moving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour the fifteenth car sideswiped the engine of To. 155.

The front end of the engine of No. 135 was somewhat damaged. Because of a coupler failure at the rear of the thirteenth err of No. 30, a separation occurred at this point. The front end of the fourteenth car stopped 15 feet to the rear of the thirtcenth car and 190 fect east of the point of collision. The fourteerth err separated from the fifteenth car. The fifteenth and sixteenth cers, remaining coupled, stopped upright, across R. L O. tracks Nos. 1 and 2 and at an angle of 15 degrees to them. Starting at a point 29 feet back of the front end of the fifteenth cor, the side sheets above and below the windows on the left side and appurtenances below the floor were torn away throughout a distance of 42 feet. The left side-sill and the cross combers were bent and broken, and the flooring and interior fixtures were torn away inward to the center sills. The injuries occurred in this car. No other cars in the train word damaged. The sixth, thirteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth cars were equipped at each end with tightlock couplers.

The weather was elemenned it was dark at the time of the accident, which occurred about 9:34 p. m.

The fifteenth car of No. 30, Pullman Cascade Rapids, a sleeping car of lightweight high-tensile steel construction, is 84.5 feet long between the pulling faces of the couplers, and contains 5 bedrooms and 10 roomettes. The car is provided with two 4-wheel trucks spaced 59.5 feet between truck centers.

Discussion

The investigation disclosed that about 9:28 p.m. the terminal trainmaster, located in a tower 2,230 feet east of the centerline of the passenger station, give instructions over the public-address system for all switchtenders concerned to line the switches and crossings for No. 30 to proceed from U. D. track No. 3 to B. & O. track No. 30 to proceed from 50 was ready to depart from the station on track No. 3, and the engineer sounded four short blasts on the pneumatic horn as a signal to the switchtender in the charge of crossing 3. At this time the front end of the first Diesel-electric unit was standing about 270 fect wast of crossing 3. The enginemen, who were in the control compartment at the front end of the

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first unit, said that the switchtender crossed over from the north and around a N. Y. C. yard engine and gave a signal with a lighted green lantern for No. 30 to proceed eastward. No. 30 departed at 9:32 p. m., entered crossing 3, where the front portion was diverted to indder 1 and entered B. & O. track No. 4 through the north slip of crossing 4. The engineer say that switch 5, at the junction of B. & O. track No. 4 and Ladder 2, was not properly lined, and reduced speed accordingly. The switchtender in the charge of the switches and double-slip crossings in this vicinity lined the route to divert No. 30 from B. & O. track No. 4 to E. & O. track No. 2, then gave a signal with a green lantern for No. 30 to proc od over this route. This train entered 1ndder 2, moved through the south slip of crossing 7 and proceeded eartward on B. & O. trace To. 2, which norwally is the track used by east-bound passenger trains on the Columbus and Newer's Division. The entire train had passed through crossing 7, and both Diesel-electric units and fourteen cars had passed the ongine of No. 155; standing on 5. & 0. track No. 1 at a point 264 feet east of crossing 10, when the brokes of No. 30 became applied in emergency. Immediately afterward it was found that a separation had occurred between the thirteenth and fourteenth onrs and between the fourteenth and fifteenth cars, and that the fifteenth and sixteenth cars very derniled to the north and were crossvise B. & O. tracks Nos. 1 and 2.

Examination of the cars of Vo. 30 did not disclose any condition which could have contributed to the cause of the derailment.

Examination of the tracks, the switches and the doubleslip crossings immediately after the accident disclosed that the operating lovers of crossing 3 were in position for normal movement from U. D. track No. 5 to E. & O. track No. 2. The operating rod of the west, or trailing, center-points was bent downward about 5 inches and westward at an angle of 45 degrees. These points and bean trailed through. The south facing conter-point was open about 3/4-inch and there were heavy warks the point about 3 inches invard from its end. In addition, on there were henvy abraded marks on the reverse side of this point. At a point 41 increase cast of the south facing conterpoint a flange mark appeared on the top surface of the south knuckle rail then dropped to the ties inside this rail in a short distance. Corresponding flange morks appeared on the top surface of the north facing conter-point and on the top surface of the north knuckle rail, then dropped to the ties in a short distance. These flarge marks continued eastward to the east switch points, where the flenge marks on the south crossed over the top of the south inside stock rail and dropped to the ties outside. Corresponding marks appeared south of the north outside stock rail and north of the north inside stock rail. From the east switch points eastward to crossing 4,

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wheelmarks appeared on the south ends of the ties of B. & O. track No. 2, and corresponding marks appeared between the rails of B. & O. track No. 2 to switch 5, then there were marks indienting that these derailed wheels were diverted to ladder 2-and followed that track between switch b call crossing 7, then were diverted at crossing 8 to E. & C. track No. 1, crossed crossing 10 and continued along B. & O. track No. 1 to the point of collision.

From the condition of crossing 2 ofter the accident it is apparent that at the time No. 30 entered this crossing it was lined for movement from ladder 1 through the north stip witch to B. & O. trach No. 2. In order for such movement to be made the two south points of the west switch rails would be closed and the two north points would be open, the nouth trailing conter-point would be closed and the north point would be open, the north facing conter-point would be closed and the south point would be open, the two south points of the east switch rails vould be closed and the two north suit ... peints ould be open, the operating levers would beth be lined toward the east, and the west switch lump would display a green light and a green target, and the east switch has a red light and r red target. It is apparent that wheels of the Diesel-Alcothic units, the first 1- cars and the front truck of the fift all cur ran through the trailing center-point, forced the south point north-word and bent the operating mod. This action we top solited through the operating rod to the facing enter-point, which closed the south point and op mud the north point under the heavy blows, then the renr truck of the fifteenth car become deveiled. The operation levers of crossing 5 are not provided. with positive latches. It is apparent that the force exerted by the theols against the trailing movable center-points during the dorailment of the fifteenth car coused the inside lever to be operated to normal position for the sixtuenth cor.

The engineer and the fireman of No. 30 shid they did not observe the indications displayed by the unitable proof crossing 3, and that they do not depend upon observation of the switch lamps of any of the double-slip prossings, but depend solely upon dignals timen by the stitchtenders in the charge of the crossings. In this instance, the engineer said he received a proceed signal river with a green lantern from the vicinity of crossing 7, and proceeded accordingly. The engineer said that when the first Diesel-electric unit entered upon crossing 3, the unit lurched and the traction wheels slipped. However, this action of the Diesel-electric is not unusual while moving over double-slip crossings at slow speed. The engineer said that it is not unusual for cast-bound presenger trains to be diverted from U. D. track No. 3 to E. 2 0. track No. 4 at crossing 5, then back to F. 2 O. tract No. 3 at either ladder 2 or 3. The first he knew of enything being urong was when the brakes became applied in mergency at the time of the collision. All such movements are controlled by

switchtenders, who receive instructions over a publicaddress system from the terminal trainmaster. On this occasion, all double-slip crossings involved, except crossing 3, were lined for movement from U. D. track No. 3 to B. & O. track No. 2 and across ladders 2 and 3. The switchtenders in charge of the crossings involved in this movement, other than crossing 3, realined the crossings to reroute No. 30 back to B. & O. track No. 2. Inc switchtender in charge of crossing 3 said that several minutes before No. 30 departed from U. D. track No. 3 he had lined crossing 3 for movement to 5. & O. track No. 2, and at that time neither switch lamp was lighted. He was not certain whether he had given a proceed signal, but thought that his helper, who usually works south of crossing 3, had given the signal. The switchtender helper said that he had neither given a signal to No. 30, nor lined crossing 3 for the movement of No. 30. No unauthorized person was observed in the vicinity of crossing 3 by any employee on Juty. Several other switchtenders said that the switch lamps of crossing 3 were lighted then No. 30 departed.

The movement of No. 30 leaving the station was governed by signals of a switchtender. In this instance, the hand signal to proceed was given when the route was improperly lined for the intended movement. If an interlocking had been in use the governing signal for No. 30 would not have permitted entry to the route when the switches were improperly lined.

<u>Causc</u>

It is found that this accident was caused by a doubleslip movable-center-point crossing being improperly lined for the movement intended.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Union Depot Company, the Baltimore and Chio Railroad Company, and the Pennsylvania Reilroad Company install an interlocking in the territory where this accident occurred.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this third day of August, 1948.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

M. P. BARTEL,

(SEAL)

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