

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2808

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY

REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT

AT KIOWA, KANS., ON

JUNE 27, 1944

SUMMARY

Railroad: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Date: June 27, 1944
Location: Kiowa, Kans.
Kind of accident: Side collision
Trains involved: Freight : Freight
Train numbers: Extra 4095 East : Extra 2916 East
Engine numbers: 4095 : 2916
Consist: 73 cars, cabooses : 105 cars, cabooses
Estimated speed: 6 m. p. h. : 15 m. p. h.
Operation: Timetable, train orders and
automatic block-signal system;
yard limits
Track: Single; tangent; vertical curve
Weather: Clear
Time: 1:20 p. m.
Casualties: 1 killed
Cause: Failure properly to control
speed of both trains moving
within yard limits

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2808

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY

August 7, 1944.

Accident at Kiowa, Kans., on June 27, 1944, caused by
failure properly to control the speed of both
trains moving within yard limits.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹


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PATTERSON, Chairman:

On June 27, 1944, there was a side collision between
two freight trains on the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway at Kiowa, Kans., which resulted in the death of
one employee.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the
Commission to Chairman Patterson for consideration and dis-
position.

- o S. K. Junction, Kans. 69.9 mi.
- x Kiowa, Kans. (Point of accident) 38.6 mi.
- o Waynoka, Okla.



Inv. No. 280,
 A. T. & S. F. Ry.
 Kiowa, Kans.
 June 27, 1944

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Panhandle Division designated as the First District and extending eastward from Waynoka, Okla., to S. K. Junction, Kans., 108.5 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a single-track line over which trains were operated by timetable, train orders and an automatic block-signal system. Within yard limits at Kiowa, 58.6 miles east of Waynoka, three auxiliary tracks, designated from south to north as tracks No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3, paralleled the main track on the north. A lead track 273 feet long connected the east ends of the auxiliary tracks and the main track. The east switch of the lead track was a spring switch. The accident occurred 2.66 miles east of the west yard-limit sign and 0.59 mile east of the station, at the fouling point of the main track and the turnout of the lead track. From the west on the main track there were, in succession, a tangent 6,026 feet in length, a 0°40' curve to the left 430 feet and a tangent 357 feet to the point of accident and 245 feet beyond. The grade for east-bound trains was 0.40 percent ascending, 6,100 feet, then there was a vertical curve 682 feet to the point of accident and 418 feet beyond.

The automatic block system was arranged on the overlap principle. Signals 3064 and 3062, governing east-bound movements, were located, respectively, 2,622 feet and 90 feet west of the point of accident. These signals were of the one-arm, three-indication, upper-quadrant, semaphore type, and were approach lighted. The track circuit of the fouling section of the turnout of the east lead-track switch extended 241 feet west of the switch.

DEFINITIONS.

* * *

Restricted Speed.--Proceed prepared to stop short of train, obstruction, or anything that may require the speed of a train to be reduced.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

93. * * *

Within yard limits all trains and engines may use main track, not protecting against second or third class trains or extra trains, * * * All except first class trains will move within yard limits at restricted speed; the responsibility for accident with respect to second or third class or extra trains rests with the approaching train.

Description of Accident

Extra 4095 East, an east-bound freight train, consisting of engine 4095, 73 cars and a caboose, moved eastward from track No. 3 to the lead track. While it was moving at an estimated speed of 6 miles per hour the engine entered the turnout of the east lead-track switch, and the tender was struck by Extra 2916 East.

Extra 2916 East, an east-bound freight train, consisting of engine 2916, 105 cars and a caboose, passed the west yard-limit sign at Kiowa, passed signal 3064, which displayed proceed, passed signal 3062, which displayed stop-and-proceed, and while moving at an estimated speed of 15 miles per hour it struck Extra 4095 East.

The tender of the engine and the first two cars of Extra 4095 East and the engine of Extra 2916 were derailed and considerably damaged.

It was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 1:20 p. m.

The employee killed was the engineer of Extra 4095 East.

Discussion

The rules of this carrier governing operation within yard limits provide that all trains except first-class trains must be operated in such manner that they can be stopped short of a train or an obstruction, and all surviving employees concerned so understood.

Extra 2916 East and Extra 4095 East were moving within yard limits when the accident occurred. Extra 4095 was en route eastward from track No. 3 to the main track, and had proceeded a distance of about 3,200 feet at a speed of about 6 miles per hour when the engine entered the turnout of the east lead-track switch and fouled the main track. Extra 2916 had proceeded a distance of 2.66 miles east of the west yard-limit sign when the accident occurred. Within the yard-limit territory its maximum speed was 38 miles per hour, and at the time of the accident the speed was 15 miles per hour. Cars standing on tracks No. 1 and No. 2 prevented the employees on the engine of each train from observing the movement of the other train until their engines were about 600 feet west of the point where the accident occurred. The fireman and the front brakeman of Extra 2916 called a warning when they first

saw the engine of Extra 4095 as it entered the turnout, and the engineer moved the throttle lever to closed position. When engine 4095 entered the controlling track circuit of the turnout of the east lead-track switch the indication of signal 3062 changed from proceed to stop-and-proceed. Then the engineer of Extra 2916 moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the collision occurred before the train was stopped. The fireman and the front brakeman of Extra 4095 said the first they knew of anything being wrong was when the engineer called a warning just prior to the collision. The engineer was killed in the accident. If the speed of both trains had been controlled in accordance with the requirements of the yard-limit rule, this accident would not have occurred. The investigation disclosed that it was common practice for trains to be operated within these yard limits similarly to the manner in which the trains involved were being operated, and this investigation directs attention to the need for increased supervision with respect to operating practices at this point.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure properly to control the speed of both trains moving within yard limits.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this seventh day of August, 1944.

By the Commission, Chairman Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.