



U.S. Department  
of Transportation

**Maritime  
Administration**

# ***MARITIME SECURITY REPORT***

**\* April 1997 \***



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## ***INTRODUCTION***

The *Maritime Security Report* is an unclassified quarterly publication prepared to inform the commercial maritime industry, senior Maritime Administration officials, the Secretary of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security, and the *Federal Ad Hoc Working Group On Maritime Security Awareness*. The report focuses on international criminal activity and security issues which could pose a threat to U.S. commercial maritime interests and the movement of U.S. civilian cargoes in foreign trade.

The global nature of U.S. trade means that U.S.-flag ocean carriers call ports in nearly every country, and cargoes owned by U.S. interests may be embarked on ocean vessels of any flag or in any port worldwide. U.S. commercial maritime interests, therefore, can be jeopardized worldwide by a broad range of criminal activities, adversely affecting their competitiveness.

The *Maritime Security Report* is intended to increase awareness of the scope and severity of economic crime affecting U.S. maritime commerce. The Maritime Administration expects increased awareness to contribute toward deterring criminal exploitation of the maritime transportation system, its users and providers.

The *Maritime Security Report* is produced under the authorization of Margaret D. Blum, Associate Administrator for Port, Intermodal, and Environmental Activities. The information contained in the report is based on our research and analysis of recent, significant developments, and is compiled from commercial sources and U.S. Government reports.

Please direct any questions and comments on the information in this report to Thomas Morelli, Coordinator, Maritime Intelligence & Security, or John Pisani, Director, Office of Ports and Domestic Shipping, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590, or telephone (202) 366-5473/fax (202) 366-6988.

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Note: The preceding issue of the *Maritime Security Report* is dated January 1997. Issues previous to that are dated: September 1996, April 1996, January 1996, and August 1995 (the initial issue of the report). Copies of previous issues are available.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **HAITI - Maritime Smuggling of Drugs and Contraband Goods Adversely Impacting Legitimate Commerce and Development**

According to the U.S. Department of State's 1997 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Haiti is a significant transshipment conduit for South American cocaine destined for the United States. This smuggling is facilitated by Haiti's system of seaports which remain largely unmonitored and through which narcotics move relatively unimpeded. Smugglers of narcotics and contraband merchandise exploit the pervasive corruption and a lack of minimal, consistent customs and cargo security controls in Haiti's 14 seaports.

While the U.S. Department of State recognizes countering narcotics smuggling in Haiti is a high priority, the impact of smuggling and trafficking contraband merchandise in Haiti is of growing concern. Smuggling and trafficking contraband merchandise adversely impacts on the longevity of legitimate commercial activity and economic development in the country. The trade in contraband goods results in lost foreign trade revenue and involves undocumented international voyages the same as does narcotics smuggling.

To improve port security in Haiti, it may be necessary to establish a comprehensive and integrated port and waterways management strategy. Emphasizing the operations of coast guard, customs, national police, and port security, the strategy may improve Haiti's capabilities for deterring and countering encroachment of its national territorial and economic integrity by smugglers.

### **POLICY - Partnering: A Key To the Growing Challenges Confronting Maritime Security**

Maritime transportation symbolizes the international interdependence that has evolved among nations and accounts for nearly all the tonnage of goods moved in the global economy. This makes the security of the trade corridors, through which these goods are moved and countless passengers served, an issue of critical international importance.

To do so, the increasingly complex nature and transnational scope of security issues which threaten the maritime industry demand a broader range of collaboration among governments and the international commercial maritime industry. The intermodal vulnerabilities that need to be addressed in maritime security include people, freight, infrastructure, assets, and system

confidence. And solutions to maritime security problems are made more challenging today by intermodalism, international growth in transport activities, and the need for information assurance within the operating systems.

All of these factors combine to press the importance of establishment of Federal/industry partnerships with all parties that benefit from the maritime transportation system. Only through these partnerships can we reduce system vulnerabilities, demonstrate the cost effectiveness of viable security programs, increase user confidence, and reduce liability exposure.

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## **HAITI - Maritime Smuggling of Drugs and Contraband Goods Adversely Impacting Legitimate Commerce and Development**

According to the U.S. Department of State's 1997 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Haiti is a significant transshipment conduit for South American cocaine destined for the United States. This smuggling is facilitated by Haiti's system of seaports which remain largely unmonitored and through which narcotics move relatively unimpeded. Some shipments transit the country across its land border into the Dominican Republic for transshipment to the United States. The U.S. Department of State recognizes that countering narcotics smuggling in Haiti is an integral part of that country's transition to social, economic, and political reform.

While counternarcotics carries the high priority, the impact of smuggling and trafficking contraband merchandise in Haiti is of growing concern. Smuggling and trafficking contraband merchandise adversely impacts on the longevity of legitimate commercial activity and economic development in the country. The trade in contraband goods results in lost foreign trade revenue and customs tariffs and involves undocumented international voyages the same as does narcotics smuggling. This maritime trade fuels a black market economy, adding to the disenfranchised attitude of provincial populations, and provides commercial facilitation exploited by narcotics smugglers.

**Port Control/Security and International Trade.** Smugglers of narcotics and contraband merchandise exploit the pervasive corruption and a lack of minimal, consistent customs controls and cargo security in Haiti's 14 seaports. The adverse effects of smuggling in contraband merchandise impacts not only Haiti but also the countries in which this trade is conducted, making the situation a regional economic problem.

**Unreported Trade.** The lax enforcement efforts that facilitate contraband smuggling also result in an incomplete and inaccurate accounting of Haiti's export/import activity. This results in distorted measurements of Haiti's foreign trade deficit and domestic production, which are essential parts of a consistent, coherent body of national economic information.

Merchandise trade data recording the physical movement of export/import goods includes the commodity classification, value, quantity, weight, port of destination/origin, and dutiable status and tariff rates of imports. These data are essential to complete and accurate assessments of Haiti's trade patterns, evaluation of foreign competition, and identification of commercial opportunities in its domestic market and overseas. The absence of these data adversely impacts transport planning efforts to select where and how much to invest in port facilities

and associated intermodal landside access routes. Analytic tools used in transport planning and operations (e.g., geographic information systems) require such data inputs.

These conditions combine to engender a commercial maritime environment vulnerable to criminal exploitation for smuggling narcotics, contraband goods, and migrants. Haiti's national security is confronted by economic and trade marginalization in part contributed by these transnational threats. Overcoming these adverse impacts is important to Haiti's commercial and economic development.

**Integrated Security/Economic Strategy.** The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assesses Haiti's problems to include pervasive corruption and inefficiency in the public sector. A growing social polarization and a lack of investment in human and physical infrastructure have contributed to Haiti's political instability.

Many of Haiti's regional neighbors are practicing open trade and applying private sector-driven economic models. If Haiti's maritime transport sector is to establish more secure trade corridors, become competitive in international commerce, and attract job-creating trade and investment, progress in these problem areas is necessary.

Caribbean officials have counseled that the success of their counternarcotics efforts will depend on the overall economic situation in the region. Recently, Phillip Goddard, Barbados' minister of international trade and business has said that "there is a direct correlation between the efforts to contain drug trafficking and maintenance of strong economies in the region." A regional multilateral approach to address these concerns is underway.

**The Caribbean Summit.** The agenda of the May 10, 1997, summit meeting between President Clinton and Caribbean heads of state called for formulating a plan of action linking security issues with the economic performance of island nations. Ralph Marag, Trinidad and Tobago's foreign minister and chairman of the summit steering committee, emphasized the importance of the summit's agenda. In order for Caribbean nations "to become less of a transshipment point for drugs, our economies must become more buoyant", Marag said. The summit strategy formulates a new regional approach intended to integrate trade, economic, and environmental issues, with justice and security issues -- such as drug smuggling, money laundering, weapons trafficking, and strengthened criminal justice systems.

**Transport Geography that Favors Smugglers.** Haiti's attractiveness as a cocaine transshipment and storage point is inspired in part by the country's strategic location. Haiti lies



in close proximity to many of the smuggling routes that converge in the northeastern Caribbean Sea, through which transit approximately one-third of the cocaine smuggled into the United States.

The territorial extension of Haiti's northern and southern peninsulas, creates five separate coastal segments totaling nearly 1800 kilometers in length. Haiti's 14 seaports are dispersed along all five coastal segments. The country's land border with the Dominican Republic (338 kilometers/km) is mostly mountainous and sparsely inhabited terrain, with little road access, and virtually unpatrolled by Haitian immigration or customs authorities. These factors challenge efforts to conduct maritime patrol along Haiti's coastline and to secure the integrity of its sea and land boundaries.

Marine Intermodal Impediments. The inaccessibility of most Haitian ports stems from a rudimentary highway infrastructure built across the country's extended landscape, which has tended to isolate the provincial ports from scrutiny. These isolating factors of Haiti's transport system and its weak administration engender a provincial perspective among local inhabitants, which are conditions smugglers consider favorable.

Haiti's highway system is approximately 4,000 km, of which only 950 km are paved. The best roads -- routes 200 and 300 -- provide landside access to the country's two principal ports, Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien, in addition to 100 which connects the two ports.

Assisting Haiti in modernizing and upgrading its highway system is an important element in bringing the 12 provincial ports into the mainstream of the formal commercial economy. Such development to enhance the landside accessibility of these ports may aid smugglers as well, unless done as a systemic approach to intermodal infrastructure and security improvements.

**Haiti's Cabotage Trade and Smuggling.** The widely dispersed network of ports and poor road system connecting them has made the maritime cabotage trade crucial to domestic commerce in Haiti's nine departments. However, a pervasive international trade in contraband merchandise is taking advantage of the uncontrolled administration of the 12 provincial ports to circumvent customs.

Customs and the NPA. Haiti's National Port Authority (NPA) requires import traffic to be conducted only at Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien; the only ports for which it is responsible. The two ports are called on by more than 20 international ocean freight carriers and passenger cruise lines, many of which are U.S. registered companies. About 90% of Haiti's registered maritime imports and exports move through Port-au-Prince.

The requirement is intended to enable collection of customs revenues, port fees, and documentation before foreign cargoes are transhipped into the cabotage trades (domestic coastal commerce) among Haiti's 12 provincial ports. Approximately 40% of Haiti's government budget is financed by customs and tax receipts. The Port-au-Prince customs house, which is independent of the NPA, collects 80% of that revenue. However, the NPA has no administrative jurisdiction over the provincial ports, and customs regulations rely essentially on voluntary compliance.

Lost Foreign Trade Revenue. Small cargo vessels making numerous direct transits handle the traffic among Haiti's 12 provincial ports and ports of the Dominican Republic, other Antillean countries, and with South Florida. These undocumented voyages involve loading and discharging significant volumes of inter-island freight. Reportedly, they frequently occur in the absence of Haitian customs, immigration, or port security intervention.

Over 50% of Haiti's economy is estimated to be conducted in the informal sector, which emphasizes the economic importance of these ports to remote provincial towns and populations. For example, the Rice Corporation of Haiti, a subsidiary of American Rice, Inc., has complained to the U.S. Embassy that contraband rice accounts for more than half of rice imports. By evading the customs requirement, these undocumented voyages cause Haiti's treasury to lose badly needed foreign trade income from the undeclared cargoes.

Smuggling at the Provincial Ports. Dockside at the provincial ports, contraband cargoes from these voyages are bought and sold, loaded and discharged in cash transactions by independent traders without apparent auditable documentation. Lighterage is commonly used to conduct cargo handling operations, particularly at the minor facilities, which have limited berthing and shallow or obstructed approaches. Landside merchants conduct equally informal secondary market transactions involving the same inbound or outbound contraband goods, as well as cargoes from the legitimate cabotage trade.

These ports are reported to provide employment for hundreds of Haitians working as longshoremen, commercial shippers, brokers, and local merchants. In these port communities, locals struggle to make a living wage. Their trade in legitimate merchandise -- or smuggled contraband goods, narcotics, aliens and migrants, or weapons -- may not be subjected to rigorous distinctions. Attempts to impose commercial trade standards and practices can be expected to conflict with local laissez-faire mercantilism.

The following lists the provincial ports, the departments in which they are located, and the numbered highway routes, if any, which provide them with landside access to their hinterland markets.

Secondary ports:

DEPARTMENT	PORT	HIGHWAY No.
<i>Grand' Anse</i>	<b>Miragoane</b>	200
<i>Grand' Anse</i>	<b>Jeremie</b>	220
<i>Artibonite</i>	<b>St-Marc</b>	100
<i>Artibonite</i>	<b>Gonaives</b>	100, 113
<i>Nord-Quest</i>	<b>Port-de-Paix</b>	151
<i>Quest</i>	<b>Petit-Goave</b>	200, 214
<i>Sud-Est</i>	<b>Jacmel</b>	204B
<i>Sud</i>	<b>Les Cayes</b>	200, 214, 213

Minor ports:

DEPARTMENT	PORT	HIGHWAY No.
<i>Grand' Anse</i>	<b>Corail</b>	218
<i>Grand' Anse</i>	<b>Anse-d'Hainault</b>	-
<i>Artibonite</i>	<b>Anse-a-Galets</b>	-
<i>Sud</i>	<b>Port-a-Piment</b>	213

**Drug and Migrant Smuggling.** Methods of maritime drug smuggling into Haiti are similar to patterns throughout the Caribbean transit zone, where the commercial maritime mode is increasingly favored by cocaine smugglers for transporting shipments. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), coastal freighters were the primary method used by cocaine smugglers to transship their loads through Haiti during 1994. The U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have made a number of cocaine seizures aboard coastal freighters and smaller cargo ships of Haitian registry.

**Regional Port-State Control.** Much of the small-scale trade in legitimate and contraband cargoes carried to and from Haiti's 12 provincial ports by vessels of Haitian registry is conducted in the vicinity of the Port of Miami. This small-vessel trade is affected by a Caribbean Regional Port State Control System, which was established through multilateral agreement among Caribbean countries and includes the United States. Set to take effect July 1, 1997, it specifies minimum standards for cargo ships, including those under 500 gross registered tons. In the United States, the USCG effects port-state control directives to ensure the safety and seaworthiness of all foreign registries and U.S. domestic vessels.

Haiti's director of its National Port Authority, Duquesonne Extra, claims enforcement of the new regulations will collapse

trade at the country's provincial ports, and reportedly said recently that it will "increase anti-American sentiment." The director of Haiti's Maritime and Navigation Service, Venel Pierre, recently was quoted explaining that "Haitian seagoing craft conform to international standards," and are safely maintained and inspected regularly.

According to the USCG, about 60 Haitian vessels -- typically under 25 meters in length and of wooden construction -- make the four-day voyage three to six times per year to Miami. Haiti, however, claims that 350 such vessels are under Haitian flag. Although an exact account of the number of vessels transiting this trade route is difficult to determine, the volume of undocumented cargo it accounts for is believed to be significant. USCG inspections are likely to impact the thriving business in smuggled and under-invoiced merchandise traded in Haiti's provincial ports. However, if these cargoes were processed through customs into Haiti's legitimate economy, the effects would stimulate commercial activity in excess of current benefits.

**Systemic Problems Facing Haiti's NPA.** Haiti's President Preval has expressed intent to improve the customs service, simplify the import process, establish foreign trade zones, and privatize the country's port operations. In the Fall of 1996, Haiti's parliament reluctantly passed a bill authorizing the modernization of state enterprises, including the National Port Authority (NPA). The improvements required are extensive.

Major Impediments to Trade. In early 1995, some U.S. companies doing business in Haiti reported major impediments to trade which impinged on their ability to sustain or expand operations. They cited Haiti's infrastructure problems generally, but emphasized customs and seaport operations. These included: high customs tariffs, and ineffective customs control at the seaports, inefficient port operations, incompetent security, and exorbitant port surcharges and freight rates. They also expressed concerns about political instability and fears of another trade embargo being imposed.

Reforms in Haiti's port sector depend in part on the support of commercial partners, Haitian and international business stakeholders. Their support conveys a continued interest in Haiti's economic development, sustained commercial viability, and the prosperity of the Haitian populace.

Port Operations and Management. The poor management by Haiti's port authority has resulted in a deterioration of port services and facilities. Equipment is dilapidated and port operations have been grossly over staffed. Wharfage fees reportedly exceed those of other ports in the region.

Combined with the poor administration of Haiti's customs service, the international commercial maritime industry regards Port-au-Prince -- Haiti's best facility -- as an inefficient and expensive port with low productivity. In the early 1980s, container operations at Port-au-Prince port were efficiently managed by a private marine terminal company.

Port Authority Employment. Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien port authorities have been excessively over staffed. According to one account, overstaffing in some functional divisions has been as much as 10 times the required number. Port security personnel are on paymaster rolls in numbers which far exceed their observed operational presence on duty.

Only recently has rationalization of port employment occurred with the imposition of presidentially mandated austerity measures, primarily at the Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien facilities. According to the NPA, the number of port employees has been cut from 2,500 to 1,600, and an additional 1,100 layoffs are planned. These staff reductions come in advance of intended implementation of port privatization measures. The longshore labor that handles cargo is not included in these numbers.

Port Privatization. The issue of port privatization in Haiti has triggered popular protests and opposition within the government, which halted the program during 1995. Privatization of labor-intensive industries, such as the NPA, has been attacked as undermining an established national source of patronage and decried as exploitation by foreign companies. Opposition to the port privatization plan has also been raised from the Haitian business sector, which has expressed disapproval over the prospect of losing control of its interests in the maritime industry and related commercial sectors.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean prefers that governments retain sufficient control of ports but be operated by the private sector. This arrangement enables both parties to share in the port revenues and provides the incentive for them to solve common problems and operate efficiently. This is also intended to ensure that no group is able to insulate itself from market forces and establish monopolistic advantage. Financial transparency in the privatization process is essential and is particularly needed to prevent penetration of legitimate commercial enterprises by organized crime. In Haiti's maritime trade sector, these are applicable considerations.

Longshore Labor. Throughout Latin America, opposition by longshore labor unions remains a major barrier to the implementation of essential labor reforms. In Haiti, labor has also voiced opposition to port privatization.

Labor tends to oppose port privatization, which often results in reduced union and non-union staffs employed by the port authority. Its effect on stevedoring agreements often results in reductions in the size of longshore gangs permitted during cargo handling operations.

Port Security. Profitable port business and trade relationships depend on the security of the cargo and passengers which move through an interdependent network of international maritime trade corridors. Good security constricts the opportunities for criminal exploitation of the shipping cycle as it moves through a country's ports. In Haiti, however, endemic corruption and lax security in commercial port activities are easily exploited by criminal conspiracies.

Necessary initial steps toward improving Haiti's port security operations include establishing port security standards and accepted practices and training of carefully screened staffs in their implementation. Effective port security in Haiti also necessitates a partnership with the country's customs service, national police, and coast guard.

**U.S. and Multilateral Assistance/Initiatives.** Haiti's economic and security difficulties make it unlikely to surmount the transnational problems confronting it without bilateral and multilateral assistance. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the U.S. and Haiti includes programs intended to strengthen Haitian maritime law enforcement, drug interdiction, and customs capabilities.

Coast Guard. Also key in the strategy to assist Haiti are USCG port visits, professional exchanges, and bilateral counternarcotics. As a component of the Haitian National Police, a coast guard was established in August 1996, with U.S. assistance. Training of this force of over 40 personnel is being conducted through a joint effort by Canadian and U.S. coast guards.

Viewed as an emerging success, the Haitian Coast Guard has been formed around a flotilla of four 25-foot boats and one 40-foot craft, and a new base in Port-au-Prince harbor. In 1996, the Haitian Coast Guard participated in two cocaine seizures during combined operations with the USCG and DEA. In September 1996, the U.S. agreed to continue financial assistance to the Haitian Coast Guard, and to assist with port security measures for Port-au-Prince.

Customs Service. The U.S. Customs Service (USCS) has identified containerized commercial cargo at seaports as its primary unsolved narcotics detection requirement. As part of its response to that problem, USCS established a business-led alliance called the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), in

1996. It is intended to significantly deter the use of legitimate commercial shipments as narcotic smuggling conveyances by examining the entire process of manufacturing, packaging, and shipping merchandise to the U.S. from foreign countries. BASC complements the long-standing USCS Sea Carrier Initiative Program which emphasizes deterring narcotic smuggling onboard commercial ocean carriers.

National Police and Counternarcotics. International counternarcotics training by the U.S. is managed and funded by the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is part of an international effort with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to retrain Haiti's national police force. This training includes a focus on improving its effectiveness as a professional civilian institution that is fully integrated into the society, capable of protecting its people, and dedicated to supporting the country's constitution and laws, and human rights.

Port Security Training. Training of commercial port security personnel is also a key component in an integrated and comprehensive strategy for establishing secure trade corridors for Haiti's international commerce. The port security function is complementary to coast guard, customs, and police roles and missions -- but sufficiently different -- to warrant specialized training. A general overview of recommended standards and practices is included in *Port Security: A National Planning Guide*, produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) and Coast Guard.

Port security is a major goal of the Organization of American States (OAS) as expressed in its recently published *Guidelines for An Inter-American Port Policy*, all of which are applicable in Haiti. Established training has previously been conducted on a limited basis for OAS countries under the sponsorship of OAS and MARAD, and funded by the U.S. Department of State. Haitian port security personnel have not as yet received this training.

A Port and Waterways Management Strategy. Haiti presently has limited capabilities for deterring and countering encroachment of its coastal waters and ports by smugglers of narcotics, contraband, and illegal aliens. The smuggling is violating Haiti's national territorial and economic integrity with impunity. Therefore, it may be necessary for Haiti to establish a comprehensive and integrated port and waterways management strategy. Key components of this strategy include the coast guard, customs, national police, and port security.

Working together these organizations may improve Haiti's capabilities to deter smuggling. As improvements are made in

Haiti the result may also increase the effectiveness of regional counternarcotic/migrant interdiction operations and U.S. efforts in the transit zones.

COMMENT: Enacting requisite port security measures in Haiti must be done in coordination with other national agencies and regional governmental initiatives. A restructured port security division, administratively controlled by the Government of Haiti's National Port Authority, is probably the most practical near-term approach to reform. This more graduated approach to forming a viable port security service in Haiti may enable institutional confidence building and provide indigenous employment opportunities. In this way, new operational security standards and practices could be introduced while minimizing administrative dislocations or labor discontent.

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## **POLICY - Partnering: A Key To the Growing Challenges Confronting Maritime Security**

Maritime transportation systems span the world and provide indispensable services every day, ensuring economic prosperity and quality of life. Maritime transportation symbolizes the international interdependence that has evolved among nations and accounts for nearly all the tonnage of goods moved in the global economy. The security of the trade corridors through which these goods are moved and countless passengers served is an issue of critical international importance.

Historically, maritime security has been focused primarily on acts of piracy, pilferage, and the vulnerability of ports to such things as fires and explosions. Today, we see increasing concerns with a broader range of criminal acts, such as theft of intermodal cargo, drug and weapons smuggling, terrorism, extortion, and illegal immigration. The increasingly complex nature and international scope of security issues which threaten the maritime industry and the movement of cargo in trade demand a broader range of collaboration among governments and the international commercial maritime industry.

**Threats - Transnational and Intermodal.** Pirates and thieves are nothing new in the maritime environment. With the advent of sophisticated container technology, cargo theft that was petty pilferage is now large-scale larceny with over \$10 billion dollars worth of cargo stolen annually, according to the commercial industry's National Cargo Security Council. In south Florida alone, losses are estimated to exceed \$1 million per week. Containers also serve as an attractive haven for the transport of illegal immigrants, narcotics, and other forms of international smuggling and trafficking in stolen goods.

These transnational threats of terrorism, sea robbery, smuggling of stowaways and drugs, cargo theft and fraud, and bribery and extortion negatively impact our intermodal transportation systems. These attacks included armed assaults, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and fire bombings.

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{CDR D. Michael Smith, U.S. Coast Guard, contributed this policy report. CDR Smith is Deputy Associate Director of Maritime Policy in the Department of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security, where he is concluding a tour of duty. His new assignment will be Executive Officer, USCG Marine Safety Office, Tampa, Florida.}

The table below shows the number of violent attacks against all types of transportation systems in 1996, relative to the maritime mode.

<u>Mode</u>	<u># of Incidents</u>	<u>% of Incidents</u>
Maritime	184	26
Bus	163	24
Highways	87	12
Rail	79	11
Aviation	71	10
Pipelines	61	9
Bridges	17	2
Subways	8	1
Other	33	5

**Intermodal Vulnerabilities.** The maritime transportation system has a number of vulnerabilities which can generally be placed into five broad categories:

People - including the users and the operators of the system;

Freight - the cargoes, in all their various forms, that are moved through the maritime transportation system;

Infrastructure - the facilities and installations of the system, including ports, roadways, warehouses, railways, and intermodal freight and passenger terminals;

Assets - the containers, ships, cranes, and other such intermodal equipment used in the operation of the system;

Confidence - the belief by the users and providers of the transportation system that it is viable for their needs.

**Vulnerabilities Specific To Maritime.** In addition to these general areas of vulnerability mentioned above, there are three major factors that have added new factors to be considered in addressing maritime transportation vulnerabilities.

Marine Intermodalism. Intermodalism maximizes efficiency by speeding travel and cutting costs. At the same time, it increases the number of modes used, increases the number of transfer terminals, and the number of people with access to the system. These exchanges increase the number of opportunities for hostile intervention or criminal exploitation. Intermodalism can also mean an increase in the organizations responsible for the security of an entire transit or shipment, making protective efforts difficult to coordinate. Governmental agencies, port authorities, marine intermodal providers, and shippers must

develop partnerships and alliances that will lessen the risk raised from the complex array of entities potentially responsible for the security of marine intermodal movements.

Internationalization. The second factor stems from the increasing internationalization of intermodal transportation systems. This also provides for increases in the opportunities for those who would take advantage of the open nature of the system. We need to ensure that the access provided by internationalism does not compromise the safety and security of the people who use the system. Consequently, to do so necessitates the security and integrity of international frontiers and cross-border facilities. This, in turn, requires multilateral agreements with our trade partners to develop processes that will guarantee our commitments to secure our transnational transport systems.

Information Assurance. The third factor is that of ensuring the integrity of our information and communications systems. These systems are vulnerable not only to physical attacks by terrorists but also to computer intrusions which have previously disrupted information based systems in finance, telecommunication and other infrastructures. In today's cyberspace environment, computer terrorists can reach across continents to disrupt the operations of international transportation systems. The reality of such a transnational threat environment demands that we master its technical complexities.

Addressing Vulnerabilities. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is currently engaged in conducting a comprehensive surface transportation vulnerability assessment of United States infrastructure, including the maritime mode. This effort is being jointly conducted under DOT's Research and Special Programs Administration and the Office of Intelligence and Security. This assessment will look at the transportation infrastructure in terms of its systemic vulnerabilities. The goal of this study is to create a unified picture of the security of the transportation system as a whole --a system which is both global and intermodal.

There are, however, efforts which can currently be employed to reduce the vulnerabilities of the maritime transportation system. Some of these processes are:

Knowledge of the System's Vulnerabilities - this begins with a critical examination of the system, including its connecting nodes, route networks, and critical intermodal interchange junctions;

Identification/Prioritization of Potential Targets - a process closely related to the identification of vulnerabilities but one which also establishes models

that will allow for accurate determination of specific vulnerabilities most likely to be exploited;

Strategic Planning - a valuable tool in efforts to reduce the vulnerability of the transportation system and the process which information on three major considerations in question is gathered: (a) What is being transported? (b) How does it need to be transported and what necessitates that method? and (c) What are the alternative modes/routes if primary preferences are not available?

Implementation of Technology - provides us with a chance for examining innovative ways of minimizing the vulnerabilities of the nation's transportation system, helping to detect potential acts, and hardening potential targets;

Establishment of Partnerships - partnering with all parties that benefit from the system aids in reducing its vulnerabilities and helps demonstrate the cost effectiveness of viable security programs (e.g. cargo security), increases user confidence, reduces liability exposure, and produces other commercial benefits.

**Federal/Industry Partnerships.** While DOT has introduced regulations, the primary method by which the Department expects and intends to carry out its transportation security initiatives is through the pursuit of partnerships with the maritime community. Cooperative public-private partnerships are the indispensable key to success in providing transportation security.

To assist in reducing vulnerabilities through this concept of partnering, DOT has developed a strategy of working with and supporting the maritime industry and other Federal agencies through a three-element approach which strives to:

- (1) Reduce the industry's susceptibility to terrorism and cargo theft whether in domestic or international ports;
- (2) Deter and prevent opportunities for criminal exploitation of the maritime transportation system; and
- (3) Facilitate efforts of law enforcement agencies to arrest and prosecute those committing crimes against the maritime transportation system.

Federal partnerships have been formed within DOT through close working cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration. Interdepartmentally, DOT agencies work closely with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and a number of other Federal agencies involved in maritime transportation security issues.

DOT agencies have developed important partnerships with the commercial maritime industry, including such groups as the Maritime Security Council, the International Council of Cruise Lines, the American Association of Port Authorities, the American Society for Industrial Security, the National Cargo Security Council, the International Maritime Organization, the International Maritime Bureau, and numerous other groups. The maritime transportation environment is truly diverse and requires the participation of all its many components to function in a safe and secure manner.

Within the past few years, we have seen great strides in these partnership efforts. The effort and commitment put forth by both industry and government have been instrumental in the success that these partnerships have brought about. Some of the major successes that have occurred between the Department of Transportation and industry are:

- \* A quarterly MARAD publication entitled **Maritime Security Report**. This report serves to advise the industry of current issues affecting maritime security, focusing on international criminal threats to U.S. traded cargo;

- \* **International Perspectives on Maritime Security**, a joint publication of the Department and the Maritime Security Council. It is a compilation of articles by experts within the maritime security field on problems the industry is facing and potential solutions, and may be used as a supplemental text for training programs;

- \* The recent publication of a national port security policy, **Port Security: A National Planning Guide**, is the first in a planned series of manuals that will provide government and industry with valuable information and guidance on critical aspects for ensuring a secure maritime transport system;

- \* A three day workshop on maritime security co-sponsored by the International Council of Cruise Lines, the Maritime Security Council, the American Association of Port Authorities, and the Port of Los Angeles, which

brought industry and government transportation security experts together for a series of panel discussions;

- \* Establishment of a government/industry ad-hoc information exchange working group provides a forum for its members -- from various government agencies, the Maritime Security Council, the International Council of Cruise Lines, and the American Association of Port Authorities -- to exchange information on threats to the maritime transport system;

- \* Establishment of a threat dissemination process which provides industry with timely and meaningful guidance in the event of increased threats against the transportation system; and

- \* The Maritime Administration's Cargo Handling Cooperative Program which provides research to advance cargo handling techniques for marine-related intermodal systems.

COMMENT: In conclusion, a primary goal within every element of the transportation field is the ability to provide safe and secure transportation corridors. This goal, however, cannot be achieved by governments alone. The central defining element of any security program is the acceptance of responsibility for the protection and security of the transportation system by all of the parties who benefit from it. This acceptance of shared responsibility is critical to being agile and proactive in reacting and implementing countermeasures to the steady stream of emerging threats.

All parties must commit themselves to a policy of substantially improving the security of their ports and maritime trade corridors. That commitment not only will benefit their own respective systems but also enhance the entire maritime transportation system worldwide. Maritime transportation security must be incorporated right from the beginning as an integral part of all trade negotiations. All of these steps must be initiated today if there is to be a more secure transportation system for tomorrow.

All of these challenges discussed above -- intermodalism, internationalization, enhanced information systems assurance -- have in common the fact that they transcend the traditional operational boundaries of marine transportation. They are transnational in nature. Meeting these challenges demands that a systemic approach to these issues be taken by looking at the transportation system in its entire context. This will require unprecedented levels of cooperation and coordination.

Lessons learned through Federal/industry partnerships and decades of experience demonstrate that practical, cost effective and flexible security measures are achievable. DOT agencies will continue to work with industry and other government agencies

within the United States and overseas to combat maritime security threats. Through partnerships, the high level of security expertise in industry and government can be harnessed into improving and providing a secure maritime transportation system.

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