United States
Coast Guard

30 March 1995

From: Chairman, Incident Specific Preparedness Review Team
To: Chief, Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection

Subj: INCIDENT SPECIFIC PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR) OF THE RESPONSE TO THE OIL SPILL RESULTING FROM THE LEAKAGE OF DILUENT OIL FROM THE SHORELINES OF GUADALUPE BEACH, CA

1. Under the direction of a Unified Command, responders undertook a massive project to eliminate the threat of a substantial release of oil into the marine environment near Guadalupe Beach, California. This highly successful operational response presented difficult and complex challenges to all parties. The Area Contingency Plan preparedness process required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) contributed directly to the effective use of all available resources. Of particular note and direct credit to all concerned, the project was completed without accident or serious injury.

2. From the outset, this incident involved a controversy over whether it was a remediation project or an emergency response. At the center of the controversy was the 'extensive permitting required by local agencies. Many opined that, inasmuch as this was an emergency, the federal On Scene Coordinator (OSC) should use the OPA authority to set aside the permit requirements and get on with the job at hand. The opposing view cited the ongoing nature of the event and rejected as ludicrous the notion that the circumstances constituted an emergency. Our consideration of this difference in perspective concluded two things:

a. The OSC correctly applied the OPA guidance in determining that a substantial threat of release existed. He was legally bound to move forward and abate that threat.

b. The OSC's decision to let the responsible party fulfill the many local permitting requirements was in full harmony with the letter and spirit of OPA. The OSC made it clear that his order did not eliminate the requirement to fully address public interests through compliance with state and local laws. On the other hand, the OSC made it equally clear that if a local law unduly delayed the response, he was prepared to rely on the supremacy of his federal mandate and proceed. In our view, this position reflected the right course, balancing the need for operational expediency with legal issues and other stakeholder concerns.

3. Based on input from both government and private industry that the PLLS long report format was not well received in the Berman report, we abridged the Lessons Learned format for use in the main report. We have also included Lessons Learned in the PLLS long report format for inclusion in the PLLS system when it becomes operational.

4. The presence of an issue among our lessons learned need not suggest the presence of a major problem. Indeed, some of the problems noted reflect no more than choices consciously made by the Unified Command as a consequence of the ever present need to juggle constrained resources. In the main, the lessons identified are not new. They are nonetheless instructive. To the extent that they are applied, they will benefit the continuing development of the nation's ability to respond to oil spills.

J.T~ KUCHIN

End: (1) Final Report
(2) ISPR Process Observations
(3) PLLS Long Reports (G-MEP only)

Copy: COMDT (G-MEP)
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INCIDENT SPECIFIC
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW

GUADALUPE BEACH OIL SPILL

Final Report

Submitted on 30 March 1995

ENCLOSURE (1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Background of the Site.

a. The Leroy trust owns a tract of oceanfront property approximately 80 miles north of Santa Barbara and 20 miles south of San Luis Obispo, near the town of Guadalupe, CA. The trust has leased 2,300 acres to Unocal since 1953. The lease allows Unocal to extract hydrocarbons from beneath the surface. Because the crude oil was difficult to remove, Unocal routinely used a partially refined petroleum diluent to help it do so.

b. In 1988 and 1990 the California Department of Fish and Game became aware of periodic sheens on the surface of the ocean off the coast of Guadalupe. The source of these sheens was not known to the government. Although the results of later searches by California investigators showed that Unocal knew of several releases, they had never been reported to a regulatory body. Although Unocal never admitted to creating the sheens, as operator of the oil field it accepted responsibility for any cleanup needed. Further investigation revealed thirty one plumes of diluent, at least one of which was near the tidal zone. This was called the Leroy 5X plume. Operating under the belief that the diluent plumes could be migrating toward the ocean, Unocal installed a 1,000 foot long bentonite wall in March 1990. The company had hoped that this would limit the amount of oil reaching the tidal zone. The wall, combined with 15 extraction wells, allowed Unocal to recover about 700,000 gallons of diluent by early 1994.

c. In spite of earlier efforts, however, diluent was released into the surf in January 1994. Following additional research, Unocal determined that the oil plumes were not migrating; instead, the oil was being released as a result of beach face erosion. Historically, this had occurred during winter storms. The Coast Guard's Captain of the Port for Los Angeles and Long Beach (COTP) investigated. He evaluated Unocal's findings regarding the association between beach face erosion and release of the oil, as well as the extent of the Leroy 5X plume, and determined that the combination of these factors constituted a substantial threat of an imminent release of diluent.

2. The Response.

a. On 1 April 1994, the COTP issued an administrative order to Unocal based on his determination that unless corrective action was taken before the next round of winter storms, a substantial release was imminent. Unocal developed a General Response Plan following the guidelines of the Area Contingency Plan (ACP) developed pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Both plans require a unified command structure designed to effectively employ the assets and combined capabilities of federal, state and local government and the responsible party.

b. The Unocal plan required the construction and installation of a steel cofferdam around the plume, and the excavation and cleanup of roughly 165,000 cubic yards of contaminated sand. The excavation resulted in the removal of .810 barrels of free floating diluent from the ground water inside the cofferdam, decontamination of the sand by thermal desorption (removing over 5,000 barrels of diluent), and replacement of the sand into the hole. Before refilling the hole with cleaned sand, Unocal installed a 965 foot long wall of high density polyethylene (HDPE) along the east side of the excavation pit. This HDPE wall is designed to prevent additional contamination of the ocean by contaminants migrating west from the Guadalupe field.

c. Before the excavation phase of this project began, the OSC consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. He ultimately received a biological opinion that authorized the project to move forward and outlined certain restrictions regarding the snowy plovers and brown pelicans that nest at the beach. However, the beginning of the excavation phase was delayed until 2 September 1994 to allow for the birds' nesting season.

d. In order to complete this project, Unocal was required to obtain a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission, as well as a number of other permits from various state and local agencies. The Coastal Commission permit placed a number of conditions on Unocal in an effort to ensure the coastal resources were protected. Other permits were issued with conditions that tried to minimize the release of hydrocarbons to the atmosphere. Several required Unocal to employ an unbiased monitor who would report relevant activities to the permitting agency.

e. The Unified Command managed public affairs principally through Unocal's public affairs office. The tremendous effort by the Unified Command to keep the public informed did not fully alleviate public concerns about the extent of the pollution problem, the adequacy of the response effort, or the impact on the affected community. For some, concerns became a matter of public trust in the Coast Guard, the California Dept. of Fish and Game and Unocal.

3. External Events.

One environmental group sued the Coast Guard alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Actin an attempt to prevent the project from proceeding. Other groups have sued or threatened to sue Unocal under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act and other environmental laws. The Justice Department is reportedly investigating this incident to determine whether a criminal prosecution is warranted as a result of Unocal's failure to report the release of oil into the ocean.

4. Lessons Learned.

a. This response had three aspects that made it a unique response for the coastal Unified Command and the Central Coast Area Contingency Plan.

- It was land-based rather than water-based.

- It was an effort to mitigate the substantial threat of an imminent discharge into the marine environment rather than a cleanup of oil that had already entered the ocean.

- The event stretched over an extended period of time, and was, from start to finish, more akin to a remediation project (with a relatively short deadline) than a classic emergency response.

b. A careful review of the plans developed for this area and the way in which they were used during this operation has taught us a number of lessons in five principal areas. These are described briefly below. Further explanations of the context in which we learned these lessons are attached. It is important to remember that these lessons were learned in the course of reviewing an OSC's successful exercise of his OPA authority working with state and local agencies and a cooperative and capable responsible party to remove a pollution threat from Guadalupe Beach.

I. Response Management:

Once the decision was reached that a substantial threat of discharge existed, the preplanned organizational mechanisms were quickly brought into play. A Unified Command Structure based on the Incident Command System (as outlined in the Area Contingency Plan) was established. From the beginning, all three members of the Unified Command underestimated the burden of operating the response management system. The ACP wiring diagram is simple enough and does provide the first step in establishing the system. Employing the system, however, is a complex process requiring specific skills and talents including considerable energy devoted to active management and operation of the system. Notwithstanding this, the Unified Command Structure did work and contributed directly to getting the job done.

b. A joint/unified safety team was established and a comprehensive Site Safety and Occupational Health Plan was prepared. The plan was rigorously enforced. It covered all aspects of the response including visits by the media and others. The remarkable safety record of the six month long industrial/response project (1 minor injury) was the direct result of a vigorous and unyielding commitment to safety by the Unified Command.

II. Scientific Support and Coordination:

a. Science was a central issue in many aspects of the response. Generally speaking, the Area Contingency Plan (ACP) and the National Contingency Plan (NCP) indicate that the SSC will play a lead role in coordinating the use of science by the Response Management System (RMS). Given the much larger role of trustees and local government agencies described by OPA and the extensive NCP prescribed role for the Scientific Support Coordinator, Area Committees should ensure that plans provide adequate guidance in describing what the RMS will expect from the SSC and how he will function within the system.

b. Three environmental laws, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) played roles in the response. Compliance with the ESA delayed the response; a restraining order was filed on the basis of the NEPA; and Unocal was issued a coastal development permit under the CZMA. Area Committees should ensure that Area Planning efforts consider the requirements of NEPA, the ESA and the CZMA before a spill occurs.

III. Stakeholder Management:

Apart from the difficulties presented by the actual work of accomplishing the abatement project, the most daunting challenge for the Unified Command was handling the issues posed by stakeholders interested in the response. Almost without exception, the lessons learned came to light as the result of stakeholder concerns stressing the response system. The OPA framework requires full organizational commitment to both stakeholder concerns and response operations. Effective management of stakeholder concerns requires ongoing outreach by the Area Committees and comprehensive development of strategies to address and handle the entire range of stakeholder issues, including those that are raised for the first time in the midst of the emergency

IV. Public Affairs:

Unocal hired a public relations professional and dedicated her full time to the project. The State of California and the Coast Guard provided a limited number of personnel at the beginning of the excavation project. Public Affairs did an excellent job of producing. daily news releases and providing a broad range of support services. In general, however, the State and Coast Guard Unified Command members failed to fully anticipate the intensity of the "public perception" controversy that grew up around the response. Public Affairs must be viewed as a critical success factor and must be employed proactively at the beginning of an incident.

V. Area Contingency Plan:

a. Overall, the OPA preparedness process appears to be taking us in the right direction. The Area Committee process works. The plans have been written; drills and exercises are strengthening readiness. In the Guadalupe incident, much of the plan did apply, even to this rather non-traditional event.

b. The troubling aspect is that despite considerable effort, the Area Contingency Plan (arguably a centerpiece of our preparedness efforts) may not yet be fully valued as a response tool. Every responder interviewed indicated that he or she did not use the Plan because it was either not helpful or not applicable to this event. In many ways, failure to use the plans under fire limits our ability to capture and preserve the full fruits of the planning processes. Although the process of developing plans helps responders prepare, unless we use the plans we develop, our effectiveness may never rise to the level envisioned by OPA. This is a critical process issue that needs further analysis.

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Effective Response

OBSERVATION:

The Guadalupe Beach underground diluent plume posed an unusual set of difficult challenges to the response community. The successful abatement of the threat required extraordinary effort and initiative by all players in the Response Management System. Approximately 6000 barrels of diluent were removed from the environment. Removal was accomplished by thermal desorption of the excavated sand and skimming from the surface of the pond that was created by the excavation. Given the severity of the January 1995 storms which have been classified as 100-500 year intensity, much of this oil may have been released to the nearshore environment at Guadalupe Beach, CA had the response not been undertaken.

LESSONS LEARNED:

The preparations made in the Area Contingency Plan and related preparedness actions contributed directly to the success of this response. The concerted action of a Unified Command involving Unocal, the State of California and the U.S. Coast Guard, with inputs from other government agencies and outside stakeholders, prevented a significant release from occurring during the winter of '94-'95.

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Proactive Execution of OPA9O Authority

OBSERVATION:

The history of releases from Unocal's Guadalupe oil field combined with the expectation of winter storms made a substantial release of diluent imminent. Based on OPA's provisions, the federal On Scene Coordinator was required to direct actions to prevent a discharge.

The federal On Scene Coordinator's proactive order requiring Unocal to prevent a future spill from its Guadalupe field was criticized by state agencies that had arguably conflicting statutory duties to protect natural resources on the California coast.

LESSONS LEARNED:

The Oil Pollution Act's requirement of proactive federal action may conflict in practice with its empowerment of states.

DISCUSSION:

The Oil Pollution Act changed the legal framework within which an OSC must respond to a spill. The old, somewhat permissive, authority to clean up oil spills is now a mandatory duty to remove a discharge or prevent the substantial threat of a discharge. 33 USC 1321(c)(l)(A). The Act also preserves state authority to impose requirements regarding the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into waters within the state. 33 U.S.C. 1321(o)(2). Moreover, nothing in section 1321 precludes a state or political subdivision thereof from enforcing more stringent requirements regarding the abatement of pollution. 33 U.S.C. 1370.

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Federal Law versus State and Local Law in Response Operations

OBSERVATION:

At Guadalupe, Unocal applied for a number of permits to ensure its cleanup operation complied with state and local laws. A number of people expressed the view that the federal On Scene Coordinator should have ignored the permit requirements and advised Unocal to do the same.

LESSONS LEARNED:

In a case being monitored by the Coast Guard, the OSC and his staff must recognize that the OPA expressly intended states and localities to have a role in the cleanup process. There is no clear exemption from these requirements for a responsible party. Although federal law may ultimately be viewed as supreme, it may be so viewed only if the operation of a state law actually conflicts with the federal mandate. An OSC would be wise to reserve any power to exert the supremacy of federal law until it is obvious that state or local requirements conflict with his duties under the OPA.

DISCUSSION:

It is not clear that a response action under the Clean Water Act relieves the responsible party from the need to comply with state and local law. Indeed, the President (federal On Scene Coordinator) is only relieved from complying with contracting procedures or employment procedures imposed by the federal government--and then only when he directs the removal of a spill that poses a substantial threat to the public health or welfare of the United States. 33 U.S.C. 1321(c)(2)(A). The National Contingency Plan is similarly silent on the effect of state and local law on a response under the Clean Water Act. In contrast, when the NCP deals with hazardous substances, it discusses the effect state and local laws may have one response in great detail. Cf. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300.430(d)(3), 300.430(e)2)(i)(A), 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(B), 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(H)(2), and 300.430(f)(l) (ii)(C). (discussing applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements under the hazardous substance portions of the NCP). Here, although the OSC maintained his intent to complete the project in time to prevent a release of diluent, he never relieved Unocal of the need to comply with state and local laws.

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Execution of Individual Responsibility within the Unified Command Structure

OBSERVATION:

The Unified Command (UC) performed as a cohesive unit, focusing on a common objective. This unity in focus and purpose contributed much to the ability of the UC to work effectively in managing the response. The focus of some State and Coast Guard personnel, however, was such that they occasionally tended to view external requirements such as stakeholder concerns as things to be overcome rather than legitimate needs to be satisfied. As a result, some stakeholders, including other government agencies, thought the Coast Guard and California's Office of Oil Spill Prevention & Response (OSPR) lost credibility.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Unified Command (UC) functions most effectively when there is a strong sense of unity, even esprit, in the members. At the same time, strong camaraderie in UC could actually work against overall effectiveness if “team unity” develops to the point that members take on ownership of the problems/challenges presented to other members of the UC. The risk is that these actions could then subordinate the legitimate objectives of their parent organization to those of the UC. The best balance requires that there be a full expectation that each unified command member will, in addition to aggressively managing the response, be representing all concerns of the parent organization.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Continue/expand discussion of the dynamics of Unified Command roles in response management training.

DISCUSSION:

There is an underlying tension between Unified Command members' individual responsibilities and their collective responsibility to quickly remove a substantial threat to the marine environment. With the issuance of an administrative order to Unocal came the added responsibility for the federal OSC to ensure compliance with laws regulating his own actions, such as the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act. Most importantly, however, he and his staff must maintain the appearance and the reality of being objective regulators of the Responsible Party. Similarly, Unocal was not only required to obey the OSC's order, but was required to satisfy the requirements of several apparently conflicting laws and meet its obligation

to shareholders by minimizing the cost of the cleanup. California's Office of Oil Spill prevention & Response (OSFR), the state representative in the Unified Command, not only had to ensure the cleanup met California's standards, but also had a duty to protect the state's interests in ensuring compliance with other state laws.

Federal, state and industry representatives involved in the unified Command structure should recognize the paradoxical nature of responding to the incident while representing separate constituencies. Discussion of the paradoxical nature in response management training will raise consciousness and better prepare players to deal with conflicting priorities during response operations

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Operation of the Response Management System (RMS)

OBSERVATION:

The Response Management System called for in the Central Coast Area Contingency Plan is a Unified Command Structure based on the Incident Command System. The use of the pre-planned structure contributed directly to successful management of the response. Those responders who were familiar with the ICS process were generally better able to function in this response.

Each party in the Unified Command underestimated the burden of establishing and effectively operating the Response Management System. examples include: failing to commit sufficient or sufficiently skilled personnel to adequately staff critical positions; requiring personnel to cover two or more "full-time" positions simultaneously; and rotating personnel through the response management system too frequently. On several occasions, members of the Unified C6mmand had to consult with their off-site headquarters before making decisions. The responders felt that this detracted from the effectiveness of the UC.

As the response operation began to wind down, the RMS personnel resources began to dwindle rapidly. The reduction in staffing was not managed to ensure that the system continued to function fully. This conveyed a waning interest and commitment to supporting the Response Management System.

LESSONS LEARNED:

The California UCS/ICS is a flexible and capable Response Management System. In general, large Response Management Systems have all the challenges of any complex organization with several, significant, added complications: many of the members have rarely or never worked together; they are often functioning in a time sensitive, crisis environment; they are serving in a location remote from their homes and normal life; they are filling roles that may be significantly different from their day-to-day employment and require seldom used skills. The members of Unified Command must appreciate these complexities and ensure that they are attended to throughout the response. In addition, flexibility of the system depends on adaptation of the prescribed wiring diagram to the specific circumstances of each response. Each party must carefully identify and provide the needed staffing for the response. Inadequate staffing, in terms of the number of personnel, their skills, and the authority they have to make decisions, will inevitably lead to reduced performance of the system.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

ACP's should be reviewed to ensure that they adequately provide for the maintenance and management of the RMS throughout a response. In particular, key players must have a full appreciation of how to operate the system. Consideration should be given to training specialists in the operation of the Response Management System. Such individuals would then be in a position during an actual response to assist Unified Command in operating the system as it responds. For a very large RMS, system/process maintenance" may be a full time job.

All personnel who serve in the RMS should be trained in the operation of the system and in the specific roles they will perform.

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Safety

OBSERVATION:

An extremely thorough Site Safety and Health Plan was developed by the Unified Command. Adherence to the processes and standards described in the plan was vigorous and unyielding during the entire response operation. Individual responsibility for all actions was specifically emphasized by requiring each worker to review the plan. Further, the plan explicitly states that any worker who could not comply with the requirements would be excluded from the work area. The response operation was conducted with only a single minor injury.

LESSONS LEARNED:

An effective safety program is a critical success factor in emergency response.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Ensure that the ACP provides for immediate development of a comprehensive Site Safety and Health Plan.

DISCUSSION:

Contributing factors to the safety performance included:

- An agreement between Cal-OSHA and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) that delegates authority for developing and administering the Site Safety & Health Plan to OSPR. As a result, the State OSC has full authority to ensure safety is built in to all aspects of the response.

- The Guadalupe Site Safety & Health Plan provisions were consistently enforced for all parties. No one was allowed on-site unless he was willing to comply with the Plan' 5 requirements.

- Site-specific training was offered frequently to interested parties so that they could visit the site.

SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT & COORDINATION

Role of the Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC)

OBSERVATION:

The Guadalupe response was embroiled in contentious issues centered on the environment. Almost without exception, advocates and opponents alike based their position on scientific data. The ACP indicates that the SSC will play a lead role in coordinating, facilitating, and managing such issues, but never clearly establishes the manner in which he will function in the Response Management System to fulfil the envisioned roles.

During the Guadalupe response, the SSC served principally as a member of the Planning Section. Because his position and role in the response management system are not well defined, there is a potential for him to become isolated from the OSC.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Better planning for employment of the SSC should increase his usefulness to the Unified Command and his ability to carry out his assigned tasks.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Area Contingency Plans should be reviewed to ensure that the Response Management System has fully developed the organization and strategy to be employed in managing and coordinating science issues. This should include: designing of the SSC role so as to enable fulfillment of all the roles described in the NCP; and complete planning for coordination between the SSC, the natural resource trustees, the "stakeholder manager", and other groups concerned with science issues.

DISCUSSION

The three primary documents providing guidance to responders in California on the role of the SSC are summarized here.

1. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) states that the SSC..

   "...serves on the federal OSC's/RPM's staff, leads the scientific team and...may...provide scientific support for operational decisions and for coordinating on-scene scientific activity..."

   “...strives for a consensus on scientific issues affecting the response, but ensures that differing opinions within the community are communicated to the OSC/RPM.”

"depending on the nature and location of the incident, ... integrates expertise from governmental agencies, universities, community representatives, and industry to assist the OSC/RPM in evaluating the hazards and potential effects of releases and in developing response strategies."

"...may facilitate the OSC's work with the lead administrative trustee for natural resources to ensure coordination between damage assessment data collection efforts and data collected in support of response operations."

2. The Area Contingency Plan (ACP) discussion of the SSC as a Special Force parallels the National Contingency Plan except that it does not use the word "may" in describing the duties of the SSC. The ACP indicates that several different cells in the RMS will perform functions that have a scientific flavor...
   - Safety Staff will coordinate with public, government, ... regarding public health concerns including... fisheries restrictions
   - Strategy Unit (Planning Section, Strategy Branch) will develop natural resource protection priorities & protection strategies
   - Wildlife Recovery & Rehabilitation Unit...
   - Technical Branch will provide scientific and technical information and analysis to support response planning and operations
   - Alternative Response Technology Branch will identify environmental trade of is associated with application of a specific alternative response technology
   - Natural Resource Damage Assessment Unit....

3. The Field Operations Guide (developed in California; published Oct 94; not available during the Guadalupe response) identifies the role of a "Scientific Support Coordinator Specialist" and suggests that, as a "Technical Specialist", the SSC may be assigned anywhere in the ICS organization and if necessary, may be formed into a separate unit with other technical specialists.

In many cases, the SSC serves as something of a free agent during response, providing some specific technical support and helping out wherever needed. The alignment of realistic expectations for the SSC with a viable, defined structure in the Response Management System should aid his ability to serve and his usefulness in response.

SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT & COORDINATION

NOAA's Roles in Response

OBSERVATION:

At one point in the response, a request to conduct marine environmental testing by the NOAA Coastal Resource Coordinator created some confusion. The confusion arose principally because this person, who had the dual roles of providing advice to the federal OSC as a natural resource trustee and serving as a member of the RRT, chose to involve the RRT in making the request to the OSC, rather than operating as a trustee from within the Response Management System.

The Area Contingency Plan indicates that the Planning Section will provide input to the Unified Command on trustee issues.

LESSONS LEARNED:

A major spill will likely involve three separate NOAA entities; a Scientific Support Coordinator; a Coastal Resources Coordinator (natural resource trustee and RRT member); and an NRDA trustee. Until NOAA clarifies the interactions between the SSC, Coastal Resource Coordinators, and Natural Resource Damage Assessment personnel, there is a potential for confusing the roles and responsibilities of NOAA personnel during a response.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Area Committees should review NOAA's guidance on roles and reflect the clarification of responsibility in subsequent editions of the ACP.

DISCUSSION:

NOAA is currently developing guidance to its staff regarding the roles of the various entities during response operations. This guidance should be distributed widely to other Federal agencies, the appropriate State agencies, other resource trustees and industry. It should also be incorporated as part of each Area Contingency Plan.

SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT & COORDINATION

OSC Compliance with the Endangered Species Act

OBSERVATION:

Endangered species were present on the beaches at Guadalupe. Their likely presence was noted in the ACP but no consultation had been undertaken with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before the OSC ordered Unocal to perform this cleanup. After the OSC issued his order, he undertook an endangered species consultation which delayed the response action.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Failure to ensure compliance with the Endangered Species Act in advance of a spill could frustrate effective response action. To avoid a harmful delay or a violation of the Endangered Species Act, OSCs should consider consulting with the FWS before a spill occurs.

DISCUSSION:

The Endangered Species Act requires each federal agency to consult with the Secretary of Commerce or Interior to ensure the agency's action is not likely to either jeopardize the continued existence of any threatened or endangered species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of its habitat. 16 'U.S.C. 1536. Because the OSC was required to consult with the FWS after he issued his administrative order to Unocal, Unocal's response was delayed. Although the delay did not preclude a successful response, a similar delay could cause harm in another case. To avoid a harmful delay or a violation of the Endangered Species Act, OSCs should consider consulting with the FWS before a spill occurs. This could be accomplished in advance based on the ACP's gathering data that shows the presence of endangered species in areas where oil spill response operations are anticipated. See U.S. Department of the Interior letter to Rear Admiral Arthur E. Henn dated 26 July 94.

SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT & COORDINATION

OSC Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act

OBSERVATION:

The Environmental Center of San Luis Obispo (ECOSLO) filed a lawsuit against the Coast Guard and Unocal to prevent the planned cleanup at Guadalupe. ECOSLO alleged that the Coast Guard had not complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in reaching its decision to issue an administrative order to Unocal.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Failure to ensure compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act in advance could frustrate effective response actions.

DISCUSSION:

Federal agencies must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) unless there is a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority. This means that an agency must first determine whether a proposed action will have a significant impact on the quality of the human environment. If agency action will have such an impact, the agency must complete an environmental impact statement. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). Although it could be argued that the need for timely response under OPA creates a conflict with the need for environmental analysis under NEPA, even an emergency does not totally exempt a federal agency from compliance with NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. 1506.11. In this case, there was no need to perform that analysis because all "actions preformed as a part of Coast Guard operations to carry out statutory authority in the areas of maritime safety, protection of the environment, or military readiness," had been categorically excluded from the NEPA requirement. See para 2.B.2 of Commandant Instruction M16475.1B.

On 29 July 1994 the Coast Guard published a federal register notice of new language that excludes from NEPA analysis only those "operations to carry out . . . oil and hazardous substance removal programs that have been the subject of a programmatic NEPA analysis and documentation." 59 Fed Reg 38654 (July 29, 1994). The Marine Environmental Protection Division at Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MEP) has announced that it is undertaking the required programmatic analysis. Commandant (G-MEP) letter 16465 dated 20 October 1994. Absent a statutory change, the environmental impact analysis for the Coast Guard's ACPs should either be tiered into the G-MEP analysis or conducted independently to determine the significance of any impact on the environment.

SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT & COORDINAT~ON

OSC Compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act

OBSERVATION:

Preventing the discharge of diluent from the Unocal field in Guadalupe required Unocal to dig up a portion of the California beach. The California Coastal Commission (CCC), the agency responsible for California's Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP), became critical of the response plans and felt obliged to exercise its authority requiring Unocal to obtain a coastal development permit. This permitting action was viewed by some as being in conflict with the OSC's order.

LESSONS LEARNED:

An OSC should try to accommodate coastal zone management concerns during the development of the ACP but, if a conflict arises, need not allow coastal zone concerns to adversely affect his response efforts.

DISCUSSION:

The Coastal Zone Management Act generally requires federal actions to be consistent with the enforceable policies of state CZMPs approved by NOAA. 16 U.S.C. 1456(c).~ Ideally, an OSC will develop his ACP in close coordination with state coastal zone managers, ensuring early on that any planned response will be undertaken consistently with a state's CZMP. To the extent this cannot be accomplished, however, OSCs should understand that, ultimately, nothing in the Coastal Zone Management Act may in any way affect a requirement established by the federal government pursuant to the Clean Water Act. 16 USC 1456(f).

STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT

Stakeholder Management

OBSERVATION:

Stakeholders came from two groups: local government agencies; and the private sector, comprised of individuals and representatives from special interest groups. The Unified Command established a Multi Agency Committee (MAC) to coordinate local government concerns. The MAC meetings were regularly attended by private stakeholders as well and the MAC became the primary Stakeholder Management forum.

Several stakeholders (public and private) expressed disillusionment and distrust of the "system" that was supposed to be representing their interests. As a result they sought other means outside the system to accomplish their purposes. These included: appealing directly to Unified Command; seeking relief via law suits including one attempt to obtain a restraining order; processing permits very slowly; and complicating permits with requirements that reflected their mistrust of the Unified Command

LESSONS LEARNED:

Effective management of stakeholder issues is a critical success factor in response.

Local and state government agency concerns do not necessarily line up with the State's Unified Command representative and they are not always satisfied with representation by another state agency.

As a general rule, coordination of public stakeholders should be addressed separately from private stakeholders.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Area Contingency Plans (ACP) should be reviewed to ensure that the Response Management System (RMS) is capable of handling an assortment of stakeholders including local government[6] commercial interests, special interest groups and private citizens. Coordination of local government stakeholders should be done separately from private stakeholders.

The agency from which the State Unified Command representative is designated should take the lead in developing the organizational structure and relationships that will be used to ensure that local and state agencies' concerns are properly represented in the RMS.

Whenever possible, drills and exercises should include substantial stakeholder management issues.

Area Committees should continue pre-spill education of stakeholders in oil and hazardous substance spill response.

DISCUSSION

State of California personnel indicated that the use of the Multi Agency Committee (MAC) to coordinate local government participation in spill response is a relatively new and evolving concept in their response system. Their experience with it may be useful to other areas of the country as they continue to refine the process.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public Affairs Management

OBSERVATION:

Representation of. the event in the media spanned a wide range from positive to negative. A combination of somewhat confrontational public meetings and negative press coverage during a period near the actual project start was troubling to the UC.

Both State and CG UC members indicated that, in retrospect, it would have been beneficial to have committed more resources to the JIC from the outset and to have managed the public information issues more proactively.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Public Affairs is a critical success factor in response. An event significant enough to trigger activation of a full Unified Command Response Management System should automatically trigger activation of a Joint Information Center and unified Public Affairs staff in accordance with the ACP.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Fully staff a Joint Information Center and manage public information efforts aggressively from the very beginning of an event. Ensure preparedness efforts continue to emphasize effective public information as one of the factors critical to success of an emergency response.

DISCUSSION:

Unocal assigned a full time public relations professional to the Guadalupe response early in March of 1994 to handle its public affairs. That individual staffed the Joint Information Center (JIC) until September when the State of California and the Coast Guard each brought in Public Affairs personnel (total of 6 personnel) at the actual beginning of the beach excavation. The Coast Guard personnel stayed for a couple of days and the State staff remained somewhat longer. All UC members felt that the Unocal PAO did an excellent jobs

The role and importance of Public Affairs in response operations was well understood by all members of the Unified Command. The ACP prescribes a valid organization, identifies function and responsibilities of the Public Affairs staff, and stresses Public Affairs as a critical element of response. In this case, the Unified Command elected to not fully staff a Joint Information Center (JIC) with all players represented and did not use the public affairs section of the ACP. In

general, the "non-traditional non-emergency" nature of the incident, the slow start-up and lengthy time frames involved in the project; and the pressures of resource constraints contributed to the decision to not staff a full, unified public affairs response and rely on the Unocal PAO as the sole member of the JIC.

A Guadalupe Public Affairs anecdote: Following one of the public briefings by Unified Command, a citizen shared the fact that the considerable and ongoing controversy over the Guadalupe response in the media had lead him to believe that the project posed a grave threat to public health. The resulting anxiety was the only reason he had decided to attend the public meeting. Once he was provided the full picture at the briefing,. his fears were entirely allayed and he was satisfied that the project was being properly handled.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Unified Command Response to Public Inquiries

OBSERVATION:

Many stakeholders were uncertain about procedures for addressing inquiries to the Unified Command. Many followed normal procedures, addressing written inquiries to the Coast Guard, California's Office of Oil Spill Prevention & Response (OSPR) or Unocal, but received no response. The public perception was that these inquiries were not adequately addressed in MAC meetings, periodic faxes, telephone hotlines or public meetings. This led many in the community to believe that the Unified Command was not fully focused on community interests. In fact, these inquiries were considered by the Unified Command and were included in subsequent Incident Action Plans (IAP) when appropriate. Unfortunately, failure to respond directly to inquiries did not satisfy the public's need, and detracted from otherwise superlative efforts to keep the public informed.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Timely response to all public inquiries is essential to a successful response effort.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Upon activation of the Unified Command, advise the public of how inquiries about the response effort will be handled. Ensure that the RMS is fully prepared to receive and respond in a timely fashion to inquiries.

DISCUSSION:

Perception is reality. In the public view, no response to a written inquiry was the worst possible response. Planning and training should ensure that the RMS tracks and responds to all inquiries.

AREA CONTINGENCY PLAN

Use of the Area Contingency Plan

OBSERVATION:

Almost every person involved in the response, regardless of affiliation, indicated that they did not use the Area Contingency Plan during this response because it wasn't applicable to this kind of response. Several suggested that the Area Plan is prepared for the typical "vessel on the rock" scenario and that it did not have information relevant to the atypical response at Guadalupe. Most sections of the ACP, however, were used during the response. In addition, our review indicated that better use of the plan might have improved the quality of response in several areas.

LESSONS LEARNED:

The Preparedness process is working. The content of Area Plans is generally aligned with our patterns of response.

Responders lacked a full understanding and appreciation of the Area Contingency Plan and are generally not inclined to use it during a response.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Area Committees should ensure that preparedness efforts provide for training responders in the plan. In addition, they should undertake steps to make the plan more usable during response. The format and bulk of the ACP may be partially at fault for the disinclination to use the plan. The development of job aids similar to the "Field Operations Guide" developed in California, that distill key information into user friendly pieces may be helpful.

G-MEP should consider convening a team to address the usefulness of ACP's during response.

DISCUSSION:

Responders uniformly indicated that they did not consult and/or were not aware that the ACP might contain useful information for this response. Even those involved with drafting specific sections indicated that they had little appreciation for the contents of the rest of the Plan. Given the ACP size and organization (almost 350 pages printed on both sides and 2.5 inches thick overall), this is perhaps not surprising. In many ways, however, failure to use the plans under fire limits our ability to capture and preserve the full fruits of the planning processes. Although the

process of developing plans helps responders prepare, unless we use the plans we develop, our effectiveness may never rise to the level envisioned by OPA. This is a critical process issue that needs further analysis.

AREA CONTINGENCY PLAN

Addressing Non-traditional Spills in the ACP

OBSERVATION:

Most people involved with the Guadalupe spill viewed the response undertaken as being completely outside the scope of the AC?. It was different than the "typical" Coast Guard response, which they believed involved a ship running aground offshore.

LESSONS LEARNED:

To the extent that the division of duties between the Coast Guard and the EPA in any given area gives the Coast Guard responsibility for preventing spills that occur on land, the cognizant Area Committee should ensure that the ACP includes guidance for responding to a substantial threat of discharge or an actual discharge from onshore facilities such as Unocal's oil field in Guadalupe.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

As applicable, ACP's should be modified to address the risk of discharges from onshore facilities that are either ~n or near the area and any additional resources needed to address those risks.

AREA CONTINGENCY PLAN

Use of the Lessons Learned Database

OBSERVATION:

ISPR lessons learned must be submitted in the PREP Lessons Learned System (PLLS), a derivative of the Coast Guard (CGULLS) and Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systems (JULLS). PLLS "customer representatives" participated in the ISPR. The ISPR chairman (senior Coast Guard), NSFCC representative[1] state government representative and industry representative did not have PLLS access. State and industry representatives reviewed the Berman ISPR Report taking information from the executive summary. They noted that the lessons learned format was awkward and detracted from their ability/willingness to use the material.

LESSONS LEARNED:

PLLS, as currently administered, does not serve the customers' needs.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Consult with customers to identify system modifications to make PLLS user friendly.

Provide OSC/COTPs and supporting Coast Guard units with PLLS access capability.

DISCUSSION:

OSC/COTPs, state and industry representatives involved in preparedness and response, as well as supporting Coast Guard commands are the PLLS customers; these customers are not familiar with, and thus, do not use the lessons learned system. All found the executive summary portion of the ISPR report to be useful.

Ultimately, we should have a lessons learned system which can be accessed by all customers. In the effort to improve the lessons learned system, we should stress that it is applicable for exercises as well as real world responses.

THE ISPR PROCESS

CHRONOLOGY:

25	OCT	94	Assignment letters issued.
15-17	NOV	94	Indoctrination meeting at USCG Headquarters. (3 days) Developed: issues list, survey form, and travel schedule; began work on interview guide. G-MEP brief on ISPR.
15-21	JAN	95	Completed site visit. (5 days) Finalized interview guide. Interviewed Coast Guard, State, Responsible Party and public interest representatives.
06-10	FEB	95	Met at USCG National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC). (5 days)
26-30	MAR	95	Recorder traveled to MSO Mobile to work directly with Chairman to complete the report (4 days).

OBSERVATIONS:

1. Team Membership:

- The addition of a State and an industry rep was extremely valuable. They provided input that could not have been obtained from Coast Guard reps alone, ensuring that the team focused on the entire spectrum of issues. Their presence also helped communication with industry and state reps in all phases of information gathering.

- An environmental law specialist was added to our team because of the unique legal issues raised in the Guadalupe response.

- We spent considerable time in group discussions and deliberations. A trained facilitator could have been very helpful in working the process.

2. Member Appointment Letters: Providing a briefing package with the assignment letter would be helpful. The package might include:

(1) ISPR "process" references (COMDTINST; previous ISPR process reports; travel authorization instructions for civilians; etc.)

(2) Incident specific paragraph summarizing the event and indicating why it was selected for an ISPR.

3. Recorder: G-MEP should designate the recorder and provide that individual with an outline of responsibilities (similar to guidance provided for Marine Board recorders in the Marine Safety Manual). Those might include:

- Assemble documentary information needed by the team (ACP, State Contingency Plan, IAP, POLREPS, News Clips, FRP, VRP, NCP, Response Plan Regulations, etc.) Our team found it useful to have two copies of the ACP and State Plan available each time we met.

- Copying and disseminating documents.

- Coordination of arrangements for each of the team get together, including work with the MSO (travel arrangements, facilities, support equipment, identification of personnel to be interviewed, arrangements for interviews, support requirements, etc.)

4. Formal notification: G-MEP should formally notify the response principles (RP, State, CG) that an ISPR has been convened and outline the goals of the review. Our work was a considerable burden to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office. Inasmuch as that is largely unavoidable, the letter to the Commanding Officer of the MSO might recommend the designation of a liaison to serve as the primary point of contact to the team.

5. Immediate Site Visit: The initial meeting in CG HQ was valuable. In retrospect, we should have had one member of the team make a short visit to the site before our first meeting in order. to get a first hand knowledge of the incident. This would have been a big help in our discussions to identify the primary focus areas.

6. Written Survey: The survey form we developed and distributed added no value to our review. 150 distributed; 8 completed.

7. Site Visit Timing: The team visit to the site was delayed at the request of the State Incident Commander. The Unified Command was concerned that ISPR interviews might interfere with continuing response operations. We suggest that the site visits and interviews be done after the response is completed.

8. Interviews:

- We used a variety of interview techniques. Where possible, interviews of key players were done by the entire team. We developed an Interview guide to serve as the outline of our conversations with responders and stakeholders. It helped maintain focus and ensured that we covered the material.

- Prior to leaving California at the conclusion of the site visit, we conducted a brainstorming session to revise focus areas and identify lessons learned. Assignments were then made to individuals to begin drafting lessons learned. This enabled members to continue working in anticipation of the next team meeting to write the report.

9. Writing the Report: The team assembled in Elizabeth City at the NSFCC to write the report.

   - Process: The challenge of blending perspective and opinion of a diverse group made writing the report the most difficult part of the entire process. After identifying the key lessons, we made assignments to individual team members to prepare the lessons learned. This was very much an interactive process and involved extensive review and critique. Team members wrote during the day, reviewed/critiqued written work at night and provided feedback to authors each morning. This routine of refining members' written work continued throughout the week. We were able to produce a reasonably solid framework by weeks end. Extensive review and critique continued over the following weeks until the final meeting between the recorder and chairman.

   - Physical Considerations for the "writing site":

     (1) Computer terminal for each member plus computer printers and technical support. The State and Industry reps had IBM compatible laptops. Arranging for transfer of files from their equipment to the standard work station was accomplished.

     (2) Conference room; photocopier; phones. An electronic planning board was very useful at the HQ meeting and at the NSFCC.

     (3) Away from normal workplace of all team members.

   - We wrote our report, assuming a readership that would be generally aware of OPA9O, Area Contingency Plans and the NCP. We endeavored to limit the use of Coast Guard acronyms I lingo.

10. Teleconferencing: Very helpful; used extensively to prepare for trips, conduct interviews, critique/review written work.

11. ISPR Products: The following items were generated by our ISPR and may be useful as a "go-by" (attached):

    (1) ISPR Point of Contact List
    (2) Focus Issues List

(3) Interview Guide
(4) Survey & Cover Letter
(5) Event Chronology
(6) Reference List

ISPR - ____________________, __
(POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION)

Revised: _____95

CAPT ______________
(W) (___) ___-____ ________________
(FAX) -____ ________________
(E-MAIL) ____________________ ________________
______ *(H) (___) ___-____ (ISPR TEAM USE ONLY... DO NOT GIVE OUT)*

___ ______________
(W) (___) ___-____ ________________
(FAX) -____ Attention: ___ ______
(E-MAIL) ____________________ ________________
(H) (___) ___-____ (ISPR TEAM USE ONLY... DO NOT GIVE OUT)

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(W) (___) ___-____ ________________
(FAX) -____ Attention: ___ ______
(E-MAIL) ____________________ ________________
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(FAX) -____ Attention: ___ ______
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(FAX) -____ Attention: ___ ______
(E-MAIL) ____________________ ________________
______ *(H) (___) ___-____ (ISPR TEAM USE ONLY... DO NOT GIVE OUT)*

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(W) (___) ___-____ ________________
(FAX) -____ Attention: ___ ______
(E-MAIL) ____________________ ________________
______ *(H) (___) ___-____ (ISPR TEAM USE ONLY... DO NOT GIVE OUT)*

ISPR - _____, __
STAKEHOLDERS
(POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION)

Revised: ____

FEDERAL:

____ _____ **(D__ (m))**
(W) (___) ___-____
(FAX) -____
(E-MAIL) _____

____ ____ **(COTP, MSO ____)**
(W) (___) ___-____
(FAX) -____
(E-MAIL) _____

STATE:

__ _____ _____ (____)
(W) (___) ___-____
(FAX) (___) ___-____
(E-MAIL) N/A

RESPONSIBLE PARTY:

__ _____ (_____)
(W) (___) ___-____
(FAX) -____
(E-MAIL) N/A

ISPR - GUADELUPED CA
FOCUS ISSUES

.... The purpose of this review is to examine the implementation and effectiveness of the Area contingency Plan process and its integration with response plans and other applicable contingency plans at the federal, state and local levels.... A thorough and objective review of the response activities versus the plans and federal, state and local relationships should assist in identifying strengths and weaknesses in our planning methodology..." (Comdt G-MEP ltr dtd 25 Oct 94 establishing Guadalupe ISPR)

- RESPONSE MANAGEMENT I UCS

- GOVERNMENT AGENCY COORDINATION: Conflicting priorities between governmental agencies challenged the Response Management System.

- STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS: Multiple and divergent concerns were. expressed by a variety of stakeholders (including special interest groups). Conflicts centered around environmental scientific issues.

- REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM ROLE

- RESPONSIBLE PARTY ROLE

- PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS & MECAANISMS: Federal, State and Local permitting requirements became a major issue in this case.

- NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT/COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT:

Extent to which these (& other) Acts apply to emergency response.

- ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT; NRDA: Management of these issues during response.

- PUBLIC AFFAIRS ROLE

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA

(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: PHONE NO.:

OCCUPATION: ADDRESS:

DATE/LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:

ISPR PANEL MEMBER(S):

GENERAL OUESTIONS

1. WHAT IS YOUR JOB?

2. WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE IN THE GUADALUPE CLEAN-UP?
   - TITLE
   - LOCATION DURING EVENT
   - DURATION OF YOUR INVOLVEMENT (HOW LONG SPENT ON EVENT)

3. EXPERIENCE IN POLLUTION RESPONSE:

4. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS PROCESS?
   (ACP / CALIFORNIA PLAN I RP PLAN / IAP)

   - DID YOU HAVE A ROLE IN PREPARING A PLAN? WHICH ONE(S)?
   - KNOWLEDGE OF PLAN (ALL I PARTS.. WHICH?)
   - DID YOU HAVE ACCESS TO THE PLAN?
   - WAS THE PLAN USEFUL TO YOU IN YOUR ACTIVITIES? EXPLAIN

5. DID PLAN DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING OR EXERCISES HELP YOU WITH THIS RESPONSE?

6. WHAT CHANGES WOULD YOU MAKE TO THE ACP OR SPILL PREPAREDNESS PROCESS?

7. WHAT DID YOU VIEW AS THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS OR CONCERNS?

8. WHAT WORKED ESPECIALLY WELL?

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA
(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: DATE/TIME:

GOVERNMENT AGENCY COORDINATION OUESTIONS

NEEDED INTERVIEWS/TARGET AUDIENCE:

Agency Reps	Committee Representatives
RRT Members	Federal/State/Local interested parties
SSC	Outside Observers

1. What was the role of the monitor?

2. Were the right players involved in planning? Responding?
   - Others who should have participated
   - Anticipated role
   - Time and duration of involvement
   - Intra agency multiple roles (NOAA) (CG) (State)

3. Describe good working relationships observed during planning and responding.
   - What made it good?
   - Facilitated/defined in the plan?

4. Describe relationships which could be improved?

5. Concerns with jurisdiction?

6. EPA involvement?
   - Inland response required?
   - Role. as RRT member?
   - ERT employment?

7. Why was this event an emergency? Importance to your agency?

8. Describe wants and needs in a post operational review.
   - Discuss players, forum, timing & rationale, plan revision.

9. What was the role of the State Interagency Oil Spill Committee (SIOSC) if any?

NAME: DATE/TIME:

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUESTIONS

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA
(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NEEDED INTERVIEWS/TARGET AUDIENCE:

UC Reps	RRT Members
Monitors	Committee Representatives
Outside Observers	Federal/State/Local interested parties

1. Was UC Public Affairs element formed IAW ACP?
   -Was the plan adequate?
   -Include input from local media?

2. Was UC Joint Information CTR established, too?

3. How did UC members coordinate press releases responses to media inquiries, public meetings, political dignitaries?

4. How did UC publicize plans, actions and milestones?
   - Responsive to state and local officials?
   - Responsive to special interest groups?
   - Thorough in addressing all public concerns?

5. Describe working relationships in dealing with media?
   - Facilitated by planning?
   - Key players/agencies

7. Describe relationships which could be improved?

8. Media outlets interested in response operations?

9. Was JIC element effective?

10. Are you aware of JIC info from the NW Area Committee?

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA
(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: DATE/TIME:

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT / UCS

NEEDED INTERVIEWS/TARGET AUDIENCE:

UC Reps:	FOSC	Operations Section
	State OSC	Logistics Section
	RP OSC	Finance Section
	Deputy OSC	SSC
	Planning Section	
External:	Customers of UCS	

1. Please relate the events and your activities leading up to the establishment of the UCS.

2. Please relate the events and your activities following the establishment of the UCS.
3. Describe the UCS that was established.
   - What happened IAW Plan?
   - What varied from Plan?
   - What did you need from the Organization?
     - Did you get it?
     - Was it provided for in the Plan?
   - What worked well? Helped?

- What needs improvement? Who should address?

- Characterize the effectiveness of the UCS.

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA

(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: DATE/TIME:

REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM

1. What did the RRT do in support of OSC prior to determination of substantial threat?

   -Identify issues addressed.

   -What helped?

   - What more could have been done?

   - Why not done?

2. What did the RRT do in support of OSCIUCS after declaration of substantial threat?

   - Identify issues addressed.
   - What helped?

- What more could have been done?

   - Why not done?

3. Did the RRT play a role in this clean-up?

   - Was it consistent with the role described in the plan?

   - Was it helpful?

   - What more could have been done?

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA
(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: DATE/TIME:

STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS

How did you identify and notify stakeholders?

How and when did you address their concerns?

- Public Meetings
- Reply to a letter
- Speak with in the development of the area plan
- Speak with in 4eveloping the IAP

Were or should these folks have been involved in the ACP process? Is the ACP process to "general" to address specific concerns?

Did the plan provide adequate guidance to address stakeholder concerns?

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA

(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: DATE/TIME:

RESPONSIBLE PARTY (RP) CONCERNS

Emergency or not?

Did UNOCAL view this as an emergency response under OPA or as a quickly implemented site remediation?

History/chronology since report to NRC?

How did UNOCAL perceive the agencies' response: E/R or site remediation?

Was there any advantage/detriment to UNOCAL when the USCG stepped into the response?

How did the State "non-emergency" status affect UNOCAL? Unocal response plans

Did UNOCAL have a spill response plan under OPA/CWA or other regs applying to spills from this facility (pipeline, tankage, production operation) or this type of incident?

What parts of UNOCAL's plan if any were useful in this response?

Response Actions

Was the IAP a joint effort of the Unified Command?

Who provided expertise for the site clean-up? Should this information be included in the ACP?

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA
(INTERVIEW GUIDE)
DATE/TIME:
NAME:

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

Section 7 consultations with USFWS & NMFS must be undertaken by EPA & CG OSCs before ACPs are finalized. This should be done through the Area Committees. USFWS & NMFS should be members of the Area Committees. Are they members of this Area Committee & were section 7 consultations conducted prior to this ACP approval?

- The 3 birds/animals of concern in this response were the endangered California least tern, the threatened snowy plover and the brown pelican. Were these birds/animals identified in the ACP?

- The nesting season for the birds was identified as May through September. Was this listed in the ACP?

- Does the ACP include adequate guidance for the OSC under the ESA?

- In the background information, CG initiated informal consultation with USFWS & later formal "section 7" consultation under ESA. How was this carried out? Are there formal procedures for doing this, & if so, are they outlined in the ACP?

- In the background information, CG initiated informal consultation with USFWS & later formal "section 7" consultation under ESA. How was this carried out? Are there formal procedures for doing this, & if so, are they outlined in the ACP?

- Are there procedures in place to expedite a section 7 consultation in a response that presents a substantial threat to the environment?

ISPR - GUADALUPE, CA
(INTERVIEW GUIDE)

NAME: DATE/TIME:

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

The Coast Guard was directly challenged on NEPA compliance in its cleanup oversight role via a petition for injunctive relief & temporary restraining order brought by a local citizens' environmental group. (Was this ECOSLO?) What exactly was their complaint and how, according to them, was the CG not in compliance?

COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT

What specifically, if anything, was done relative to CZMA? Does the ACP address CZMA?

Were you aware of advice from NOAA urging States to participate

in the ACP process to ensure CZMA consistency?

PERMITS

What agencies require permits? For what actions?

Are all the permit requirements identified in the ACP?

Did the nature of this response activity (i.e., the building of the wall, sand cleaning, etc.) precipitate the need for all the permits?

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (NIWA)

What did the trustees expect from the OSC in this response? Does the ACP address NRDA trustee concerns?

FINAL QUESTION

Discuss other issues that may be relevant to improving the ACP and quality of the response.

Is there anyone else you think we should interview?

US Department
of Transportation
United States
Coast Guard

Commanding Officer
National Strike Force
Coordination Center

Dear Sir or Madam:

I'd like your help in gathering information on the spill incident at Guadalupe Beach, California. We are conducting an "Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR)" of the pollution response to the Unocal Guadalupe Oil Field. We will be examining contingency plans and the planning processes in place, as well as the response activities involved in this incident. Our goal is to identify lessons learned that we can share nationwide to improve our overall preparedness for spill response. Any information you can provide will help us in this effort.

Please fill out the attached survey and return it to:

U.S. Coast Guard
National Strike Force Coordination Center
1461 U.S. Highway 17 North
Elizabeth City, NC 27909
Attn: LT Mike Crickard

If you have any questions on this, please contact Lieutenant Mike Crickard at (919) 331-6000, extension 3004. I thank you in advance for your cooperation in this.

Sincerely,

J. T. KUCHIN
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
ISPR Team Leader

End: (1) ISPR Survey

INCIDENT SPECIFIC PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR)
SURVEY
Guadalupe[1] CA Oil Field Response Event (1994 Activity)

PURPOSE: To conduct a thorough review of the response activities versus the response plans developed under OPA 90 guidance[1] including the relationships between local, state, federal and industry representatives. The intent is to identify strengths and weaknesses in order to improve planning and response processes, not to evaluate individual or agency performance.

When completing this survey please consider the following:

- Response Management and the utilization of the Unified Command System
- Government Agency Coordination
- Stakeholder concerns
- Regional Response Team Involvement
- Role of the Responsible Party
- Requirements to issue State and local permits.
- Influence of National Environmental Policy Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, Endangered Species Act, Natural Resource Damage Assessment and other environmental laws on response actions.
- Public affairs issues.

PLEASE USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

Name:

Agency Affiliation (If applicable):

Phone: Fax:

Address:

What particular role did you play in the event? What did you do and when?

RESPONSE:

What 5 things worked well?

What 5 things need additional work?

COMMENTS ON THE AREA COMMITTEI PLOCESS MID AUA;;CO-NTIN-GEMCT PIMI CONTINT:

To what extent did you use/refer to the ACP and/or the facility response plan during the response? What section of the plan did you use?

What other contingency plans, reference publications or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) did you use during the response?

Based on your experience in this spill, what issues/processes should the Area Committee address?

ISPR GUADALUPE EVENT
CHRONOLOGY

90/ /	OSPR on the case. (CGMSO PR 1)
90/ /	Recovery operations, under Regional Water Quality Control Board, ongoing. (CGMSO PR 1)
94/03/06	Emergency Coastal Permit, #P890275E, dtd 94/03/06, issued by County of San Luis Obispo. (SLO PERMIT)
94/03/26	OSC met w/ UNOCAL and EPA reps: * Conducted site survey. * Issued verbal Notice Of Federal Interest. * Directed UNOCAL to provide Action Plan by 07 APR. (CGMSO PR 1)
94/03/26	USCG OSC discussed OSC responsibilities w/ EPA OSC:

	* CG lead agency during response phase until immediate threat of release to navigable waters no longer exists. * EPA should assume OSC during long term remediation phase. (CGMSO PR 1)
94/03/26	CG OSC planned to conduct Unified Command Meeting. (Meet w/ State IC and UNOCAL IC on 31 MAR.) (CGMSO PR 1)
94/03/29	CG OSC held conference call w/Region IX EPA reps to discuss OSC roles and responsibilities. (MSO PR 2)
94/04/01	Meeting held at ORCUTT, CA between MS0 LA/LB, UNOCAL, EPA REGION IX and OSPR. (MSO PR 2)
94/04/01	Meeting held at SAN LUIS OBISPO, CA between OSPR, State Lands Commission, Regional Water Quality Control Board and Air Quality Management. (MSO PR 2)
94/04/06	MS0 POLREP TWO
94/04/06	CG OSC determined conditions require immediate removal actions. (MSO PR 2)
94/04/96	UNOCAL to formally present Response Plan on 12 APR 94. (MSO PR 2)
94/04/06	USCG opened pollution fund for Coast Guard monitoring costs... EPA REGION IX and NOAA for operating and plan review costs. (MSO PR 2)
94/04/08	UNOCAL submitted Response Plan for review. (MSO PR 3)
94/04/12	MTG held w/agencies to review Plan and discuss issues raised/ not discussed by the Response Plan. (MSO PR 3)
94/ /	MSO POLREP FOUR
94/04/12	MTG - UNOCAL discussed alternatives to excavation. (Excavation deemed most appropriate at this time.) * UNOCAL given authorization to proceed w/ engineering plans and to initiate contingency planning efforts. * Joint Press Release issued. * Original project date delayed due to identification of endangered & threatened species nesting in and around project area. (MSO PR 4)

94/04/14	APR 94 Public scoping/hearing in San Luis Obispo. * MSO issued list of Issues of Concern to UNOCAL. (MSO PR 3)
94/04/15	MSO POLREP THREE
94/04/15	USFWS authorized $1OK for response and monitoring costs. (MSO PR 3)
94/04/15	POLREP indicates UNOCAL to address all agency concerns 19 APR 94. (MSO PR 3)
94/04/26	UNOCAL notification to NRC and MSO of 2-5 BBL DILUENT discharge into the Pacific Ocean due to heavy rains & extreme high tides resulting in heavy beach face erosion that exposed the subterranean bentonite wall. * Lagoon impacted. * Vegetation/kelp lightly oiled. * CA Fish and Game biologist requested to /responded to survey scene. * Upon F&G recommendation, UNOCAL removed contaminated debris from beach and conduct clean up of lagoon. (MSO PR 5)
94/04/27	Unocal reports that discharge has stopped. (MSO PR 5)
94/04/29	MSO POLREP FIVE
94/04/29	CG began "informal" consultation with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. (MSO PR 5)
94/04/29	POLREP indicates UNOCAL to submit a complete Response and Contingency Plan by 01 JUL 94. (MSO PR 5)
94/04/29	POLREP indicates MSO looking at possibility of securing permit (Section 7 Consultation) with USFWS to proceed with project in AUG. (MSO PR 5)
94/04/29	UNOCAL reports discharge stopped, estimated 2-5 BBLS released[1] lagoon area cleaned. (MSO PR 5.)
94/05/16	Began surveys (for presence of snowy plovers and least turn) conducted by private consultant within 400 meter area north of excavation site. * Ongoing survey schedule to continue every Monday, Wednesday and Saturday. (MSO PR 6)
94/05/20	MSO POLREP SIX
94/05/20	POLREP indicates no further discharge noted since late APR 94. (MSO PR 6)

94/05/20	POLREP indicates UNOCAL soliciting bids for excavation project. (MSO PR 6)
94/05/20	POLREP indicates USCG/OSPR/RP meeting slated for 15 JUL 94. (MSO PR 6)
94/05/20	POLREP indicates MSO continues to pursue Section 7 consultation. (WKLY reports to be submitted by USEWS.) (MSO PR 6)
94/06/14	Multi Agency Committee (MAC) met. * Concerned UNOCAL is not providing satisfactory level of information to involved agencies. (MSO PR 7)
94/06/15	Unified Command System (UCS) meeting held with OSPR/UNOCAL/NOAA SSC/USCG IC. * Planning objectives developed and proposed operation submitted for FOSC conceptual approval. * It was approved. Issues from MAC are being addressed by UNOCAL & USCG. (MSO PR 7)
94/06/20	MSO POLREP SEVEN
94/06/20	FOSC developed formal Section 7 consultation with USFWS. (MSO PR 7)
94/06/20	UNOCAL modified proposal to include shoring entire plume area with steel interlocking sheets with sand removal/treatment/replacement actions. * Project to run 24 hours a day for 6 weeks. * Start date 0l AUG 94. (MSO PR 7)
94/07/01	FOSC received Incident Action Plan and conducted thorough review. _____
94/07/11	MSO reps met with MAC and Unocal to discuss concerns with the IAP. _____

94/07/14	MSO POLREP EIGHT
94/07/15	USCG Federal On-Scene-Coordinator (FOSC) issued an Administrative Order directing UNOCAL to implement UNOCAL's Incident Action Plan dtd 94/07/01. (MSO ADMIN ORDER 01/94)
94/07/19	Section 7 consultation modification.( )
94/07/28	Meeting with Unocal and FOSC on OPA admin order.( )
94/07/29	Public Meeting with San Luis Obispo Board of supervisors 'and public at Guadalupe Beach.
94/08/02	MSO POLREP NINE
94/08/05	Presentation to SLO County Board of Supervisors. ( )
94/08/08	Letter from Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors (Supervisor Patton) to USCG MSO/Group LA-LB, indicating concern about plans sponsored by the UNOCAL Company.
94/08/08	UCS meeting held and IAP presented to UC.
94/08/10	UCS public meeting held.
94/08/15	Mobilization Commenced. ( )
94/08/16	Construction Permits for project B940114 (Structures: 001/#93977, 003/#93973, 004/#93974, 005/#93975, 006/#93976), dtd 94/08/16, issued by Department of Planning and Building, County of San Louis Obispo. (SLO PERMITS)
94/08/18	MSO POLREP TEN
94/08/18	MSO POLREP indicates final cleanup levels being negotiated with Regional Water Board. (MSO PR 10)
94/08/19	Coastal Development Permit, D890558D, dtd 94/08/19, issued by Department of Planning and Building San Luis Obispo County. (SLO PERMIT)
94/08/19	Construction Permits for project B940114 (Structures:

006/#94006, 007/#94007), dtd 94/08/19, issued by Department of Planning and Building, County of San Louis Obispo. (SLO PERMITS)

94/08/22 IC requires additional geo probes.( )

94/08/22 Authority To Construct Application, #1862, dtd 94/08/22, issued by Air Pollution Control District (APCD), County of San Luis Obispo. (SLO PERMIT)

94/08/23 Emergency Coastal Development Permit, #E-94-12, dtd 94/08/23, issued by California Coastal Commission. (CCC PERMIT)

94/08/24 Removal of old extraction and monitor wells, No nesting plovers or terns on site. ( )

94/08/25 Construction Permit for project B940114 (Structure: 002/#94062), dtd 94/08/25, issued by Department of Planning and Building, County of San Louis Obispo. (SLO PERMIT)

94/08/27 MSO POLREP ELEVEN

94/09/05 Emergency Class I Permit, Leroy 33-13 Disposal Well, dtd 94/09/05, issued by USEPA Region IX. (USEPA PERMIT)

94/09/07 Construction Permit for project B940114 (Structure: 010/#94143), dtd 94/09/07, issued by Department of Planning and Building, County of San Louis Obispo (SLO PERMIT)

94/09/16 Permit to Operate for the Excavation and Stackpiling of Petroleum Contaminated Soil, #U-3032-G-1, dtd 94/09/16, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo. (USEPA PERMIT)

94/09/29 Reinitiation of the Formal Consultation of the Removal of Diluent Contamination at the UNOCAL Guadalupe Oil Field, Guadalupe Beach, San Luis Obispo County, CA, (1-8-94-F-49R), dtd 94/09/29, issued by USD01 Fish and Wildlife Service. (USD01 FISH & WILDLIFE SVC LTR)

94/09/30 USCG Federal On-Scene-Coordinator (FOSC) issued an Administrative Order allowing UNOCAL to delay the high density polyethylene wall (HDPE) from 15 OCT 94 until 15 NOV 94. (MSO ADMIN ORDER 02/94)

94/09/30 Approval of Alternative Cover Material for Stockpiles (per Permit to Operate U-3032-G-1, condition number 4), dtd 94/09/30, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo. (SLO APPROVAL

LTR)

94/10/01 USCG Federal On-Scene-Coordinator (FOSC) issued a letter as a follow-up to ADMIN ORDER 02/94 to clarify position regarding the source of backfill sand. Only thermally cleaned sand is to be used. (MSO LTR dtd 94/11/01)

94/10/06 Start-up Authorization (Thermal Desorption Unit), #1880, dtd 94/10/06, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo. (SLO AUTHORIZATION LTR)

94/10/06 Start-up Authorization (Thermal Desorption Unit), #1870, dtd 94/10/06, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo. (SLO AUTHORIZATION LTR)

ISPR - GUADALUPE. CL REFERENCE LISTING
Revised: 24DEC94
STATUTES

1. Endangered Species Act of 1973. (ESA)

2. DOI ltr dtd 94/07/26 to USCG G-M. (Discussion on ESA of 1973 and OPA Section 7 Consultations)

3. National Environmental Policy Act (USCG COMDTINST M16475.1B). (NEPA)

4. Forest Service NEPA Handbook. (Checklist excerpts from)

5. 40 CFR Part 1501 - NEPA and Agency Planning.

6. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. (CZMA)

7. NOAA ltr dtd 92/07/29 to USCG G-MEP-3. (discussion on CZMA of 1972)

8. 15 CFR Part 930 - Federal Consistency with Approved Coastal Management Programs.

9. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. (Subtitle D -Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990)

10. Draft Model Federal Consistency Determination for Federal Agencies.

11. CZMA discussion paper undated.

12. Gulf Of Mexico Lightering G-LEL Memo 5892 undated. (Discussion on NEPA/CZMA/ESA)

13. Clean Water Act. (Excerpt - National Response System)

14. Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 210 - 01NOV73. (Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts)

COAST GUARD INTERPRETATIONS - STATUTES

15. USCG Dil Ltr 16475/Al dtd 17OCT94. (Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Documentation Under NEPA)

16. USCG Comdt Ltr 16465 dtd 20OCT94. (Categorical Exclusions under the NEPA)

17. USCG G-MEP-3 Issue Briefing Paper dtd 01NOV94. (Categorical Exclusion - NEPA)

18. USCG G-ECV-1B Issue Briefing Paper undated. (NEPA and Marine and Regatta Permits - Categorical Exclusion discussion.)

19. USCG Comdt Ltr 16000 dtd 13SEP93. (Consistency Review Under the CZMA of 1972 of Federal Area Contingency Plans)

ISPR PROCESS

20. Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) USCG Comdt Inst 16465.42, undated.

21. Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Exercise Evaluation Reference Guide dtd 17MAR94.

22. ISPR Final Report for MORRIS J. BERMAN Oil Spill, Comdt Note 16465 dtd 94/10/07.

23. National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines, dtd 94/08. (Multi-agency USCG/DOT/EPA/DOI manual.,)

24. The Interview Process, DOT - USCG MLC-LANT Guide for Conducting Interviews, undated.

CONTINGENCY PLANS

25. State of California Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan dtd 12/93. (Draft Copy)

26. Area Contingency Plan

GUADALUPE CA SPILL RELATED

27. USCG G-MEP Memorandum 16465 dtd 94/10/13, Establishing Guadalupe ISPR. (Including Invitational Travel Orders)

28. USCG MSO GRP LA/LB Memorandum 16450 dtd 94/11/07, CAPT Page's Position Paper to ISPR Chairman (CAPT Kuchin).

29. Guadalupe Point Paper undated, prepared by MSO GRP LA/LB.

30. GENWEST Guadalupe Oil Field - Initial Report dtd 94/08/31.

31. GENWEST Guadalupe Oil Field - SSC Status Report 9/19 dtd 94/09/20.

32. DIRECTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 01/94 UNOCAL GUADALUPE BEACH I NCIDENT, dtd 94/07/15, issued by the FOSC (USCG MSO/Group LA-LB).

33. DIRECTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 01/94 UNOCAL GUADALUPE BEACH INCIDENT, dtd 94/09/30, issued by the FOSC (USCG MSO/Group LA-LB).

34. ACP Excerpts, pages E-V-211 (Inlet Sketch Map), E-V-212 (Map 093 - San Luis Obispo & Santa Barbara Counties), E-V-213 (Site A-3-143 Summary Sheet), E-V-214 (Site B-3-144 Summary Sheet).

35. Newspaper Articles, various dates in October 94.

36. Letter from Senator Feinstein, dtd 94/10/17, to USCG Congressional Affairs (G-CC), with attached listing of constituent' 5 concerns

37. Response Letter 5730 from USCG Congressional Affairs (G-CC), dtd 94/11/07, to Senator Feinstein.

38. Letter from Senator Boxer, dtd 94/08/08, to USCG Commandant, expressing concern that seawall construction could damage the surrounding coastal environment.

39. Response Letter 16450 from USCG MSO/Group LA-LB to California State Coastal Conservancy (Mr. Fischer), dtd 94/09/07.

40. Response Letter 16450 from USCG MSO/Group LA-LB to San Louis County Board of Supervisors (Supervisor Delany), dtd. 94/10/07.

41. Letter from Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors (Supervisor Patton), dtd 94/08/08, to USCG MSO/Group LA-LB.

42. Response Letter 16460 from USCG MSO/Group LA-LB to Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors (Supervisor Patton), dtd 94/08/18.

43. Response Letter 16450 from USCG MSO/Group LA-LB to Mr. Pamperine, dtd 94/10/26.

44. DRAFT Response Letter 5730 from USCG Congressional Affairs (G-CC), undated, to Senator Boxer.

PERMITS

45. Emergency Coastal Permit, #P890275E, dtd 94/03/06, issued by County of San Luis Obispo.

46. Biological Opinion for the Removal of Diluent Contamination at the UNOCAL Guadalupe Oil Field, Guadalupe Beach, San Luis Obispo County, CA, (l-8-94-F-34), dtd 94/08/10, issued by USD01 Fish and Wildlife Service.

47. Coastal Development Permit, D890558D, dtd 94/08/19, issued by Department of Planning and Building San Luis Obispo County.

48. Authority To Construct Application, #1862, dtd 94/08/22, issued by Air Pollution Control District (APCD), County of San Luis Obispo.

49. Emergency Coastal Development Permit, #E-94-12, dtd 94/08/23, issued by California Coastal Commission.

50. Emergency Class I Permit, Leroy 33-13 Disposal Well, dtd 94/09/05, issued by USEPA Region IX.

51. Permit to Operate for the Excavation and Stockpiling of Petroleum Contaminated Soil, #U-3032-G-l, dtd 94/09/16, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo.

52. Reinitiation of the Formal Consultation of the Removal of Diluent Contamination at the UNOCAL Guadalupe Oil Field, Guadalupe Beach, San Luis Obispo County, CA, (1-8-94-F-49R), dtd 94/09/29, issued by USD01 Fish and Wildlife Service.

53. Approval of Alternative Cover Material for Stockpiles (per Permit to Operate U-3032-G-1, condition number 4), dtd 94/09/30, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo.

54. Start-up Authorization (Thermal Desorption Unit), #1880, dtd 94/10/06, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo.

55. Start-up Authorization (Thermal Desorption Unit), #1870, dtd 94/10/06, issued by Air Pollution Control District, County of San Louis Obispo.

56. Construction Permits for project B940114 issued by Department of Planning and Building, County of San Louis Obispo.

Structure	001:	#93977	dtd 94/08/16
Structure	002:	#94062	dtd 94/08/25
Structure	003:	#93973	dtd 94/08/16
Structure	004:	#93974	dtd 94/08/16
Structure	005:	#93975	dtd 94/08/16
Structure	006:	#93976	dtd 94/08/16
Structure	007:	#94006	dtd 94/08/19
Structure	008:	#94007	dtd 94/08/19
Structure	010:	#94143	dtd 94/09/07

NRC CASE NOTES/U SCG KSO LA/LB POLREPS

57. NRT Incident Summary dtd 94/05/24.

58. NRT Incident Summary dtd 94/07/05.

59. POLREP ONE dtg P 2606607Z MAR 94.

60. POLREP TWO dtg P 060032Z APR 94.

61. POLREP THREE dtg P 152338Z APR 94.

62. POLREP FOUR dtg P 252320Z APR 94.

63. POLREP FIVE dtg P 292155Z APR 94.

64. POLREP SIX dtg P 200040Z MAY 94.

65. POLREP SEVEN dtg P Z 94.

66. POLREP EIGHT dtg P 142117Z JUL 94.

67. POLREP NINE dtg P 020041Z AUG 94.

68. POLREP TEN dtg P 182220Z AUG 94.

69. POLREP ELEVEN dtg P 270022Z AUG 94.

70. POLREP TWELVE dtg P 040309Z SEP 94.

71. POLREP THIRTEEN dtg P 080249Z SEP 94.

72. POLREP FOURTEEN dtg P 122308Z SEP 94.

73. POLREP FIFTEEN dtg P 142150Z SEP 94.

74. POLREP SIXTEEN dtg P 180256Z SEP 94.

75. POLREP SEVENTEEN dtg P 220540Z SEP 94.

76. POLREP EIGHTEEN dtg P 272100Z SEP 94.

77. POLREP NINETEEN dtg P 302125Z SEP 94.

78. POLREP TWENTY dtg P 032327Z OCT 94.

79. POLREP TWENTY-ONE dtg P 122310Z OCT 94.

80. POLREP TWENTY-TWO dtg P 192232Z OCT 94.

81. POLREP TWENTY-THREE dtg P 251945Z OCT 94.

82. POLREP TWENTY-FOUR dtg P 282232Z OCT 94.

83. POLREP TWENTY-FIVE dtg P 040110Z NOV 94.

84. POLREP TWENTY-SIX dtg P 160303Z NOV 94.