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U.S. Coast Guard Equipment Deployment Requirements for Hazardous Chemical Spill Response

Transportation Systems Center
Cambridge MA 02142

November 1982
Final Report

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16. Abstract <p>The objective of the study was to determine the types, quantities and locations of equipment required by the U.S. Coast Guard to respond to spills of hazardous chemicals into U.S. waters and adjacent shorelines, over and above the resources of private industry, contractors and other government agencies. The methodology was to (1) assess equipment availability outside the Coast Guard, (2) determine the distribution of hazardous chemical spills in time and location, and (3) determine the Coast Guard equipment deployment, allowing for the results of (1) and (2).</p> <p>(1) It was found that strong response capabilities of specific types are available from EPA, DOD, local governments, industry groups and manufacturers. Because of the limited extent of the data it was not possible to establish a geographic distribution, but it was estimated that the national capability is about 59% commercial, 33% private and 8% governmental.</p> <p>(2) It was found that historic chemical spill incidents cluster about industrial and population centers. Spills above a defined 'responsible' level were found to occur 40% in Central U.S., and 14%-26% in the East, Gulf and Western Coast areas</p> <p>(3) Equipment for a 20-man response team was selected that can be fit into a single van, air-transportable by a Coast Guard C130 aircraft. A seven-site configuration with a total of 11 such vans was recommended as offering the best combination of response time and van availability.</p>					
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PREFACE

This study of U.S. Coast Guard equipment deployment needed to respond to hazardous chemical spills in the United States was sponsored by the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Marine Environment and Systems, Marine Environmental Protection Division, and directed by the Pollution Response Branch G-WEP-4. The intent was to provide for hazardous chemical response a deployment analysis similar to that produced for oil spill response. The oil spill response deployment study¹ was a result of the U.S. Coast Guard's implementation of the Presidential Initiatives of March 1977.

The impetus for this study came in large part from the efforts of CDR J. L. Valenti, Chief of the Pollution Response Branch, GWEP-4. Assistance and guidance was provided throughout by Lt. M. Tobbe. Valuable contributions were made by many Coast Guard Personnel: Lt. Ron Weston, LCDR J. Paskowich, CDR D. Jensen, LCDR J. O'Beien, Ens. P. Fulton, Carlton Fowler, Lt. J. Gift, and others. Valuable and constructive comments were received from CDG R. Rufe, Jr. and Lt. D. Rome. Much assistance was received from private and industry sources, as well as from other government agencies. In particular, the assistance of Alan Humphries of the Environmental Protection Agency is acknowledged with thanks. Contributors within TSC included J. Cline, P. Hinchcliffe, D. O'Mathuma, W. MacLeod, T. Peters, and, especially, J. Garlitz.

¹"Deployment Requirements for U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Response Equipment," Rpt. No. CG-D-14-79; Vols. I and II, prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard, by Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge MA, February 1979.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended 1972, and subsequent legislation and directives require the U.S. Coast Guard to provide men and equipment to respond to spills of oil and hazardous materials into U.S. coastal waters, the Great Lakes, ports and harbors, and adjoining shorelines.* Since the inception of the Coast Guard pollution response program more than ten years ago, the agency has acquired substantial experience in responding to oil spills. In addition, three specialized units, referred to as Strike Teams, have developed an inventory of sophisticated oil removal equipment to augment local resources when that is necessary. Response to chemical spills, however, is a more complex problem because of the large variety of chemicals shipped commercially. The proper selection and quantity of equipment, and its location, needs to be established before full augmentation of the Coast Guard chemical response capability may proceed. Recognizing this need for planning information, the Coast Guard requested that the Transportation Systems Center undertake a study to determine the types, locations and quantities of equipment they should deploy to meet the threat of hazardous chemical spills in the 1980 to 1990 decade. This deployment should take into account the existing response capabilities outside the Coast Guard, as well as the geographic distribution of hazardous chemical spills to be expected in that time frame.

*Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510) on 11 December 1980, subsequent to the initiation of the present project. This new statute broadens Coast Guard response authority in two significant ways: it provides jurisdiction for hazardous substance releases into environmental media other than surface waters (air, groundwater, land surface, tec.), and it increases by several times the number of hazardous substances for which the Federal government may initiate a removal operation. Although this project could not anticipate all the possible ramifications this increased responsibility will have on the Coast Guard response program (that will not be possible for some time), it does recognize all substances that are or may be considered hazardous under P.L. 96-510.

substances designated by the Materials Transportation Bureau under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (1975). The full lists of materials included and excluded are given in Reference 3.

A second important limitation on the scope of the study is the restriction to the navigable waters and adjacent shorelines of the U.S. This designation of the Coast Guard's area of response stems from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and amendments of 1972. Under the National Contingency Plan, the Coast Guard provides the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for coastal spills and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for inland spills. The demarcation line between the two OSC jurisdictions is decided on a regional and district basis and usually is not published or available in coded form. As an approximation to this line, and to make it possible to process the large amounts of data available from the Materials Transportation Bureau, this study was limited to the counties adjacent to the U.S. coasts, Great Lakes, and major navigable waterways. These are shown in Figure A-1 (Appendix A). A list of these counties and the waterways to which they are adjacent is also given in Appendix A.

A third limitation on the scope of the study is the restriction to emergency spill situations. This excludes long term waste disposal site cleanup and chronic releases. Such non-emergency problems are usually handled by the EPA, by the spiller or by contractors. They do not normally require specialized Coast Guard equipment. The restriction to emergency response equipment excludes from consideration all long-term operations and devices such as filtration systems, incinerating equipment, earth-moving and stream-diversion equipment and large-scale removal, treatment or disposal systems.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

A three-step methodology was adopted for the project:

1. Assess the state of the art and the level of equipment availability outside the Coast Guard for hazardous chemical response.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

Section 2 outlines the major results of the first step of the methodology, i.e., the assessment of the state-of-the-art and level of equipment availability outside of the Coast Guard.

Section 3 reviews the results of the second step, i.e., the geographic and temporal distribution of hazardous chemical spills in the U.S. A list of counties with the highest frequency of spills is included.

Sections 4 and 5 carry out the last step of the methodology. Section 4 discusses the present Coast Guard chemical response capability and recommends types of equipment to complement the non-Coast Guard capability in the U.S. In Section 5, response times are calculated, based on the trial base configurations and the spill locations of step 2. Total numbers of response units are calculated for each configuration, and approximate costs estimated, assuming each response unit is composed of the equipments deduced from step 1.

Section 6 contains the conclusions and recommendations from the study.

2. ASSESSMENT OF NON-COAST GUARD HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

The objective of the first part of the study was to estimate the quantity and types of equipment available outside the Coast Guard to respond to actual or threatened spills of hazardous chemicals. The ability of the private sector, including cleanup contractors, railroads, and chemical manufacturers, as well as agencies of the Federal, State and local Governments was to be reviewed.

A complete or nearly complete inventory of currently available equipment was not possible within the project because of resource limitations. In addition, no judgments were made as to whether or not the custodians of the equipment surveyed had conducted the training necessary to use the equipment properly or as to whether the equipment was maintained in good condition. Nevertheless, general qualitative information was obtained from a limited survey. The scope of the task was limited to certain equipments of interest in the initial response to a spill:

- o Personnel protection
- o Environmental monitoring
- o Emergency containment
- o Rupture-puncture plugging and repair
- o Offloading-transfer
- o Communications
- o Logistics

Specifically excluded were major items used in the longer-term containment and cleanup of a spill:

- o Neutralizers
- o Filtration systems
- o Incinerators
- o Earth moving equipment
- o Stream diversionary devices
- o Removal, treatment, or disposal systems

- o Some of the entities contacted gave limited information concerning their capability.
- o The equipment is frequently kept at central locations but can be deployed rapidly over a wide geographical area; attributing such equipment to the central location can be misleading.
- o Much of the equipment used for spill response is multi-purpose i.e., it is normally used in the transportation, storage, and handling of chemicals, or it can also be used for response to petroleum spills.
- o Large quantities of equipment are not available to the Coast Guard for response to all spills, but could be made available under specific situations. Examples are equipment stocked by chemical manufacturers, railroads, or military services.

The first of these limitations is serious. It cannot be overcome except by a full national inventory of equipment, a procedure not only requiring resources beyond the present project, but also contingent on approval of the Office of Management and Budget for the requisite survey. However, a national inventory of equipment available for hazardous material spills (SKIM) is maintained by the Coast Guard. While this listing had proven useful in locating oil spill response equipment, it was not known at the start of the study how complete a listing it provides of chemical spill clean up equipment. Accordingly, the approach taken was to extract such data from the SKIM list and to integrate it into the present assessment.

2.2 INTEGRATION OF INTERVIEW DATA AND SKIM LIST

Combining the SKIM listings and the results of the interview data presented several difficulties: the amount of relevant chemical response gear in SKIM was expected to be small; the SKIM list for the entire country is not practical to retrieve; matching of items was difficult because of differences in the data items of the two lists. Accordingly, the comparison was approached cautiously, in three steps.

As a first step, copies were obtained of the SKIM Lists for the Marine Safety Office (MSO) Boston, for the Third Coast Guard District, and for the Atlantic Strike Team. From these lists, it was seen that, although the

activities. Some of the analytical items on the SKIM List and the study list were the same, but there were also many differences. Because of these differences and because of the small numbers of items listed, it was not possible to develop a reliable estimate of the total population of analytical equipment available. The SKIM List had no entries for the Boston MSO.

3. The SKIM Safety Equipment and Special Clothing list was not as comprehensive as the results of interviews for those regions where a major effort was made to contact the principal spill response agencies. In addition, where the same organization was cited on both lists, the items and quantities frequently differed. These differences could have arisen because the equipment lists were obtained at different times and from different people. The SKIM data were combined with the study data to provide a total list of equipment. Where quantities differed, the larger quantity was used.

As a final step, a comparison was made between the SKIM List and the study inventory for the First District. An effort was made to obtain a large data sample for this District, and most large response organizations were contacted, as well as many smaller ones. The results are shown in Table 2-1. Total numbers of equipment are shown as obtained from the two sources. The totals are the sum of the two numbers adjusted to prevent double counting (four agencies appeared on both lists). Overlap is those quantities which appear on both lists and which would cause double counting if the two lists were simply added. The SKIM to Total (S/T) percentage was calculated; it shows that the SKIM List is rather incomplete with regard to personnel protection equipment.

Similar calculations were not made for field meters and laboratory equipment because the numbers are too small to yield meaningful results. Despite the difficulties involved, the SKIM data were integrated into the overall assessment, and contributed a small but discernable amount to the quantitative results.

2.3 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

2.3.1 Tabulation of Data

After the data collection effort was completed, the quantities of equipment for both the study lists and the SKIM List were entered into data sheets. (See Appendix A of Reference 4.) The data are summarized in Tables 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5. Table 2-2 shows the quantities of protective clothing, breathing apparatus, field analytical meters, and laboratory analysis items, by each Coast Guard District, within the counties of interest as defined in Appendix A. Table 2-3 shows the same information, by state, for those agencies located outside of the counties of interest. Both tables also show the grand totals. The equipment totals by Coast Guard District for off-loading equipment are shown in Table 2-4 for the counties of interest and in Table 2-5 for outside those counties.

The quantity data seen in Table 2-2 for personnel protection equipment do not show any obvious pattern. The large quantities shown for the First and Third Districts are due to the special emphasis placed on obtaining a large data sample in those Districts. The quantities for the Second District are also large; this is probably due to the large geographical area included in the Second District (central U.S. including the Mississippi and Ohio River Valley) and to the large number of chemical industries located there.

The off-loading equipment, Tables 2-4 and 2-5, does not include the SKIM List data. The large amount of SKIM List data made entering it impractical. Further, the SKIM List does not identify the material of which the off-loading equipment is constructed. Thus all entries would have been in the Unknown Material class. Since this study was concerned with chemical-compatible equipment, large numbers of equipment of unknown material would not have contributed to the end result of the project.

The offloading equipment data, Tables 2-4 and 2-5, show that the industry is still heavily petroleum oriented. Only 37 percent of the listed pumps are made of chemical-resistant materials. Similarly, only 20 percent of the vacuum trucks and 15 percent of the tank trucks are chemical-resistant.

TABLE 2-3. PERSONNEL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT AND ANALYTICAL EQUIPMENT QUANTITIES OUTSIDE OF COUNTIES OF INTEREST

Code*	Protective Clothing				Breathing Apparatus				Field Meters				Analytical Equipment		
	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Arizona	6		2	4		4	4	4	1						
California	12	15	23			11	8	8	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Colorado	6		4			4	4	4		1	1				
Florida	2	2	4			2	4	4		1	1	1			
Georgia	36	6	6			6	6	6		10	10				
Idaho	6		4			4	4	4	1		1				
Illinois		10	10			2				1	1	1			
Kansas		10	10			3				2	2	2			
Louisiana	6		4			4	4	4	1		1	1			2
Massachusetts	8	20	37	36		86	3	2		3	3	5	4	1	2
Michigan			19		6	4	4	4		2	2	3	3	2	2
Minnesota	6		4			4	4	4	1		1	1	1		3
Missouri				1											
Montana	12		8			38	8	8	5	3	2	2	2	3	
Nebraska	6	5	9			6	4	4	1	1	1	1	2		1
New Jersey			35	35		6				3	3	1	3		2
New Mexico	6		4			4	4	4	1						
New York	100		5			5									
North Carolina		10	60			7	1	4	4	2	4	3	1	2	3
Ohio		35	212			262				12	44	2	5	2	1
Oklahoma	10		9			6	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	2	1

*Type of Equipment Code; see Table 2-2.

TABLE 2-4. OFF-LOADING EQUIPMENT TOTALS BY COAST GUARD DISTRICT WITHIN COUNTIES OF INTEREST

EQUIPMENT ITEM	COAST GUARD DISTRICT																	TOTAL	PERCENT OF TOTAL
	1	2	3	5	7	8	9	11	12	13	17								
Pumps																			
Unknown	10	0	25	11	0	4	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	54	18	
Steel	2	15	42	32	0	19	20	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	136	45		
Stainless Steel	0	2	5	20	5	7	4	5	5	1	5	1	0	0	0	54	18		
Rubber Lined	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1		
Plastic Lined	0	4	35	0	0	8	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	53	18		
Vacuum Trucks																			
Unknown	31	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	34		
Steel	0	3	25	6	0	0	14	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	51	46		
Stainless Steel	0	0	12	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	13		
Rubber Lined	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3		
Plastic Lined	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		
Glass Lined	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3		
Tank Trucks																			
Unknown	27	3	4	3	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	37		
Steel	0	0	6	10	0	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	48		
Stainless Steel	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3		
Rubber Lined	0	0	0	0	0	2	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	12		
Plastic Lined	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Glass Lined	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Vacuum Tank Barges																			
Unknown	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	67		
Steel	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	33		
Plastic Lined	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Glass Lined	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

TABLE 2-5. OFFLOADING EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE OF COUNTRIES OF INTEREST

CODE*	PUMPS				VACUUM TRUCK					TANK TRUCK					VACUUM BARGE			VACUUM TANK SKID MTD.			DRUMS								
	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	1	2	3	4	5	0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3	0	1	2	
ARIZONA			2	1	2																								
CALIFORNIA			4	2																									
COLORADO			2	1	2																								
FLORIDA																													
GEORGIA																													
IDAHO																													
ILLINOIS																													
KANSAS																													
LOUISIANA			2	1	2																								
MASSACHUSETTS					3																								
MICHIGAN																													
MINNESOTA			2	1	1																								
MISSOURI																													
MONTANA			4	2	4																								
NEBRASKA			2	1	2																								
NEW JERSEY																													
NEW MEXICO			2	1																									
NEW YORK																													

It should be noted that many of the larger cleanup contractors have standby or on-call contracts with chemical trucking companies, such as Chemical Leaman, Inc. or Matlack, Inc., whereby they can quickly obtain the necessary equipment.

Table 2-6 shows how the survey results are distributed among Federal Government, Local and State Government, Commercial, and Private organizations. About 59 percent of the equipments tabulated were in commercial contractor facilities, about 33 percent in private facilities. Government equipment (Federal, State and Local) was about 8 percent, including Coast Guard units.

2.3.2 National Total Estimates

The data tabulated in Tables 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5, are necessarily incomplete. To assess the national capability, it is necessary to make an estimate of the actual totals of equipment of each type that are available in the Coast Guard Districts throughout the country. Preparing an estimate of total equipment available proved to be difficult, even for those selected areas where a comprehensive inventory effort was made. First, the sample data were not completely reliable. Quantities often differed between the study list and the SKIM List. Also, some contractors were expanding their chemical capability and were increasing and/or expanding their equipment lists. Second, some of the agencies contacted did not provide the requested information. Third, it was not possible to identify all agencies that had a chemical response capability. Fourth, equipment might not always be available to the Coast Guard. Chemical manufacturing plants were usually well equipped, but their equipment (and trained manpower) was usually available only for spills of their own chemicals.

For the above reasons, the sample is incomplete, and the relationship of the sample to the total equipment population is unclear; thus, the estimated equipment listing does not give a precise picture of overall chemical spill response capability. However, crude estimates of equipment availability, based on the best judgement of those who carried out the interviews and surveys, were made for use in the follow-on phases of the program. The completeness of the data was estimated to be as follows:

First District. A major effort was made to obtain a large data sample. The total listing (SKIM List plus Study List) is probably about two thirds of the total available equipment.

Third District. A strong effort was made to obtain a representative data sample. The total listing is probably about one half of the available equipment.

All other Districts. A reasonable sample was sought. The total listing is probably no greater than one third of the available equipment.

In order to obtain a conservative (low) estimate of actual equipment available, the above fractions were increased to 80 percent, 70 percent, and 50 percent, respectively. The corresponding amplification factors, to be applied to the survey data in order to obtain total equipment estimates, are 1.25, 1.43 and 2.0. The results are shown in Table 2-7. This table was obtained by applying the amplification factors for the several districts to the data of Tables 2-2, 2-3, 2-4 and 2-5, and adding the results for each equipment group.

The accuracy of Table 2-7 is poor. The lower limit to the error is -50 percent (based on the 2.0 amplification factor) but the upper limit cannot be estimated as accurately. Because most of the major cooperatives and contractors have been surveyed. The total remaining inventory probably does not exceed the amounts covered. This gives a nominal upper limit on the error of 100 percent. Thus the error limits to Table 2-7 are estimated as -50 percent, +100 percent.

2.4 QUALITATIVE RESULTS

Some qualitative results emerge from the interview and survey data, when combined with the SKIM information. Appendix B shows that:

- (1) EPA strongest capability is in technical advice and detection and identification equipment.

- (2) DOD has substantial equipment at its various bases for response to fire, Nuclear/Bacterological/Chemical (NBC) releases, for fuel handling, and explosion control.
- (3) Local governments and authorities are well equipped for fire and communications, but little else.
- (4) Many commercial contractors maintain mobile units with chemical suits, gas masks, self-contained breathing apparatus, and pumps, bladders and trucks. Mobile labs and communication equipment are also common.
- (5) The Chlorine Emergency Plan, CHLOREP, operated by the Chlorine Institute maintains 64 response teams in the U.S., each with 24 hour coverage. Their capabilities include plugging and patching. The National Agricultural Chemicals Association (NACA) has 40 Pesticide Emergency Teams throughout the country. Mutual assistance programs also exist for vinyl chloride and hydrogen cyanide.
- (6) Chemical manufacturers commonly equip their plants for response on-site. Most large chemical shippers also maintain emergency trailers to respond to spills of their products. They commonly contain chemical/acid suits, meters, breathing apparatus, tool kits, meters, and in some cases pumps, overpack drums, and tank trucks.
- (7) Most railroads maintain one or more equipment storage sites along their line. They stock rubber suits, hoods, goggles, boots, and breathing apparatus. Offloading equipment is not common (exceptions: Southern Railroad, Boston and Maine).

The seven results just stated are displayed graphically in Figure 2-1.
From this Figure:

- (8) The most general available capability is lodged with commercial contractors.

	EPA	US AF	US ARMY	US NAVY	DOE	STATE AGENCY	LOCAL AUTH.	CITY POL.	CITY FIRE	PVT CONTR.	CHEM TREC	CHLO REP	AAR	CHEM. MANU	R.R.	PVT LABS
TECHNICAL ADVICE														P		
COMMUNICATIONS																
FIELD INSTRUMENTS														P	R	
LABORATORY ANALYSIS														P	R	
FACE & GAS MASKS														P	R	
SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS														P	R	
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING														P	R	
FIRE SUITS														P	R	
CHEMICAL/ACID SUITS														P		
FOAMING CAPABILITY																
OFFLOADING & CHEMICAL PUMPS														P		
CHEMICAL TANKS AND VANS, TRUCKS																
PLUGGING AND PATCHING EQUIPMENT																
CHEMICAL OVERPACK DRUMS																

FIGURE 2-1. QUALITATIVE DISPLAY OF NON-USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY (Continued)

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

From the above results the following conclusions are drawn:

First, because the assessment is not based on a comprehensive survey the potential for low estimation is greater than that for over estimation. Accordingly results showing large numbers of equipment (strong capability) are more reliable than those showing small numbers. In the strong capability category, are results (1), (2), (3), (5), (9), (12).

Second, the inaccuracy of the assessment, particularly outside of the first and third Districts, makes it difficult to ascribe a geographic distribution to the capabilities.

Third, samples of the SKIM Listing show that it is weak in chemical response gear, and especially deficient in personnel protective gear.

Fourth, the distribution of national capability is approximately 59 percent with commercial contractors, 33 percent with private organizations, and 8 percent with Federal, State and local agencies.

3. DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS IN THE U.S.

This Section describes the results of the data gathering and analysis performed to complete the second of the three steps in the methodology described in Section 1. It covers the geographic distribution of historic hazardous chemical (hazchem) spills as extracted from three sources:

- (1) The Hazardous Materials Information Report (HMIR) file of the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB).
- (2) The Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) of the Coast Guard.
- (3) The Pipeline Carrier Accident Report (PCAR) file, obtained from the Office of Pipeline Safety of the MTB.

The three sources differ in their origins and purposes. The first two, the HMIR and the PIRS files, far outweigh the third in volume of data and warrant some discussion.

The HMIR data have been submitted by carriers in accordance with 49 CFR 171.15 and 171.16 since 1970. This statute requires reports on Form DOT F 5800.1 of hazardous materials spills resulting in death, injury and damage over \$50,000. Bulk shipments by water are excluded since they are governed by Coast Guard regulation. Moreover, "hazardous materials" were designated as materials capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in commerce. The PIRS data, on the other hand, cover spills of oil or hazardous substances in accordance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). From inception to 1978 there were no specific or mandatory regulations for hazardous material entries into PIRS. During this time PIRS reports represented spills that posed severe threats to the environment or public health and welfare or that originated from Coast Guard regulated sources, such as vessels or waterfront facilities. In 1978, a list of approximately 300 hazardous substances (40 CFR116) designated under the authority of section 311 of the FWPCA, came into effect, providing a specific basis for entries into PIRS.

The results of the above history is that the HMIR data covers incidents involving hazardous materials in transport, other than bulk water shipments, while PIRS recorded incidents involving hazardous shipments by water, or from waterfront facilities or otherwise threatening U.S. waters.




FIGURE 3-1. OUTLINE OF SPILL DATA PROCESSING

TABLE 3-2. FIFTY MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED CHEMICALS (1971-1979) - MTB DATA BASE

RANK	MTB CHEM. CL CODE	CONST GUARD RELATED HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILL RECORDS - MTB DATA BASE ONLY (1971-1979)				MTB CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION
		# REC.	CUM. I	# REC.	CUM. I	
1	25 8063	4847	26.16	2274	18.52	PAINT ENAM LAQ STAN
2	25 5350	1303	6.48	1595	12.99	GASOLINE
3	95 3490	1384	6.70	944	7.63	COMP CLEANING LIQ G
4	95 3730	1104	5.49	360	2.91	COMR LIQ M.O.S.
5	25 3110	1051	5.24	395	3.22	FLAM LIQUID M.O.S.
6	25 3560	850	4.24	510	4.15	COMP PAINT REMOVE.F
7	95 9930	605	3.22	474	3.86	SULFURIC ACID
8	25 2840	608	3.03	399	3.25	CEMENT LIQ NOS
9	95 5700	555	2.77	360	2.93	RESIN SOLUTION
10	95 9030	582	2.90	124	1.01	ELECTA BATT FL
11	95 4560	276	1.88	252	2.05	HYDROCHLORIC ACID
12	25 5960	247	1.33	168	1.37	ALCOHOL A.C.S.
13	25 1130	258	1.29	167	1.36	POI SCHAUS LIQ MUS B
14	60 8520	267	1.23	155	1.24	LIQ PETROLEUM GAS
15	60 8330	189	0.94	140	1.14	ACID LIQUID M.O.S.
16	95 1120	121	0.61	149	1.21	COMBUSTIBLE LIQ NOS
17	20 3475	208	1.04	42	0.34	NIITRIC ACID
18	95 7700	97	0.49	137	1.12	PHOSPHORIC ACID
19	95 8365	186	0.93	42	0.36	AMMONIA ANHYDRACUS
20	45 1520	144	0.72	75	0.61	COMP CLEANING LIQ F
21	25 3500	129	0.64	86	0.73	COMR SOLID M.O.S.
22	95 3735	165	0.82	42	0.36	SOLVATS M.O.S.
23	25 9120	133	0.54	90	0.73	INSECTICIDE LIQUID
24	60 5980	68	0.36	130	1.05	SODIUM HYDROXIDE LIQ
25	95 9375	195	0.97	82	0.60	METHYL ALCOHOL
26	25 10820	112	0.56	152	1.24	CAUSTIC SODA LIQ
27	95 2330	23	0.10	96	0.78	COMPA GASES NOS FG
28	50 3370	61	0.30	41	0.33	COMP RUST REMOVER
29	95 3560	98	0.49	65	0.53	ACETONE
30	25 1010	71	0.35	51	0.42	XYLENE (XVLOL)
31	25 10990	87	0.43	55	0.45	PETROLEUM NAPHTHA
32	25 10160	72	0.36	70	0.57	BUILER COMP LIQ
33	25 8120	66	0.33	70	0.57	COMP PAINT REMOVE C
34	60 3600	67	0.23	85	0.69	INSECTICIDE LIQ FL
35	95 2260	80	0.40	37	0.33	DRUGS CHEMICALS COA
36	95 3570	85	0.42	16	0.15	ALMALTINE LIQUID NOS
37	25 6000	74	0.37	16	0.15	NIITRIC ACIC >408
38	95 4430	16	0.08	38	0.31	DIK MATERIAL M.O.S.
39	95 1240	63	0.31	27	0.22	COMP GASES NOS MFG
40	35 7731	92	0.46	57	0.46	COMP TR-HD KILL FL
41	35 6010	53	0.26	24	0.20	WATER TREAT COMP
42	45 3660	31	0.15	19	0.15	CARBOLIC ACID LIQ
43	25 3590	61	0.30	37	0.33	HYPOCHLORITE SCL
44	95 10710	66	0.33	21	0.17	HYDROFLUOMIC AC SLM
45	60 2670	45	0.22	37	0.33	DIL M.O.S.
46	95 5870	57	0.28	26	0.21	AMMON HYDRACIDE <<5
47	95 5770	39	0.19	57	0.46	HYDROGEN PEROXIDE
48	25 7330	48	0.24	0	0.00	
49	95 1336	74	0.37	0	0.00	
50	95 5850	16	0.08	57	0.46	

629

TOTAL 20162 12279 100.00 32340 100.00

TABLE 3-3. MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED CHEMICALS, 1973-1979
AS REPORTED TO USCG/PIRS (Cont.)

RANK	MATERIAL (1)	NUMBER OF SPILLS	%	CUM %	MATERIAL NAME
43	2069	6	0.09	97.72	Methyl Ethyl Ketone (2-Butunone)
44	2075	6	0.09	97.80	Nitric Acid
45	2094	6	0.09	97.89	Vinyl Acetate
46	2120	6	0.09	97.98	Chromium Compounds
47	2078	5	0.07	98.05	Oleum
48	2153	5	0.07	98.12	Lead Compounds
49	2213	5	0.07	98.19	Zinc Compounds
50	2029	4	0.06	98.25	Carbon Tetrachloride
51	2049	4	0.06	98.31	Ethyl Acrylate
52	2050	4	0.06	98.36	Ethyl Alcohol
53	2091	4	0.06	98.42	Trichloroethylene
54	2124	4	0.06	98.48	Cyanide Compounds
55	2145	4	0.06	98.54	Ethylbenzene
56	2002	3	0.04	98.58	Acetic Anhydride
57	2008	3	0.04	98.62	Acrylic Acid
58	2027	3	0.04	98.66	Bromine
59	2070	3	0.04	98.71	Methyl ISO-Butyl Ketone
60	2072	3	0.04	98.75	Methyl Methacrylate
61	2103	3	0.04	98.79	Aluminum Sulfate (Alum)
62	2117	3	0.04	98.84	Chlordane
63	2173	3	0.04	98.88	PCB'S
64	2180	3	0.04	98.92	Potassium Permanganate
65	2204	3	0.04	98.97	Toxaphene
66	2001	2	0.03	98.99	Acetaldehyde
67	2011	2	0.03	99.02	Allyl Alcohol
68	2022	2	0.03	99.05	N-Butyl Acrylate
69	2023	2	0.03	99.08	N-Butyl Alcohol
70	2025	2	0.03	99.11	N-Bulyraldehyde
71	2031	2	0.03	99.14	Chloroform
72	2039	2	0.03	99.17	Dichloropropane-
73	2052	2	0.03	99.20	Dichloropropane Mix
74	2055	2	0.03	99.22	Ethylenediamine
75	2062	2	0.03	99.25	Formaldehyde
76	2083	2	0.03	99.28	Hydrogen Peroxide (Greater Than 60%)
77	2090	2	0.03	99.31	N-Propyl Alcohol
78	2095	2	0.03	99.34	Trichloroethane
79	2151	2	0.03	99.37	Vinylidene Chloride
80	2156	2	0.03	99.40	Iron Compounds
81	2169	2	0.03	99.43	Maleic Acid
82	2172	2	0.03	99.45	Nitrogen Dioxide
83	2174	2	0.03	99.48	Parathion
84	2181	2	0.03	99.51	Pentachlorophenol Propionic Acid

TABLE 3-4. MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED LIQUIDS (1968-1979)
SELECTED FROM MTB (PCAR) REPORTS

<u>RANK</u>	<u>CHEM-CODE</u>	<u>CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>#INCIDENTS</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>COM%</u>
1	28 141 13	Anthracene, Crude	330	67	67
2	29 111 35	Gasoline, Blended			
	29 111 90	Gasoline, n.e.c. (1)			
	49 081 76	Gasoline, Casing Head	117	24	91
3	49 057 11	Liquified Petroleum	44	9	100
			<hr/>		<hr/>
			491		100

(1) Not otherwise classified

TABLE 3-6. MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED CHEMICALS REPORTED TO PIRS AND MTB, BY CHEMICAL GROUP

	PIRS		MTB ¹	
	spills	%	spills	%
Flammable Liquids	6,867	85	13,970	58
Corrosives	340	4	8,181	34
Poisons	-	-	740	3
Flammable Gases	132	2	540	2
Non-Flammable Gases	35	0	219	1
Other than above	709	9	422	2
	<u>8,083</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>24,072</u>	<u>100</u>

¹Includes PCAR (Pipeline Carrier Accident Reports)

however, is substantially less, for most modes as shown in the last column of Table 3-7. The duplicate records discovered represent an average overlap of less than 0.5 percent.

The reasons for the low overlap fractions are not difficult to find.

- (1) Incident reports are not made to the MTB for bulk shipments by water, but are required under the PIRS. Hence the PIRS reports of water incidents seldom duplicate the MTB reports.
- (2) Most highway and rail spills probably do not impact the navigable waters, even though they occur in coastal or waterway counties. If so, they would appear in the PIRS data with much lower frequency than in the MTB data.
- (3) The category of marine and land facility does not apply to MTB recorded incidents, except as these later are of unknown mode. Since there are relatively few records of that type in the MTB data, the overlap is small.

Because of the low overlap it was deemed unnecessary to consolidate PIRS and MTB data into a single data base, i.e., to eliminate duplication. The PIRS data can be taken to reflect water-borne and facility spills, while the MTB data can be taken to cover highway and rail spills. Pipeline spill data, however, must be extracted from both sources. Also, a check of the air-mode spills showed no overlap.

Figures 3-2 and 3-3 illustrate the breakdown by mode of the PIRS and MTB data.

The overall picture emerging from the modal breakdown, for the chemicals and counties covered, is:

- (1) Water-borne incidents occur at the rate of about 300 per year.
- (2) Spills at facilities, affecting the navigable waters, occur at the rate of about 250-year.
- (3) About 3 percent of all highway spills reported to the MTB in the coastal counties (about 90 per year) are reported in the PIRS data base as affecting the navigable waters.
- (4) Railroad incidents in the counties of interest occur at about one tenth the rate of highway incidents.




FIGURE 3-3. COAST GUARD RELATED HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INCIDENTS - MTB DATA BASE (MINIMUM DAMAGE = \$1,000.00) TOTAL INCIDENTS = 2,358




FIGURE 3-4. COAST GUARD RELATED HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS
PIRS DATA BASE (TOTAL 6,964 INCIDENTS)




FIGURE 3-6. NUMBER OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILL RECORDS REPORTED TO MTB

Pipeline: MTB + PIRS

Air: MTB

The geographic distribution of incidents, is obtained in terms of county of occurrence but, not all spills in a county of interest affect the navigable waters of the U.S. This is deduced from the large differences between PIRS and MTB data in most counties. The MTB data includes many more incidents, in general, than the PIRS. One explanation of this is the inclusion in the MTB data of many incidents that do not affect the navigable waters of the United States even though they occurred in a county of interest.

PIRS - Geographic Distribution

The chemicals appearing in the PIRS data base were divided into three groups, for convenience in plotting:

1. Flammable Oils: Gasoline, solvents, light flammable oils, paint, LPG, animal and vegetable oils.
2. Chemicals: PIRS chemical codes 2000-2999, plus oil-based pesticides.
3. Chemical and Industrial Wastes: PIRS Codes 7008, 7016.

The third category involves only 121 incidents (less than 2 percent of the incidents of interest) and hence could not provide any detailed information regarding their geographic distribution over the 612 counties of interest. (But the total quantity spilled of chemical and industrial wastes comprises 15 percent of the total spillage in 1973-79. Most of this spillage was chemical wastes released from tankers.)

Figures 3-7(a) through (d) shows the geographic distribution of incidents reported to PIRS in 1973-79 in the counties of interest. Unshaded counties experienced no incidents in the period; counties in black experienced more than nine times the average number of incidents. Intermediate shadings indicate frequencies of incidents between these extremes. The pattern shows incidents in the heavily industrialized counties of the country. These are listed in Table 3-8, which shows those counties having 50 or more spills of flammable oils or chemicals from 1973 to 1979, as recorded in PIRS. Since the average number of incidents per county is about 8.6, the occurrence of over 50 spills in any one county is a very significant deviation from the average.

The regional distribution of PIRS spill incidents is as follows:

PIRS ALL MATERIALS
1971 79

ALL NOJES # INCIDENTS = 6,05




FIGURE 3-7(b). DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS BY COASTAL AND WATERWAY COUNTIES - PIRS, SOUTHEAST U.S.

MAP-111.001

PIRS - ALL MATERIALS 1971-79

ALL MODES # INCIDENTS = 6,952




FIGURE 3-7(d). DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS BY COASTAL AND WATERWAY COUNTIES - PIRS, WESTERN U.S.

MAP441 001

TABLE 3-8. COASTAL AND WATERWAY COUNTIES HAVING 50 OR MORE¹ HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS IN 1973-79, AS RECORDED BY PIRS-USCG (Cont.)

<u>COUNTY #</u>	<u>COUNTY NAME</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</u>
33001	Will	IL	54
34024	Jefferson	KY	67
34036	Hamilton	OH	78
34070	Allegheny	PA	84
53034	Cook	IL	61
57066	Wayne	MI	92
57068	Lucas	OH	96

A county with 52 or more incidents has .75% or more of all incidents in the (modified) PIRS file of 6952 incidents.

MTB - ALL REGULATED CHEMICALS

1971-79

MODE = ALL

CHEM CLASS = ALL

INCIDENTS = 31,515




FIGURE 3-8(a).


DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS BY COASTAL AND WATERWAY COUNTIES - HMIR, NORTHEAST U.S.

MAP241.001

MTB

ALL REGULATED CHEMICALS 1971-79

MODE = ALL # INCIDENTS = 31,515
CHEM CLASS = ALL



MAP241.001

FIGURE 3-8(c). DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS BY COASTAL AND WATERWAY COUNTIES - HMIR, CENTRAL U.S.

TABLE 3-9. COASTAL AND WATERWAY COUNTIES HAVING 230 OR MORE¹ HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS IN 1971-79, AS RECORDED BY HMIR-MTB

<u>COUNTY #</u>	<u>COUNTY NAME</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</u>
11034	Orange	NY	234
11039	Albany	NY	266
11049	Hudson	NJ	475
11052	Middlesex	NJ	349
11063	Philadelphia	PA	476
11080	Baltimore City	MD	599
11108	Henrico	VA	931
11115	Norfolk	VA	306
11138	Brunswick	NC	744
13014	Duval	FL	249
13024	Dade	FL	289
13049	Mobile	AL	249
13064	Orleans	LA	615
13077	Harris	TX	876
15003	Los Angeles	CA	1187
15012	Alameda	CA	418
15031	Multnomah	OR	292
15042	King	WA	330
31023	Shelby	TN	1694
32056	Ramsey	MN	633
32057	Hennipin	MN	232
34024	Jefferson	KY	577
34036	Hamilton	OH	1084

2. East St. Louis, IL

3. San Diego, CA

which are more prominent in the PIRS than in the MTB data.

When the MTB incidents are broken down by Coast Guard Districts, the result is:

USCG Districts 1, 3, 5	7,526 incidents	24%
USCG Districts 7, 8	3,819	12
USCG Districts 11, 12, 13	3,360	11
USCG Districts 2, 9	<u>16,751</u>	<u>53</u>
TOTAL	31,456	100

plus 59 incidents in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands.

This list provides an informative comparison with the corresponding list for PIRS incidents, above. It shows clearly that a larger percentage of MTB incidents occurred in Districts 2 and 9 than did PIRS incidents, (54% vs. 27%). This may be due to the relatively larger importance of land-based industry in Districts 2 and 9. Another unusual aspect is that Districts 1, 3, and 5 have about the same percentage of incidents (24%) in both reporting systems. An explanation may be that chemical industry and transport in those Districts have a large water-based transport component. The remainder of the country would appear to be balanced between chemical industries that have water-based and land-based transport.

3.5 PROJECTION

The problem of estimating the rate of hazardous chemical spills in the 1980-1985 time frame is important for deployment planning, and has been studied at least since 1973 (Reference 13). Despite the drawbacks of employing chemical production figures as surrogates for hazchem transport exposure (Reference 13, p. 33) it is still necessary to do so, because direct measures of exposure are not generally available even today. Therefore, an attempt was made to correlate chemical production with chemical spills, based on 1971-79 data for both, and to use the results for projection into 1980-90. The results are shown in Figure 3-9 and 3-10.




FIGURE 3-10. CHEMICALS AND PRODUCTS, PRODUCTION AND SPILL REPORTS 1971-79

CHEMICAL

ALKALINES & CHLORINE
GASES, COAL TAR, PIGMENTS
BASIC ORGANIC CHEMICALS
INORGANIC CHEMICALS, NEC
ACIDS & FERTILIZERS

PRODUCT

DRUGS & MEDICINES
SOAP & TOILETRIES
PAINTS
AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS

PRODUCTION INDEX (1967 = 100)

131.4
193.7
233.3
133.8
140.5
238.2
171.6
126.2
221.6

PRODUCTION INDEX (1967 = 100)

UNADJUSTED IN '77

PRODUCTION (LEFT SCALE)

MTB SPILL REPORTS (RT SCALE)

PIRS SPILL REPORTS (RT SCALE)

THOUSANDS OF RECORDS

In summary it can be stated that while both production and total number of spills reported have been increasing at about 4-7 percent in the latter half of the decade, the number of "responsible" spills shows a leveling or declining trend in the last four years.

3.6 SUMMARY

The information and conclusions drawn from the preceding analyses apply to spills of hazardous (non-oil) materials in the coastal and waterway counties of the United States.

Mode

1. The MTB data are representative of highway, rail, and air mode spills; the PIRS data cover water and facility-based spills. There is less than 0.5 percent overlap of the two data sources.

Chemicals

2. There is also poor correlation of the two sources with regard to the types of chemicals reported spilled. This is attributed to (1) differences in the two chemical coding schemes, and (2) differences in the types of chemicals shipped by water as opposed to highway, rail, and air.
3. About 60 percent of the spills reported to MTB, and over 80 percent of the spills reported to PIRS, are flammable liquids.
4. The MTB and the PIRS systems differ in the scope and character of the substances they report (i.e., "hazardous" vs. "polluting"). This difference makes comparison of the chemicals in the two data bases very difficult.

Time History

5. The number of incidents reported to PIRS increased at about 10 percent per year from 1973 through 1977, then declined about 8 percent per year in 1978 and 1979. The MTB reports, on the other hand, show a 26 percent per year increase in number from 1971 through 1978. This rapid increase is attributed to an increase in reporting fraction rather than to an increase in incidents.

4. U.S. COAST GUARD CHEMICAL SPILL RESPONSE EQUIPMENT TYPES

The preceding Sections of this report have reviewed the non-U.S. Coast Guard chemical spill response capability and estimated the geographic distribution of chemical spills threat to be expected in 1985.

The final step of the basic methodology is carried out in this and the following Section. The present and recommended types of chemical response equipment are treated in this Section. The number and location of the response units are determined in the next Section. It will be seen that, for reasons of mobility and response time, the chemical response equipment assigned to a base should be pre-loaded onto response vehicles. Therefore, the objective of this Section is to describe the mix of equipment to be contained in these vehicles.

4.1 PRESENT COAST GUARD EQUIPMENT TYPES

A sampling of the Coast Guard hazchem response equipment was taken from the SKIM listing. Based on interviews with field personnel, it is evident that the listing was not current as of December 1980, since many equipment items reported from the field are not on the SKIM list. The following SKIM tabulation, therefore, probably underestimates the actual capability:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Self contained breathing apparatus	44
Gas Masks	135
Unspecified type, breathing apparatus	52
Fire Suits	3
Acid Suits	38
pH meters	2
Explosimeters	15
Multiple-gas meters	2
Oxygen sampler	2

(4) The response vehicles and teams described here are to be the major USCG response to chemical spills. The MSO is assumed to provide the OSC, and general expertise in chemical cleanup, but would otherwise rely on the response vehicles and teams.

(5) The equipment and capability deployed by the Coast Guard will be for

(a) rapid, but temporary assistance when other sources of response are not available.

(b) protection of Coast Guard personnel on the scene.

(c) initial assessments and monitoring of removal operations.

The guideline 5(a) is significant in that it implies that mobility should be given high priority. The general measure of mobility, of course, is response time, which in turn depends on transport mode. Two approaches are possible: (1) numerous small bases that respond over short distance via highway, and (2) few, relatively large bases that respond via air. Combinations are also possible.

Land response is best achieved by units pre-loaded and dedicated to hazardous chemical spill response. The pre-loaded unit not only saves time and improves preparedness at the initial stages of a response, but also provides storage space for the equipment between responses. The major questions in this approach are the size and contents of the response vehicle, and the numbers of such vehicles at the various bases.

Air response is more limited by cost than is land response. A significant cost saving can be achieved, however, if USCG transport aircraft (C130H, C130B) are employed, since they are normally maintained in a ready status for the Search and Rescue mission.

An ideal arrangement, but one suitable for only some bases, is a set of air-transportable response vans that are located at or near USCG airbase with C130H/B aircraft. These are:

Barber's Point, HI	3-HC-130B
Clearwater, FL	3-HC-130B
Elizabeth City, NC	4-HC-130B
Kodiak, AK	6-HC-130H
Sacramento, CA	4-HC-130H

- (1) pH meters - These are inexpensive devices that determine hydrogen ion concentrations in water, soil or liquids. Many materials have a profound effect on pH values and the extent of contamination can often be detected by these meters.
- (2) Sampling meters - Many types are available. They measure levels of methane, ethane, chlorine, hydrogen sulfide. Photo-ionizer units are available that can detect a wide variety of organic compounds and some inorganic compounds. Hydrogen flame ionization meters can detect and measure almost all organic vapors.
- (3) Multi-meters - These employ indicator tubes for each chemical to be detected. Although they are not highly accurate they are very flexible and reliable. The utility depends on the number of indicator tubes stocked.
- (4) Combustible gas indicator - These measure the level of specific gases in the atmosphere and compare it with known limits to determine the possibility of explosion of the particular air/gas mixture present. Many meters can be adjusted for more than one gas.
- (5) Oxygen meter - These measure molecular oxygen in the atmosphere as a function of partial pressure.

4.2.1.2 Personnel Protective Gear (PPG) - This is the largest and, perhaps, most important category for USCG response teams. Even if Coast Guard personnel do not themselves undertake pollutant removal actions, they require protective equipment to conduct the initial assessment of the reported spill, to effectively monitor the corrective measures of the responsible party, if any, and to supervise the efforts of any contractors whom the OSC has hired. Personnel Protective Gear (PPG) falls into two categories: respiratory protection and protective clothing. (Reference 7).

Respiratory Protection

Respiratory protective gear fall into two classes, air-purifying respirators and supplied or self-contained air- or oxygen-breathing apparatus.

- (1) Air purifying respirator (gas mask) - A breathing system which supplies breathing air to the user from the ambient atmosphere. Protection is provided by mechanical filters, chemical reactants or

referred to as a rebreather, removes the carbon dioxide from the contained air and replaces it with oxygen.

Protective Clothing

Several groups of protective clothing may be defined. The groupings below are based on the type of use to which the clothing is put rather than on the specific materials from which they are constructed. Generally, an adequately equipped response vehicle will have gear of each type.

Standard Protective Gear (splash gear) - A suit made of rubber or polymer exterior or coating over a fabric base. These suits are primarily used by Fire Departments and other agencies concerned with protection against water; these suits offer protection against heat and acid for short periods of time or for light exposures, but not against intense corrosive atmospheres or lethal poisons.

In addition to the suits themselves, numerous auxiliary items are available. These include hoods, goggles, gloves, boots, face masks, coveralls, aprons and hats. All such items are available separately. Although included in the chemical/gas suits described below each separate item should be available because it serves a distinct, single, purpose in many spills. The materials must be selected so as to provide resistance to the spectrum of chemicals likely to be encountered.

Fire Suit - a suit made with an exterior of aluminized-glass or asbestos fabric over other layers of glass, asbestos, or cloth fabrics. The more layers of insulating glass or asbestos fabric, the greater thermal protection afforded the wearer. The inner layer is usually cloth to provide strength to the suit and a non-irritating surface to the wearer. These suits always include a helmet or hood, and fully encapsulate the wearer. Accordingly, breathing apparatus is required. Several types of suits are available, and are classified accordingly to the degree of protection they give the wearer:

Proximity suit - Allows the wearer to come close to a fire; it provides protection against moderate heat and occasional contact with hot surfaces.

Approach suit - Allows the wearer to come very close to a fire; it provides protection against high radiant heat levels for extended periods of time.

data were those available from the chemical manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, in many cases, the assignments were purely judgemental in nature.

Chemical List Bridging

Inconsistency of existing material/chemicals lists was not the only difficulty encountered in this approach. A major problem emerged when the chemicals listed by PIRS were compared with those listed by the MTB. The match was poor. The attempt at 'bridging' these two lists of chemicals to a uniform system of designations, as given in the CHRIS (Chemical Hazard Response Information System) system failed for reasons described in Reference 3 and Appendix C. Therefore the analysis of chemical/material requirements for historic spills was carried out separately on the MTB and PIRS chemicals. The analysis of chemical compatibility was carried out on all materials that appeared in the PIRS spill data from 1973 to 1979 and on all MTB materials that had 10 or more spill records with quantity released data from 1976 through 1979. This resulted in 130 out of the 265 PIRS chemicals and 157 out of more than 1600 MTB chemicals being selected for analysis.

The chemicals selected for analysis were then used to extract the spill frequency and release quantity from the MTB and PIRS spill data bases. Fortunately, it was discovered (Reference 3, Table 22) that the duplication of incidents in the two data bases was less than 0.5 percent, so that the number of incidents involving a given chemical was closely approximated by the sum of the PIRS and MTB records involving that chemical. Further, it was found that the major source of mismatch between the two bases was the use of generic descriptions of chemicals (e.g., "zinc compounds", or "Corrosive Liquid, N.O.S."). In those cases the chemical was treated as the most common chemical among the group of chemicals covered by the designation.

Types and Numbers of Equipment

Each of 157 MTB materials and 130 PIRS materials were examined to determine the type of response equipment and the number of units of equipment required as a function of spill size. The results are tabulated in Appendix C1. This Appendix also shows the material recommended for each piece of equipment for compatibility with the chemical.

The materials and equipment requirements for specific chemicals were applied to actual historic spills from PIRS in 1973 through 1979 and to the

TABLE 4-1. NUMBER OF SPILLS ABOVE RESPONSE THRESHOLD
TABULATED BY EQUIPMENT TYPE

	<u>PIRS</u> <u>73-79</u>	<u>HMIR</u> <u>76-79</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% of</u> <u>Spills</u>
A1 SCBA (self-contained breathing apparatus)	587	320	907	78.32
A2 SCBA - for high concentration	0	6	6	.52
A3 SCBA - PLASTIC LENS	0	6	6	.52
B1 CANISTER - ALL PURPOSE	9	7	16	1.38
C1 CANISTER - ORGANIC	18	51	69	5.96
D1 CANISTER - AMMONIA (ALKALI)	0	7	7	.60
E1 CANISTER - CHLORINE	0	2	2	.17
F1 CANISTER - ACID	4	11	15	1.30
G1 DUST MASK	33	63	96	8.29
H1 CHEMICAL GOGGLES	39	72	111	9.59
I1 FACE SHIELD	79	45	124	10.71
J1 ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - NEOPRENE	539	119	658	56.82
J2 " " " - BUTYL RUBBER	38	52	90	7.77
J3 " " " - EPR	2	6	8	.69
J4 " " " - HYPALON	8	16	24	2.07
J5 " " " - BUTADIENE	-	-	-	-
J6 " " " - FLUORO-ELASTOMER	9	45	54	4.66
K1 RUBBER GLOVES - NEOPRENE	20	183	203	17.53
K2 " " - BUTYL RUBBER	3	16	19	1.64
K3 " " - EPR	2	8	10	.86
K4 " " - HYPALON	0	8	8	.69
K5 " " - BUTADIENE	-	-	-	-
K6 " " - FLUORO-ELASTOMER	20	26	46	3.97
L1 RUBBER BOOTS - NEOPRENE	18	180	198	17.10
L2 " " - BUTYL RUBBER	3	4	7	.60
L3 " " - EPR	2	1	2	.26
L4 " " - HYPALON	0	0	0	.00
L5 " " - BUTADIENE	-	-	-	-
L6 " " - FLUORO-ELASTOMER	20	23	43	3.71
M1 RUBBER HOOD - NEOPRENE	0	0	0	.00
M6 " " - FLUORO-ELASTOMER	12	0	12	1.04
O1 CORROSIVE	<u>123</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>258</u>	<u>22.28</u>
	667	491	1158	

TABLE 4-2. MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED CHEMICALS AND THEIR HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS AS REPORTED TO PIRS, 1973-1979.

	%	H	F	R	
1. Gasoline	45.7	1	3	0	
2. Hydraulic Fluid	12.5	-	-	-	
3. "Other Hazardous Substances"	5.9	-	-	-	
4. Lacquer-based paint	4.8	1	2	0	TGF
5. Natural gasoline	3.6	1	3	0	
6. Vegetable oil	3.2	0	1	0	
7. Animal oil	2.3	0	1	0	
8. Naptha	1.7	2	3	0	
9. Other petroleum solvent	1.6	-	-	-	
10. Xylene	1.5	2	3	0	
11. LPG	1.3	1	4	0	FG
12. Benzene	1.3	2	3	0	
13. Toluene	1.3	2	3	0	
14. Styrene	1.3	2	3	2	
15. Sulphuric Acid	1.2	3	0	2	
16. Industrial Waste	1.1	-	-	-	
17. Caustic Soda	.80	3	0	1	
18. Hydrochloric Acid	.66	3	0	0	TG
19. Chemical Waste	.66	-	-	-	
20. Mineral Spirits	.65	-	-	-	
21. Paraffin Wax	.56	0	1	0	
22. Cresol	.42	3	2	0	
23. Napthalene	.30	2	2	0	
24. Ammonia	.21	2	1	0	TG
25. Phosphoric Acid	.29	2	0	0	
26. Oil-based pesticides (1)	.27	3	1	0	PP,TGF
27. Phenol (Carbolic Acid)	.26	3	2	0	
28. Sodium Hydroxide	.26	3	0	1	
29. Cyclohexane	.22	1	3	0	
30. Ammonium Compounds (2)	.20	2	0	3	TGF,EX
31. Turpentine	.19	1	3	0	
32. Isopropyl Alcohol	.14	1	3	0	
33. Methyl Alcohol	.14	1	3	0	
34. Chlorine	.14	3	0	0	TG
35. Acetic Acid	.13	2	2	1	
36. Acetone	.11	1	3	0	
37. Acrylonitrile	.10	4	3	2	TG,TGF
38. Glycol	.10	1	1	0	
39. Ethylene Glycol	.10	1	1	0	
40. Perchloro ethylene	.10	2	0	0	
41. Calcium Compounds	.10	-	-	-	
42. Copper Compounds	.10	-	-	-	
43. Methyl Ethyl Ketone	.09	1	3	0	
44. Nitric Acid	.09	3	0	0	TG
45. Vinyl Acetate	.09	2	3	2	FG
46. Chromium Compounds	.09	-	-	-	
47. Oleum	.07	3	0	2	
48. Lead Compounds	.07	-	-	-	

TABLE 4-2. MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED CHEMICALS AND THEIR HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS AS REPORTED TO PIRS, 1973-1979 (CONTINUED)

	%	H	F	R	
97. Ethylene Cyanohydrin	.01	2	1	1	TGF
98. Glycerin	.01	-	-	-	
99. n-Hexane	.01	1	3	0	
100. Hydroflouric Acid	.01	4	0	0	TG
101. Isoprene	.01	2	4	2	
102. Methyl Acrylate	.01	2	3	2	
103. Propylene Oxide	.01	2	4	2	FG
104. Tetraethyl Lead	.01	3	2	3	
105. Butylamine	.01	2	3	0	
106. Flourine Compounds	.01	-	-	-	TG, TGF
107. Methyl Parathion	.01	4	3	2	PP
108. Phosphorous Trichloride	.01	3	0	2	TG
109. Sodium Bisulfite	.01	3	1	2	TGF
110. Sodium Hydrosulfide	.01	-	-	-	
111. Sodium Nitrite	.01	-	-	-	
112. Sodium Phosphate, Monobasic	.01	-	-	-	
113. Sodium Sulfide	.01	2	1	0	TGF
114. Strychnine	.01	-	-	-	PP
115. Uranium Compounds	.01	-	-	-	
	100.00				

NOTES:

✓ indicates that the material or group of materials can present one or more of the following hazards:

FG = gives off flammable or explosive gas

TG = gives off toxic gas

TGF = gives off toxic gas when on fire

EX = Class A or B explosive

PP = pesticide or poison

% indicates the percentage of incidents involving the listed material from among the 6964 incidents extracted from the PIRS data base, 1973-79.

(1) Endrin, in solution, taken as typical.

(2) Ammonium Nitrate taken as typical.

(3) Sodium Cyanide taken as typical.

TABLE 4-3. FIFTY MOST FREQUENTLY SPILLED CHEMICALS AND THEIR HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS AS REPORTED TO MTB, 1971-1979 (CONTINUED)

NOTES:

✓ indicates that the material or group of materials can present one or more of the following hazards:

FG = gives off flammable or explosive gas

TG = gives off toxic gas

TGF = gives off toxic gas when on fire

EX = Class A or B explosive

PP = pesticide or poison

% indicates the percentage of incidents involving the listed material from among the 31,515 incidents extracted from the MTB data base, 1971-79.

(1) Endrin, in solution, taken as typical.

(2) Ammonium Nitrate taken as typical.

(3) Sodium Cyanide taken as typical.

accomplished by another vessel, or by terminal auxiliary pumps.

In some cases of marine incidents involving hazardous materials, however, Coast Guard offloading capability may be of use. These are cases of bulk shipments of chemicals in barges (as opposed to barge shipments of chemicals in special containers or tanks). Products such as sulphuric acid, liquid fertilizer, and pesticides are commonly shipped in bulk. Conventional offloading equipment, such as steel pumps, are subject to corrosion and/or fouling by these materials; stainless steel pumps or teflon or polyethylene-lined pumps are required depending on the substance. In the event that operative pumps are not available on the barge involved and barge-mounted pumping/vacuum tank equipment cannot reach the scene rapidly, Coast Guard unloading or transfer of bulk chemicals may be necessary.

The acquisition and deployment by the Coast Guard of chemical vacuum trucks and/or truck-mounted tanks is not necessary because of the large supply of such vehicles available from chemical transport firms, such as Chemical Leahman, Inc. or Matlack, Inc. (See Section 2.) Coast Guard resources expended on this type equipment would have a low effectiveness/cost ratio because of their high cost and low utilization by the Coast Guard. The same is true of chemical barges and barge-mounted chemical tanks. Chemical-compatible overpack drums, however, are relatively inexpensive and of potential utility for small quantity releases.

4.2.1.6 Communication Equipment - Although access to extensive communication networks are usually available through local police and fire departments, Coast Guard participation in a response action should not place additional loads on such networks. In addition, response to vessel incidents may involve only Coast Guard resources.

The communication facilities employed by the Coast Guard for oil pollution response are adequate for chemical spill response with the exception of communication with and between personnel in helmeted or encapsulated suits. This can be provided by a number of types of headsets, including microphone and transmitter, since the distances involved are usually under 1000 feet.


2. The request may be for back-up of a previous response, i.e., it may be intended to augment USCG forces already on scene from the same or from another base. If it is to support another base's response, the distance to the scene may be considerable. For this reason, the response vehicles should be air transportable via USCG C130B aircraft or larger.
3. The identification of the chemicals involved will probably have been made before departure from the base or before arrival at the scene. One of the first tasks will probably be determination of the physical location and concentration of contaminants, by samples of soil, air and water. This is likely to be a continued operation that the response team will carry out throughout the mission.
4. Upon determination of the general extent and nature of the hazard, and its possible evolution, personnel protection gear will be selected. The nature of protection will be dependent on the hazard level and on the distance from the source(s), as follows:

Level 1 hazard - This is the lowest level of hazard requiring protective clothing: coveralls, gloves, boots, goggles, or face shield. Respiratory protection is afforded by dust or gas masks.

Level 2 hazard - This is typically the level of protection required for corrosive material spills. The suits must provide full protection against skin and face contact. This level required an acid-resistant splash suit, with overlapping fabric on coveralls. If a hood is employed it may be necessary to use SCBA (Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus) or externally supplied air systems.

Level 3 hazard - This is the most serious hazard level. Both respiratory and cutaneous protection are required. It is typically encountered when the material produces a poisonous or noxious gas. It calls for full body protection by heavily overlapped clothing or by an encapsulating suit, plus SCBA or an externally supplied air system.

5. The second consideration in determining personnel protection requirements is distance from the hazard source. Account must be taken of wind conditions. Typically, four zones can be distinguished:



NOTE: Zone dimensions are for illustration purposes only.
 Zone dimensions will vary on a case-per-case basis.

FIGURE 4-1. HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILL SITE WORK AREAS

TABLE 4-4. ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENT FOR CHEMICAL SPILL RESPONSE VAN

INSTRUMENTATION (7.0 CU. FT.)⁽¹⁾

1. pH meter (Orion Research Model 2-1)	4
2. Oxygen meter (Bendix Gas-Tech)	4
3. Portable Organic Vapor Analyzer (HNU)	2
4. Combustible gas indicators (MSA Model 20)	4
5. Multi-Test (indicator tube type,* MSA Universal)	4
6. Portable weather station	2
7. Emergency first-aid kits (Coast Guard Approved)	2
8. Emergency medical equipment (stretcher, blankets (2), oxygen mask and tank)	1

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING (240 CU. FT.)

1. Chemical Goggles	24
2. Face Shield	12
3. Coveralls and Jackets (Full Body, Norton)	
Neoprene	24
Butyl Rubber	12
Fluoro-Elastomer	12
4. Gloves (pairs)	
Neoprene	24
Butyl Rubber	12
Fluoro-Elastomer	24
EPR	12
Hypalon	12

* recommended inventory of indicator tubes:

Ammonia	Carbon Monoxide	Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydrocarbons	Chlorine	Vinyl Chloride
Acetone	Formaldehyde	
Alcohol	Monostyrene	
Benzene	Sulfur Dioxide	
Carbon Disulfide	Toluene	

TABLE 4-4. ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENT FOR CHEMICAL SPILL RESPONSE VAN (Cont.)

PLUGGING, PATCHING, REPAIR (3.0 CU. FT.)

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Plugging kit (bentonite, plugs, gasket material, straps) | 2 |
|---|---|

LIGHT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (230 CU. FT.)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. Escape device, (Robertshaw 5-minute) | 12 |
| 2. Tool kit | 2 |
| 3. Reference Library | 1 |
| 4. Portable shower | 1 |
| 5. Eye shower | 1 |
| 6. Decontamination support equipment | 1 set |

(1) Based on packing fraction of 0.25.

4.2.4 Offloading and Support Equipment

In addition to the basic response van, loaded with the equipment of Table 4-4, one or more auxiliary support vehicles may be dispatched. The primary such vehicle should carry offloading equipment, such as described in Table 4-5. If an offloading operation is called for, a selection of this equipment can be mounted on the 32 ft. low bed semitrailers (Model GPX-12-FS) currently located at the USCG Strike Team bases. These semitrailers are C130-air transportable.

Most chemical response missions do not call for an offloading operation by the Coast Guard team, because commercial, private or spiller resources are better able to perform the operation. The decision to commence unloading is usually reached several hours, or even days, after the first response personnel have arrived, because a substantial amount of information must be gathered before the decision can be made. Therefore, outside assistance will usually have arrived by the time it is decided to offload. For this reason USCG offloading equipment need not be dispatched immediately and routinely along with the basic spill response van previously described.

5. RESPONSE UNIT DEPLOYMENT

The major questions to be dealt with in this section are those of the locations and the numbers of USCG response units for hazardous chemical spills. The units under discussion are the response vans and offloading trailers described in the preceding section. The spill threat to be met is that described in Section 3.

5.1 METHODOLOGY

(a) A set of response base configurations will be selected for evaluation. Each configuration will consist of several bases at which one or more vans, trailers or both are stationed.

(b) Response time will be calculated for each configuration. The response time is the time from receipt at the base of a request for assistance to the time the first vehicle arrives at the spill site or other location designated by the OSC.

(c) Numbers of response vans and trailers required at each base will be calculated on the assumption that there are enough at each base to respond to 90 percent of the spills without delay.

(d) The various configurations will be compared in terms of number of sites, level of personnel, response times, and number of response units and an overall evaluation made.

5.2 BASE CONFIGURATIONS

A base configuration is a set of locations (assumed to be existing USCG installations) at which chemical spill response equipment and personnel are to be located. In addition to one or more response vans and/or trailers, the base must accommodate at least 20 men (who may also perform oil pollution response functions), as well as supporting staff, storage and repair facilities, etc. If the base is at or near one of the five USCG air stations at which C130B or C130H aircraft are based, then the equipment will be available for assistance well beyond the area normally served by the base.

chemical. (See Appendix C1.) These levels were selected to represent the average spill size normally warranting a U.S. Coast Guard response. These 'responsible' spills are tabulated by MSO/COTP area in Table 5-1. The corresponding MTB spills in 1976-79 are also shown. The breakdown by coastal region of these 'responsible' spills is compared with the same breakdown for all spills in Table 5-2. It is seen in Table 5-2 that while all PIRS spills are relatively evenly distributed, 'responsible' spills are more heavily concentrated in Districts 2 and 9, and less heavily concentrated in Districts 11, 12, 13. This concentration in the central U.S. is also seen in the distribution of MTB spills, Table 5-2. The restriction to 'responsible' spills improves the agreement between MTB and PIRS data; the rank correlation coefficient increases from .4 to .8 when that restriction is made on the data set. This suggests that the distribution of response capability by coastal area should be about 25 percent, 20 percent, 15 percent, 40 percent for Eastern, Gulf, Western, and Central areas, similar to Table 5-2.

An eleven-site configuration was obtained from the above percentages by assigning three sites to the East Coast, two sites to the Gulf Coast, two sites to the West Coast, and four sites to the Central U.S. Specific locations were obtained by identifying the sub-areas on each coast with high incidence of PIRS-recorded spills. Figures 5-1(a) through (d) show the counties of interest with encirclements of county groups having substantial numbers of spills in 1973-79.

East Coast (Figure 5.1(a)) - The major areas of spill activity have been (1) the greater New York-New Jersey region, (2) the Wilmington-Philadelphia-Trenton region, and (3) the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay (Norfolk to Baltimore). This suggests sites at New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC. The latter, however, can be replaced by the Elizabeth City Strike Team, which has the advantage of an air base.

Gulf Coast (Figure 5-1(b)) - The two Gulf Coast sites are New Orleans and Galveston-Houston.

West Coast (Figure 5-1(c)) - The two West Coast sites are best located at Los Angeles and San Francisco.

Central U.S. (Figure 5-1(d)) - The widespread spill pattern in the central U.S. makes adequate coverage difficult. The most direct approach places bases at

TABLE 5-1. RESPONSIBLE SPILLS BY MSO/COTP PIRS (1973-79)
AND MTB (1976-79) DATA (CONT.)

CGD	MSO/COTP AREA	PIRS '73-'79	MTB '76-'79
14	MSO HONOLULU, HI	-	1
17	MSO ANCHORAGE, AK	-	4
17	MSO JUNEAU, AK	-	0
17	MSO VALDEZ, AK	-	0
7	MSO OLD SAN JUAN, PR	7	-
		<u>667</u>	<u>491</u>

correlation coefficient = .574.




FIGURE 5-1(a). MAJOR AREAS OF CHEMICAL SPILLS, PIRS 1973-79, EAST COAST




FIGURE 5-1(c). MAJOR AREAS OF CHEMICAL SPILL, PIRS 1973-79, WEST COAST

Detroit/Toledo, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. This leaves heavy spill areas such as Knoxville, Memphis, Chicago, and, primarily, Charleston, WV without direct coverage. Charleston WV, however, is less than 5 road hours from Cincinnati and Pittsburgh; also Chicago is less than 5 road hours from Toledo. But response times would be improved by placing one site at Cairo, IL (MSO Paducah, KY) rather than St. Louis, from which both St. Louis and Memphis are accessible in less than 4 road hours. Therefore, the four sites are selected at the MSO's: Toledo, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Paducah.

Table 5-3 shows the four candidate site configurations. The table also shows the Districts or OSC areas covered by each base.

5.3 RESPONSE TIMES

Response time is defined as the time from request by the OSC for assistance to arrival at the spill scene of the first van or offloading trailer, from the assigned response base. The response time for each configuration depends on the spill location relative to the base, and on the mode of transport, i.e., land or air. The mean response time for each base was determined by estimating the response time from the base to the responsible spills shown in Figure 5-1. The response times were weighted in proportion to the number of spills. The mode of transport was taken to be over-the-road, except for spills covered from one of the air bases [Elizabeth City, Hamilton AFB]. In those cases the air mode was assumed if it resulted in a lower response time to the spill.

The ground response time was calculated as $(A + R/33.33)$ hours, where R is the great-circle distance from base to spill in nautical miles, and A is the sum of the following intervals:

- | | |
|---|------------|
| 1. Receipt of request, notification of CO | .25 hours |
| 2. Assembly of team | .50 |
| 3. Vehicle inspection and preparation | .25 |
| 4. Team briefing | <u>.25</u> |

A = 1.25 hours

This value of A assumes a pre-loaded response van.

The air response time was calculated as $B + R/300$ hours, where B is the sum of the following intervals:

from Elizabeth City, NC

1. Receipt of request	.25 hours
2. Aircraft requisition	.25
3. Aircraft preparation (1.00 hr)	
4. Team assembly (.50 hr)	
5. Vehicle inspection (.25 hr)	
6. Maximum of 3., 4., 5.	1.00
7. Aircraft loading	.50
8. Aircraft checkout, takeoff, landing, refuel, takeoff (over 1500 n.mi.)	.50 2.00
9. Aircraft landing, taxi	.25
10. Aircraft unloading	.50
11. Travel to spill location	<u>.50</u>
	B = 3.75
	= 5.75 (over 1500 n.mi.)

from Hamilton AFB, CA

1. Receipt of request	.25
2. Aircraft requisition	.25
3. Aircraft preparation, takeoff ferry to Hamilton AFB (1.75)	
4. Team assembly (.50)	
5. Van inspection (.25)	
6. Maximum of 3., 4., 5.	1.75
7. Aircraft loading	.50
8. Aircraft checkout, takeoff	.50
9. Aircraft landing, taxi	.25
10. Aircraft unloading	.50
11. Travel to spill location	<u>.50</u>
	B = 4.50

These response times are plotted in Figure 5-2. They apply to the off-loading trailers as well as to the chemical response vans, both being air transportable. It will be noticed that air transport is faster than land transport for distances greater than about 90 n.mi. from Elizabeth City, NC and for distances greater than about 125 n.mi from Hamilton AFB. In fact many remote lo-

cations are served more rapidly by air from Elizabeth City or Hamilton AFB, than by land from the nearest base.

The results of the response time calculations are shown in Table 5-4. As expected, the Strike Team Configuration has lower response times than the single-site, but the reduction in mean response time is only 5 percent, even though the number of bases is tripled. Moreover, the maximum response time increases to 18.8 hours from 13.3 hours. This is due to the land responses originating from Bay St. Louis, the longest of which are to Miami, FL and Brownsville, TX. Clearly, the single-site is competitive with the Strike Team Configuration because of the lower response times achievable by air from Elizabeth City, NC.

The 11-Site Configuration achieves the lowest mean response time of the four configurations. The striking aspect of this configuration is the large mean and maximum response times from Miami, FL. This is due in large part to responses from Miami to Savannah, GA and Jacksonville, FL areas. These spills are more expeditiously handled by air from Elizabeth City, NC in the single-site configuration.

The Modified 11-Site Configuration has a mean response time greater than the original 11-Site Configuration. The attempt to reduce response times by four sites placed in the Central U.S. (Districts 2 and 9) has actually resulted in longer response times. The reason is that land response from those four bases is longer than the air response from Elizabeth City, NC that they replaced. Another difficulty with the Modified 11-Site Configuration is the long response time from Bay St. Louis, which serves by land the large area formerly covered from Miami, FL.

One conclusion that emerges from the above comparisons is that areas in the Eastern U.S., more than 100-200 n.mi from a land base are usually reached more rapidly by air from Elizabeth City than from the land base. For example, the 79 spills serviced from Paducah, KY in the modified 11-Site Configuration are scattered along the lower and upper Mississippi from Memphis to St. Paul. The average response time by land from Paducah is 7.44 hours; but they can be reached from Elizabeth City by air in 5.07 hours or less, as seen in the Strike Team Configuration. The same is true of the lower eastern coast, from South Carolina to Florida, which require, on average, from 10 to 12 hours by land from Miami or Bay St. Louis, but which are reached by air from Elizabeth City in 5-6 hours.

A corollary of the above conclusion is that land-based response sites are most effective in areas of high spill density. This is seen, for example in Galveston, Long Beach, San Francisco, and Groton, NJ; these are areas of high spill density, with limited geographic extent because of adjacent land bases, as in the Modified 11-Site Configuration.

The above results suggest a means to improve the response times of the 11-Site Configuration, which has the lowest mean response time of the four candidates. This is done by eliminating the site at Miami, and servicing the area it covers by air from Elizabeth City, NC. The result is to reduce the mean response time for spills in Miami's area from 11.25 hours to 5.27 hours, and to reduce the mean response time for the entire configuration from 4.49 hours to 4.29 hours. A further improvement can be achieved by elimination of the Boston, Seattle and Kodiak sites, since their areas can be served by air without seriously affecting the mean response time. The statistics for the resulting 7-Site Configuration are given in Table 5-5. It is assumed in that Table that Elizabeth City provides response time for the 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 7th Districts, and for the 5th District below Baltimore. This table shows that a Seven-Site Configuration with air support is more effective than the 11-Site Configuration of Table 5-4.

A final improvement suggests itself in the Modified 11-Site Configuration. The Cincinnati and Paducah sites may be placed at Louisville and Huntington, and along with Pittsburgh and Toledo they are restricted to responses within about 100 n.miles of the site, the remaining area being covered by air from Elizabeth City, NC. The resultant response time statistics are shown in Table 5-6. This configuration is the same as the 7-Site Configuration except for the direct land coverage provided by the four Central sites within their immediate area. The Table (5-6) shows that this 11-Site Configuration with air support is not only superior in response time to the 7-Site Configuration with air support, but also the 11-Site Configuration of Table 5-4.

5.4 NUMBER OF RESPONSE UNITS

The response times calculated in the subsection above referred to the arrival of the first unit, usually a chemical response van. This van, as described in Section 4, is assumed to provide adequate support for a 20-man team. It is assumed that at the end of the response action at the site, the unit will

TABLE 5-6. MODIFIED 11-SITE CONFIGURATION WITH AIR - RESPONSE TIMES⁽¹⁾

<u>NAME OF SITE (CITY)</u>	<u>RESPONDABLE SPILLS, '73-'79 (PIRS recs)</u>	<u>MEAN RESPONSE (hours)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM RESPONSE (hours)</u>
<u>MODIFIED 11-SITE CONFIGURATION WITH AIR</u>			
New York, NY	83	3.35	4.8
Gloucester City, NJ	33	2.70	3.6
*Elizabeth City, NC	211	5.26	6.9
Bay St. Louis, MS	40	3.64	5.2
Galveston, TX	52	3.58	9.1
Long Beach, CA	28	2.35	4.4
*Hamilton AFB, CA	66	3.74	6.5
Pittsburgh, PA	29	3.20	4.0
Louisville, KY	30	2.80	3.2
Huntington, WV	29	2.80	3.0
Toledo, OH	<u>30</u>	<u>3.20</u>	<u>4.0</u>
	631	3.93	9.1

(1) Response to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands not included.

*Response by air when a lower response time would result.

where:

$$K = \frac{r^n}{n!} \frac{r/n}{1-r/n}$$

$$S = \sum_{i=0}^n r^i / i!$$

$$r = \lambda/\mu = \lambda t$$


The probability $P(r,n)$ is plotted in Figure 5-3 as a function of r . It shows the steady state probabilities of the spill demands exceeding the number of response units assigned to a site, as a function of the ratio of demand rate to service rate of a single unit. The probability goes to unity when that ratio equals the number of units available at the site. Stated another way: when the spill rate exceeds the combined service rate of all the units, the probability is unity that in the steady state there will be spills waiting for a free unit. The analysis can be refined by considering other than exponential distributions of the response cycle time, and by looking at the probabilities in the transient state, e.g., starting from no units out on call. These refinements are considered unnecessary at the present level of analysis and with the present accuracy of data.

5.4.2 Application of the Analysis

In order to employ Figure 5-3 a value must be assigned to r , the ratio of spill rate to (single unit) response rate. The rate at which spills can be expected to occur in the area covered by a site can be deduced from the PIRS spill data. Only 'responsible' incidents will be taken account of (See Section 5.2 and Table 5-1). The responsible spills per year for the entire U.S. are plotted in Figure 5-4, both as a percent of all spills listed in PIRS for 1973-79 and as a percent of only those spills in PIRS for 1973-79 that have an entry in the data field for quantity released. It is seen that, in both cases, the percent of spills above 'responsible' levels shows a smoothly diminishing increase from 1974 to 1978. This is not unlike the behavior of the total PIRS spill rate, Figure 3-4. It is difficult to conceive of a mechanism whereby the occurrence of larger spills would increase relative to spills of all sizes in a fashion so similar to the increase in overall spill history. The explanation may lie in a real increase in 'responsible' spills, or in a reporting anomaly. In either case the latter four years are more representative of the rate of 'responsible' spill occurrences in the next few years, than are the first three years shown in

(a) 'RESPONDABLE' SPILLS AS PERCENT OF ALL HAZCHEM SPILLS IN PIRS

(b) 'RESPONDABLE' SPILLS AS PERCENT OF HAZCHEM SPILLS WITH QUANTITY RELEASED IN PIRS



\bar{x}_1 = AVERAGE OF (a) FOR 1973-75 = 8.4%

\bar{x}_2 = AVERAGE OF (a) FOR 1976-79 = 10.25%

t = 4.35

p < .01

d.f. = 5

FIGURE 5-4. RESPONSABLE SPILLS IN PIRS, 1973-79

TABLE 5-7. BREAKDOWN BY YEAR AND USCG DISTRICT OF PIRS AND MTB 'RESPONDABLE' SPILLS

SPILL YEAR	DT 01	DT 03	DT 05	RG EC	DT 07	DT 08	RG GC	DT 11	DT 12	DT 13	RG WC	DT 02	DT 09	RG IG	DT 14	DT 17	RG AP	ALL TOTAL	DATA BASE
1976	4	14	7	25	3	9	12	2	4	4	10	34	22	56	0	1	1	104	MTB
1977	2	18	6	26	5	18	23	9	6	7	22	33	20	53	0	3	3	127	MTB
1978	6	15	5	26	4	17	21	6	3	20	29	31	27	58	1	0	1	135	MTB
1979	2	11	4	17	6	18	24	8	11	9	28	37	19	56	0	0	0	125	MTB
TOTAL	14	58	22	94	18	62	80	25	24	40	89	135	88	223	1	4	5	491	
X	3.50	14.50	5.50	23.50	4.50	15.50	20.00	6.25	6.00	10.00	22.25	33.75	22.00	55.75	0.25	1.00	1.25	122.75	
S.D.	1.91	2.89	1.29	4.36	1.29	4.36	5.48	3.10	3.56	6.98	8.73	2.50	3.56	2.06	0.50	1.41	1.26	13.23	
1973	2	13	0	15	8	7	15	2	5	2	9	11	7	18	0	0	0	57	PIRS
1974	1	10	5	16	4	15	19	3	2	1	6	14	10	24				65	PIRS
1975	1	16	3	20	7	9	16	6	12	2	20	22	9	31				87	PIRS
1976	2	10	7	19	3	14	17	10	8	7	25	39	16	55				116	PIRS
1977	3	18	16	37	8	17	25	2	9	4	15	38	11	49				126	PIRS
1978	6	23	8	37	4	20	24	5	7	2	14	29	11	40				115	PIRS
1979	1	19	11	31	8	14	22	0	2	4	6	35	7	42				101	PIRS
TOTAL	16	109	50	175	42	96	138	28	45	22	95	188	71	259	0	0	0	667	7 years
X	2.29	15.57	7.14	25.00	6.00	13.71	19.71	4.00	6.43	3.14	13.57	26.86	10.14	37.00	0	0	0	95.29	
S.D.	1.80	4.86	5.27	9.71	2.24	4.46	3.99	3.32	3.69	2.04	7.18	11.42	3.08	13.34	0	0	0	26.60	
TOTAL	12	70	42	124	23	65	88	17	26	17	60	141	45	186	0	0	0	458	4 years
X	3.00	17.50	10.50	31.00	5.75	16.25	22.00	4.25	6.50	4.25	15.00	35.25	11.25	46.50	0	0	0	114.50	
S.D.	2.16	5.45	4.04	8.49	2.63	2.87	3.56	4.35	3.11	2.06	7.79	4.50	3.69	6.86	0	0	0	10.28	

TABLE 5-8. PROBABILITY P(r,n) OF NON-RESPONSE FOR SITE CONFIGURATIONS OF TABLES 5-4, 5-5, 5-6 (CONT.)

SITE NAME	SPILLS PER 10 DAYS r	Probability of Non-Response for						UNITS ⁽¹⁾
		n = 1	2	3	4	5	6	
<u>SEVEN-SITE CONFIGURATION</u>								
New York, NY	.39	0.160	0.013	0.001				2
Gloucester City, NJ	.15	0.023						1
Elizabeth City, NC	1.55	1.000	0.510	0.130	0.034	0.007	0.002	4
Bay St. Louis, MS	.19	0.039	0.002					1
Galveston, TX	.24	0.060	0.003					1
Long Beach, CA	.13	0.017						1
Hamilton AFB, CA	.31	0.095	0.007					1*
	2.96							11
<u>MODIFIED 11-SITE CONFIGURATION WITH AIR</u>								
New York, NY	.39	0.160	0.013	0.001				2
Gloucester City, NJ	.15	0.023						1
Elizabeth City, NC	.99	1.00	0.170	0.029	0.005			3
Bay St. Louis, MS	.19	0.039	0.002					1
Galveston, TX	.24	0.060	0.003					1
Long Beach, CA	.13	0.017						1
Hamilton AFB, CA	.31	0.095	0.007					1
Pittsburgh, PA	.14	0.020						1*
Louisville, KY	.14	0.020						1
Huntington, WV	.14	0.020						1
Toledo, OH	.14	0.020						1
	2.96							14

(1) Number of response units required for probability of non-response .10 or less.

*Adding one more unit at the site will reduce probability of non-response to .05 or less.

is assumed that all vans will be similarly equipped, for several reasons. First, uniform refurbishing simplifies training, e.g., by making it possible to produce a single training manual for all sites. Further, a single van layout can lead to economies in purchasing, since all van purchases can be grouped into a single procurement, thus reducing the per unit contractual cost, and gaining the advantage of wider competitive bidding. Finally, uniform equipment arrangement in the van improves the safety of a response operation by making it easier to identify pieces of equipment and to detect lost or expended items rapidly.

(2) Personnel Costs: It is assumed that at single-van sites chemical response will be performed by a team of fixed composition (about 20). At low intensity sites (i.e., sites at which responsible spills are less than, say, one per month) most of these personnel will have other duties as well as chemical spill response. For example, the 20-man team at one of the 11 pollution response bases will have oil spill response duties as well as chemical spill response duties. If the site is not a general pollution response site, these other duties will lie in other mission areas.

At sites housing more than one chemical response van, each additional van is assumed to require an additional team. These teams must be distinct, i.e., two part-time teams cannot be combined into one full-time team, for then the number of teams, rather than the number of vans, would be the limiting factor in response availability; an analysis identical to that above for vans would lead to the same numerical requirements for teams.

Therefore, in either the single-van or multiple-van case, the personnel complement is assumed to be proportional to the number of vans.

(3) Storage areas, repair facilities: In these cases, the true cost may be non-linear with the number of vehicles, since there is often an overhead incurred with the establishment of the garage or repair shop. In some cases, the storage facilities already exist, or can be rented at a per-square-foot cost, thus leading to no cost or to proportional costs. Given the spectrum of possibilities, the proportionality assumption cannot be considered conservative or non-conservative.

(4) Replacement costs: It is assumed that use life is time-dependent rather than use-dependent. This may not be accurate for one of the major cost items, encapsulating suits, because of the build-up of chemical contaminants.




FIGURE 5-5. PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR SITE CONFIGURATIONS

TABLE 5-9. TWO-SITE CONFIGURATION⁽¹⁾

RESPONSE TIMES

<u>NAME OF SITE (CITY)</u>	<u>RESPONDABLE SPILLS, '73-'79 PIRS</u>	<u>MEAN RESPONSE (hours)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM RESPONSE (hours)</u>
*Elizabeth City, NC	537	5.45	8.1
*Hamilton AFB, CA	<u>94</u>	<u>4.27</u>	<u>6.5</u>
	631	5.27	8.1

PROBABILITY OF NON-RESPONSE

	<u>SPILLS PER 10 DAYS</u>	<u>Probability of Non-Response for</u>						Units
		1	2	3	4	5	6	
*Elizabeth City, NC	2.52	1.00	1.000	.60	.22	.075	.023	5
*Hamilton AFB, CA	<u>.44</u>	0.20	0.017					2
	2.96							

(1) Response times do not include Alaska, Hawaii or Puerto Rico.

*Response by air when lower response times result.

B: Contract to Two Air Sites: If resources are too limited to allow implementation of 7 sites, then an improved capability can still be acquired by strengthening the air capability to deliver hazchem response equipment on each coast. This will achieve reduced response times by expanding the area covered by Elizabeth City to include the entire eastern U.S. This configuration calls for 5 units at Elizabeth City and 2 at Hamilton AFB.

The total number of vans called for in either course is based on the 1976-1979 PIRS 'responsible' spill rate as defined in Appendix C1. This rate is slightly above that actually observed but may be closer to what will occur when the full Coast Guard capability is realized, and they are called upon in a wider variety of situations. As experience is gained, a more accurate estimate may be made of the responsible spill rate and the mean response cycle time, and the number of vans required reestimated.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The study was directed to U.S. coastal and waterway counties and to hazardous substances other than non-flammable oils. The three steps of the methodology produced the results summarized here in qualitative form, detailed data being contained in the Sections indicated:

Assess the Non-USCG Capability for Hazardous Chemical Spill Response (Section 2)

1. Because the assessment was not based on a comprehensive survey, the potential for error is great. The error is estimated to be -50% and +100%. The results relative to the U.S. Coast Guard are:

- o EPA's strongest capability is in technical advice and detection and identification equipment.
- o DOD has substantial equipment at its various bases for response to fire, Nuclear/Bacteriological/Chemical releases, for fuel handling and for explosion control.
- o Local governments are usually well equipped for fire and communications, but lack most other resources.
- o The Chlorine Emergency Plan (CHLOREP), the National Agricultural Chemicals Association (NACA), and other trade organizations as well as the manufacturers themselves provide extensive response capability for specific chemicals.
- o Chemical offloading equipment, such as pumps, trucks, and tanks appeared in few numbers in the survey, but a few commercial firms have large fleets of offloading vehicles.

2. The Spill Cleanup Inventory System (SKIM) provided about 25% of the total survey list. It is weak in chemical response gear and especially deficient in protective gear. A sample of the SKIM list shows it to contain about 5% of the protective clothing and breathing apparatus in the First District.

3. Over half of the protective gear and instrumentation in the survey is contained in the coastal and waterway counties. But a more specific

Determine the Types, Quantities and Locations of U.S. Coast Guard Equipment
Required to Respond to Spills of Hazardous Chemicals

TYPES (Section 4)

1. An analysis of historical 'responsible' spills showed that 78% of them called for Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, 57% needed neoprene protective splash suits, and 17% neoprene boots and gloves.
2. A complement of equipment for a 20-man response team comprising instrumentation, protective clothing, respiratory equipment, communications, and light support equipment, occupies about 1100 cubic feet, weighs about 12,000 lbs and can be fit into a single van that can be transported by a Coast Guard C130 aircraft.
3. A selection of offloading equipment can be made that fits onto a 32 ft, air transportable, low bed semi-trailer of the type currently used by the Coast Guard for oil spill response.

NUMBER AND LOCATION (Section 5)

1. Air-based Strike Teams at Elizabeth City, NC and Hamilton AFB, CA alone provide more rapid response than when a third Strike Team serves the 7th and 8th Districts by land from Bay St. Louis. (Table 5-9, Two-Site Configuration compared to Table 5-4, Strike-Team Configuration.)
2. Hazchem spills in the Central U.S. are reached more rapidly by air from Elizabeth City, NC, than by land from Toledo, OH, Pittsburgh, PA, Cincinnati, OH and Paducah, KY. (Table 5-5, Seven-Site Configuration compared with Table 5-4, Modified 11-Site Configuration.)
3. The response times for the seven configurations evaluated are (Tables 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-9):

<u>(#) Configuration</u>	<u>Response Times (hours)</u>	
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
(1) Single-Site	6.58	13.3
(2) Two-Site	5.27	8.1
(3) Strike Team	6.24	18.8
(4) Seven-Site	4.32	9.1
(5) 11-Site	4.49	13.3
(6) Modified 11-Site	5.34	18.8
(7) Modified 11-Site with Air	3.93	9.1

- o Expansion to the full 11 units called for in the Seven-Site Configuration, contingent on the actual experience regarding (a) responsible spill rate, and (b) response cycle time.
- o Addition of 4 sites in Central U.S., at Toledo, Pittsburgh, Huntington and Louisville, yielding the Modified 11-Site Configuration.

Offloading units are not included in the above outline, but it is suggested that initially one offloading semi-trailer be stationed at each of the two air bases. Contingent on the demand for, and experience in their use, additional semi-trailers would be stationed at (in order): New York, Galveston, Bay St. Louis, and Elizabeth City. An additional requirement for deploying the offloading units to any site is that tractor(s) have already been stationed at the site for oil pollution response or other duty.

4. If expansion of the present site configuration is not possible within available funds, then it is recommended that the air response capability still be developed, with the objective of the Two-Site Configuration of Table 5-9. This Configuration provides relatively good response and availability with only 7 units. The stages suggested are:

- o Development of air response capability with two units at Elizabeth City and one at Hamilton AFB. The present Gulf Strike Team would be retained.
- o Addition of two more units at Elizabeth City and one more at Hamilton AFB, still converting the Bay St. Louis unit to air-transportable form.
- o Transfer of the Gulf Strike Team unit to Elizabeth City.

Offloading semi-trailers would be phased in at Elizabeth City (2 units) and Hamilton AFB (1 unit).

5. If air transport capability is not available for the hazchem response equipment, then the first recommended objective is the Modified 11-Site Configuration. The response times for 15 units, shown in Table 5-8 and 5-4, however, will not be achieved. To bring response times down to the levels of the seven configurations shown in Table 5-4 would require expansion to more than 11 sites and, probably, more than 15 units. This course of action has not been investigated in detail because it is considered to be less cost-effective than development of an air-response capability.

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APPENDIX A
DEFINITION OF AREA FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL RESPONSE STUDY

The study area definition was evolved from consultation with the Coast Guard and from computational considerations. It was decided to limit the study to coastal regions, major "navigable waterways," and the Great Lakes. As a working definition of "navigable waters," it was decided to take all waterways of nine or more feet in depth, with substantial commerce. As an indicator of "substantial commerce", a minimum annual petroleum movement of 1,000,000 short tons was adopted. The resulting waterways are listed in Table A-1.

In order to clearly define the shorelines adjacent to coasts, waterways and the Great Lakes, it was found to be most practical to employ the boundaries of the counties contiguous to the shorelines. County data are easily obtained from the HMIR spill records and can be determined from the latitude and longitude given in the PIRS data base. Moreover, county boundaries for all counties in the U.S., are available in computerized form at the Transportation Systems Center, where they have been plotted on maps of the continental United States. Although the data base provided information on spills which have occurred in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, maps for these areas were not produced.

In summary, then, the study area was taken to be all counties adjoining the East, West and Gulf coasts, "navigable waterways of substantial commerce," the Great Lakes, and the coasts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

This Appendix gives the names of the selected waterways, gives the number of counties found in each Coast Guard district, and gives the name of each Coast Guard-related county. Figure A-1 is a map of the continental United States, showing in outline, state boundaries and each county relevant to the study. (Actual spill maps appear in Section 3. Table A-2 shows the number of coastal counties in each Coast Guard District. Table A-3 is a complete list of the coastal and waterway counties defining the study area. Each was given a 5-digit code, according to the scheme shown at the front of the Table in parentheses.

4. Texas City channel, TX

5. Mississippi River, Baton Rouge to the Sea, LA

Great Lakes Waterways and Rivers

1. Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, Lockport, IL to Lake Michigan

West Coast Waterways and Rivers

1. San Francisco Bay, Suisan Bay Channel, Carquinez Strait, Marie Island Strait, San Pablo Bay, San Joaquin River (mouth to Stockton, CA), Oakland, Richmond, CA

2. Columbia River, mouth to Portland, OR

3. Puget Sound (Tacoma and Seattle, WA).

The above rivers and waterways are in addition to coastal and Great Lakes ports and harbors, the Alaskan Coast, and coastal waters of: Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

TABLE A-2

COAST GUARD RELATED COUNTIES

C.G. DISTRICT NO.

NUMBER OF COUNTIES

1	24
2	209
3	44
5	70
7	43
8	62
9	84
11	4
12	18
13	25
14	4
17	25
TOTAL	612

REVISED Jan. 1, 1981

COAST GUARD RELATED COUNTY CODE

Y.S.C. CODE	ST CD	ST AB	CO CD	COUNTY NAME	CG DT
10000				COASTAL AND COAST WTRWAY	
11000				ATLANTIC COAST + WTRWAY	
11001	23	ME	029	WASHINGTON	01
11002	23	ME	009	HANCOCK	01
11003	23	ME	019	PENOBSCOT	01
11004	23	ME	027	WALDO	01
11005	23	ME	013	KNOX	01
11006	23	ME	015	LINCOLN	01
11007	23	ME	023	SAGADAHOC	01
11008	23	ME	005	CUMBERLAND	01
11009	23	ME	031	YORK	01
11010	33	NH	017	STRAFFORD	01
11011	33	NH	015	ROCKINGHAM	01
11012	25	MA	009	ESSEX	01
11013	25	MA	025	SUFFOLK	01
11014	25	MA	021	NORFOLK	01
11015	25	MA	023	PLYMOUTH	01
11016	25	MA	001	BARNSTABLE	01
11017	25	MA	019	NANTUCKET	01
11018	25	MA	007	DUKES	01
11019	25	MA	005	BRISTOL	01
11020	44	RI	005	NEWPORT	01
11021	44	RI	001	BRISTOL	01
11022	44	RI	007	PROVIDENCE	01
11023	44	RI	003	KENT	01
11024	44	RI	009	WASHINGTON	01
11025	09	CT	011	NEW LONDON	03
11026	09	CT	007	MIDDLESEX	03
11027	09	CT	009	NEW HAVEN	03
11028	09	CT	003	HARTFORD	03
11029	09	CT	001	FAIRFIELD	03
11030	36	NY	005	BRONX	03
11031	36	NY	119	WESTCHESTER	03
11032	36	NY	087	ROCKLAND	03
11033	36	NY	079	PUTNAM	03
11034	36	NY	071	ORANGE	03
11035	36	NY	027	DUTCHESS	03
11036	36	NY	111	ULSTER	03
11037	36	NY	039	GREENE	03
11038	36	NY	021	COLUMBIA	03
11039	36	NY	001	ALBANY	03
11040	36	NY	083	RENSSELAER	03
11041	36	NY	091	SARATOGA	03
11042	36	NY	103	SUFFOLK	03
11043	36	NY	059	NASSAU	03
11044	36	NY	081	QUEENS	03
11045	36	NY	047	KINGS	03
11046	36	NY	061	NEW YORK	03
11047	36	NY	085	RICHMOND	03
11048	34	NJ	003	BERGEN	03
11049	34	NJ	017	HUDSON	03
11050	34	NJ	013	ESSEX	03
11051	34	NJ	039	UNION	03
11052	34	NJ	023	MIDDLESEX	03

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T.S.C. ST ST CO COUNTY NAME CG
CODE CD AR CD DT
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11108	51	VA	087	HENRICO (= 087 + 760)	05
11109	51	VA	760	RICHMOND CITY	05
11110	51	VA	041	CHESTERFIELD	05
11111	51	VA	149	PRINCE GEORGE	05
11112	51	VA	181	SURRY	05
11113	51	VA	093	ISLE OF WIGHT	05
11114	51	VA	695	NANSEMOND (= OLD 123)	05
11115	51	VA	710	NORFOLK (=710+550+740)	05
11116	51	VA	550	CHESAPEAKE	05
11117	51	VA	740	PORTSMOUTH	05
11118	51	VA	810	VIRGINIA BEACH	05
11119	37	NC	053	CURRITUCK	05
11120	37	NC	029	CAMDEN	05
11121	37	NC	139	PASQUOTANK	05
11122	37	NC	143	PERQUIMANS	05
11123	37	NC	041	CHOWAN	05
11124	37	NC	073	GATES	05
11125	37	NC	091	HERTFORD	05
11126	37	NC	015	BERTIE	05
11127	37	NC	187	WASHINGTON	05
11128	37	NC	177	TYRRELL	05
11129	37	NC	055	DARE	05
11130	37	NC	055	HYDE	05
11131	37	NC	013	BEAUFORT	05
11132	37	NC	137	PAMLICO	05
11133	37	NC	049	Craven	05
11134	37	NC	031	CARTERET	05
11135	37	NC	133	ONSLOW	05
11136	37	NC	141	PENDER	05
11137	37	NC	129	NEW HAMOVER	05
11138	37	NC	019	BRUNSWICK	05
13000				ATL + GULF CSTL + WTRWAY	
13001	45	SC	051	HORRY	07
13002	45	SC	043	GEORGETOWN	07
13003	45	SC	019	CHARLESTON	07
13004	45	SC	029	COLLETON	07
13005	45	SC	013	BEAUFORT	07
13006	45	SC	053	JASPER	07
13007	13	GA	051	CHATHAM	07
13008	13	GA	029	BRYAN	07
13009	13	GA	179	LIBERTY	07
13010	13	GA	191	MCINTOSH	07
13011	13	GA	127	GLYNN	07
13012	13	GA	039	CAMDEN	07
13013	12	FL	089	NASSAU	07
13014	12	FL	031	DUVAL	07
13015	12	FL	109	ST. JOHNS	07
13016	12	FL	035	FLAGLER	07
13017	12	FL	127	VOLUSIA	07
13018	12	FL	009	BREVARD	07
13019	12	FL	061	INDIAN RIVER	07
13020	12	FL	111	ST. LUCIE	07
13021	12	FL	085	MARTIN	07
13022	12	FL	099	PALM BEACH	07
13023	12	FL	011	BROWARD	07

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T.S.C. ST ST CO COUNTY NAME CG
CODE CD AP CD DT
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13079	48	TX	039	BRAZORIA	08
13080	48	TX	321	MATAGORDA	08
13081	48	TX	239	JACKSON	08
13082	48	TX	057	CALHOUN	08
13083	48	TX	469	VICTORIA	08
13084	48	TX	391	REFUGIC	08
13085	48	TX	007	ARANSAS	08
13086	48	TX	409	SAN PATRICIO	08
13087	48	TX	355	NUECES	08
13088	48	TX	273	KLEBERG	08
13089	48	TX	261	KENEDY	08
13090	48	TX	489	WILLACY	08
13091	48	TX	061	CAMERON	08
15000				PACIFIC COAST + WATERWAY	
15001	06	CA	073	SAN DIEGO	11
15002	06	CA	059	ORANGE	11
15003	06	CA	037	LOS ANGELES	11
15004	06	CA	111	VENTURA	11
15005	06	CA	083	SANTA BARBARA	12
15006	06	CA	079	SAN LUIS OBISPO	12
15007	06	CA	053	MONTEREY	12
15008	06	CA	087	SANTA CRUZ	12
15009	06	CA	081	SAN MATEO	12
15010	06	CA	085	SANTA CLARA	12
15011	06	CA	075	SAN FRANCISCO	12
15012	06	CA	001	ALAMEDA	12
15013	06	CA	013	CONTRA COSTA	12
15014	06	CA	067	SACRAMENTO	12
15015	06	CA	077	SAN JOAQUIN	12
15016	06	CA	095	SOLANO	12
5017	06	CA	055	NAPA	12
5018	06	CA	041	MARIN	12
5019	06	CA	097	SONOMA	12
5020	06	CA	045	MENDOCINO	12
5021	06	CA	023	HUMBOLDT	12
5022	06	CA	015	DEL NORTE	12
5023	41	OR	015	CURRY	13
5024	41	OR	011	COOS	13
5025	41	OR	019	DOUGLAS	13
5026	41	OR	039	LANE	13
5027	41	OR	041	LINCOLN	13
5028	41	OR	057	TILLAMOOK	13
5029	41	OR	007	CLATSOP	13
5030	41	OR	009	COLUMBIA	13
5031	41	OR	051	MULTNOMAH	13
5032	53	WA	015	COWLITZ	13
5033	53	WA	069	WAKIYAKUM	13
5034	53	WA	049	PACIFIC	13
5035	53	WA	027	GRAYS HARBOR	13
5036	53	WA	031	JEFFERSON	13
5037	53	WA	009	CLALLAM	13
5038	53	WA	045	MASON	13
5039	53	WA	035	KITSAP	13
5040	53	WA	067	THURSTON	13
5041	53	WA	053	PIERCE	13

T.S.C. CODE	ST CD	ST AP	CO CD	COUNTY NAME	CG DT	
31017	28	MS	027	COAHOMA	02	LM 620 - LM 662
31018	05	AR	107	PHILLIPS	02	LM 620 - LM 673
31019	05	AR	077	LEE	02	LM 673 - LM 697
31020	28	MS	143	TUNICA	02	LM 662 - LM 697
31021	28	MS	033	DE SOTO	02	LM 697 - LM 715
31022	05	AR	035	CRITTENDEN	02	LM 697 - LM 760
31023	47	TN	157	SHELBY	02	LM 715 - LM 755
31024	47	TN	167	TIPTON	02	LM 755 - LM 773
31025	47	TN	097	LAUDERCALE	02	LM 773 - LM 820
31026	05	AR	093	MISSISSIPPI	02	LM 760 - LM 829
31027	47	TN	045	OYER	02	LM 820 - LM 845
31028	29	MO	155	PEMISCOT	02	LM 829 - LM 870
31029	47	TN	095	LAKE	02	LM 845 - LM 905
31030	21	KY	075	FULTON	02	LM 905 - LM 930
31031	29	MO	143	NEW MADRID	02	LM 870 - LM 915
31032	21	KY	105	HICKMAN	02	LM 930 - LM 940
31033	21	KY	039	CARLISLE	02	LM 940 - LM 950
31034	29	MO	133	MISSISSIPPI	02	LM 915 - LM 954
32000				UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER		UM 0 - UM 26
32001	29	MO	201	SCOTT	02	UM 26 - UM 48
32002	17	IL	003	ALEXANDER	02	UM 48 - UM 55
32003	17	IL	181	UNION	02	UM 55 - UM 78
32004	29	MO	031	CAPE GIRARDEAU	02	UM 48 - UM 75
32005	29	MO	157	PERRY	02	UM 75 - UM 110
32006	17	IL	077	JACKSON	02	UM 78 - UM 110
32007	17	IL	157	RANDOLPH	02	UM 110 - UM 136
32008	29	MO	193	STE GENEVIEVE	02	UM 110 - UM 139
32009	29	MO	099	JEFFERSON	02	UM 139 - UM 161
32010	17	IL	133	MONROE	02	UM 136 - UM 172
32011	17	IL	163	ST. CLAIR	02	UM 172 - UM 183
32012	29	MO	189	ST. LOUIS	02	UM 161 - UM 196
32013	17	IL	119	MADISON	02	UM 183 - UM 209
32014	29	MO	183	ST CHARLES	02	UM 196 - UM 237
32015	17	IL	083	JERSEY	02	UM 209 - UM 220
32016	29	MO	113	LINCOLN	02	UM 237 - UM 258
32017	17	IL	013	CALHOUN	02	UM 220 - UM 276
32018	29	MO	163	PIKE	02	UM 258 - UM 297
32019	17	IL	149	PIKE	02	UM 272 - UM 312
32020	29	MO	173	RALLS	02	UM 297 - UM 306
32021	29	MO	127	MARION	02	UM 306 - UM 329
32022	17	IL	001	ADAMS	02	UM 312 - UM 347
32023	29	MO	111	LEWIS	02	UM 329 - UM 351
32024	29	MO	045	CLARK	02	UM 351 - UM 361
32025	17	IL	067	HANCOCK	02	UM 347 - UM 391
32026	19	IA	111	LEE	02	UM 361 - UM 396
32027	17	IL	071	HENDERSON	02	UM 391 - UM 426
32028	19	IA	057	DES MOINES	02	UM 396 - UM 426
32029	19	IA	115	LOUISA	02	UM 426 - UM 449
2030	17	IL	131	MERCER	02	UM 426 - UM 449
2031	17	IL	161	ROCK ISLAND	02	UM 449 - UM 512
2032	19	IA	139	MUSCATINE	02	UM 449 - UM 470
2033	19	IA	163	SCOTT	02	UM 470 - UM 507
2034	17	IL	195	WHITESIDE	02	UM 512 - UM 525
2035	19	IA	045	CLINTON	02	UM 507 - UM 533
2036	17	IL	015	CARROLL	02	UM 525 - UM 549

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T.S.C. ST ST CO COUNTY NAME CG
CODE CD AB CD DT
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T.S.C. CODE	ST CD	ST AB	CO CD	COUNTY NAME	CG DT	
34015	21	KY	059	DAVIESS		
34016	21	KY	091	HANCOCK	02	OH 771 - OH 742 GR 19 - GR 35
34017	18	IN	147	SPENCER	02	OH 742 - OH 712
34018	18	IN	123	PERRY	02	OH 769 - OH 731
34019	21	KY	027	BRECKINRIDGE	02	OH 731 - OH 681
34020	21	KY	163	MEADE	02	OH 712 - OH 698
34021	18	IN	025	CRAWFORD	02	OH 698 - OH 630*
34022	18	IN	061	HARRISON	02	OH 681 - OH 663
34023	21	KY	029	BULLITT	02	OH 663 - OH 617
34024	21	KY	111	JEFFERSON	02	
34025	18	IN	043	FLOYD	02	OH 630 - OH 593
34026	18	IN	019	CLARK	02	OH 617 - OH 607
34027	21	KY	185	OLDHAM	02	OH 607 - OH 572
34028	21	KY	223	TRIMBLE	02	OH 593 - OH 576
34029	18	IN	077	JEFFERSON	02	OH 576 - OH 555
34030	21	KY	041	CARROLL	02	OH 572 - OH 546
34031	18	IN	155	SWITZERLAND	02	OH 555 - OH 535
34032	21	KY	077	GALLATIN	02	OH 546 - OH 510
34033	21	KY	015	BOONE	02	OH 535 - OH 517
34034	18	IN	115	OHIO	02	OH 517 - OH 477
34035	18	IN	029	DEARBORN	02	OH 510 - OH 499
34036	39	OH	061	HAMILTON	02	OH 499 - OH 491
34037	21	KY	117	KENTON	02	OH 491 - OH 455
34038	21	KY	037	CAMPBELL	02	OH 477 - OH 470
34039	39	OH	025	CLERMONT	02	OH 470 - OH 444
34040	21	KY	023	BRACKEN (Pendleton)	02	OH 455 - OH 430
34041	39	OH	015	BROWN	02	OH 444 - OH 421
34042	21	KY	161	MASON	02	OH 430 - OH 405
34043	39	OH	001	ADAMS	02	OH 421 - OH 401
34044	21	KY	135	LEWIS	02	OH 405 - OH 375
34045	39	OH	145	SCIOTO	02	OH 401 - OH 357
34046	21	KY	089	GREENUP	02	OH 375 - OH 335
34047	21	KY	019	BOYD	02	OH 357 - OH 325
34048	39	OH	087	LAWRENCE	02	OH 325 - OH 317
34049	54	WV	099	WAYNE	02	OH 335 - OH 292
34050	54	WV	011	CABELL	02	OH 317 - OH 312
34051	54	WV	053	MASON	02	OH 312 - OH 287
34052	39	OH	053	GALLIA	02	OH 287 - OH 234 KN 0 - KN 19
34053	39	OH	105	MEIGS	02	OH 292 - OH 257
34054	54	WV	035	JACKSON	02	OH 257 - OH 200
34055	39	OH	009	ATHENS	02	OH 234 - OH 206
34056	54	WV	107	WOOD	02	OH 200 - OH 196
34057	54	WV	073	PLEASANTS	02	OH 206 - OH 165
34058	39	OH	167	WASHINGTON	02	OH 165 - OH 147
34059	54	WV	091	TYLER	02	OH 196 - OH 140
34060	54	WV	103	WETZEL	02	OH 147 - OH 133
34061	39	OH	111	MONROE	02	OH 133 - OH 122
34062	54	WV	051	MARSHALL	02	OH 140 - OH 111
34063	39	OH	013	BELMONT	02	OH 122 - OH 93
34064	54	WV	069	OHIO	02	OH 111 - OH 84
34065	39	OH	081	JEFFERSON	02	OH 93 - OH 82
34066	54	WV	009	BROOKE	02	OH 84 - OH 50
34067	54	WV	029	HANCOCK	02	OH 82 - OH 65
34068	39	OH	029	COLUMBIANA	02	OH 65 - OH 40
34069	42	PA	007	BEAVER	02	OH 50 - OH 40
34070	42	PA	003	ALLEGHENY MH 0 - MH 35	02	OH 40 - OH 15
					02	OH 15 - OH 0 AL 0 - AL 30

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T.S.C. ST ST CO COUNTY NAME CG
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51007	55	WI	003	ASHLAND	09
51008	55	WI	051	IRON	09
51009	26	MI	053	GOGEBIC	09
51010	26	MI	131	ONTONAGON	09
51011	26	MI	061	HOUGHTON	09
51012	26	MI	083	KEWEENAW	09
51013	26	MI	013	BARAGA	09
51014	26	MI	103	MARQUETTE	09
51015	26	MI	003	ALGER	09
51016	26	MI	095	LUCE	09
51017	26	MI	033	CHIPPEWA	09
53000				LAKE MICHIGAN WATERWAY	09
53018	26	MI	097	MACKINAC	09
53019	26	MI	153	SCHOOLCRAFT	09
53020	26	MI	041	DELTA	09
53021	26	MI	109	MENOMINEE	09
53022	55	WI	075	MARINETTE	09
53023	55	WI	083	OCONTO	09
53024	55	WI	009	BROWN	09
53025	55	WI	029	DOOR	09
53026	55	WI	061	KEWAUNEE	09
53027	55	WI	071	MANITOWOC	09
53028	55	WI	117	SHEBOYGAN	09
53029	55	WI	089	OZAUKEE	09
53030	55	WI	079	MILWAUKEE	09
53031	55	WI	101	RACINE	09
53032	55	WI	059	KENOSHA	09
53033	17	IL	097	LAKE	09
53034	17	IL	031	COOK	09
53037	18	IN	089	LAKE	09
53038	18	IN	127	PORTER	09
53039	18	IN	091	LA PORTE	09
53040	26	MI	021	BERRIEN	09
53041	26	MI	159	VAN BUREN	09
53042	26	MI	005	ALLEGAN	09
53043	26	MI	139	OTTAWA	09
53044	26	MI	121	MUSKEGON	09
53045	26	MI	127	OCEANA	09
53046	26	MI	105	MASON	09
53047	26	MI	101	MANISTEE	09
53048	26	MI	019	BENZIE	09
53049	26	MI	089	LEELANAU	09
53050	26	MI	055	GRAND TRAVERSE	09
53051	26	MI	009	ANTRIM	09
53052	26	MI	029	CHARLEVOIX	09
53053	26	MI	047	EMMET	09
55000				LAKE HURON WATERWAY	09
55054	26	MI	031	CHEBOYGAN	09
55055	26	MI	141	PRESQUE ISLE	09
55056	26	MI	007	ALPENA	09
55057	26	MI	001	ALCONA	09
55058	26	MI	069	IOSCO	09
55059	26	MI	011	ARENAC	09
55060	26	MI	017	BAY	09
55061	26	MI	157	TUSCOLA	09

APPENDIX B

SYNOPSIS OF INTERVIEWS MADE TO ASSESS CHEMICAL SPILL RESPONSE CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD

1. RESPONSE CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR AGENCIES

1.1 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1.1.1 Environmental Protection Agency

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the primary responsibility to protect the land areas of the United States, except for those designated areas of Coast Guard responsibility, from pollution caused by the spill of hazardous materials. The EPA provides the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for its areas of jurisdiction.

The EPA maintains local emergency response teams ERT. In accordance with the National Contingency Plan these teams provide information, expert consultation, and general support to the OSC. They are not equipped, however, for actual removal action.

For example, the Boston Regional Office has an eight-man team on 24-hour standby. Each man has a self-contained breathing system, a full-face gas mask, a five-minute escape pack, a face shield, and disposable coveralls, gloves, and boots. The team has a complete kit of hand tools and equipment and full complement of detection identification meters (two of each type); H-nu organic vapor detector, oxygen sampler, explosimeter, organic vapor detector tube sampler, continuous oxygen monitor, and pH meter. They can borrow two portable gas chromatographs. Thus, the EPA does have a good investigative response capability but must bring in contractor assistance for containment, off-loading, plugging, removal, and cleanup.

In addition, some bases also have units equipped with encapsulating suits used for handling exotic rocket fuels. The recent Titan II missile mishap in Arkansas pointed out the use of these suits; the chemicals involved were hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide.

1.1.2.2 Army - The Army Technical Escort Center is responsible for transportation of chemicals and related materials, and has a limited initial spill response capability. Depending on the material spilled, the Army may use contractors for follow-on containment and cleanup. Response capabilities exist at all Army bases; decontamination facilities exist throughout the Army. A typical complement is 100 M-3 suits and a much larger number of M-9 gas masks. In addition to the typical 30-man decontamination team, other units such as the Military Police also have gas masks, so the total number of potentially available masks is large.

Other response capabilities also exist at Army bases. The fire department at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, has 15 fire approach suits and 25 air packs in addition to their regular nomex turnout (rain type) suits. The Fire Chief has also been designated the base OSC by the Environmental Control Office for both oil and chemical spills, and the Department has a small supply of containment boom for oil. Chemical response capability is limited as the base uses few hazardous chemicals. Fort Devens relies extensively on contractors for both initial response and cleanup.

Fort Devens also has an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team equipped with fullface protective masks, M-20 self-contained breathing apparatus, and M-3 protective clothing with acid-resistant aprons. A typical team consists of five men.

1.1.2.3 Navy - Like the other Armed Services, the Navy relies primarily on contractors for response to both chemical and oil spills. The Operations Department, Supervisor of Salvage, has overall responsibility. Some equipment, primarily for oil spills, is stored at central locations at Cheatham Annex, Virginia, and Stockton, California.

Therefore, beyond establishing that these development efforts exist, little information could be obtained.

1.1.3 Department of Energy

The Department of Energy (DOE) has both regional and national response teams for response to spills of radiological materials. While these teams normally would respond only to radiological accidents, they do have personnel protection equipment and communication equipment which has direct application to hazmat spill response.

1.2 STATE GOVERNMENTS

State government agencies concerned with hazmat spill response are usually either Environmental Protection Agencies or Water Resources Agencies, who are responsible for preventing contamination of lakes, streams, and waterways. These agencies dispatch inspectors to spill sites, who may act as OSCs to coordinate containment and cleanup efforts. Most contacted states maintain a limited inventory of supplies and equipment, but this capability is intended only for initial response use. Subsequent efforts are transferred either to the spiller or to a cleanup contractor.

Maine, Pennsylvania and Virginia have no protective clothing except rain gear. Ohio has nine ammonia suits with self-contained breathing apparatus. Maryland has five sets of fire-fighting type rubberized clothing with breathing apparatus, and two acid suits. None have asbestos fire suits.

The field inspectors or response teams have field meters. Maine teams have pH meters, explosimeters and gas samplers. Pennsylvania has some pH meters and explosimeters. Ohio and Virginia field inspectors have these meters, plus a water testing capability. Maryland inspectors have pH meters, and 10 equipment trailers have a pump and explosimeter. Ohio has a portable gas chromatograph.

Maine and Pennsylvania rely on police radio networks for communication. The other three states have their own radios and networks for spill response.

facilitate emergency response team operations, by evacuating surrounding areas if necessary, and by providing transportation for cleanup personnel and equipment to the spill site.

Police rely on the Coast Guard for hazmat identification. They do have the Chemical Hazard Response Information System (CHRIS) Manual, and lists and procedures issued by the Coast Guard and by CHEMTREC. Some departments have field meters.

1.4.2 City Fire Departments

Fire departments respond to a spill only when requested. They do not patrol their areas, and thus do not detect spills. The fire departments' involvement in a hazmat spill is limited to control of fire. These departments have the primary foam-delivery capability by fire boats and fire trucks. Their on-vehicle foam supply is supported by centralized department supplies and by ready access to manufacturers' stocks, so their foam delivery capability is almost unlimited. In some ports, Coast Guard and Port Authority crews also have a foaming capability.

Fire departments do not have any plugging or off-loading equipment. They rely on the Coast Guard and CHEMTREC for material identification. They also have the CHRIS Manual and the Hazmat Classification Book. They have field meters associated with their fire-fighting mission, such as explosimeters, carbon monoxide testers, oxygen samplers, etc.

The departments usually have fire suits. Philadelphia has three special chemical units equipped with asbestos fire suits with self-contained breathing apparatus. Both New York and Philadelphia also use standard protective clothing, with gas masks, for fire approach and entry.

Most fire departments have extensive communication networks, and can establish working control of a spill area pending arrival of police.

Transportation of equipment to the site area may be accomplished by utilizing one or a combination of several means including: 1) land transport by truck or van; 2) water transport by boat or barge; or 3) cargo airlift. The latter mode is utilized by Marine Pollution Control of Detroit in the event of a major spill. Their "response kit" consists of acid, disposable, and rubber suits, external and internal breathing apparatus, respirators, vacuum tank trucks, pumps, and drums. All of this equipment is airlifted on a Boeing 747 to the site area.

Contractors generally do not maintain substantial equipment inventories in the following areas:

- o Fire Entry and Proximity Suits - equipment is maintained primarily by chemical manufacturers and large city fire departments.
- o Plugging and Repair Capabilities - contractors generally perform these functions by subcontracting this work to an ocean salvage company or on land, a chemical shipper producer. Crowley Environmental Services of Seattle, OH Materials of Findlay, Ohio, and Ocean Salvage Corporation of New York do, however, maintain pre-packaged plugging kits containing items such as bentonite, plugs, gasket material, and straps.
- o Foam Systems - none of the contractors contacted maintain foam delivery systems or their equivalent.

Several contractors, such as OH Materials, operate mobile laboratories for analytical testing. These self-contained laboratories are capable of being placed anywhere on a site and can run samples utilizing a mass spectrometer in one hour or less to identify chemical components and their respective concentrations. If the sample is beyond the capability of the mobile laboratory it can be analyzed at the company's fixed laboratory in Findlay.

Field testing units such as pH meters, oxygen and multiple gas meters are maintained adequately by most contractors to monitor cleanup efforts. More exotic field testing equipment includes fluorescence, specification, flame ionization, and electron capture techniques, among others. Many smaller, local contractors depend upon independent testing laboratories for thorough and objective chemical analysis.

The second stage of CHEMTREC's duties becomes more difficult if either the shipper is unknown or the material is unidentified. In this instance, CHEMTREC may rely upon other information sources such as the Coast Guard National Response Center to identify the shipper/carrier or the Association of American Railroads' commodities movement/tracking system.

CHEMTREC provides no physical assistance in a spill incident, but serves as the vital communication point for the entire emergency response system of the private sector. Its capabilities have been recognized by the DOT as well; working together, the capabilities of both systems are enhanced.

The Chlorine Institute of New York (CHLOREP) is a private consortium of chlorine and compressed gas manufacturers and shippers; it has established 32 designated response zones in the U.S. In the event of a chlorine or compressed gas discharge, CHLOREP's emergency response coordinator receives a notification of the incident from CHEMTREC. The coordinator then dispatches one of 64 U.S.-based response teams to the incident site. The location of these teams is concentrated in areas where the greatest number of manufacturing plants is situated. For example, the Louisiana Panhandle area contains the greatest proportion of chlorine producers in the Nation. Hence this area displays a high correlation of response teams relative to other areas of the Nation.

CHLOREP's emergency response teams are staffed with 12 personnel per team which provide 24-hour coverage. The staffing objective is to provide three personnel per six-hour shift. CHLOREP has also designed and distributed 6,500 chlorine emergency kits to industrial and water treatment plants throughout the U.S. Kits contain various plugging and repair supplies including gasket material, strapping, bentonite clay sealant, heavy plastic tarpulins, and plugs.

Each response team is equipped with at least one kit and enough self-contained breathing apparatus, spare tanks, and respirators to supply each man for an indefinite period of time. CHLOREP response teams arrive at the scene in an average time of 20 minutes, depending upon location and accessibility.

Manufacturers response teams have been developed to offer initial emergency spill control assistance in the event that a company product is involved in an accidental release. The manufacturer of that product is most familiar with its chemical properties. In addition, manufacturers are now formulating mutual aid agreements to exchange emergency support teams and equipment in the event of a spill outside a given company's region.

The chemical manufacturers' teams are usually not the first to arrive at the spill site. Further, the manufacturers typically limit their function to initial response. They do not engage in longer term containment and cleanup; these functions are turned over to contractors.

For example, Dow Chemical Corporation has over 50 plants manufacturing hazardous materials in the United States. Four major divisions are located in Midland, Michigan; Plaquemine, Louisiana; Freeport, Texas; and Pittsburgh, California. The remaining 46 locations are classified as "satellite plants." Each plant is equipped with a fire department on the premises. Further, Dow has 22 sales offices throughout the Nation which each maintain at least one self-contained breathing unit and have a Sales Officer able to provide advice and request company assistance.

Each plant has developed an emergency response system which is activated through the Emergency Response Coordinator. The Coordinator's legal responsibility is merely advisory but he may and often does provide technical and equipment assistance when needed. Each major division is home base for an emergency response trailer. The contents of each trailer consist of at least the following equipment and supplies dedicated to hazmat emergencies:

- o Personal protective clothing including two Acid King or Eastwind acid suits and three heavy vinyl suits for corrosives
- o Self-contained breathing apparatus consisting of five Scott air-packs (45 minute) and spare cylinders
- o Two each portable pH, oxygen, and explosion meters
- o Two stainless steel, explosion-proof chemical transfer pumps

for handling truck spills of gasoline or other hydrocarbons, but may have wider applications. Trailers contain a number of explosimeters and air packs, as well as sorbent material and containment boom.

Hooker Chemical Corporation has adopted a unique approach to respond to chemical emergency incidents. They have developed standard emergency equipment kits as follows:

- o Kit #1 - Personal Safety Equipment includes one each of the following: full face MSA respirator, MSA cannister, disposable dust mask, Homer coveralls, face shield, rain suit, gloves, and boots.
- o Kit #2 - Tool Kit & Miscellaneous Equipment
- o Kit #3 - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus consists of one 30-minute Scott air pack and spare cylinder.
- o Kit #4 - Acid Suit consists of one Eastwind acid suit.
- o Kit #5 - Specialty Kits Equipment may contain any or all of the following: explosion meter, oxygen meter, vapor acid suit, phosphorous suit, etc.

A number of kits by type are distributed among each of 22 Hooker plants in the United States. Distribution of kits is based upon historical spill incidents and, in the case of specialty kits (#5), the plant's major products. For example, the Jeffersonville, Indiana plant is a major phosphorous production unit. It maintains the following emergency kit inventory: six each-Kit #1, one each-Kit #2, three each-Kit #3, three each-Kit #4, and three each of Kit #5 which contains a total of three phosphorous suits.

Mobay Chemical Corporation is another example of a manufacturer which has anticipated a need for coordinated response to chemical emergencies with trained personnel and equipment. They have developed an emergency response program to handle their own chemicals by assembling seven response teams in Union, New Jersey; New Martinsville, West Virginia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Bushy Park, South Carolina. Response teams normally consist of two to three members at each producing facility.

specific training to handle hazardous material emergencies. Generally, if a spill presents a threat to the health of personnel, they are instructed to evacuate the area immediately.

If a freight car is found to be leaking hazmat by a line inspector, the incident is reported to the local dispatcher or trainmaster utilizing the locomotive's radio. The dispatcher must then take steps to isolate the car and identify its contents. The AAR's Standard Transportation Commodity Code (STCC) "49" designates all hazardous materials and their positions in the train's consist. A computer-generated printout of this information is carried by trainmen to expedite chemical identification. Procedures and actions to be taken are followed utilizing the AAR's "Transportation Emergency Guide." The dispatcher then notifies the safety department which in turn notifies government officials, CHEMTREC, and the consignee or shipper. The situation is then re-examined and a decision is made as to whether a "go-team" response is warranted at the incident scene. Spill type, quantity, risk factor, and in-house resources bear on the determination of whether clean-up contractors will be called to the scene.

If a railroad maintains equipment for control and containment, it is usually located in or around classification yards and engine terminals. Both the Chessie System and Norfolk and Western Railroad maintain equipment along rivers which traverse their trackage. Southern's hazmat storage areas are in Atlanta, Birmingham, Greensboro, and Chattanooga.

As a general rule, railroads do not own chemical or thermal protective clothing. The Boston and Maine Railroad and Conrail maintain rainsuits for inclement weather. Chessie System outfits its superintendents with rubber suits, goggles, boots, and self-contained breathing apparatus. Norfolk and Western maintains a supply of respirators and self-contained breathing apparatus at various locations. Southern Railway operates three emergency storage trailers which contain one combustible gas meter, a minimum of 6-12 vinyl rainsuits, and two acid suits with hoods, gloves, boots, and self-contained breathing apparatus. These trailers are towed to the incident scene by one of six vehicles operated by the safety department. Spill crews arrive at the scene by rail, automobile, or air.

APPENDIX C

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR REQUIREMENTS FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILL RESPONSE

I. Litant

Office of Energy and Environment
Transportation Systems Center

- This Appendix summarizes the work leading to the quantification of the personnel protective equipment required for response to various types and sizes of hazardous chemical spills that have occurred in the United States in 1973-1979.

1. INTRODUCTION

A large amount of work has been done over the past years by government and private agencies in assembling data on the types and frequency of occurrence of spills of hazardous materials, as well as categorizing response gear for use against each type of spilled material. (References 1 through 11.) In most spills, the hazardous materials were capable of being identified as individual chemicals. In some cases, however, the spilled material was a mixture, sometimes complex, containing one or more hazardous chemicals.

A spilled hazardous material requires that some action be taken to prevent an adverse effect upon the local population and the environment. A hazardous spill response team, if provided with correct information concerning the type and quantity of the material, should be prepared to cope with the situation without delay.

Historic hazardous materials spills have been recorded by the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) and the Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS). These data have been summarized by type, frequency, and wherever possible, by quantity of spill. (See Reference 12.) Many of the spills were identified only vaguely, and required judgment to determine how to categorize them.

Various coding systems have been devised to group the materials into some sort of order that would be useful in determining how to cope with the spills. The CHRIS Code is one example of the several methods to do this.

There was little problem in "bridging" between the MTB and PIRS lists and CHRIS where the chemical compound or material was specific in each. However, bridging became difficult where one MTB or PIRT entry consisted of groups such as "Zinc Compounds" or "Cyanide Compounds." Even more difficult to classify were "Corrosive Liquid N.O.S.", "Flammable Liquids", or "Comp. Rust Preventer or Remover". In the case of grouped compounds of the same element, the entry was treated as would be the most hazardous commonly used compound of that group. In the second type, "Corrosive Liquids", etc. the literature was consulted, where possible, to get an idea of the chemicals that might be used in such mixtures. A judgment was then made as to its classification.

Altogether, 156 MTB and 166 PIRS materials were classified. As might be expected, there was some duplication between the lists. However, the cases in which no direct correspondence could be established between MTB, PIRS and CHRIS chemicals represented a majority of the cases of historic spills. (Reference 13.) Accordingly, attempts employ a single chemical list were abandoned, and equipment assignments were made on the PIRS and MTB chemical lists separately.

2. Response Gear Required for Different Hazardous Materials

The second task in this project was to list the types of personnel protective gear that would be required by a person responding to a spill of each of the different hazardous materials. The results are shown in Appendix C-1. In preparing this list, several considerations to be made before defining the level of protection categories. W.M. Hammer, et al (Reference 11) propose the following requirements in the selection of equipment:

- a. Physical motion should be as natural and unimpeded as possible.
- b. The equipment should be able to function throughout the period of time that an individual expects to be within the boundaries of the hazard.
- c. The equipment should be tough and reusable, if it can be determined.
- d. Normal decontamination methods should be simple, rapid and non-destructive.
- e. Personnel utilizing the equipment should feel reasonably comfortable and confident of their own safety.

will reduce the oxygen content of the air. In that case, an SCBA must be substituted for the canister.

3. Elastomer Compatibility with Different Hazardous Materials

Following the selection of personnel gear, it became necessary to specify, for each hazardous material, the type of elastomer that could be used in the coating of the body protective clothing, and in the gloves and boots. A number of references were consulted, and surprisingly, very significant differences were found among these as to the recommended elastomers. In several cases, various source recommendations varied from "excellent" to "poor" for the same chemical. It was finally decided to rely heavily on the recommendations of the chemical industry, augmented by other judgmental factors.

The six types of elastomer that were found to be most used were: neoprene, butyl rubber, EPA, Hypalon, butadiene and fluoroelastomers. In many cases it was found that more than one type of elastomer was suitable, and these were indicated on the work sheets; however, only one is listed in the final compilation. It should be pointed out that in several cases, the best elastomer available was listed nowhere better than "fair" in its resistance to the particular material.

4. Quantities of Equipment as a Function of Spill Size and Material

Finally, since spills of hazardous materials come in various sizes, it was necessary to determine how many units of personnel response gear should be available for different size spills of the same material. Here, again, some assumptions had to be made.

- a. In most cases, if the spill was into a waterway, the methods of response would require the use of a different set of parameters than those used in this work. It was therefore assumed that the spill occurred either on land adjacent to a waterway or on board a vessel in a waterway.
- b. The minimum gear recommended, no matter what the material spilled, nor the size of the spill, was two units. The reason for two units is principally the premise that any spill considered as a hazardous material should be approached by at least two individuals suitably prepared and clothed. A backup is always needed in the event of a

REFERENCES
TO APPENDIX C

1. USCG Commandant Instruction M16465.12 (OLD CG-446-2). Manual of the Chemical Hazardous Response Information System (CHRIS).
2. USCG Commandant Instruction 16465.16. Policy Guidance for Response to Hazardous Chemical Discharges.
3. Standard Transportation Commodity Code Tariff No. 1-G (STCC 49).
4. U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) CG-450.
5. USCG Commandant Instruction M16465.14. CHRIS Response Methods Handbook.
6. USCG Survey of Personnel Protective Clothing and Respiratory Apparatus for use by Coast Guard Personnel in Response to Discharges of Hazardous Chemicals. W.M. Hammer et al (Sept. 1974).
7. The General Chemical Resistance of Various Elastomers - 1979 Yearbook of the Los Angeles Rubber Group, Inc.
8. Chemical Resistance of DuPont Elastomers - E.I. Dupont Co.
9. SAX, N.I. - Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials. (Reinhold)
10. Kirk-Othmer-Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology.
11. Hammer, W.F. et al, "Survey of Protective Clothing and Respiratory Apparatus for Use by Coast Guard Personnel in Response to Discharge of Hazardous Chemicals," CG-D-89-75.
12. "Analysis of Hazardous Chemical Spills Along the Coasts and Major Waterways of the United States," U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, MA, Report No. CG-123-1.
13. "Interim Report on Coast Guard Related Chemical Spill Data," Project Memorandum, CG 023, September 1980. Report No. CG-023-1, Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, MA 02142.

APPENDIX C1
ESTIMATES OF PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR REQUIRED
AS A FUNCTION OF SPILL SIZE

This Appendix lists, for each of 157 MTB-listed chemicals and 130 PIRS-listed chemicals, the types and quantities of protective gear estimated to be needed to respond to a spill of given size of the chemical.

The first two columns show the MTB or PIRS code for the chemical. (A description of the chemical is given in the last column.) The third column lists spill size (QTY) and the units (U) which are either gallons (G) or pounds (P). The next column (headed NU) gives the minimum number of units estimated to be required to respond to a spill size not exceeding that under QTY of the same line, but exceeding the amount on the preceding line. (The amount zero is understood for the first value of QTY of the chemical.) Spills of quantities greater than the largest listed for the chemical require the largest number of units shown in the NU column.

The types of gear are indicated in the column headed "Personnel Protection Gear Code." The codes are explained on p. 28. The number of units required applied to each type of gear for which there is an entry under "Personnel Protection Gear Code." The terminology 'rubber clothing', 'rubber gloves', 'rubber boots' are used generically to indicate items of the specific material following the hyphen.

USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS RESPONSE

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE	CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION
				-A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-J-K-L-M-N-O-	
2008319			A1	K6L6	PETROLEUM NAPHTHA COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID
2008319		001000G	2		
2008319		005000G	2		
2008319		010000G	3		
2008319		025000G	4		
2009719			B1	K6L6	SOLVENT N.O.S. COMBUSTIBLE
2009719		001000G	2		
2009719		005000G	3		
2009719		010000G	4		
2501010			A2	J2	ACETONE
2501010		002000G	2		
2501010		005000G	2		
2501010		010000G	2		
2501010		025000G	3		
2501140			A1	J1	ACRYLONITRILE
2501140		000500G	2		
2501140		005000G	3		
2501140		025000G	4		
2501190			C1	K4	ALCOHOL N.O.S. FLAMMABLE LIQUID
2501190		002000G	2		
2501190		005000G	2		
2501190		050000G	3		
2501660			C1	K1L1	ANTIFREEZE COMPOUND FLAMMABLE LIQUID
2501660		001000G	2		
2501660		005000G	2		
2501660		010000G	2		
2501660		050000G	3		
2502070			A1	J6	BENZENE (BENZOL)
2502070		001000G	2		
2502070		005000G	2		
2502070		010000G	3		
2502070		030000G	3		
2502470			C1	K6L6	BUTYL ACETATE
2502470		005000G	2		
2502470		030000G	3		
2502690			A1	J6	CARBON BISULFIDE OR CARBON DISULFIDE
2502690		000250G	2		
2502690		001000G	3		
2502690		005000G	4		
2502840			C1	J6	CEMENT LIQUID N.O.S.
2502840		002000G	2		
2502840		010000G	3		
2502840		050000G	3		
2502860			C1	K1L1	CEMENT ROOFING LIQUID
2502860		002000G	2		
2502860		010000G	3		
2502860		050000G	3		

USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS RESPONSE

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY	U	N	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE											CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION				
					A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	
2505130					A1									J6						FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS N.O.S.
2505130		001000G																		
2505130		005000G																		
2505130		010000G																		
2505130		050000G																		
2505360					A1										K1L1					GASOLINE
2505360		001000G																		
2505360		005000G																		
2505360		010000G																		
2505360		025000G																		
2505580					A1										K1L1					HEXANE
2505580		001000G																		
2505580		005000G																		
2505580		010000G																		
2505580		030000G																		
2505960											G1H1			J1						INK
2505960		000150F																		
2505960		001000F																		
2505960		005000F																		
2506000					A1										J1					INSECTICIDE FLAMMABLE LIQUID N.O.S.
2506000		000500G																		
2506000		001000G																		
2506000		005000G																		
2506000		010000G																		
2506080					A1										K1L1					ISOPENTANE
2506080		001000G																		
2506080		005000G																		
2506080		010000G																		
2506080		025000G																		
2506924					B1										J1					METHYLAL
2506924		001000G																		
2506924		005000G																		
2506924		010000G																		
2506924		050000G																		
2507040					A1										J3					METHYL ETHYL KETONE
2507040		002000G																		
2507040		005000G																		
2507040		010000G																		
2507040		025000G																		
2507100					A1										J3					METHYL METHACRYLATE MONOMER INHIBITED
2507100		001000G																		
2507100		005000G																		
2507100		010000G																		
2507100		025000G																		
2507490					A1										K1L1					MOTOR FUEL N.O.S. FLAMMABLE LIQUID
2507490		001000G																		
2507490		005000G																		
2507490		010000G																		
2507490		025000G																		

USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS RESPONSE

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE													CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION			
				A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O		
6008540						C1							J6							POISONOUS SOLID CLASS B N.O.S.
6008540		001000F	2																	
6008540		005000F	3																	
6008540		010000F	3																	
6008540		050000F	3																	
6010336						C1							J2							TOLUENE DIISOCYANATE
6010336		000500G	2																	
6010336		005000G	3																	
6010336		010000G	4																	
9501004								F1				J1							O1	ACETIC AQUEOUS SOLUTION
9501004		001000F	2																	
9501004		005000F	3																	
9501004		010000F	3																	
9501004		030000F	3																	
9501006						C1							J4						O1	ACETIC ACID GLACIAL
9501006		001000G	2																	
9501006		005000G	3																	
9501006		020000G	4																	
9501008								A1					J4						O1	ACETIC ANHYDRIDE
9501008		001000G	2																	
9501008		005000G	3																	
9501008		010000G	3																	
9501008		020000G	3																	
9501120								A1					J1						O1	ACID LIQUID N.O.S.
9501120		000500G	2																	
9501120		005000G	3																	
9501120		010000G	3																	
9501120		050000G	4																	
9501125													H1I1J1						O1	ACID SLUDGE
9501125		002000G	2																	
9501125		005000G	3																	
9501125		025000G	3																	
9501132						C1							J1						O1	ACRYLIC ACID
9501132		001000G	2																	
9501132		005000G	2																	
9501132		010000G	3																	
9501240								A1					J1						O1	ALKALINE LIQUID N.O.S.
9501240		001000G	2																	
9501240		005000G	3																	
9501240		010000G	4																	
9501270								B1					J1							ALKALINE CORROSIVE LIQUID N.O.S.
9501270		002000G	2																	
9501270		005000G	2																	
9501270		010000G	3																	
9501270		030000G	3																	
9501336								A1					J1							AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE .LT. 45% AMMONIA
9501336		002000G	2																	
9501336		005000G	2																	
9501336		010000G	3																	
9501336		050000G	4																	

USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS RESPONSE

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(3 DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY	N	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE	CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION
		U	U	A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-J-K-L-M-N-O	
9503570				A1 J6 01	COMPOUND PAINT REMOVER
9503570		000500G	2		CORROSIVE LIQUID
9503570		002000G	3		
9503570		005000G	4		
9503570		010000G	4		
9503730				A1 J6 01	CORROSIVE LIQUID N.O.S.
9503730		000250G	2		
9503730		000500G	2		
9503730		001000G	3		
9503735				G1H1I1J1 01	CORROSIVE SOLID N.O.S.
9503735		001000F	2		
9503735		005000F	2		
9503735		010000F	3		
9503735		050000F	3		
9504480				H1I1 K1L1 01	DRUGS CHEMICALS CORROSIVE
9504480		002000G	2		
9504480		010000G	2		
9504480		025000G	3		
9504560				H1 J4 01	ELECTROLYTE BATTERY FLUID
9504560		000500G	2		
9504560		005000G	3		
9504560		010000G	3		
9504560		050000G	4		
9505005				G1H1I1J1 01	FERRIC CHLORIDE SOLUTION
9505005		005000F	2		
9505005		010000F	2		
9505005		030000F	2		
9505165				A1 J1 01	FLUOBORIC ACID
9505165		000250G	2		
9505165		000500G	2		
9505165		001000G	3		
9505190				A1 J2 01	FORMIC ACID
9505190		000250G	2		
9505190		001000G	2		
9505190		005000G	3		
9505570				A1 J1	HEXAMETHYLENE DIAMINE SOLUTION
9505570		000500G	2		
9505570		002000G	2		
9505570		005000G	3		
9505650				A1 J2	HYDRAZINE SOL .LT. 51 WT
9505650		000100G	2		
9505650		000500G	3		
9505650		001000G	4		
9505700				A1 J2 01	HYDROCHLORIC ACID
9505700		001000G	2		
9505700		005000G	3		
9505700		010000G	4		
9505700		025000G	4		

USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS RESPONSE

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE	CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION
				A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-J-K-L-M-N-O	
9508628				H111J2 01	POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE LIQUID OR SOLUTION
9508628		000200G	2		
9508628		000500G	2		
9508628		010000G	3		
9508628		025000G	3		
9509760			A1	I1J1 01	SULFURIC ACID SPENT
9509760		001000G	2		
9509760		005000G	2		
9509760		010000G	3		
9509760		020000G	3		
9508766			A1	K1L1 01	PROPIONIC ACID
9508766		001000F	2		
9508766		005000F	2		
9508766		025000F	3		
9509930			A1	J1 01	SULFURIC ACID
9509930		001000G	2		
9509930		005000G	3		
9509930		010000G	4		
9509890			A1	J1 01	SULFURIC CHLORIDE
9509890		000050G	2		
9509890		000250G	3		
9509890		001000G	4		
9510230			A1	J6 01	THIONYL CHLORIDE
9510230		000250G	2		
9510230		000500G	2		
9510230		001000G	3		
9510230		005000G	4		
9510290			A1	J2 01	TIN TETRACHLORIDE ANHYDROUS
9510290		001000G	2		
9510290		005000G	3		
9510290		025000G	4		
9510730				H1I1 K1L1 01	WATER TREATMENT COMPOUND LIQUID
9510730		002000G	2		
9510730		010000G	3		

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PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE											CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION							
				A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	T	Y	K	L	M	N	O				
	2002			A1									J4							01	ACETIC ANHYDRIDE	
	2002001000G		2																			
	2002005000G		3																			
	2002010000G		3																			
	2002025000G		3																			
	2003			A1									J2								ACETONE	
	2003002000G		2																			
	2003005000G		2																			
	2003010000G		2																			
	2003025000G		3																			
	2004			A1									J2								ACETONE CYANOHYDRIN	
	2004000250G		2																			
	2004001000G		3																			
	2004005000G		3																			
	2004010000G		4																			
	2005			A1									K1L1								ACETONITRILE (METHYLCYANIDE)	
	2005001000G		2																			
	2005005000G		3																			
	2005010000G		3																			
	2005025000G		4																			
	2008				C1								J1								ACRYLIC ACID	
	2008001000G		2																			
	2008002000G		2																			
	2008025000G		3																			
	2009			A1									J1								ACRYLONITRILE	
	2009000500G		2																			
	2009005000G		3																			
	2009025000G		4																			
	2010			A1									J1								ADIPONITRILE	
	2010000500G		2																			
	2010001000G		2																			
	2010005000G		3																			
	2010025000G		4																			
	2020			A1									J6								01	BENZYL CHLORIDE
	2020000500G		2																			
	2020001000G		2																			
	2020005000G		3																			
	2020025000G		4																			
	2011				C1								J1								ALLYL ALCOHOL	
	2011001000G		2																			
	2011005000G		2																			
	2011010000G		3																			
	2011025000G		3																			
	2013			A1									J1								01	CADMIUM COMPOUNDS
	2013000500G		2																			
	2013002000G		3																			
	2013005000G		4																			

USCG HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL SPILLS RESPONSE

PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE											CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION							
				A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O				
	2029					C1							J6									CARBON TETRACHLORIDE
	2029002000G	2																				
	2029005000G	2																				
	2029025000G	3																				
	2030									G1H1I1J1							O1					CAUSTIC SODA
	2030002000F	2																				
	2030005000F	2																				
	2030010000F	3																				
	2030025000F	3																				
	2031			A1									J1									CHLOROFORM
	2031001000G	2																				
	2031005000G	3																				
	2031010000G	4																				
	2032								F1				J1				O1					CHLOROSULFONIC ACID
	2032001000G	2																				
	2032005000G	3																				
	2032010000G	3																				
	2032025000G	4																				
	2033					C1				H1			J1				O1					CRESOL
	2033001000G	2																				
	2033005000G	3																				
	2033010000G	3																				
	2033030000G	4																				
	2034			A1									J2									CROTONALDEHYDE
	2034001000G	2																				
	2034005000G	2																				
	2034025000G	3																				
	2035					C1																CYCLO HEXANE
	2035002000G	2																				
	2035005000G	2																				
	2035010000G	3																				
	2035025000G	3																				
	2039			A1									J6									DICHLOROPROPANE- DICHLOROPROPANE MIXTURE (D.D. SOIL FUMIGANT)
	2039002000G	2																				
	2039005000G	2																				
	2039010000G	3																				
	2039025000G	3																				
	2040			A1									J1									DIETHANOLAMINE
	2040002000G	2																				
	2040005000G	2																				
	2040025000G	2																				
	2044			A1									J2									DIMETHYLAMINE (40% AQUEOUS)
	2044002000G	2																				
	2044005000G	2																				
	2044010000G	2																				
	2046								H1					K1L1								GLYCOL
	2046005000G	2																				
	2046010000G	2																				
	2046025000G	2																				

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PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE							CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION									
				A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O		
	2060			A1									J1					O1	HYDROCHLORIC ACID	
	2060001000G	2																		
	2060005000G	2																		
	2060010000G	3																		
	2060025000G	4																		
	2061			A1									J4					O1	HYDROFLUORIC ACID (40% AQUEOUS)	
	2061000150G	2																		
	2061000500G	3																		
	2061001000G	4																		
	2062			A1									J1						HYDROGEN PEROXIDE (.GT. 60%)	
	2062002000G	2																		
	2062005000G	3																		
	2062010000G	3																		
	2062025000G	4																		
	2063			A1										K1L1M1					ISOPRENE	
	2063002000G	2																		
	2063005000G	2																		
	2063025000G	3																		
	2064					C1								K2L2					ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL	
	2064002000G	2																		
	2064005000G	2																		
	2064010000G	2																		
	2064030000G	3																		
	2065						B1							J1					LIQUID SULFUR	
	2065005000F	2																		
	2065025000F	2																		
	2066						C1							K1L1					METHYL ACRYLATE	
	2066001000G	2																		
	2066005000G	2																		
	2066010000G	3																		
	2066025000G	3																		
	2067						C1							K1L1					METHYL ALCOHOL	
	2067002000G	2																		
	2067005000G	2																		
	2067010000G	2																		
	2067030000G	3																		
	2069			A1										J3					METHYL ETHYL KETONE (2-BUTANONE)	
	2069002000G	2																		
	2069005000G	2																		
	2069010000G	2																		
	2069025000G	3																		
	2070						C1							J1					METHYL ISO-BUTYL KETONE	
	2070002000G	2																		
	2070005000G	2																		
	2070010000G	2																		
	2070025000G	3																		

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PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
REQUIREMENTS
(@ DIFFERENT SPILL SIZES)

MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	N U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE											CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION				
				A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	
2085				A1										K2L2					PROPYLENE OXIDE
2085005000G		2																	
2085010000G		2																	
2085025000G		3																	
2095025000G		2																	
2086				A1									J2						STYRENE
2086001000G		2																	
2086005000G		3																	
2086010000G		3																	
2086030000G		4																	
2087				A1														O1	SULFURIC ACID
2087001000G		2																	
2087005000G		2																	
2087010000G		3																	
2087025000G		3																	
2088				A1									J1						TETRATHYL LEAD
2088000500G		2																	
2088002000G		3																	
2088005000G		3																	
2088010000G		4																	
2089				A1									J1						TOLUENE
2089001000G		2																	
2089005000G		2																	
2089010000G		3																	
2089030000G		3																	
2090						C1							J6						TRICHLOROETHANE
2090000500G		2																	
2090005000G		2																	
2090010000G		3																	
2090025000G		3																	
2093						C1								K6L6					TURPENTINE
2093005000G		2																	
2093010000G		2																	
2093025000G		3																	
2094						C1							J1						VINYL ACETATE
2094002000G		2																	
2094005000G		2																	
2094020000G		2																	
2095						C1							J2						VINYLDENE CHLORIDE
2095002000G		2																	
2095005000G		2																	
2095010000G		2																	
2096				A1										K6L6M6					XYLENE
2096001000G		2																	
2096005000G		3																	
2096010000G		3																	
2096025000G		3																	

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PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
 REQUIREMENTS
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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE													CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION	
			A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M		N
	2124		A1						H1		J1						CYANIDE COMPOUNDS
	2124000500F	2															
	2124002000F	3															
	2124010000F	3															
	2124030000F	4															
	2125						G1H1				K1L1						2,4-D (ACID)
	2125001000F	2															
	2125005000F	3															
	2125010000F	3															
	2125025000F	4															
	2136		A1								J1						DINITROPHENOL
	2136001000F	2															
	2136005000F	3															
	2136010000F	3															
	2136025000F	4															
	2145		A1								K2L2						ETHYLBENZENE
	2145002000G	2															
	2145005000G	2															
	2145010000G	2															
	2145030000G	3															
	2146		A1								J1			O1			FLUORINE COMPOUNDS
	2146000500F	2															
	2146002000F	3															
	2146010000F	3															
	2146030000F	4															
	2151						G1		I1		K1L1						IRON COMPOUNDS
	2151002000F	2															
	2151005000F	2															
	2151010000F	2															
	2151030000F	3															
	2153		B1								J1						LEAD COMPOUNDS
	2153002000F	2															
	2153005000F	2															
	2153010000F	2															
	2153030000F	3															
	2156						G1		I1		K1L1						MALEIC ACID
	2156005000F	2															
	2156010000F	2															
	2156025000F	2															
	2158						G1		I1		K1L1			O1			MERCURY COMPOUNDS
	2158000500F	2															
	2158002000F	3															
	2158010000F	3															
	2158030000F	4															
	2161			C1							J2						METHYL PARATHION
	2161000250F	2															
	2161001000F	3															
	2161005000F	4															

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MTB CL-CODE	PIRS CODE	QTY U	PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE													CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION	
			A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M		N
	2190		A1							J2							SODIUM HYDROXIDE
	2190	002000G															
	2190	005000G															
	2190	010000G															
	2190	030000G															
	2191						H1				K1L1						SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE
	2191	001000G															
	2191	005000G															
	2191	010000G															
	2191	025000G															
	2193						G1		I1		K1L1						SODIUM NITRITE
	2193	005000F															
	2193	025000F															
	2195						G1H1				J2						SODIUM PHOSPHATE, MONOBASIC
	2195	005000F															
	2195	025000F															
	2197						G1H1				K1L1			O1			SODIUM SULFIDE
	2197	005000F															
	2197	025000F															
	2198						G1H1				K1L1						STRYCHNINE
	2198	000050F															
	2198	000200F															
	2198	000500F															
	2199		A1							J4				O1			SULFUR MONOCHLORIDE
	2199	001000G															
	2199	005000G															
	2199	010000G															
	2204					C1					K2L2						TOXAPHENE
	2204	000050F															
	2204	000250F															
	2204	001000F															
	2209						G1H1				K1L1						URANIUM COMPOUNDS
	2209	000200F															
	2209	001000F															
	2209	005000F															
	2209	010000F															
	2211		A1							J2							XYLENOL
	2211	001000G															
	2211	005000G															
	2211	010000G															
	2211	025000G															
	2213		A1							J1				O1			ZINC COMPOUNDS
	2213	002000F															
	2213	005000F															
	2213	010000F															
	2213	030000F															

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PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEARS
 REQUIREMENTS
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 MTB PIRS QTY N PERSONNEL PROTECTION GEAR CODE
 CL-CODECODE U U CHEMICAL DESCRIPTION

 A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-J-K-L-M-N-O

NOTES :

COL 23 -- G = GALLONS ;
 F = POUNDS

EQUIPMENTS CODES :

- A1 = SCBA
- A2 = SCBA - FOR HIGH CONCENTRATION
- A3 = SCBA - PLASTIC LENS

- B1 = CANISTER - ALL PURPOSE

- C1 = CANISTER - ORGANIC

- D1 = CANISTER - AMMONIA (ALKALI)

- E1 = CANISTER - CHLORINE

- F1 = CANISTER - ACID
- F2 = CANISTER - ACID- CHROMIC AC FILT.

- G1 = DUST MASK

- H1 = CHEMICAL GOGGLES

- I1 = FACE SHIELD

- J1 = ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - NEOPRENE
- J2 = ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - BUTYL RUBBER
- J3 = ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - EPR
- J4 = ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - HYPALON
- J5 = ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - BUTADIENE
- J6 = ALL RUBBER CLOTHING - FLUORO-ELASTOMER

- K1 = RUBBER GLOVES - NEOPRENE
- K2 = RUBBER GLOVES - BUTYL RUBBER
- K3 = RUBBER GLOVES - EPR
- K4 = RUBBER GLOVES - HYPALON
- K5 = RUBBER GLOVES - BUTADIENE
- K6 = RUBBER GLOVES - FLUORO-ELASTOMER

- L1 = RUBBER BOOTS - NEOPRENE
- L2 = RUBBER BOOTS - BUTYL RUBBER
- L3 = RUBBER BOOTS - EPR
- L4 = RUBBER BOOTS - HYPALON
- L5 = RUBBER BOOTS - BUTADIENE
- L6 = RUBBER BOOTS - FLUORO-ELASTOMER

- M1 = HOOD

- N1 = NO SPECIAL PROTECTION

- O1 = CORROSIVE C1-29/C1-30